115 F. 124 | 8th Cir. | 1902
Lead Opinion
after- stating the case as above, delivered the opinion of the court.
This case presents a single issue: Is the defendant Alfred W. Fleming the legitimate son of Dr. Alfred W. Fleming, deceased? There are, however, two other questions, the answers to which may go far toward the determination of this issue. They are: Was there a common-law marriage between Dr. Fleming and Mary C. Quan prior to November, 1891 ? And, if not, did the ceremony of marriage between them subsequent to the birth of the son raise a conclusive presumption of the legitimacy of the boy, under section 2917 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri?
In cases like that in hand, which involve the legitimacy of children, the legal presumptions are strong and the competent indicia are many from which such a marriage may be inferred. In criminal prosecutions for bigamy, incest, and adultery, and in civil actions for criminal conversation, strict proof of marriage is required. It is not so in suits involving the legitimacy of offspring. In such actions the legal presumption is that every child is the fruit of a lawful, rather than of a meretricious, union, and that there had been a timely and legal marriage between the father and mother before the birth of the child. Orthwein v. Thomas, 127 Ill. 554, 562, 563, 21 N. E. 430, 4 L. R. A. 436, 11 Am. St. Rep. 159. Every intendment is indulged in favor of legitimacy, and it is one of the strongest presumptions of the law,— a presumption not to be overcome by a mere preponderance of testimony or of probabilities, — that a timely marriage preceded cohabitation apparently matrimonial. Piers v. Piers, 2 H. L. Cas. 331; Hynes v. McDermott, 91 N. Y. 451, 458, 43 Am. Rep. 677; Teter v. Teter, 101 Ind. 129, 133, 51 Am. Rep. 742.
This dominant presumption may be strengthened by resort to. the acts and conduct of the parties; by proof of cohabitation and general reputation among their acquaintances and friends (Boatman v. Curry, 25 Mo. 433, 438; Inhabitants of Newburyport v. Inhabitants of Boothboy, 9 Mass. 414, 415; Badger v. Badger, 88 N. Y. 547, 552, 42 Am. Rep. 263); of their treatment of each other; of their speaking concerning and addressing each other in the presence of third parties as husband and wife (Maryland v. Baldwin, 112 U. S. 490, 498, 5 Sup. Ct. 278, 28 L. Ed. 822); of the christening of the offspring of their union as their children (Hervey v. Hervey, 2 Wm. Bl. 877; State v. Worthingham, 23 Minn. 528, 536); of the conferring of the name of the father upon the son (Caujolle v. Ferrie, 23 N. Y. 90, 102); of the son’s recognition and treatment by both parties as their child. (Patterson v. Gaines, 6 How. 550, 589, 12 L. Ed. 553; Starr v. Peck, 1 Hill, 270, 272); and by proof of any and all acts, words, and conduct which have a natural and rational tendency to show the existence of the marriage relation.
These rules and principles of law are indisputable, and must serve as our guide in the consideration and determination of the questions
The first wife of thfe doctor was a widow when he married her. She had borne a child to her former husband, but there was no issue of her marriage with the doctor. Shortly after the death of the doc
There are two witnesses who testify that shortly after the birth of the boy the doctor admitted to them that this child was not his son, and there are two more who say that he was practically silent when his paternity was questioned. But, on the other hand, the unvarying testimony of all the other witnesses upon this subject, witnesses so numerous and so credible that their evidence cannot be disbelieved, was that from the birth of the boy until the death of the doctor the latter invariably recognized, claimed, and treated him as his son. There was other testimony at the hearing which has not been recited, but with the exception of a single line of evidence, to which reference will shortly be made, there was no other evidence presented of sufficient importance to vary the conclusion to which that which has already been mentioned must lead.
