ADOPTION BY STEFAN S.
Ken-19-262
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT
January 9, 2020
2020 ME 5
JABAR, J.
Argued: December 5, 2019;
JABAR, J.
[¶1] The father of two children appeals from judgments of the Kennebec County Probate Court (E. Mitchell, J.) terminating his parental rights in anticipation of adoptions pursuant to
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] On July 30, 2018, the mother and stepfather of the children filed petitions to adopt the children the Kennebec County Probate Court, seeking to establish the
[¶3] The following facts are drawn from the court‘s explicit findings and the trial record. See Guardianship of Ard, 2017 ME 12, ¶ 15, 154 A.3d 609 (“In the absence of a motion for findings of fact, see
[¶4] The mother and father divorced in 2012, and a parental rights and responsibilities order was issued in conjunction with the divorce, awarding primary residence to the mother and contact rights to the father. In practice, the amount of time that each child spent with the father varied over time. Beginning in 2015, the father‘s contact with the children declined gradually. The father has not seen the children since July 2016, and has had no communication with the children since May 2018. This lack of contact is at least partially the result of the mother‘s conduct—the court found that she “wrongfully made it difficult for [the father] to contact her.” Since at least 2015, the children have resided primarily with the mother and stepfather. The stepfather is consistently involved in caring for the children and interacts on a daily basis with their educational and medical providers.
[¶5] The two orders issued by the court are mirror images of one another except for the relevant child‘s name. The court made the following findings with regard to both children:
[T]he termination of the parental rights of [the father] thereby freeing the child for adoption by [the stepfather] would be in the child‘s best interests. This Court also specifically finds that [the father‘s] failure to make any attempt to establish a family relationship with the child, or contribute in any way toward the child‘s financial support, constitutes clear and convincing evidence that [the father] has been unwilling or unable to take responsibility for the child within a time reasonably calculated to meet the child‘s needs.
[¶6] The court also found that “[the father] has not taken the necessary steps in a reasonable time frame to care for his son with highly special needs well known to him. He has been absent from his life for over two years and owes over $30,000 in child support.” Although the court noted that the mother had wrongfully made it difficult for the father to contact her or the children, the court found that the father
II. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standard
[¶7] “When a private individual invokes court action to terminate parental rights . . . the court engages in state action that implicates the constitutionally protected liberty interest a parent has in parenting his or her child free from state interference.” Adoption of Isabelle T., 2017 ME 220, ¶ 3, 175 A.3d 639. These protections are not absolute. Id. ¶¶ 5-6. “A state may interfere with a parent‘s fundamental right to parent a child when the court makes a finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that the parent is unfit and the child‘s best interest will be served by state intervention to avoid harm to the child.” Id. ¶ 6.
[¶8] Petitions for private adoptions in Maine Probate Courts are governed by the Adoption Act,
[¶9] A court‘s finding of unfitness must be grounded in one or more of the following findings:
(i) The parent is unwilling or unable to protect the child from jeopardy and these circumstances are unlikely to change within a time that is reasonably calculated to meet the child‘s needs;
(ii) The parent has been unwilling or unable to take responsibility for the child within a time that is reasonably calculated to meet the child‘s needs; [or]
(iii) The child has been abandoned; . . . .
[¶10] We review factual findings regarding whether termination is in the best interest of a child for clear error. Adoption of Isabelle T., 2017 ME 220, ¶ 30, 175 A.3d 639. A finding of parental unfitness is also reviewed for clear error, and we will find such an error “only if there is no competent evidence in the record to support it; if the fact-finder clearly misapprehended the meaning of the evidence; or if the finding is so contrary to the credible evidence that it does not represent the
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
[¶11] The father challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underpinning the trial court‘s findings that he was unfit and that termination would be in the children‘s best interests. Contrary to his contentions, the record evidence is such that the trial court “could reasonably have been persuaded that the required findings were proved to be highly probable.” Id. ¶ 33. The court did not err in reaching its findings, nor did it abuse its discretion in its decision to terminate the father‘s parental rights. Adoption of Shayleigh S., 2018 ME 165, ¶ 14, 198 A.3d 791; Adoption of Isabelle T., 2017 ME 220, ¶ 30, 175 A.3d 639.
1. Finding of Unfitness
[¶12] Record evidence demonstrates that the father‘s efforts to maintain contact with his two children have been sporadic and ineffective. Prior to 2016, he had regular contact with the children and took advantage of his contact rights. After March 2016, he had virtually no in-person contact with the children and any phone contact was short and intermittent. After June 2018, he had no direct contact with the children. His efforts to maintain contact were limited to contacting the mother. What little indirect contact did occur was a product of the efforts of the paternal grandparents. The father moved to Florida in December 2016, to seek employment and work on his sobriety, staying for nearly two years.
[¶13] The mother imposed roadblocks to the father contacting the children, severely curtailing the father‘s contact after he was arrested in March 2016. She also moved to a new address in October 2017, and changed her phone number in June 2018. The trial court acknowledged the wrongfulness of this conduct and took it into consideration in its orders. However, the father‘s record of minimal contact with the children predated the imposition of these roadblocks. By mid-2015, his contact with the children had declined to, at most, one overnight visit per weekend. Further, after the mother cut off his contact, the father did not attempt to enforce his rights through the judicial system or otherwise try to pursue contact. He did not contact the maternal grandparents, the children‘s schools or medical providers, or the stepfather.
[¶14] The court found that both children will need special care and attention for the rest of their lives, and the record demonstrates that their disabilities render change, uncertainty, and transition extremely difficult for both children. The trial court reasonably could have been persuaded that it was highly probable the father was either unwilling or unable to take responsibility for the children in a time reasonably calculated to meet their needs.
