Adkins v. Rumsfeld

judgment to the on all of the MICHAEL, Before WIDENER and association’s claims. We conclude Judges, R. Circuit and JOSEPH rejected correctly district court the associ- GOODWIN, Judge United States District ation’s challenges, constitutional and we for the Southern District of Virginia, West also conclude the individual claims by sitting designation. succeed, cannot though even district court had matter over Judge Affirmed published opinion. them. We therefore affirm. opinion, MICHAEL wrote which joined. Judge Judge GOODWIN a separate concurring

WIDENER wrote I.

opinion. A.

MICHAEL, Judge. Circuit eligible To be for pay, retirement mem- The Uniformed Services Former Spous- bers of the gener- uniformed services must (Act) es’ Protection Act gives states ally time, serve a specified length for of option to a classify United States armed usually years. 20 least See 10 U.S.C. disposable forces member’s § et seq. (Army); seq. § 3911 6321 et (Navy pay property tirement upon as divisible (Air Corps); seq. § and Marine 8911 et 97-252, No. divorce. Pub.L. Stat. Force). Members mandatory also face a (codified as at 10 amended U.S.C. age regardless of 62 of how 1408). addition, § In establishes long they served, subject to certain a payments mechanism allowing eligi- an exceptions. § 1251. The spouse ble receive the of share pay amount of retirement usually is pay directly retired from product of two factors: the number of pursuant to a state court order in divorce years of creditable service and fixed proceedings. Id. In this case current and percentage of the member’s “pay level retired members of the armed forces achieved at retirement.” Barker v. Kan- pay whose retirement has been divided sas, 503 U.S. proceedings, state divorce and associa- (1992); L.Ed.2d 243 see 10 members, tion such U.S.C. representing sued the §§ (setting forth rules of for Defense. The al- computation pay). of retirement lege regulations that the Act and im- Federal may plementing impose obligations law violate their members constitutional rights Many even after process protection and retirement. retirees re- equal They See, of allege law. main members the Armed also that the Act fails Forces. 3075(a) 8075(a) § respect principle, e.g., (Army); § purportedly root- U.S.C. (Air Force). ed in the They may Constitution’s Armed and circum- Forces some Clauses, Full legis- Faith Credit stances be duty, recalled into active see 10 lation concerning military § pay they may must have U.S.C. not violate the nationally uniform effect provisions without Military varia- the Uniform Code of ... more 802(a)(4). protection decide should be Justice, obligations, § These see spouse----This mili- afforded a former imply [such] do not significant, though ... Congress for alone.” Id. at regarded to be decision is tary pay is 235-36, 101 compensation as for re- S.Ct. legal purposes all job during retirement. duced activities exactly made that decision in Congress may instead pay some contexts passing Uniformed Services Former past compensation as “deferred viewed pro- The statute Spouses’ Protection Act. Barker, services,” subject specified limitations vides 1619, just ordinary public sector like may disposable “a treat retired exam- pensions. Divorce is one employee to a payable pay periods member for be- ple. Id. 25,1981, ginning prop- after either as June erty solely property of the or member as property spousal division spouse the member his in accor- usually question of state upon divorce is dance with the law the “The of the domestic law. whole 1408(c)(1) (em- § such court.” 10 U.S.C. belongs wife ... relations of husband and added). phasis Disposable retired and not to the laws of the States monthly certain total retired less Burrus, of the States.” In re laws United deductions, 1408(a)(4), § and no more than 586, 593-94, disposable half of the retiree’s retired (1890). application of state L.Ed. 500 But may be awarded to the former as law narrow circum family under some 1408(e)(1). property, Retire- divisible inter stances cuts into substantial federal disability ment waived to receive bene- pay law yield to federal under ests must 1408(a)(4)(B); § fits is excluded. Mansell Hisquierdo the See v. Supremacy Clause. Mansell, 581, 594-95, 490 U.S. 109 S.Ct. 590, 572, 581-83, 99 439 U.S. Hisquierdo, (1989). Although 104 L.Ed.2d 675 it (1979). S.Ct. 59 L.Ed.2d Su 8, 1982, signed September into law on one of these cir preme Court identified 1,1983, February effective the became McCarty McCarty, cumstances in expressly statute covered 2728, 69 L.Ed.2d day the after June tirees (1981). the Court found an irrecon There McCarty. Congress Court handed down stat cilable conflict between federal spouses could later clarified that military pay— governing utes if pay a of retired not seek share making as re which Court construed or became final before separation divorce of pay property the retiree— tirement state court did not June and the pay that treated earned dur and state law treat) (or “treat reserve ing marriage spousal property. as divisible mem- pay of the amount of retired [the] on to hold that state law The Court went property. ber” as divisible military a could not be allowed to divide 1408(c)(1). § pro retiree’s retirement divorce jurisdic- to the “law of the By referring ceedings. Id. at S.Ct. 2728. order, a divorce is, issuing tion” of a court spouse the retiree’s former could That 1408(c)(1) unambiguously to the § leaves of the retiree’s retire receive a share treat of whether to dis- “plight of states choice pay. Remarking ment for dur- posable retired earned service an of a retired service member ex-spouse See one,” empha ing marriage property. as divisible the Court is often serious Barker, 603, 112 at also 503 U.S. determination was sized its “giving the Act as may (describing legislative “Congress well correction: (DFAS) verify dividing pay). of’ such must that the order option States satis- nearly appears every statutory state has requirements. fies Id. ¶ retired adjudicated elected treat as If right 2906. the order generally property. divisible marital See duty a member who was on active Divisibility State-by-State Analysis court, not represented in the order must Military Pay, Army Law. 42. Retired certify that the court afforded member 1408(c)(1) Nevertheless, § under division procedural protections under the by state court that only can be made (SCRA), Civil Servicemembers Relief “jurisdiction over the member” based on ¶ § 501 App. seq. U.S.C. et Id. 290602. residence, domicile, or the con- member’s If, however, regular the court is order 1408(c)(4). § sent. U.S.C. face, its DFAS does not further review the rendering case to determine whether the the Act provision