It is said that the fact that they conducted a ceremonial marriage after the birth of the child is strong, if not demonstrative, evidence that there was no marriage before. But it may well be that, although there was an actual marriage before, the facts that its proof was not of record, and rested only in matrimonial cohabitation, repute, declarations, and treatment, and that the doctor’s estate was large, and his desire that the boy should inherit it earnest, induced them to make and record the ceremonial marriage as indubitable record evidence of their marriage relation and the legal rights of the boy, notwithstanding the fact that they knew there had been an actual marriage which made him their heir. A subsequent ceremonial marriage is not inconsistent with a prior common-law marriage, and it does not necessarily overcome the presumption thereof which arises from matrimonial cohabitation, the declarations and conduct of the parties, and their reputation. Betsinger v. Chapman, 88 N. Y. 488, 496, 499; Starr v. Peck, 1 Hill, 270, 272.
The relation between Dr. Fleming and Mary C. Quan was illicit in its inception. It commenced before the doctor was divorced from his first wife, and it is insisted that the presumption that it continued to be unlawful until the ceremonial marriage was solemnized must prevail, in the absence of evidence of the time and place of a change to the matrimonial relation. A relation of concubinage is presumed to continue in the absence of evidence of a change to matrimony, and there are a few decisions which support the contention of counsel here. Barnum v. Barnum, 42 Md. 251, 296, 297; Cunninghams v. Cunninghams, 2 Dow (House of Lords) 482; Clayton v. Wardell, 4 Comst. 230, 236. But the true rule and the great weight of authority is that inasmuch as the law itself and all its presumptions deprecate illegal, and favor lawful, relations, slight circumstances may be sufficient to establish a change from an illicit to a legal relation, and that proof of its time or place is not indispensable. Badger v. Badger, 88 N. Y. 547, 553, 42 Am. Rep. 263; Caujolle v. Ferrie, 23 N. Y. 90, 106, 110; In re Taylor, 9 Paige, 611, 614; Fenton v. Reed, 4 Johns. 52, 4 Am. Dec. 244; 1 Bish. Mar. & Div. § 965. In this way it appears from a review of this evidence that there is nothing in it which imperatively forbids a finding that there was a valid marriage between these parties subsequent to the divorce and prior to the
Fortunately there is an established principle of law, and a class of evidence in this record to which it applies, which removes this doubt and difficulty. The principle of law is that where parties who are incompetent to marry enter an illicit • relation with a manifest desire- and intention to live in a matrimonial union rather than in a state of concubinage, and the obstacle to their marriage is subsequently re,'moved, their continued cohabitation raises a presumption of an actual marriage immediately after the removal of the obstacle, and warrants a finding to that effect. The Breadalbane Case (Campbell v. Campbell) L. R. 1 H. L. Sc. 182, 206, 212; De Thoren v. Attorney General, 1 App. Cas. 686; Fenton v. Reed, 4 Johns. 52, 4 Am. Dec. 244; Hynes v. McDermott, 91 N. Y. 451, 458, 43 Am. Rep. 677; In re Taylor, 9 Paige, 611; Rose v. Clark, 8 Paige, 574; Van Buskirk v. Claw, 18 Johns. 346; Caujolle v. Ferrie, 23 N. Y. 90; Betsinger v. Chapman, 88 N. Y. 487, 499; Starr v. Peck, 1 Hill, 270; Gall v. Gall, 114 N. Y. 109, 118, 21 N. E. 106; Donnelly v. Donnelly, 8 B. Mon. 113; Blanchard v. Lambert, 43 Iowa, 228, 22 Am. Rep. 245; State v. Worthingham, 23 Minn. 528; Dickerson v. Brown, 49 Miss. 357; Floyd v. Calvert, 53 Miss. 37, 45; Jones v. Jones, 45 Md. 155; Yates v. Houston, 3 Tex. 433-450.
