Truсk Insurance Exchange (“TIE” or the “insurer”) contracted to indemnify Adolph Coors Company and Coors Brewing Company (collectively, “Coors” or the “insured”) for damages the insured had to pay “because of bodily injury caused by an occurrence to which this insurance applies” during the policy coverage periods. TIE further contracted to defend Coors in any suit “seeking damages on account of such bodily injury, even if any of the allegations of the suit are groundless, false, or fraudulent.” Subsequently, Coors and several other alcohol manufacturers became defendants in five putative class action lawsuits 1 that included allegations of unfair business practices, unjust enrichment, negligence, civil conspiracy, and corrupt activity, all in connection with the marketing of alcoholic beverages to underage consumers. 2 TIE refused to defend Coors in these suits, *620 prompting Coors to commence the instant litigation against TIE for breach of its insurance contract (specifically, breach of the “duty to defend”). The Superior Court granted summary judgment to TIE, concluding that TIE had no duty to defend because “this Court cannot find that the lawsuits allege damages that occurred as a result of bodily harm.” 3 We affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of TIE.
I.
We review the grant of a motion for summary judgment
de novo. Joeckel v. Disabled Am. Veterans,
II.
Preliminarily, we must determine whether to apply the substantive duty-to-defend law of Colorado or, instead, that of the District of Columbia in deciding the dispute before us. During the Superior Court proceedings, the parties disagreed on this issue, with Coors relying on the District’s law in its motion for summary judgment, and TIE advocating application of Colorado law in its opposition. In her Order granting summary judgment to TIE, the trial judge applied Colorado law, but noted that she would have arrived at the same result under the District’s law. 4
Choice of law questions are subject to
de novo
review.
Vaughan v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.,
Applying the governmental interest test, we agree with the trial court that Colorado law should govern. Coors Brewing Company both is incorporated and has its principal place of business in Colorado, and Adolph Coors Company likewise has its principal plaсe of business there. TIE, incorporated and headquartered in California, also lacks any relevant relationship with the District of Columbia. Correspondence between the parties indicates that Colorado is where they negotiated and finalized the insurance contract and performed their contractual obligations. Moreover, the parties agreed upon a “Colorado Amendаtory Endorsement” to the insurance policy, presumably for the purpose of complying with Colorado law. The District’s only apparent connection to the contractual dispute is the Hakki lawsuit, the one underlying suit filed in this jurisdiction (the other suits are in the courts of Colorado, North Carolina, and Ohio). Under these circumstances, it seems clear that Colorado has a more “significant relationship” to the Coors-TIE insurance transaction than the District or any other jurisdiction. See Restatement (Second) of CONFLICT of Laws § 188(1).
III.
Under Colorado law, an insurer must defend its insured where the underlying complaint includes allegations that, “if sustained, would impose a liability on the insured that is arguably covered by the policy.”
Carl’s Italian Rest. v. Truck Ins. Exch.,
Pursuant to the insurance policies at issue, TIE must defend Coors against suits “seeking damages” on account of such bodily injury or property damage [caused by an “occurrence” to which this insurance applies], even if any of the allegations of the suit are “groundless, false, or fraudulent.” Bodily injury is defined in the policies as “bodily injury, sicknеss or disease sustained by any person which occurs during the policy period, including death at any time resulting therefrom.” Occurrence is defined as “an event, or series of events ..., proximately caused by an act or omission of the insured ... which re- *622 suits, during the policy period, in bodily injury ... neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured.” Thus, TIE has a duty to defend Coors only if the underlying complaints (1) can be reаd to allege that, through its acts or omissions, Coors caused bodily injury that was both unintentional and unexpected, and (2) seek damages on account of such bodily injury. 5
IV.
The parties focus their disagreement on whether the underlying complaints “seek damages on account of [] bodily injury.” Pointing to the class plaintiffs’ repeated references to illnesses and accidents associated with underage drinking, Coors maintains that the complaints do seek damages on account of bodily injury and therefore trigger TIE’s duty to defend. TIE counters that the complaints’ allusions to alcohol-related “human suffering” are only “tangentially-related” to the stated causes of action, through which plaintiffs seek to recover for purely economic injury (ie., the “enormous economic injuries to Plaintiffs and the classes” occаsioned by “billions of dollars in family assets [being] transferred to Defendants as part of the far-reaching illegal trade in alcoholic beverages”).
Clearly, the
Halda, Kreft, Eisenberg,
and
Tully
complaints do seek relief for (two types of) non-bodily injury suffered by the class plaintiffs themselves.