Another created a personal jurisdiction court had over the mechanism,” Mansell, “payments ¶ retiree. Id. days 291003. Within 30 under which the order, effective service of the directly DFAS must transmits to former notify the affected retiree in Id. writing. the share of retired to which ¶ they 290901. are entitled under state court The retiree is entitled to re- divorce 1408(d). § spond, decrees. See 10 To “will U.S.C. and DFAS not honor the court eligible payments, for the direct the for- modified, order if is defective or su- ¶ spouse mer must perseded, have been married or set aside.” Id. years, member for least 10 and during spouse may The retiree or the former later marriage the member must have com- request file a that DFAS reconsider its years pleted at least 10 mili- creditable regarding decision the court order based 1408(d)(2). tary service. A former on specified reasons. DFAS must “re- payment process initiates the direct reconsideration, spond to the request by serving upon concerned a giving explanation of the determination “specifically providing ¶ order reached.” Id. 2912. payment the of an disposa- amount of the 1408(d)(1). §

ble retired pay.” The court B. face,” order be “regular must on its 1408(b)(1)(B), § which means that it “is plaintiffs The 58 in individual this case jurisdic- court competent issued a are either retired armed service members tion,” 1408(b)(2)(A), § and contains no in- drawing duty retirement or active it dication that legal issued without membei-s who will be eligible this 1408(b)(2)(B)-(C). authority, § on retirement. On various dates between 2003, 1978 and (DOD) these 58 individuals were Department

A regula- Defense They subject all divorced. to state tion issued to pursuant congressional au- court thorization, granting divorce orders for- 1408(j), § sets forth spouses mer a portion further of their payments details of the mecha- pay. DOD DFAS makes direct Management nism. See Financial 7B, the Regulation, former of at Volume Ch. least some of the DOD (July 2005), plaintiffs. plaintiff 7000.14-R at association available www. is the dod.mil/comptroller/fmr/07b/07b 29.pdf. Spouses’ Uniformed Services Former Pro- — a After tection Act Litigation Support Group, submits a certified or order, ULSG, copy the state court non-profit liability corpo- the DOD’s limited 2,500 members, Defense Finance and Accounting nearly Service ration. has the money ceed with its claim that half of whom have donated violated about component of Due the substantive the Pro- to the association. by retroactively reaching cess Clause the the of De- sued plaintiffs of service members who April 2004 the U.S. District fense in joined passage. before the The court Act’s Virginia. District of Court for Eastern on based determination the date the (1) declaring that They sought judgment joined military, long affiant which was rights under the Act the members’ violates after the effective date. Reaching Act’s Clause and the sub- Equal Protection merits, the court on district went procedural components of the stantive and equal protection dismiss claim and ULSG’s Act is Due Clause and that the Process claim, uniformity pro- but allowed it allows state unconstitutional because claim to process go cedural due forward. apply non-uniformly. it The dis- courts to summary judgment moved Both sides granted Secretary’s motion trict court claim, surviving and in October Rumsfeld, to dismiss. Adkins granted summary district court (E.D.Va.2004). The court F.Supp.2d Secretary. appeal This judgment subject it matter concluded that lacked challenging the district court’s dismissal it understood the jurisdiction because summary judgment orders followed. seeking appellate federal Our review is de novo. court orders in their review 429-33; see proceedings. divorce Id. II. Feldman, 460 Appeals

