An automobile owned and driven by Dr. George R. Beridon had a collision with an automobile owned and driven by James A. De Jean, and in which Lawrence B. San-doz was a guest.
Separate suits for damages were filed by De Jean and his guest, Sandoz, against Dr. Beridon and the /Etna Life Insurance Company, his liability insurance carrier.
These suits were consolidated for trial in the district court, and each plaintiff recovered judgment against Dr. Beridon.
On appeal by defendant to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, these suits were also consolidated in that court.
The judgment in favor of Sandoz was amended and affirmed; and the judgment in favor of De Jean was reversed-and the suit dismissed, as the Court of Appeal found that he was guilty of contributory negligence. Sandoz v. Beridon (De Jean v. Beridon) (La.App.)
Plaintiff, /Etna Life Insurance Company, as the insurer of Dr. Beridon’s car against damages caused to others, paid the judgment in favor of Sandoz against Dr. Beridon, which, with interest and cost, amounts to the sum of $4,063.43.
In the present suit, plaintiff insurance company seeks to recover one-half of this amount from De Jean and the American Indemnity Company, his liability insurance carrier, on the ground and under the allegations that, by virtue of such payment on behalf of Dr. Beridon, plaintiff is legally subrogated to all the rights which Dr. Beridon' has against De Jean, and is entitled to recover of De Jean; as joint tortfeasor, for contribution as a solidary obligor of Lawrence B. Sandoz.
Defendants filed in the lower court an exception of no right or cause of action to plaintiffs demand, which was sustained, and plaintiff’s suit was dismissed. From that judgment plaintiff appealed to this court. The case was transferred to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, on motion to dismiss, for the reason that this is a suit for damages for physical injuries, and that this court was without jurisdiction ratione materias. Ætna Life Insurance Co. v. James A. De Jean et al.,
In due course, the Court of Appeal (
The case is now before this court on writ of review from the Court of Appeal, First Circuit.
1. At the outset, it must be noted that Sandoz, the injured guest in De Jean’s *1077 car, did not bring an action for damages against De Jean and Dr. Beridon, as joint tort-feasors, and obtain judgment in solido against both defendants for damages arising from their concurrent negligence.
Had Sandoz done so, then the solidary liability of both defendants would have been fixed by a judgment of court, and, under article 2103 of the Civil Code, as construed by this court in the recent case of Quatray v. Wicker,
In the opinion of this court, ordering this case transferred to the Court of Appeal, it is said: “The fact the Court of Appeal [Sandoz v. Beridon (De Jean v. Beridon)
2. We do not find any conflict between Sincer v. Heirs of Bell,
The case of Sincer v. Bell, as announced in Quatray v. Wicker,
It is also said in Quatray v. Wicker,
It is to be noted,
particularly,
that, in commenting on the Sincer Case, in Qua-tray v. Wicker, this court said at page 296 of
“The opinion rendered in the case [Sincer v. Bell] contains an inference that, if *1079 the judgment which Sincer had paid had been rendered against him and Bell in solido, Bell would have owed compensation to Sincer. Here is the inference:
“ ‘Nor, in our view, can Sincer derive any action against Bell by the payment of the judgment. That judgment was against Sincer alone, adjudging him liable for negligence. * * * There could be, as between Sincer and Bell, no contribution arising out of that payment, for contribution, when admitted, is on the theory that payment by one discharges another also.’ ” (Italics ours.)
The judgment in the case at bar in favor of Sandoz, the injured guest in De Jean’s car, is against Dr. George R. Beridon alone, adjudging him liable for negligence. No co-tort-feasor was made defendant in the case.
The judgment rendered against Dr. Beridon is therefore for his own individual liability, arising from his own individual negligence, and, clearly, it is a judgment for his own individual debt.
Since Dr. Beridon, upon his payment of this judgment, would not have been entitled to contribution against De Jean, it follows, necessarily, that .plaintiff, ¿Etna Life Insurance Company, th.e alleged subrogee of Dr. Beridon, acquired no greater rights by its payment of the judgment in favor of Sandoz than Dr. Beridon would have had, had he paid the judgment himself.
Our conclusion is that the judgment of the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, affirming the judgment of the district court, sustaining the exception of no right or cause of action tendered by defendants, is correct. We do not find it necessary to pass upon the plea of prescription of one year.
It is therefore ordered that the judgment of the Court of Appeal, First Circuit,-be and is hereby affirmed, and that plaintiff, ¿Etna Life Insurance Company, pay all costs including cost of the present application for writ of review.