6
First, the complaints allege economic injury, stating that members of the putative Guardian Class (consisting of parents and guardians whose children purchased and consumеd alcohol illegally) suffered “substantial financial losses” and “injury to their business or property” when Coors procured “billions of dollars in family assets” through illicit alcohol sales to their children.
7
Second, the complaints allege that members of the putative Guardian Class and the putative Injunctive Class (consisting of parents and guardians of all children currently under age twenty-one) incur injury when “underage consumers
*623
arе induced to illegally consume defendants’ alcoholic beverages.” This second type of injury perhaps is best characterized as psychological, on the theory that it relates to the distress a parent feels when his child may be exposed to danger. Psychological harm, however, is not bodily injury “when there is no physical impact, fear of physical harm, or physical manifestation of emоtional distress.”
Nat'l Cas. Co., supra
note 7,
There is, however, another possible reading of the complaints — one that we must consider since we are obligated to construe the underlying complaints in favor of the insured Coors
8
— that could trigger TIE’S duty to defend. At least arguably, the underlying complaints can bе read to seek redress for “thousands of [alcohol-related] deaths, injuries, and illnesses” to underage drinkers and the public at
large
— i.e., redress for bodily injury “sustained by
any
person.” (emphasis added). We may assume that claims by class plaintiffs seeking to vindicate the rights of the general population are vulnerable to dismissal on grounds of standing.
See, e.g., Adams v. Land Servs., Inc.,
To our knowledge, Colorado courts have not opined on whether a complaint against an insured that asserts a claim for which the plaintiff lacks
standing
— e.g., a complaint in which the plaintiff seeks a legal remedy for bodily injuries suffered by the general population — triggers an insurer’s duty to defend under a policy like the one at issue. But a court elsewhere, albeit in an unpublished opinion, has suggested that the answer to that question could be “yes.”
See Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Nat'l Shooting Sports Found., Inc.,
No. 99-31046,
*624 V.
If the underlying complaints allege that Coors’ acts or omissions resulted in harm that was “not expected or intended,” TIE must provide a defense, but if they allege “expected” or “intended” harm, TIE has no duty to defend. Coors argues that there is a duty to defend because the inclusion of a negligence count in each of the complaints establishes that the underlying plaintiffs sought relief from the unintended effects of Coors’ allegedly unreasonable acts. But, viewing the complaints in their entirety, we do not believe it is even “arguable” that the class plaintiffs sought relief on account of injuries that, from Coors’ perspective, were unexpected or unintended.
See Compass, supra
note 6,
To begin with, the complaints unambiguously characterize Coors’ conduct as purposefully harmful. Each complaint begins with an accusation that Coors and other alcohol manufacturers injured the class plaintiffs through the operation of “a long-running, sophisticated, and deceptive scheme ... to market alcoholic beverages to children and other underage consumers” in order to “generate billions of dollars per year in unlawful revenue.” 10 Underscoring the point, several of the class complaints specifically disclaim concern with “the incidental exposure of children to alcoholic beverage advertising that is properly and reasonably directed to adults.” 11 The lawsuits instead “seek[ ] redress only for thе deliberate and reckless targeting of underage consumers.” (emphasis added): Accordingly, notwithstanding the pleading of a negligence claim, 12 it is clear that the *625 underlying litigation exclusively targeted Coors’ intentional conduct.
Second, even if, as Coors contends, the complaints do not suggest that Coors “wanted to hurt minors” through its intentional acts, that argument does not advance Coors’ position. This is because Coloradо’s duty-to-defend jurisprudence does not distinguish between the desire to engage in activity that is harmful, and the desire to actually cause harm.
See, e.g., Hecla, supra,
Thus, under any reasonable reading, the complaints allege that Coors knew that underage drinking and its accompanying dangers “would flow directly and immediately” from its actions. Whether Coors maliciously wished harm upon underage consumers — or, more precisely, whether the underlying complaints accuse it of such malice — is irrelevant.
See Fire Ins. Exch. v. Bentley,
Because the underlying complaints allege and seek relief on account of injury that resulted from Coors’ intentional commission of harmful acts, we hold that they did not trigger TIE’s duty to defend. Accordingly, the order of the trial court entering summary judgment in favor of TIE is
Affirmed.
Notes
. The five lawsuits are Hakki v. Zima Co. ("Hakki ”), Wilson v. Zima Co. [("Wilson ”) ], Kreft v. Zima Beverage Co. ("Kreft ”), Eisenberg v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. (“Eisenberg ”), and Tully v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. ("Tully Because the plaintiffs in these suits assert virtually identical allegations against Coors, we refer to them collectively, using the terms “underlying suits,” "underlying plaintiffs,” "class plaintiffs,” and "underlying complaints.”