D.C. Court of 75 L.Ed.2d U.S. must examine at the outset We Co., (1983); v. Fid. Trust Rooker holding district whether the court erred 68 L.Ed. 362 matter lacked (1923). alternative, the district Con over individual member’s claims. concluded, among things, other Supreme only vested Court gress standing lacked individual jurisdiction to state court deci with review court. proceed F.Supp.2d federal 1257. The Rooker- sions. U.S.C. 432. The court also concluded doctrine, rule, corollary to this Feldman standing be- lacked associational ULSG ... courts from prohibits “lower federal individual members had cause none its exercising appellate jurisdiction over final standing. Id. at 433. Dennis, judgments.” Lance v. state-court - U.S. -, -, to alter the plaintiffs’ On the motion curiam). 59(e), (per 1059

judgment, see the dis- 163 L.Ed.2d Fed.R.Civ.P. recently granted Supreme leave to amend Court has under trict court ULSG a “narrow allege associational stand- scored that Rooker-Feldman is complaint courts complaint deprives Id. It district ing. Once the amended was doctrine.” filed, jurisdiction subject matter over “cases Secretary moved to dismiss brought complaining fail- losers by lack matter and state-court injuries by judg caused state-court ure a claim. In March 2005 the to state the district court court that an affidavit ments rendered before district concluded inviting and dis by commenced proceedings submitted a ULSG member was suffi- rejection review and of those standing cient had to trict court to show that ULSG Corp. Exxon Mobil Saudi bring equal protection, procedural judgments.” 280, 284, Corp., 125 uniformity claims. The court Basic Indus. 544 process, (2005). held, however, 454 For- 161 L.Ed.2d pro- could not S.Ct. ULSG 464 way, in the doctrine Act is unconstitutional would invalidate the

mulated forbids for an injury statutory “seek[] claims that redress basis for the federal by decision itself’ effectively caused the state-court prevent mechanism DFAS district they “ask[] because federal continuing from transmit payments appellate an review of court conduct on a based state court decree. Such a Dep’t Davani Va. state-court decision.” not, however, declaration would amount to (4th F.3d 719 Transp., 434 Cir. appellate reversal or modification of valid 2006). words, ap other the doctrine in state court decree entered an individual plies party “where a effect seeks to take bottom, plaintiffs At divorce case. an ex- appeal an of an unfavorable state-court of the amination federal constitutional Lance, to a federal court.” decision lower presented here challenge against the Act (The at 1202. court in S.Ct. district require scrutinizing does not and invalidat- the Supreme this case ruled before Court ing any individual judgment. state court ap decided Exxon Mobil. therefore Contrary expressed to the view decisions, our plied then-governing which concurring opinion, test is not whether an given “expansive had the doctrine inter sought relief the federal suit “would interpretation pretation,” an now “reined upset” certainly the enforcement of a state Davani, in” by Supreme Court. decree, post court at but rather wheth- 718.) F.3d at modify” er the relief would “reverse or argues that the individual Mobil, state court decree. See Exxon fall claims within even the narrowed doc- (“Among U.S. at feder- plaintiffs because lost in trine courts, clarified, al Court Rooker Con- proceedings divorce court before bringing gress empowered only Supreme] had [the suit, their federal their injury because Court appellate authority to exercise ‘to ultimately by caused the adverse state modify’ reverse judg- or state-court judgments. court We need decide ment.”) (quoting Fidelity Rooker v. Trust we with agree description whether of Co., claims because least some of the (1923)). Or, L.Ed. put it another plaintiffs individual ones whose —the way, when asked the district attempting DFAS redistributes —are not court here to the Act declare unconstitu- to appeal unfavorable state court decisions. tional, they thereby did not upon [ ] “call is, That if even these were “state- injurious the ... [c]ourt overturn complaining injuries court losers caused Mobil, judgment.” state-court Exxon by judgments state-court rendered before U.S. at 125 S.Ct. 1517. As proceedings district com- sult, the individual plaintiffs whose retire- menced,” concurring opinion as the takes currently ment pay is redistributed be, them to post they were not DFAS not “in ... appealing]” effect “inviting rejection district court review and their state court “decisions] divorce to a Mobil, judgments.” of those Exxon Lance, lower federal court.” 126 S.Ct. at plain- U.S. at 125 S.Ct. 1517. These doctrine, 1202. The Rooker-Feldman con- tiffs seek a declaration that Act is it by tracted as has Supreme been unconstitutional applied as to them. The decisions, Court’s recent did therefore not applies plaintiffs by Act to these requiring deprive subject the district of court matter the Armed payments Forces transmit to jurisdiction in this case. qualifying former pursuant

state court Supra, part divorce decrees. of reading Our the claims also I.A. A federal court why justiciable declaration that shows presents case Comm’n, 333, 2434, 343, 432 U.S. plain- the individual controversy that (1977). standing matter 53 L.Ed.2d 383 and ULSG have tiffs —a of, if it even is un- be assured must we conclude that sub- Because we federal Earth, appeal. Friends contested of ject present, may is matter we Inc., (TOC), v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. Inc. proceed to the merits the constitutional 167, 693, 180, 120 S.Ct. 528 U.S. claims. (2000). satisfy the To stand- L.Ed.2d must plaintiff allege requirement, ing “[a] III. injury to the de- fairly traceable personal plaintiffs challenge The the district allegedly unlawful conduct fendant’s invoking of their court’s dismissal claims by requested to be likely redressed need process, alleged substantive 737, v. 468 U.S. Wright, Allen relief.” uniformity governing for in rules 3315, L.Ed.2d 556 S.Ct. affairs, equal protection. (1984). that The contend when aof portion transmits a service DFAS A. to a former