In the case at bar the obstacle to the marriage in the inception of the illicit relation was the prior marriage of Dr. Fleming to his first wife, which was still undissolved. That obstacle was removed by the-divorce in November, 1890. The facts in the leading case upon this subject, which received great consideration in the house of lords, the Breadalbane Case (Campbell v. Campbell), were in all essential particulars identical with those in the case at bar. James Campbell had eloped with the wife of one Ludlow in the year 1781, and had lived and cohabited with her until his death in 1806. Ludlow had died in 1784. The question was whether Campbell was married to the widow of Ludlow between 1784, when he died, and 1788, when their first child was born. There was a consensus of opinion among the judges-that such a marriage should be inferred immediately after the death-of Ludlow. Lord Westbury said:
“There is nothing to warrant the proposition that the subsequent conduct of the parties shall be rendered ineffectual to prove marriage by reason, of the existence, at a previous period, of some bar to the interchange of consent. It would be very unfortunate if it were so. * * * There is no foundation for the argument that the matrimonial consent must of necessity be referred to the commencement of the cohabitation, nor any warrant for the-appellant’s ingenious argument that, as the consent interchanged must be-referred to some particular period, which he insisted was at the commencement of the cohabitation, and therefore insufficient, the cohabitation, which continued afterwards without interruption, would warrant no other conclusion than that which would be warranted by the consent interchanged at a time when it was insufficient. I should undoubtedly oppose to that another, and, I think, a sounder, rule and principle of law, namely, that you must infer the consent to have been given at the first moment when you find the parties able to enter into the contract The conclusion, therefore, that I derive, and which, unquestionably, is consistent with the language of the cases which have been referred to, is that the consent between these parties was given, and that the marriage, therefore, in theory of law, took place, at*131 the time when, by the death of the first husband, they became competent to enter into the contract.” L. R. 1 H. L. Sc. p. 212.
Lord Cranworth said:
“I cannot but infer, from all which occurred with respect to the mode in which these persons lived together, not only that they desired to be husband and wife, but also that they believed themselves to be so. In such circumstances we ought to infer, after their deaths, that at some time during the long period during which they lived together, and in some manner, however informal, they did that which they could do without any difficulty, viz., enter into an agreement to be or become married persons, and so to acquire for themselves and their children the status which the evidence satisfies me they wished to enjoy.” L. R. 1 H. L. Sc. p. 206.
The other authorities which have been cited above demonstrate the fact that the English and American courts have adopted the views and have followed the principle thus announced in the Breadalbane Case, and have permitted these views and this salutary principle of law to control the determination of like cases whenever they have been presented for decision.
Do the facts of this case subject it to the application of this principle? One of the witnesses testified that while Mary Quan was living with Dr. Fleming on Chestnut street she first told her she was married to him, but subsequently said that he had another wife, and that this was what was making her unhappy. This testimony and her continued cohabitation and life with him show clearly enough that she desired the matrimonial relation. Moreover, there is a class _ of evidence in this record that is free from all suspicion of preparation for the trial of this issue, from all taint of prejudice, interest, or influence, and that is undimmed by the lapse of memory. It portrays the purpose, intentions, and desires of these parties in establishing and maintaining their relation in a way that cannot fail to carry conviction to the mind of every unprejudiced reader. It consists of more than 40 letters written to Mary Quan by Dr. Fleming between April 1, 1887, and June 18, 1897. In the' first letter, which is postmarked April 2, 1888, he wrote to her: “You are well aware how I am situated, plenty financially and possessing all the world’s goods that ought to make me happy; yet there is lacking the one great thing, love connubially. No respect, — no confidence; nature forces me to look elsewhere. I am of a very loving and amorous disposition. What am I to do?” He wrote her on December 19, 1888: “I am feeling a great deál better, and if I could only be with you would be perfectly well again. I hope the day is not very far off when you and I will be together for good.” On December 24, 1888, he wrote: “Perhaps this time next year we will be together for good.” On December 26, 1888, he wrote: “This time next year I hope and trust, sweet one, that you and I will be together for good, never to be separated, not even by death.” And on January 23, 1889, he wrote: “I am not happy without you, and never will be contented until you and I are united forever, never to be separated either in this world or the next.” Here are but a few extracts from the many letters contained in this record. These letters cover a long period of time. They show no change of affection, desire, or purpose, but exhibit from the commencement of the correspondence, in 1887, until its close, in 1897,
