140 S.E. 24 | N.C. | 1927
On 29 March, 1927, the board of commissioners of the town of Fuquay Springs passed two ordinances authorizing the issuance of bonds — the first in the sum of $90,000 for a water system, the second in the sum of $60,000 for a sewer system, each ordinance containing the proviso that it should take effect when approved by popular vote. The election was held and a majority of the votes were in favor of issuing the bonds. The plaintiffs, citizens and taxpayers of the town, brought suit to enjoin the sale of the bonds, setting up irregularities and statutory provisions which they alleged vitiated the election. On the return day the temporary restraining order was vacated and set aside, and the plaintiffs excepted and appealed.
The General Assembly may confer upon municipal corporations the power to create debts and issue bonds for necessary expenses without the approval of a majority of the qualified voters; but when it is provided by statute or ordinance that a proposition to incur the indebtedness shall be submitted to the voters their approval is necessary to a valid issuance of the bonds.McKethan v. Comrs.,
The appellants impeach the election on the ground that it was held without authority of law. The statute reads as follows: "Whenever the taking effect of an ordinance authorizing the issuance of bonds is dependent upon the approval of the ordinance by the voters of a municipality, the governing body may submit the ordinance to the voters at an election to be held not more than six months after the passage of the ordinance. The governing body may call a special election for that purpose or may submit the ordinance to the voters at the regular municipal election next succeeding the passage of the ordinance, but no such special election shall be held within one month before or after a regular election." C. S., 2948(2).
We deem it clear that the last two words, "regular election," relate to the antecedent "regular municipal election" and not, as contended by the appellees, to a general State and National election. This is the more reasonable, if not the only reasonable, interpretation of the statute. The regular municipal election was held on 7 May, 1927, and the special bond election on 7 June, 1927. The question is whether the latter election was held within one month after the former.
The word month shall be construed to be a calendar month, unless otherwise expressed. C. S., 3949(3). "The modern authorities, which are very numerous, recognize but two sorts of months, lunar and calendar. The lunar month, when spoken of in statutes, consists of twenty-eight days; a calendar month contains the number of days ascribed to it in the calendar, varying from twenty-eight to thirty-one." S. v. Upchurch,
The time within which an act is to be done shall be computed by excluding the first and including the last day. C. S., 922. If 7 May be *426
excluded the election of 7 June took place within a calendar month after the regular municipal election, because 7 June was the last day of the calendar month commencing after the expiration of 7 May. This is the law as expounded in Burgess v. Burgess,
The remaining question, whether the statute prohibiting an election within the prescribed time (C. S., 2948(2) is mandatory or directory, has been resolved against the position taken by the defendants. With respect to a special tax in special school districts a statute provided that no election for revoking such tax should be ordered and held in the district within less than two years from the date of the election at which the tax was voted and the district established. C. S., 5533. In Weesner v.Davidson,
The election of 7 June was void because it took place within a period during which the statute in express terms provided it should not be held. Judgment
Reversed. *427