. Five additional lawsuits that are similar to the underlying suits — Bertovich v. Advanced Brands & Importing Co., Tomberlin v. Adolph Coors Company, Sciocchetti v. Advanced Brands & Importing, Konhauzer v. Adolph Coors Company, and Alston v. Coors — named Cоors as a defendant after Coors initiated its action against TIE. During the trial court proceedings, Coors noted this development in its statement of material facts not in dispute and in its brief in support of its motion for summary judgment against TIE. However, *620 Coors did not amend its complaint or specifically assert that it sought a judgment with respect to TIE’s duty (yel non) to defend against these later suits, and the trial court’s summary judgment order referrеd only to five underlying suits. Because the trial court did not decide the duty-to-defend issue with respect to these later suits, that issue is not before us. But, obviously, to the extent the complaints in those matters mirror the complaints in the five underlying suits, our decision may be instructive.
. The trial judge, the Honorable Natalia Combs Greene, reasoned that:
[T]he complaints in question, while suggesting (or stating) that the representative plaintiffs (or thеir purported class members) have suffered bodily injuries as a result of the conduct of Coors, exclude any such injuries in the prayer for relief. Because plaintiffs, in their underlying complaints, specifically limited their alleged damages to monetary damages caused to the plaintiffs (and thereby their representative class), this Court cannot find that the lawsuits allege damages that occurred as a result of bodily harm.
. The parties’ briefs on appeal cite authority from both jurisdictions, but at oral argument their counsel appeared to agree that the trial judge did not err in applying Colorado law.
. TIE also has a duly to indemnify, and a corresponding duty to defend, with respect to suits arising out of property damage. However, Coors does not assert that the property damage provisions of the insurance policies give rise to a duty to defend the underlying suits.
. The complaints refer, for example, to "[t]he injuries suffered by the plaintiff classes,” and to it being "reasonably foreseeable that underage consumers would be induced to illegally [consume alcohol] ... and that the Classes would be injured thereby."
The trial judge focused her analysis on the complaints’ specific prayers for relief, and reasoned that “[b]ecause plaintiffs ... specifically limited their alleged damages to monetary damages ... this Court cannot find that the lawsuits allege damages that occurred as a result of bodily harm.” We decline to rest our decision on the type of remedies sought through the underlying suits, because that may not be dispositive under Colorado’s duty-to-defend case law.
See Compass Ins. Co. v. City of Littleton,
.Such economic harm quite obviously is not "bodily injury.”
Cf. Miller v. Triad Adoption & Counseling Serv., Inc.,
.
See Compass Ins. Co., supra
note 6,
. Moreover, Coors has a viable argument that the Wilson complaint (see note 1, supra) does seek damages "because of bodily injury” to one of the plaintiffs in that suit. Plaintiff Joseph Wilson alleges that he personally consumed alcohol while under the age of twenty- *624 one, and the сomplaint implies that he is among the underage drinkers who may have suffered "bodily injury” insofar as "alcohol consumption causes brain damage.”
.Filling out the remainder of the complaints are charges that Coors and its co-defendants "engage in active, deliberate, and concerted efforts to maximize their profits,” "use [] code words to conceal and disguise research and marketing efforts dirеcted at children,” "believe that it is crucial to establish [an alcohol] brand preference at a very early age,” "knowingly and deliberately place their print advertisements in publications which are disproportionately read by underage consumers,” "knowingly and deliberately design and operate their web sites to appeal to underage consumers,” and "knowingly and purposely sell and distributе apparel, toys, and other logo merchandise designed to appeal to underage consumers.” More succinctly, Coors is said to “wilfully, intentionally, recklessly, and negligently engage[] in extensive unfair and deceptive marketing efforts,” "routinely and intentionally advertise!] its alcoholic beverage products in [youth-oriented] publications,” and make “false, unfair, and deceptive representations that its advertising and marketing efforts are in compliance with [the alcohol industry’s ethical guidelines].”
The complaints' "negligence” counts continue the theme, asserting not that the alcohol manufacturers "failed” to exercise due care, but that they "refuse[d] to take reasonable steps” to avoid “inducing” consumption of their products by underage individuals.
See, e.g., People v. Anyakora,
. Kreft: ¶ 4, JA 449; Eisenberg: ¶ 4, JA 479; Tully: ¶ 4, JA 548.
.
See Lopez ex. rel. Lopez v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co.,