Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. City of Corry, Appeal, No. 358

Appeal, No. 358 | Pa. | Jul 11, 1900

Opinion by

Me. Justice Mitchell,

The city of Corry formally contracted for the building of a sewer, the contractor performed the work, the city accepted it, and is in possession, but it now seeks to escape payment on the ground that its contract was ultra vires. If this is true the overruling requirements of public policy compel us to hold the defense good in law, however unjust and dishonest in morals. But the invalidity of the contract should be clearly established, and the burden of showing it is on the city. This being a case stated all facts not contained in it must be assumed not to exist, and the consequences must fall on the party having the burden of proof.

The contract called for the building of- a sewer for the price of $57,000, $9,800 of which was to be paid out of the general sewer fund, and the remainder to. be assessed upon the property-benefited by the contemplated sewer. The city by ordinance appropriated the $9,300 out of the general sewer fund and it was duly paid, so that it is only material to the present inquiry so far as it may bear upon the validity of the contract at the time it was made. By ordinance and proceedings in court the rest of the contract price was duly assessed upon the property benefited, including that which abutted on the line of the sewer, and some that did not. The city collected all of the assessments of the former class and many of the latter, and has paid out all the orders on the treasurer given to the contractor so far as the funds collected would go. But some owners of non-abutting property having resisted payment, the assessments of that class were held invalid, and the funds not being produced from the expected source, payment of the outstanding orders was refused and the holder brought this suit upon them.

At the date of the contract in 1891 it is admitted that the debt of the city of Corry was in excess of its constitutional limit, but several years having been consumed in the building of the sewer the debt meanwhile had been so far reduced that the balance ■ due on this contract could be paid without transgressing the constitutional restrictions. On this point, however, the court below rightly held that the validity of the contract must be determined as of the time it was made. The question therefore is, did this contract increase the debt of the city of Corry at the date of its execution.

As to the $9,300 to be paid by the city out of the general sewer fund, there is nothing in the case stated to show that the amount was not then in the city treasury or payable and subsequently paid out of the current revenues. This item therefore did not increase the city’s indebtedness in the prohibited sense. There is no constitutional restriction on municipal expenditure, provided it is paid as it goes. What is prohibited is the incurring of debt. If the city has the money on hand or provides at the time a present means of raising it otherwise than by loan, it may contract for expenditure without restriction. In Appeal of the City of Erie, 91 Pa. 398" court="Pa." date_filed="1879-11-10" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/appeal-of-the-city-of-erie-6236287?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="6236287">91 Pa. 398, Gordon, J., quoting from Grant v. City of Davenport, 36 Iowa, 396" court="Iowa" date_filed="1873-04-28" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/grant-v-city-of-davenport-7095603?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="7095603">36 Iowa, 396, says : “ When a contract made by a municipal corporation pertains to its ordinary expenses and is, together with other like expenses, within the limits oí its current revenues and such special taxes as it may legally and in good faith intend to levy therefor, such contract does not constitute the incurring of indebtedness within the meaning of the constitutional provision limiting the power of municipal corporations to contract debts.” And he adds: “ If the contracts of municipal corporations do not overreach their current revenues, no objections can lawfully be made to them, however great the indebtedness of such municipalities may be ; for in such case their engagements do not extend beyond their present means of payment, and so no debt is created.” This is quoted with approval by our Brother I)BAN in Wade v. Oakmont Boro., 165 Pa. 479" court="Pa." date_filed="1895-01-07" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/wade-v-oakmont-borough-6242668?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="6242668">165 Pa. 479, 488.

It is not, however, always possible to adapt present action to future results with absolute precision, and if means are adopted which in good faith, according to reasonable expectation, will produce a sufficient fund, the contract entered into on the faith of them should not be held unlawful on account of an unintentional miscalculation, or an accidental and unexpected failure to produce the full result. Thus if a city at the time of making a contract levies a special tax in good faith supposed to be adequate to meet it, but in consequence of fire or flood or decline in values the result is an insufficient fund, it cannot be held that the contract good at its inception would thereby be made bad. The constitutional restriction was not intended to make municipalities dishonest, nor to prevent those who contract with them from collecting their just claims, but to check rash expenditure on credit, and to prevent loading the future with the results of present inconsiderate extravagance.

In the present case the city of Corry provided the contract price of the sewer by an appropriation of money which, as already said, we must assume to have been in the treasury, and by assessments upon the property benefited. There is nothing to indicate that these assessments were not in good faith and reasonable expectation supposed to be adequate to produce the required fund and offered and accepted by the contracting parties in the mutual belief in their validity. So far as they were upon abutting property they ñilfilled their intended purpose. The distinction in regard to uonabutting property had not then been made, and was not in contemplation of either side. When it was determined that this part of the agreed means of payment would be unavailable, the loss should in equity and justice fall on the city which has received the full consideration stipulated for, and to this extent paid nothing.

The cases on this subject are conflicting. See Dillon on Municipal Corporations (4th ed.), secs. 480-482 and notes. They show that there is no disposition of the question which is wholly free from difficulty. We have preferred to follow the line which we think not inferior in just legal reasoning, while clearly superior in the honesty and justice of the result reached.

There is another view of this particular case which leads to the same conclusion. As already said the building of the sewer occupied several years. During the progress of the work differences arose in regard to payments, and in 1895 a compromise was agreed upon between the contractor and a committee of the city council, subsequently ratified by ordinance, whereby the outstanding orders.in favor of the contractor were canceled, and new orders issued against which the city stipulated that no defense should be made by it. Among such new orders are those now sued on. The validity of the assessments on non-abutting property was then undecided. The contractor agreed to furnish additional counsel and aid in the prosecution of a test case on this subject, and to abate the sum of $550 from his claim, should such suit be decided against the city. This compromise was carried out by the parties except as to the payment of the orders involved in this suit. No reason is shown why it was not entirely valid and binding. The case stated does not show that the stipulated payments on these orders could not at that time have been made from money in the treasury, or from current revenue, even if that fact had been a necessary element in the validity of the compromise.

Judgment reversed and judgment directed to be entered for the plaintiff for $6,000 with interest.