member’s Act, DFAS effects pursuant to the exempt Act does not service The property. member’s a transfer joined pri- forces members who armed inflicts allegedly transfer direct That or to its from court di enactment harm the member that is upon economic dividing military re vorce decrees See, e.g., not hypothetical. concrete and divorce, does it pay upon tirement nor FEC, v. Soc’y Life, Human Inc. Va. for exempt members from the federal these Cir.2001) (4th (quoting 263 F.3d that DFAS adminis payments mechanism Wildlife, 504 Lujan Defenders of joined ters. who The service members 119 L.Ed.2d 351 S.Ct. al military before the statute’s enactment (1992)). di- money transfer follows lege exemptions lack of these to, from, and is traceable rectly hence they alters the retroactively compensation Act; moreover, to the DFAS’s obedience expected They hired. contend when if a injury could redressed because retroactivity amounts to a violation un- to declare were federal Pro component the Due the substantive constitutional, have to would cease DFAS the Fifth Amendment. cess Clause of The individual making transfers. this claim did resolve district court apportioned whose erroneously concluded because it through pay- the Act’s dispensed is jurisdiction. The lacked matter standing have mechanism therefore ments practical consequence error no See, e.g., proceed federal court. J.A. claim, however, fails on because the claim (alleging that “automatic deduction the merits. [plaintiff Richard made aspects of eco retroactive “[T]he from his retired Becker’s ex-wife A.] prospec as well as the legislation, nomic DFAS”); (raising identical al- J.A. 121 of due aspects, must meet the test tive Conroy, F. plaintiff legation William Romein, Corp. Motors process,” Gen. III). Further, because the ULSG mem- 1105, 117 dispensed whose retirement bers omitted), (1992) (punctuation L.Ed.2d 328 that mechanism spouses under “[e]lementary considerations because standing, satisfies the ULSG should fairness individuals dictate standing. See quirements associational law to have an know what Apple opportunity Adver. v. Wash. State Hunt 466 182, (1926)). according to conform their conduct 70 435 This S.Ct. L.Ed. “ex- requirement plicit language”

