3 N.J. Eq. 376 | New York Court of Chancery | 1835
The bill was filed to foreclose the equity of redemption in lands mortgaged by Humphrey Williams to Joseph White, by deed of mortgage bearing date the twenty-fifth day of April, eighteen hundred and thirty-one, and registered on the thirty-first day of March, eighteen hundred and thirty-two. The amount of money secured by the mortgage, was five hundred and fifty-five dollars and seventy cents. John Field and Curtis Williams are purchasers of the equity of redemption, by deed bearing date the third day of April, eighteen hundred and thirty-two.
The defendants, in their answer, set up various matters of defence. They admit that Williams was, at the time of the giving of the mortgage, seized of a farm in Shrewsbury of one hundred acres, more or less ; and say that Joseph White was a man of singular and parsimonious habits, without any family ; that every winter except one, from eighteen hundred and five and eighteen hundred and six, until the time of his death, in March, eighteen hundred and thirty-two, he had been in the habit of living and boarding at the house of Humphrey Williams, until eighteen hundred and twenty-nine, at the expense of Humphrey Williams, and from eighteen hundred and twenty-nine to eighteen hundred and thirty-two, at the expense of Curtis Williams; that he commenced his visits at the beginning of winter, and in the spring following he would generally proceed to Newark, where he would rest until the fall following, and then return; that during the winter he generally employed himself in making wooden shovels, which he sold for his owq use and benefit; that
The answer goes on further to state, that when the bond and mortgage were executed, Williams was not indebted to White,, but White was indebted to Williams in a considerable balance j. that Williams requested afterwards- of White and Edwards the?
A replication has been filed, and much testimony taken on both side.
On a careful review of the whole evidence, I am of opinion,
1. That there is not sufficient proof to justify a conclusion that the bond and mortgage were without consideration, and fraudulently obtained.
The notes given at different times by Williams to White, for money borrowed and for interest, formed the consideration of the ■mortgage. The honesty of these notes is not disputed. T.he
2. It is alleged that the mortgage was read .as conveying ¡twenty acres, when in fact it .conveys forty acres, ¡and four witoesses have sworn to it, viz. Gideon Barker, Britton White., jr.
If, however, these witnesses should be correct in the matter to which they have testified, and Edwards actually read the mortgage as covering twenty acres only, instead of forty acres, •it will not vitiate the instrument unless it is shown to have been done intentionally, with a view to defraud and deceive. This is not shown. The strong presumption is the other way. It is fair to presume, that the instrument was prepared according to the direction of the parties. They came to him for a certain purpose, and must have given him instructions, and known what was to be done. If, then, he prepaied the instrument, and in reading it read twenty acres, by mistake, when he should have read forty acres, it will not avoid the instrument, it is as it was Intended to be, and no injury is done. I dismiss this part of the •defence as untenable.
3. It is insisted that the mortgage was never consummated •by delivery; that it was placed in the hands of Edwards as an •escrow, and was not to be given up until it was acknowledged bj •the grantor.
Generally speaking, when a deed is delivered by the grantor to a stranger, to be delivered to the gtantee on the performance of some condition, it is considered an escrow; but in all cases the condition is to be performed by the grantee, and not by the grantor. The grantor has done all that was needful for him, to give complete effect t.o the instrument; he cannot by any subsequent act or omission or refusal of his, prevent, his own deed from being operative. In this case, the act was to be done by the grantor, that is to say, he was to acknowledge the deed, and therefore it cannot be considered as an escrow. The intention of the parties cannot be misunderstood. When the mortgage was executed, there was no officer present competent to take an acknowledgment, and it was agreed that all the papers, the notes, bond and mortgage, should remain in the hands of Edwards until Williams should have an opportunity of acknowledging the mortgage, so that it might be registered, and then it was to be given to White, and the notes to Williams. This arrangement, however, did not put it in the power of Williams to avoid the mortgage by refusing to acknowledge it; and although Edwards might have refused to deliver up the papers either to the one party or the other, the rights of the parties would not have been affected by such refusal.
4. Again, it is strenuously insisted, that the claim of Humphrey Williams, one of the defendants, against the estate of White, for board, cfcc. should be inquired into in this suit, and referred to a master, as a setoff against the amount of the mortgage.
If there be any valid claim against the estate, it cannot be set off in this suit. This is a proceeding in rem against the land, and not against the person of the debtor.- The ordinary pririci
I do not find any thing in the evidence to warrant the belief that it was the agreement of the parties that the claim for boarding, &c. should operate as a payment of the mortgage, per directum. The very giving of the mortgage after all the services had been rendered, negatives the idea. If the debt had been actually paid at that time, there was no inducement to give the mortgage, and it was improper to do it. If there be any claim, it cannot be entertained here.
5. There is one other matter to be considered, and that is, the apparent erasure or alteration of the date of the bond.
The instrument was executed, doubtless, on the twenty-fifth day of April, eighteen hundred and thirty-one. The alteration is in the last word of the year. It was either written three and altered to one, or originally written one and altered to three. Edwards, the scrivener, cannot account for it. He has no recollection of it whatever. He thinks the word three is in his handwriting, but does not think he altered the word one to three. He says also, that if the alteration was made by him at- all, it
The alteration is apparent. The principle of law admits,of no dispute, that when a deed has been altered in an immaterial part, by the person to whom it belongs, after delivery, it will be avoided ; and if it be altered in a material part, even by a stranger, the same result will follow. The alteration must be after the delivery: 1 Shep. Touch. 69. Where there is no memorandum or note made of the alteration, the time when it was made is a question of fact: Den v. Wright, 2 Hals. 175. The true inquiry in this case is, whether the erasure or alteration was made before or after the execution of the bond.
It is difficult to determine from inspection whether the word one or three was first written, but I think it evident that both were written by the same hand and pen, and that they were written by Edwards. He thinks the word three is in his handwriting, but says nothing of the word one. Being written by him, it must have been before the delivery of the bond ; as he states himself that he made no alteration after the papers werq executed. If the word three was first written by mistake, and altered afterwards to one, so as to conform to the truth, as is most probable, the matter is explained. If the one was altered to a three, it is impossible to account for it, and as the witness says, it must remain a mystery. I do not know that it is important for me to settle this difficulty. I am satisfied, from the appearance of the paper, the hand-writing, and the color of the ink, that the alteration was made by Edwards; and he having sworn that if made by him, it was made before the execution of the instrument, the instrument is not affected by it.
The defendants, in their defence, interposed some other difficulties in the way of recovery; such as, that the mortgage having been proved by the subscribing witness before John P. Lewis, one of the complainants, just before he took out letters of administration, and after it is supposed he had agreed to administer upon the property; and also that James T. White, the other administrator, had purchased the right of one of the next of kin o.f
Under this view of the case, the complainants are entitled to relief. Let it be referred to a master, in the usual way, to-take-an account.
Order accordingly.