74 N.J.L. 649 | N.J. | 1907
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Plaintiff recovered a verdict and judgment for personal injuries sustained by him in a collision between an automobile driven by the defendant and a bicycle propelled by the plaintiff. The assignments of error relate to the instructions given or refused to be given by the trial justice to the jury.
Only two matters require mention.
First. The trial judge refused to charge, as requested, that if the plaintiff had deliberately attempted to exaggerate his injuries, the jury had a right to consider such fact in deciding for themselves how much weight they would give to the other statements in the plaintiffs testimony. We are unable to find in the record any evidence that the plaintiff did deliberately attempt to exaggerate his injuries. Assuming that he did so attempt, yet the maxim falsus in uno falsus in omnibus, upon which the request to charge was based, is not a mandatory rule of evidence, but is rather a permissible inference that the j ury may or may not draw when convinced that an attempt has been made by a witness to mislead them in some material respect. In the ease of the Santissima Trinidad, 7 Wheat. 283, 339, Mr. Justice Story said: “Where a party speaks to a fact in respect to which he cannot be presumed liable to mistake, as in relation to the country of his birth, or his being in a vessel on a particular voyage, or living in a particular place, if the fact turn out otherwise, it is extremely difficult to exempt him from the charge of deliberate falsehood, and courts of justice, under such circumstances, are bound, upon principles of law, and morality and justice, to apply the maxim falsus in uno falsus in omnibusBut this was said in discussing the weight of the evidence, and was not, as we take it, intended to lay down a positive rule of. law, to be applied in all cases. See, also, 3 Jones Ev., § 905; 30 Am. & Eng. Encycl. L. (2d ed.) 1072.
To the same effect are numerous other decisions of this court, among which may be mentioned Oliver v. Phelps, 1 Zab. 597, 609; Kalbfleisch v. Standard Oil Co., 14 Vroom 259, 260; Trade Insurance Co. v. Barracliff, 16 Id. 543; Packard v. Bergen Neck Railway Co., 25 Id. 553; Garretson v. Appleton, 29 Id. 386, 391.
Th,e exception now under consideration did not at all point out what legal proposition was intended to be challenged. The exception was therefore nugatory. We may add that the only criticism that is pressed upon us in the argument here is to that clause in the charge which declares in substance that by the Automobile act of 1903 these vehicles are not subjected to section 91 of the Road act of 1874. Gen. Stat., p. 2823. This is quite true so far as anything in the act of 1903 is concerned. If the learned trial justice was in error in the view he expressed, aside from the act of 1903, to the effect (hat automobiles are not “carriages” within the meaning of section 91 of the Eoad act, which requires drivers of carriages upon the public roads, when met by another carriage, to keep to the right, and when overtaken by a carriage, to likewise keep to the right, so as in both cases to permit the carriage met or overtaken (sic) to pass free and uninterrupted, it remains to be said that the effect of this instruction was favorable to the defendant, as tending to absolve him from criticism by reason of the fact that he was driving his motor car on the-left side of the street, which admittedly he was doing at the time of the collision.
The other assignments of error have been examined, and found to be without substance.
The judgment under review should be affirmed.
For reversal — None.