ly; expectations settled should not be “is demand- ing requires statutory one” that lightly disrupted.” Landgraf language v. Film USI “high clarity.” Prods., 265, 1483, Cyr, at a level of v. 244, 114 INS St. 511 U.S. S.Ct. 316-17, 289, 2271, (1994). 533 U.S. 121 S.Ct. 150 plaintiffs 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (2001). L.Ed.2d The requirement 347 was analogy draw an to States v. Lario United 879, Larionoff, not satisfied in 2150, noff, 864, U.S. S.Ct. 2150, it is here. S.Ct. but satisfied Con- (1977), L.Ed.2d 48 where the issue was gress decided that the Act allow would government risk of retroactive action that military state courts to divide retirement to would be detrimental service (again, earned after June In Congress members. that case author day the Supreme Court handed down subsequently repealed ized but a program McCarty) proceedings. in divorce Con- paid variable to re-enlistment bonuses gress made tempo- this decision about the forces armed members whose skills the ral reach of the statute clear in the words military critically needed. Id. at statute itself. plaintiff-service 2150. One mem 1408(c)(1). Congress spoken Where ber in agreed to his en extend Larionoff clearly so about statute’s intended effect, while program listment was in reach, against the presumption retroactivi- not begin serving but did his re-enlistment ty simply does come play. into term until after program’s repeal. Id. Next, expectations,” “settled Land 97 S.Ct. 2150. The military denied graf, U.S. at re program member bonus because the sulting from the re-enlistment bonus was abolished his pe before re-enlistment Congress program established and then began. holding riod that the member in dismantled not easily to prom was entitled originally bonus Larionoff we compared those examine here. As him, ised to the Court observed that Con we have emphasized, the Act does not gress gave no indication in repealing the deprive members their retirement program that it also intended to “divest pay. simply gives state courts the rights already [the member] he had option to divide that pay, requires earned.” Id. at 97 S.Ct. 2150. to enforce court state de cite Larionoff through cisions quali direct urging they us to hold that are entitled to fying spouses. Congress may have their undivided pay. promised re-enlistment bonuses of very is a different case from this Larionoff a certain po amount members in the one, First, Supreme however. Court’s sition described The indi Larionoff. search in that case for a “clear expression here, however, vidual cannot of congressional rights intent” alter the plausibly allege that at time they of members who had extended their enlist joined the military Congress promised to id., ments, simply application of a permanently shield their retirement “ general familiar rule: ‘a statute shall not from former spouses presenting valid given be retroactive effect unless such con Only Supreme orders. explicit language Court’s decision in McCarty n required by struction is —not ” or by necessary implication.’ Fernandez promise by Congress arguably —could Gonzales, (June -Vargas supported expectations of some 2006) (quoting United States St. service members Louis, Co., 3,1, & T.R. S.F. would shielded this manner. argue “give[s] rise to dispa- The com- that Act argument that fails. Yet even individual rate treatment to service members” and that none of the plaint reveals that, “produces in that it non-uniform results when argue to is entitled plaintiffs in McCarty implemented state law.” J.A. 137. This deci- between slim window contend, alleged uniformity, they lack of is they had a passage, and the Act’s sion impermissible their retire- under Constitution’s legitimate expectation that Clauses, Const., I, divorce Armed Forces U.S. art. upon would be shielded ment 8, § Only els. and the Full Faith and garnishment. two from division Clause, IV, id., § they art. 1. allege this were Credit plaintiffs in case signed Act into divorced before the was disagree. portion We The of the Full Indeed, they September law in 1982. were rely plaintiffs Faith and Credit Clause the McCarty decided. divorced before “may by gener provides Congress on Stanton, Jr., in They Lloyd divorced E. in prescribe al Laws the Manner which 1978, Zim- Arizona in March and Carroll Acts, Records and Proceed public] [state merman, August in in divorced California ings proved, and the Effect there shall be of the in which the courts states Yet of.” Id. There no indication that Con is treated mili- these were divorced plaintiffs gress passing clause when invoked this on divorce tary pay as divisible had, law, if it Act into but even the clause Loan, time, Loan see Van v. Van Congress any require impose does not 214, (1977); 215-16 116 Ariz. 569 P.2d any uniformity ment of substantive area Fithian, 592, 111 Cal.Rptr. In re 10 Cal.3d is law. The word “uniform” no (1974), and the P.2d 451-57 though provision, this where found yet interpreted Supreme had not Court in the Constitu can be found elsewhere contrary as rule. requiring federal law See, Const., I, § e.g., cl. 4 tion. art. U.S. cannot So even Stanton and Zimmerman “uni (empowering Congress establish deprived them of that the Act claim subject Bankruptcies form Laws on the McCarty expectation holding. based on the States”). As throughout United “ Clauses, ‘judicial def the Armed Forces plaintiffs individual did state Congress apogee’ ... is at its when upon claim which erence process substantive raise Thus, legislates authority under granted. the district its relief could be armies,” Forum support reaching that claim error in not court’s Rumsfeld —Inc., Rights, & Institutional affect case. Academic does not the outcome U.S. -, -, (2006) (quoting B. Rostker v. L.Ed.2d 156 Goldberg, option giving state courts (1981)), Congress’s 69 L.Ed.2d 478 upon di divide retiree no to allow decision vorce, among Act variation tolerates ordinary di exemption from special actually divid the states how precisely is entitled principles vorce law spouses in individual cases. ed between of the Dismissal sort deference. although Congress provided example, For non-uniformity was correct. claim of the mem spouse’s that the former share to an pay pursuant order ber’s retirement C. may per not exceed dividing property argue next cent, 1408(e)(1), state courts right constitutional appro lesser as violates are free to award a share distinguishing between equal protection in an case. The priate individual 468 three under

persons scrutiny. based on classifications. viewed intermediate First, They scheme allege statutory first that Act’s has we ask “whether the clas- impact a on disproportionately harmful fe- sification is indeed neutral in the sense argument so, that not gender-based,” male service members. This at- it is and if second, a tempts present sex “whether the effect discrimination adverse re- discrimina,- plaintiffs gender-based claim. The female contend that flects invidious Congress when enacted the statute it tion.” Id. protect spouses aimed to not em- vocabulary specific. The Act’s is not sex (whom ployed Congress home outside the refers service members and former women) at allegedly assumed the ex- were spouses, defining spouse the term as “the (whom pense of the service members Con- who, or of husband wife ... a on member men). gress allegedly assumed were The order, or before date of argue although further that married that member.” number women the Armed Forces 1408(a)(6). So must apply we the Fee- increased, the statute has not been ney To satisfy test. element first changed. They allege allowing test, enough it is not that the statute former husbands of female service mem- neutral; rather, facially there must also bers to receive share their retirement be no covert sex-based discrimination. unfair,” “manifestly is as these former 274, 442 Feeney, U.S. at 99 S.Ct. in many husbands cases own are, sure, There to be isolated statements Appellants’ income. Br. at 52. In other history the legislative describing the Act words, contend that the Act as concerned about service members’ against discriminates women in the Armed See, 97-502, e.g., S.Rep. 43, wives. No. and in of men Forces favor because former re-printed in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. likely are more husbands than former (additional Denton) (“[I]t statement of Sen.