In the absence of countervailing evidence, the testimony of the declarations regarding the impotency and sterility of the doctor, regarding the two or three declarations that he made that the boy was not his son, regarding the few statements of Mary Quan that she was not his wife, regarding her acts of burning papers and of stating the date of the birth of her son a year too late, regarding her lack of chastity and the unnatural practices in which she and the doctor are alleged to have indulged, their oaths that they were single when they applied for their license to marry, and evidence of less importance which points in the same direction, might well -overcome the presumption of legitimacy, and lead to the conclusion that these parties were not married until the ceremony of October 4, 1892. But all this evidence is overwhelmed by the persuasive proof that, while the relation between the doctor and Mary Quan was illicit in its inception, it was entered upon and continued with the actual and expressed desire and purpose to make it matrimonial instead of meretricious as soon as the obstacle of the doctor’s first marriage should be removed; that upon the removal of this obstacle the cohabitation continued so that the presumptions of the marriage and of the legitimacy of its issue immediately arose when the decree of divorce was rendered in November, 1890; that the doctor and Mary Quan were reputed to' be husband and wife among all their acquaintances and friends who knew them at 206 Chestnut street; that they lived and cohabited together as Mr. and Mrs. Fleming; that they declared themselves to be so; that they addressed and introduced each other as husband and wife during all the time from 1889 until the death of the doctor; that from the time when Dr." Fleming deserted his wife, in the fall of 1889, and established his permanent relation with Mary Quan in the rooms on Chestnut street, until his death, in 1898, he supported her, and exhibited an
The effect of the conclusion which has now been reached, the conclusion that there was an actual marriage between Dr. Fleming and the mother of the defendant Alfred W. Fleming in November, 1890, is that he was born in lawful wedlock, and that he is presumptively the legitimate son and heir of the doctor. It is still contended by counsel for the complainants, however, that the evidence conclusively shows that Dr. Fleming could not have been the father of this boy, and that his paternity must be attributed to some one of the younger men who visited the apartments of his mother. They insist that the age of the doctor, in 1891, 63 years; his previous habit of intoxication; the fact that he had no children by his first wife, although she had borne one to her first husband; his own declarations and those of his wives to the effect that he was impotent or sterile; the testimony that he suffered from gonorrhea; the fact that he lived with Mary Quan three years before she bore her son; the testimony of the unnatural practices in. which they indulged, and of the illicit relations between Mary Quan and other men, — conclusively prove that Dr. Fleming was incapable of begetting a child, and that he could not have been the father of her son. They are met, however, by the indisputable principle of the law that where once a marriage is proved nothing can impugn the legitimacy of the issue short of proof of facts which show it to have been impossible that the husband could have been the father. Patterson v. Gaines, 6 How. 550, 558, 12 L. Ed. 553. Now, the substance of the evidence for the complainants upon this issue, with the exception of the testimony relative to the declarations of the doctor and his wives upon this subject, was submitted to six medical experts, three produced by the complainants and three by the defendants, and the former answered that it was not, and' the latter that it was, possible for Dr. Fleming to have been the father of the son of his wife. The testimony of the experts does not persuade us that the strong presumption of legitimacy was overcome thereby.
The court below excluded from the evidence all the testimony of the declarations of Dr. Fleming and of his two wives relative to his impotency and his sterility, and the testimony of one witness relative to a declaration of the doctor that he had suffered from gonorrhea, and these rulings are assigned as error. Objection to the consideration of these specifications of error is made because no exceptions
There is another reason for this result. There is a statute in the state of Missouri which reads: “If a man, having by a woman a child or children, shall afterward intermarry with her, and shall recognize such child or children to be his, they shall thereby be legitimated.” Rev. St. Mo. § 2917. It is contended by counsel for the appellees, on the one hand, that under this statute recognition of the children by the husband is conclusive evidence that he was their father. On the other hand, counsel for the appellants insist that it is only those children which the husband has had by a woman before the marriage that his recognition legitimates, that it does not legitimate children -which the woman has had by other men before the marriage, and that the issue whether or not the woman had the child or children in question by the man who subsequently becomes her husband or by another man is always open to proof de hors the recognition of the husband. The majority of the court is of the opinion that the contention of counsel for the appellees is sound and
The sum of the whole matter is that the defendant Alfred W. Fleming is the legitimate son-and heir of Dr. Alfred W. Fleming, deceased, and that the decree of the court below must be affirmed. It is so ordered.
