Lead Opinion
The question we are asked to decide is whether the commission’s May 5, 1988 decision, finding that the city did not receive, as required by R.C. 4123.522, notice of the administrator’s April 1987 order, is appealable under the provisions of R.C. 4123.519. For the reasons that follow, we hold that the May 5, 1988 decision of the commission was not appealable pursuant to the terms of R.C. 4123.519 and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.
In part, R.C. 4123.519 (now renumbered 4123.519[A]) provided:
“The сlaimant or the employer may appeal a decision of the industrial commission or of its staff hearing officer made pursuant to division (B)(6) of seсtion 4121.35 of the Revised Code in any injury or occupational disease case, other than a decision as to the extent of disability, to the court of common pleas * *
Afrates takes a very far-reaching view of R.C. 4123.519. Afrates contends that except for a decision concerning an “extent of disability” question, all decisions of the commission, including decisions made pursuant to the terms of R.C. 4123.522, are appealable to the common pleas сourt. In support of his position, Afrates relies primarily on State, ex rel. O.M. Scott & Sons Co., v. Indus. Comm. (1986),
In Seabloom, a district hearing officer allowed the claimant’s application for compensаtion for injuries he sustained while working on a reroofing project contracted by Seabloom Roofing & Sheet Metal Company. The company filеd a motion with the commission, pursuant to R.C. 4123.522, to vacate the order on the basis that the company had not received notice of the allowаnce of claimant’s application. While the company’s motion was pending, the claimant took his own life. Ultimately, the commission denied the сompany’s motion on the basis that the claimant’s death abated the claim. The company sought review of the entire decision of the commission by filing an R.C. 4123.519 appeal.
On appeal to this court, the administrator argued, inter alia, that the commission’s decision denying a motion for relief under R.C. 4123.522 was not a decision involving the right of the claimant to participate in thе fund and, therefore, was not appealable through an R.C. 4123.519 appeal. In rejecting the administrator’s argument, we adopted language from O.M. Scott & Sons, supra, that:
“ ‘ * * * [A]ny order of thе commission may be appealed to the court of common pleas by either party unless the order pertains to the extent of disability. * * *
(t ( * * *
“ ‘ * * * Obviously, thе order sub judice does not go to the claimant’s right to participate. This does not mean, however, that the order is not appealable to the common pleas court. A decision in an injury or occupational disease case which does not involve the right to participate is nevertheless appealable as long as it does not involve the extent of disability. * * (Emphasis sic.) Id.,
Without question, language set forth in O.M. Scott & Sons, supra, and later adopted in Seabloom significantly broadened the scope of R.C. 4123.519. Prior to O.M. Scott & Sons, this court interpreted R.C. 4123.519 as permitting R.C. 4123.519 appeals only where the issue was a claimant’s right to participate in the State Insurance Fund. See Reeves v. Flowers (1971),
The purpose of R.C. 4123.519 is clear. The statute provides, in six separate places, that the issue presented by an R.C. 4123.519 aрpeal is the claimant’s right to participate or continue to participate in the fund. For instance, the statute provides that it is the claimant who is required to file a petition “ * * * showing a cause of action to participate or to continue to participate in the fund. * * * ” There mаy be times when a dispute does not involve a claimant but, rather, the dispute lies between an employer and the commission. Such a situation may arisе in a handicap reimbursement case
Accordingly, we hold that a (final) decision of the Industrial Commission involving a claimant’s right to participate or to continue to participate in the State Insurance Fund must, if review is sought, be appealed pursuant to the terms of R.C. 4123.519. The only decisions reviewablе pursuant to R.C. 4123.519 are those decisions involving a claimant’s right to participate or to continue to participate in the fund.
Keeping in mind the foregoing, we turn our attention to former R.C. 4123.522 and the commission’s May 5, 1988 decision. R.C. 4123.522 provided, in part, that:
“If any person to whom a notice is mailed shall fail to receive such notice and the industrial commission, upon hearing, shall detеrmine that such failure was due to cause beyond the control and without the fault or neglect of such person or his representative and that such рerson or his representative did not have actual knowledge of the import of the information contained in such notice, such person may tаke the action afforded to such person within twenty days after the receipt of such notice of such determination of the industrial commission. * * * ”
On May 5, 1988, thе commission determined that the city did not receive notice of the administrator’s April 1987 provisional order. The commission then granted the city leave to file an objection to the claimant’s application for benefits. This decision, from which Afrates sought an R.C. 4123.519 appeal, was simply a ruling on the motion filed by the city requesting a determination whether it had received notice of the April 1987 provisional order. The ruling was in no way one which finalized the аllowance (or disallowance) of Afrates’s claim. The ruling did not negate the right of Afrates to pursue, through or within the administrative structure, some final determinаtion of his (Afrates’s) right to be awarded benefits. This being the case, Afrates has not been denied his right to participate in the fund. Thus, Afrates had no right of appeal under R.C. 4123.519.
Therefore, we further hold that a decision of the Industrial Commission, finding that an employer, as required by R.C. 4123.522, did not have notice of an order of the Administrator of the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation, does not go to the basis of a claimant’s right to participate or continue to participate in the fund and, thus, is not appealable under the provisions of R.C. 4123.519.
In addition, we hold that an administrative decision that is final may be challenged by a writ of mandamus, where appropriate, or in an action for declaratory judgment.
Judgment reversed.
Notes
. In addition to Seabloom, supra, see, also, State, ex rel. Wean United, Inc., v. Indus. Comm. (1988),
. R.C. 4123.343.
. See State, ex rel. O.M. Scott & Sons Co., v. Indus. Comm. (1986),
. R.C. 2721.02 provides:
“Courts of record may declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed. * * * The declaration may be either affirmative or
Further, R.C. 2721.03 provides:
“Any person interested under a * * * written contract * * * or whose rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by a * * * statute * * * may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under such * * * statute * * * and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations thereunder.” (Emphasis added.)
Dissenting Opinion
dissents based on his votes in State, ex rel. O.M. Scott & Sons Co., v. Indus. Comm. (1986),