wives to have sources of other income than virtually is impossible compensate military pay. divided caring for her efforts wife husband, home, family, preserv- and in argument This does not state a ing stability.”) a sense of family (emphasis claim for sex discrimination violation of added). As the court recognized, district equal protection. A explicitly statute that however, excerpts these are isolated incon- people classifies on sex based clusive because bulk of congres- scrutiny, intermediate which means “it sional terms, materials used sex-neutral must be at least established chal See, speaking and not wives. lenged important classification serves gov e.g., S.Rep. No. objectives ernmental and that the discrimi (“[T]he U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1601 committee natory employed means substantially believes that the unique status of the mili- objec related to the achievement of those tary spouse spouse’s great contri- INS, Nguyen tives.” bution to our require defense L.Ed.2d status the military spouse be acknowl- omitted). (punctuation contrast, a stat edged, protected.”). supported and ute explicitly classify that does not people based sex “gender-neutral and is thus Feeney requires second element face,” on its Pets. Adm’r Mass. Fee “that a showing gender-based discrimina- ney, has, tory purpose at least in some meas- (1979), ure, L.Ed.2d 870 must be assessed un shaped legislation.” the ... Feeney, der a two-element test it is plain- before U.S. at 99 S.Ct. 2282. The family management of the household are tiffs, however, plausibly and cannot do not solely many spouse’s responsibil- “at passed the Act times Congress allege that of,’ merely ‘in lends a ity. cohesive- ‘because part least in upon facing rigors female to the of family effects” ness the spite its adverse of/ members, military life, protracted 99 S.Ct. 2282. including and service id. sure, Indeed, that Con- To plaintiffs complain separations.”). the Con- stressful plight of female gress respect not consider gress did also demonstrated members, Mansell, which means that Con- service of rights service members. See (“[T]he the invidious possessed gress cannot 490 U.S. at them that against whole, intent to discriminate history, as legislative read indi- us intermediate scru- apply would allow to to Congress cates that intended both cre- tiny. for former to spouses ate new benefits and designed limits on state courts to place not The therefore does statute retirees.”). event, military protect women, men and but between distinguish Congress properly could have concluded and their retired service members between more in- those sacrifices were even rational basis apply spouses. former We ordinary than the sacrifices associat- tense “[A] this classification. classifi review to marriage employees, with to civilian ed rights involving fundamental cation neither of spouses that former service mem- is ac proceeding along suspect lines nor protection deserved additional bers thus validity. of strong presumption corded a civilian spouses not to former afforded run classification cannot afoul Such a purpose, not the employees. While sole if is a Clause there Equal Protection protection legitimate was a spouse former disparity relationship rational between animating Act. purpose legitimate govern of treatment and some Doe, Heller 509 U.S. purpose.” mental Second, rationally the Act was indeed 312, 319-20, 2637, 125 L.Ed.2d government in- legitimate this related to (citations omitted). (1993) Under Act explained, terest. As we have rational test a court must determine basis simply limited function. freed state (1) purpose that animates “whether the to divorce re- upon courts divide regulations is challenged] laws and [the completed on service tirement based Sons, Inc. v. legitimate,” Smith Setzer & which allowed the during marriage, Panel, F.3d Review S.C. Procurement property to increase the avail- state courts (2) (4th Cir.1994), and whether The Act addi- spouse. to the former able it “reasonable the lawmakers mecha- tionally established challenged of the classifi believe that use for some former that makes easier nism promote purpose,” id. cation would share of retire- spouses to receive their & v. State Bd. (quoting S. Ins. Co. W. Life to state court orders. pursuant ment 648, 668, 101 Equalization, course, work, For scheme (1981)). 2070, 68 L.Ed.2d 514 (who distinguish spouses must Act the pay- advantage are entitled to take Act this rational basis The survives mechanism) First, from retired mem- ments Congress special view. exhibited (whose subject pay is and economic sac- bers personal concern for distribution). argue that the that the of a service rifices the former unconstitutionally favors marriage. makes to sustain member allowing by members over service S.Rep. See No. (“Child spouses access to the former at 1601 care U.S.C.C.A.N. they, members, though gence reviewing Agency). even unlike After the Act obligated perform to continue to are not for Congress, the DOD concluded that the if government upon duties for the called remarriage provision absence cutoff military justice no requires legislative correction because provisions. Supra, part argu- I.A. This the question is best answered in individu- presupposes ment that the retirement DOD, al A cases courts. See Re- compensation only can be characterized as port Congress Concerning Federal during for services rendered retirement. Spouse Former Protection Laws 82 Although is false. mil- presupposition (“State courts, law, not Federal should itary pay unique has some fea- remarriage.”), determine the of effect tures, ordinary it also resembles civilian at http://www.dod.mil/prhome/ available pension many respects, Congress in (hereinafter spouserev.html Former that in grasped passing resemblance the Spouse Report). Protection The decision Supreme Act. In the Court particular, to whether include a cutoff in remarriage explained “premise that Act’s the behind properly Congress. statute is left to permitting apply to their States com- simply The compel Constitution does not munity military laws to property retire- Congress provide for the service mem- pay ment is that such deferred system entirely a bers identical to the one services,” not compensation past “com- government created other officers. pensation for reduced current services” The spouses of service members make that performs the service member after unique during sacrifices marriage, forego- Barker, retirement. 503 U.S. at 112 ing many opportunity cases “to Thus, Congress S.Ct. 1619. could reason- pursue ... their career[s]” own. ably permit military states divide retire- S.Rep. No. at spouses ment favor of former with- Recognizing U.S.C.C.A.N. 1601. these making spouses out those work for this sacrifices, Congress reasonably could pay, pay compensates because the concluded that a remarriage cutoff was past member for services that the member necessary not and that state courts should familial, spouse’s rendered with the former be question. free to resolve the If one emotional, support. and other purpose allowing the former The also contend that the Act portion receive a of the retire- creates a second treating classification provide ment is to support, economic retired favorably service members less Congress obligated was not to assume than other federal employees. need support for this would al- One of their concerns is that does ways disappear upon spouse’s the former cutoff, a remarriage contain so a for- remarriage. mer spouse who remarries does not reasons, For these the district court cor- right thereby forfeit the to receive the de- rectly dismissed equal protection portion termined of the service member’s claim. contrast, pay. retired pay- certain