Concurrence Opinion
(concurring). The evidence in this case, which I have studied attentively, has not served to convince me of the existence of a common-law marriage between Dr. Fleming and Mary C. Quan, notwithstanding the presumption that is so earnestly invoked in support of the existence of such a marriage contract. I am of opinion that their relations were illicit, and were understood by them to be illicit, until their formal marriage, on October 4, 1892, which was one month after the child Alfred W. Fleming was born. I accordingly dissent from the conclusion reached by my associates -as to the existence of a common-law marriage.
I concur, however, in the order affirming the decree below for the following reasons:
The Missouri statute (Rev. St. Mo. 1899, § 2917), quoted in the foregoing opinion, declares that “if a man, having by a woman a child, * * * shall afterward intermarry with her and shall recognize such child * * * to be his,” it shall thereby be legitimated. This statute, in my opinion, in effect makes the fact that a man recognizes a child, born out of wedlock, as his offspring, after he has married the mother, persuasive, if not conclusive, evidence that he is the father of such child. The question, is pertinent, why did the legislature require recognition unless it was to be taken as evidence ■of paternity from one who was most liable to know the fact ? It cannot be reasonably claimed that the legislature intended that recognition should have no probative force, as respects the question of paternity, and that this latter fact must be established otherwise than by recognition. No legislature would be apt to sanction such a doctrine, and, if it had been the intention of, the legislature to formulate that rule, nothing would have been, said concerning recognition, but the statute would have simply declared that if a man has by a woman a child, and subsequently marries her, the child shall be deemed legitimate. Besides, the rule which denies that recognition has any probative force or only slight weight, as bearing on the question of paternity, would leave an illegitimate child in practically the same helpless and unfortunate condition which such children occupied before the statute was enacted, since it would frequently be impossible for a child to prove its paternity otherwise than by recognition. The statute in question was inspired by an humane purpose. It was intended primarily for the benefit of those who were so unfortunate as to be born out of wedlock, and who, for that reason, were made out-. casts by the common law, and looked upon as having no inheritable blood. As the statute is remedial, and was enacted mainly for the
In the present case it is not necessary to adopt the extreme view that recognition of an illegitimate child by a man who has married its mother is conclusive proof of paternity which no evidence can overturn, and hence that the legitimacy of a child born out of wedlock, if it is recognized, by force of the statute is placed on a firmer foundation than the legitimacy of a child born in lawful wedlock, and no decisive opinion need be expressed on that point. I think that it is true, however, that by the recognition of a child born out of wedlock, under the circumstances aforesaid, such a child is placed in the same favorable position as one born during wedlock; that it can only be rendered a bastard, after such recognition, by the same kind of proof which is required to overturn the legitimacy of a child born in the course of wedlock; and that it is entitled to the benefit of the same presumptions.
I fully concur in the views expressed in the foregoing opinion to the effect that the evidence in the case at bar was insufficient to show that Dr. Fleming was not and could not have been the father of Alfred W. Fleming, and also insufficient to overcome the very strong presumption of legitimacy which the law raises for the protection of those who are born in the course of wedlock. It being my view of the case, as above expressed, that’ because Alfred W. Fleming was recognized by Dr. Fleming as his child, after the formal marriage on October 4, 1892, and continuously until the doctor’s death, such recognition placed the child in the same favorable position as if born in the course of wedlock, it follows, as a matter of course, that the evidence in question was likewise insufficient to overcome the presumption of legitimacy which existed in his favor, although there had been no common-law marriage prior to Alfred W. Fleming’s birth.
For these reasons, somewhat hastily expressed, I concur in the order affirming the decree of the lower court.