2. Finding Regarding the Children‘s Best Interest
[¶15] The significant special needs of the children are also relevant to the court‘s second core finding—that termination of the father‘s parental rights would be in the children‘s best interests.
In considering the children‘s best interests, the court is required to consider the needs of the children, including the children‘s age, the children‘s attachments to relevant persons, periods of attachments and separation, the children‘s ability to integrate into a substitute placement or back into their parent‘s home and the children‘s physical and emotional needs. Also relevant to the best interests determination is the harm the children may suffer if the parent‘s rights are not terminated, as well as the children‘s need for permanence and stability.
Adoption of Isabelle T., 2017 ME 220, ¶ 49, 175 A.3d 639 (quotation marks omitted) (alterations omitted).
[¶16] The trial court considered the needs of each child, their respective ages and relationships with their parents and stepfather, the time spent with the parties, and their ability to integrate into the mother and stepfather‘s home. The record evidence shows that both children, and the younger child especially, require consistency, routine, and predictability in order to function well in the home and in school. Strong coordination among the caregivers, educators, and medical providers is necessary in order for the children to coexist with their family members and peers, and to progress toward their social and educational goals. The evidence shows that the father has not contributed to those coordinated efforts, but that the stepfather has. The evidence further shows that sporadic contact with the father interferes with the children‘s routine and progress. With regard to the younger child, changes to routine correlate with increased aggressive behaviors. In light of the evidence presented at trial, the trial court could reasonably have been persuaded that the required findings were proved to be highly probable, and thus did not clearly err in determining termination to be in the best interest of each child.
[¶17] Because the trial court did not clearly err in its determinations that the father has been unwilling or unable to take responsibility for the two children within a time reasonably calculated to meet their needs and that termination was in the best interest of each child, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in terminating the father‘s parental rights.
C. The Court‘s Sequence of Findings
[¶18] The father next argues that the trial court erred as a matter of law by first determining that termination was in the best interest of each child and then finding that he has been unwilling or unable to take responsibility for the children within a time that is reasonably calculated to meet their needs. The father raises this challenge for the first time on appeal. See supra Part I. Therefore, we review for obvious error. In re Joshua B., 2001 ME 115, ¶¶ 9-10, 776 A.2d 1240; see Alexander, Maine Appellate Practice, § 402(a) at 310 (5th ed. 2018); see also MP Assocs. v. Liberty, 2001 ME 22, ¶ 18, 771 A.2d 1040. Obvious error is that which deprives a party of a fair trial or otherwise treats a party unjustly. See Shayleigh S., 2018 ME 165, ¶ 18, 198 A.3d 791.
[¶19] Title 22 § 4055(1)(B)(2) lists two findings as prerequisites to a termination of parental rights: first, that termination is in the best interest of the child; and second, that the parent has demonstrated unfitness in one of four ways.
[¶20] In both of the trial court‘s judgments, it first stated that it found termination to be in the child‘s best interests. Then, in a separate sentence, the trial court found that the father “has been unwilling or unable to take responsibility for the child in a time reasonably calculated to meet the child‘s needs.” However, the language of the trial court‘s order does not necessarily suggest that it made a finding as to the children‘s best interests before reaching the question of fitness; the record demonstrates that the trial court clearly understood that the two findings were distinct and that a finding as to fitness must be reached before it could proceed to a best interest analysis. At trial, the court stated, “[Y]ou don‘t even get [to] the best interest of the child standards until you deal with the termination standard.”
[¶21] The trial court‘s order and the record evidence do not support a conclusion that the father was denied a fair trial or subjected to a serious injustice. The trial court made all required findings, correctly applying the standard of clear and convincing evidence to both the best interest prong and the fitness prong. The trial court understood that these findings were independent of one another and a finding as to one should not inform the finding as to the other. Therefore, any mistake made by the trial court in arranging its findings within the termination orders was not obvious error. Cf. In re Michelle W., 2001 ME 123, ¶¶ 8, 11, 777 A.2d 283; In re Joshua B., 2001 ME 115, ¶ 8, 776 A.2d 1240.
D. Necessity of Termination
[¶22] Finally, the father argues that the trial court erred in concluding that his parental rights needed to be terminated in order for the stepfather to adopt the children. Instead, the father argues, the trial court could have granted the adoption petition without terminating his rights, leaving the children with three legal parents. This argument reflects a misunderstanding of Title 18-A adoption proceedings and is not persuasive.
[¶23] The Probate Court is a court of limited jurisdiction. Marin v. Marin, 2002 ME 88, ¶ 9, 797 A.2d 1265. The Adoption Act grants the Probate Court jurisdiction over adoption petitions.
Adoption Act does not authorize rehabilitation or reunification
[¶24] Here, the father was a living parent of both prospective adoptees and, as such, the trial court could not grant either petition without his consent, which the father did not provide.
[¶25] The trial court did not have the authority to pursue the third option described by the father: an open adoption granted with his parental rights intact but without his written consent. Although the Maine Parentage Act contemplates more than two parents, the Adoption Code does not. Title
[¶26] The trial court did not err in failing to consider an adoption not authorized by law.
The entry is:
Judgments affirmed.
Caleb J. Gannon, Esq., and John E. Baldacci, Jr., Esq. (orally), Lipman & Katz, Augusta, for appellant father
Maryellen Sullivan, Esq., and Joe Lewis, Esq. (orally), Port City Legal, Portland, for appellees mother and stepfather
Kennebec County Probate Court docket numbers A2018-4689 and A2018-4690