ments to former of employees in service, foreign service, the civil and intel- IV. ligence agency are if terminated those spouses remarry reaching speci- Finally, before challenge See, (civil fied age. e.g., § grant summary U.S.C. the district court’s judg service); § (foreign ment in Secretary U.S.C. ser- favor of their vice); (Central Intelli- claim that the Act and its implementing Corp. Ency- In Endicott-Johnson provide procedural due do not regulations Press, Inc., clopedia compliance evaluate the Act’s process. To (1924), 69 L.Ed. 288 the Court upheld procedural Process Clause’s with Due a creditor state law that allowed with (1) a court must determine component, garnish judgment valid state court something plaintiffs “los[t] whether wages additional notice. debtor’s without protected fits into one the three The the pre-depriva- Court reasoned that life, liberty, categories: property,” or proceeding put tion was sufficient plaintiffs “reeeive[d] whether the notice that be property debtor on his could protection procedural minimum measure Id. to the creditor’s claim. at 288- under circumstances.” warranted 89, 45 “in 61. held that the ab- County Employees’ Arlington Mallette statutory requirement, sence of a it is not II, (4th Ret. 91 F.3d Supp. Sys. judgment essential [the debtor] Cir.1996). parties dispute do not given notice before the issuance an exe- property have a retired service members cution against tangible property.” his Id. interest con- by Stipra, part created federal statutes. tends that Endicott-Johnson forecloses They appear agree by I.A. also to that plaintiffs procedural process the due at- to allowing spouses certain former enforce the pro- tack because state court divorce marital dividing court the es- state orders all the that ceedings give members notice tate, payments the federal mechanism they Although due. are Endicott-Johnson to a this deprivation least contributes overruled, it was not been decided in- parties The focus property interest. significantly before the Court revised its part procedural on of the stead the second process rights, approach to due and since The process test. contend due give then reluctant to courts been requires Secretary to process that due controlling weight. Endicott-Johnson See investigate jurisdictional basis for ev- County Dep’t, Aacen Juan v. San Sheriff’s decree, ery state divorce instead of (10th Cir.1991) 695 & n. 5 F.2d all that accepting valid decrees as that Endicott-Johnson focused (explaining face.” “regular [their] on U.S.C. of seizure and “pre-execution on notice 1408(b)(2). They § also claim that that “have and various courts hearing” fully Secretary indemnify must retiree precedential value of Endi- questioned the spouse to former pay given light pro- in modern due cott-Johnson on decree. The based an invalid divorce decisions.”); Diana cess see also Gribbon further that the plaintiffs insist Baida, H. Pro- Motz Andrew Due & court com- must review whether the state and Postjudgment Debtors Rights cess with the terms of the Servicemem- plied Obligors, 45 Md. L.Rev. Support Child Act, app. bers Civil Relief U.S.C. (noting judicial hesitation 64-69 seq., taking than as true state et rather in the after- relying on Endicott-Johnson complied that it has court’s certification such procedural process math due cases view, plaintiffs’ with this statute. Family Covp., Finance as Sniadach moreover, pre- and process requires due L.Ed.2d U.S. procedures (1969)). and post-deprivation remedies relying on Endicott- Instead “informal, parte, ex Johnson, than the went to ex- more formal the district court on provision regulations using incomplete” reconsideration Act and the amine the ¶ test articulated Ap- balancing forth in DOD 7000.14-R 2912. first set Eldridge, 424 Mathews pellants’ Br. at (1976), jurisdictional, procedural, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 den found or substan- mechanism satisfied tive defect in that order. The this test. offer no evidence DFAS makes unacceptably high number of errors under plain- We need not decide whether the scheme; indeed, existing they present claim properly through tiffs’ is assessed concerning no evidence the error rate at application direct of Endicott-Johnson or all. The plaintiffs present also no evidence through test, balancing the Mathews be- commonly overpays DFAS cause in they thing: the end show the same spouses, based on its own errors or regulations provide the Act and the all that courts, those of state then fails process requires. Endicott-Johnson compensate service members for suggests that service members who dis- sulting only loss. The relevant evidence the state allocation pute court’s of retired contrary: record was a DFAS their former must present employee testified if a former spouse legal arguments or factual to the overpaid error, of a because DFAS once courts, arguments these save DFAS learns of the error it reduces future raise them later before DFAS. Mathews payments to that former until requires attention three factors: effect of the overpayment is out. canceled First, private interest that will be agency’s of a regulation lack written action; second, affected the official governing process is not relevant. the risk deprivation of an erroneous such through procedures interest Without empirical evidence pay- that the used, value, probable and the any, if of ments mechanism does not prac- work in procedural additional or tice, substitute safe- only we can consider the risk of error guards; finally, and the Government’s in the mechanism as described the stat- interest, ... including the fiscal and ad- themselves, utes and regulations we and ministrative burdens the additional conclude that risk is minimal. be- To procedural ... requirement would en- with, gin we no assuming have basis for tail. routinely state courts favor former spouses over dividing service members in Here, at U.S. 893. pay. Any mistakes “private interest that will be by affected state courts do likely make seem action,” id., the official is the service mem- caught by who, personnel following DFAS statutory right ber’s federal to retirement regulations, scan certified state pay. already As we explained, have court presented compli- orders for facial qualifies right by empowering jurisdictional ance with procedural state courts to award to the safeguards for service members. See up percent the pay as marital ¶2906. DOD 7000.14-R And when that property. estate Retirement sig- is a process fails, aggrieved may members asset, nificant private so the interest is not quest DFAS reconsideration of the deci- trivial, it but neither is so weighty as to ¶ sion. Id. 2912. eclipse the other factors.

