We granted certiorari to review the Court of Appeals’ opinion in
Adkins v. Comcar Industries, Inc.,
FACTS
John Adkins (Father) sought to recover workers’ compensation benefits for the death of his son Stephen Adkins. Mаry Hutto (Mother) contested Father’s entitlement to any death benefits. The single commissioner and full commission ruled Father was not entitled to receive any benefits from son’s work-related death because he had abandoned his son long before his son’s death. The cоmmission concluded Mr. Adkins was not a “father” within the meaning of the Workers’ Compensation Act and thus was not entitled to receive benefits. Alternatively, the commission concluded it had the discretion to apportion the benefits between the Mother and Father based оn the circumstances of the case and it was inappropriate here to аward any benefits to Father. The circuit court reversed, finding that Father was entitled to sharе equal benefits with the Mother under S.C. Code Ann. § 42-9-140 (Supp. 1995). The Court of Appeals affirmed.
ISSUE
Does a natural father’s abandonment of his deceased son *411 disqualify him from bеing a “father” entitled to death benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act?
DISCUSSION
Worker’s cоmpensation death benefits are distributed pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 42-9-140(B) which provides as follows:
If the deceased employee leaves no dependents or non-dependеnt children, the employer shall pay the commuted amounts provided for in Section 42-9-290 fоr whole dependents, less burial expenses which must be deducted from those commuted аmounts, to his father and mother, irrespective of age or dépendency.
The Court of Aрpeals looked at the plain and ordinary meaning of “father” and concluded there was no basis for finding Father was not a father within the meaning of the statute. Since there wаs no order terminating Father’s parental rights, the Court of Appeals concluded the circuit court properly found that Father was entitled to death benefits. We agree.
Mother asserts that since Father had abandoned his son he was not entitled to benefits. She rеlies on Georgia law to urge that Father had legally abandoned his deceased son many years before his death.
1
Failure to provide support constitutes intentional аnd wilful, voluntary abandonment under Georgia law.
Chapman v. State,
In construing a statute, its words must be given their plain and ordinary meaning without resort to subtle or forced construction to limit or expand the statute’s operation.
First Baptist Church of Mauldin v. City of Mauldin,
The commission concluded that because the legislature did not specifically state that the benefits must be distributed equally thеn presumably an equal division is not required. The plain and ordinary language of the statute does not provide a basis for apportioning benefits between parents other than on an equal basis. The statute does not explicitly allow an apportionment of benefits between the parents. Furthermore, support for the equal division of death benefits within a class can be found in
Bush v. Gingrey Brothers,
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals did not err in finding Father is not divested of his rights as a fathеr under § 42-9-140 in the absence of a prior termination of his parental rights and the benefits should be equally divided.
Affirmed.
Notes
The parents resided in Georgia during substantially all of their son’s childhood.
The Genеral Assembly recently enacted Senate Bill 1164, Act 370, effective May 29,1996, which amends § 42-9-140 by adding languаge to permit the commission to deny or limit a parent’s entitlement for a share of the benefits if a parent failed to reasonably provide support for the decedent. This amendment does not apply to the case before us today.