50 N.J. Eq. 566 | New York Court of Chancery | 1892
Though several grounds of action are set forth- in the bill! itt this case, the only evidence produced by the complainant on the hearing in support of them is such as is found in a mutilated writing. This writing, before its mutilation and when in- its-original state, contained these words:
“ §29,536.96-100. Newark N. J., May 29th, 1877.
“ Due Thos. Agens Twenty Nine Thousand Five Hundred and Thinty Siis 96-100 Dollars for cash deposited in trust with mé Fredfc. G. Agens,”
To put the ease in the strongest possible form for the complainant, let us suppose that the mutilation was accidental, of, better still, let the paper be considered as before the court unmutilated and in its original integrity, then the question would be, Does the breach of such a contract as the paper expresses, or as must be implied from its language, lay the slightest foundation for a decree in equity ? Or, stated in another form, Does the breach of such a contract constitute a wrong which may be redressed in equity ? This question can be answered in but one way. The case which would thus be presented would, as it seems
The dividing line between the two jurisdictions is well defined and may be described as follows: No suit can be maintained in equity fbr a cause of action for which there is an adequate and complete remedy at law. This is a jurisdictional regulation which may. not be transcended without usurpation. Freeholders of Essex v. Newark Bank, and S. C. on appeal, 3 Dick. Ch. Rep. 51, 627, furnishes an apposite illustration of the way in which this regulation is applied and enforced. ' The material facts of that case, briefly stated, were: The county collector of Essex county deposited part of the money which came to his hands as collector in a bank in his own name, adding the word “ collector.” After he had ceased to be collector, by the election of another person to that office, he refused, on the request of the board of freeholders, to turn over the moneys so deposited and .still standing to his credit in bank, and the bank also refused to honor a check drawn by the new collector against the fund. The former collector refused to turn over the- money because he ■insisted that he was still in office, the election of his successor having been made without authority of law, and the bank put its refusal to honor the check of the new collector on the ground ,-that it could not safely pay money on a check drawn by any other'person than the person to whose credit the money stood on its books, for the reason that, by the contract, arising by implication of law from such credit, the bank became the debtor of the "depositor, and stood liable at law alone to him, and consequently a payment on the ordet of any other person would not discharge its liability, but leave .it still liable at law to the depositor. The position taken by the bank seemed to me to be 'sound. The view I'took of the case, was this: That while.the equitable title to- the money was in the board, of freeholders, or they, at least, had a, clear right in .equity to control its disposition j still, as the bank had. made.no contract, expressed or imr pli.ed, with them, it was subject-to no obligation or duty to them
But it is claimed that this court should take jurisdiction of the case, because, by the execution and delivery of the paper, a trust was created. The due bill does say that the sum which it admits to be due is “ for cash deposited in trust,” but the paper itself declares no trust, and none is averred in the bill nor proved by the complainant. The defendant, by his answer, says that the money was deposited with him under an understanding that he would pay out the same, from time to time, as the testator should direct. Now, it may be, if the word “ trust,” as here used, is understood in its broadest and most comprehensive sense, it will follow that it must be admitted that the delivery of the paper created a trust, for, as was said by Chancellor Kent, in Kane v. Bloodgood, 7 Johns. Ch. 90, 110: “ Every deposit is a direct trust, and every person who receives money to be paid to another or to be applied to a particular purpose, to which he does not apply it, is a trustee, and may be sued, either at law for money had and received, or in equity as a trustee for a breach of trust.” But the admission of such a trust will not help the complainant, for it unquestionably belongs to the class which are cognizable at law, and it is, therefore, subject to the rule that, if an action at law to enforce it is barred by the statute of limitations, suck
But one thing more need be said on this branch of the case.. There are trusts which are not subject to or affected by the statute of limitations, nor to the rule of analogy deducible therefrom. They are such as are not cognizable at law, and over-which the common law courts can exercise no jurisdiction, but-are technical and continuous in their nature, and for that reason come properly within the exclusive jurisdiction of courts of' equity and cannot be enforced or efficiently administered by any other tribunal. This is the rule laid down by Chancellor McGill, in Gutch v. Fosdick, 3 Dick. Ch. Rep. 353, as the established; law of this state.
The defences thus far considered do not touch the merits of' the case, but rest on principles regulating jurisdiction and the-effect of laches. A defence on the merits has also been made,, and, I think, successfully. The defendant admits that the' testator made two deposits with him in addition to the one made-May 29th, 1877, namely, one on the 9th of April, 1877, of $2,000, and the other on the 13th of January, 1878, of $365.:
■But it is contended that the checks, standing alone, are not evidence of payment. Under the rule laid down in Bunting ads. Allen, 3 Harr. 299, 304,, it is insisted that the production of a check in evidence simply raises a presumption that thé drawer was indebted to the payee in the particular sum mentioned in the check, and that it was given in payment of that specific debt; and that that presumption must stand until it is proved that the check was given in payment- or part payment of the debt or claim which is the subject of the controversy. The adoption of this rule, as the rule of decision in this case, will not entitle the complainant to prevail, for, in my judgment, the proofs plainly show that the checks put in-evidence by the defendant were given in payment of the debt on which this suit is founded. This fact inay be proved ’by circumstances as well-as by direct evidence; "The circumstances which I think prove it are-: The ease is barren of-the least evidence tending to show that there were any
The complainant’s bill must be dismissed, with costs,