The next concern is the risk of error. The plaintiffs speculate that if DFAS enforcing orders, state court were to go beyond DFAS the face of the state might ways. err in several For example, court validity, orders to assess their DFAS might DFAS accept a state court order as would catch more even state court errors. regular on its face and make payments They do not specify exactly what addition- accordingly though even there is investigation they some hid- al person- believe DFAS lacked matter pro- with under comply conduct to must nel DFAS cess, hint that must Rooker-Feldman doctrine. though they for individual explanations written provide Exxon Mobil reaffirmed that the doc- well as create a decisions as garnishment trine appellate of those ex- for review channel is confined to cases the kind from the addition of Requiring planations. acquired which doctrine name: its govern- on the bear would procedures by cases state-court com- brought losers balancing. in Mathews ment’s interest plaining injuries caused by state-court pay- would slow More intensive review judgments rendered before the district monthly DFAS sends processing. ments 54,- proceedings court commenced and invit- to about pay distributions ing rejection district court review spouses, Spouse see Former 000 former those judgments. III.C., Report, part at 19 supra Protection 1, 1999), figures April as of (providing 284, 125 Corp., Exxon Mobil U.S. might longer to wait of them have all S.Ct. 1517. if pay DFAS their share of retirement get case precisely That is have here. we must in finer detail the review employees inviting court district court of state divorce underlying merits judg- review their individual state court If not want to DFAS did increase orders. they ments ask the court to when federal time, it would to hire case-processing These declare the Act unconstitutional. staff, gov- would raise the additional which complain- plaintiffs are “state-court losers running total expenses ernment’s injuries judg- ing of caused state-court payments mechanism. ments rendered before district requiring conclude that DFAS We proceedings commenced.” Exxon Mobil comply- additional review before conduct Corp., 544 state court orders would harm the ing with Declaring the Act unconstitutional would minimizing ad- government’s interest judgments certainly pay- those upset expenses without demonstra- ministrative ments the state court decisions ordered reducing existing rate of bly error outcome federal would cease. Such system. process Due does enforcement kind from court likens this case “the require already pro- more than DFAS acquired name.” which the doctrine its pursuant to the Act. district vides Corp., Exxon Mobil granted summary judg- correctly therefore procedural on the ment to process claim. Thus, judgment affirm I would reasoning: court but on the district its V. that the doctrine divest- Rooker-Feldman reasons, uphold we For all these jurisdiction. it of matter ed court orders and affirm the district statute summary judgment. of dismissal

AFFIRMED

WIDENER, Judge, concurring: Circuit I separate-

I concur in the write result. however, opinion I am of

ly, because correctly determined

the district

Case Details

Case Name: Adkins v. Rumsfeld

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Date Published: Sep 18, 2006

Citation: 464 F.3d 456

Docket Number: 05-2307

Court Abbreviation: 4th Cir.