OPINION
This сase involves an insurance coverage dispute over whether there was sufficient evidence at trial to establish that a third-party had the permission of the policyholder to use the insured automobile, thereby making the insurer liable for damages resulting from the third-party’s use of the policyholder’s car. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the Superior Court, which held that the evidence was not sufficient to render the insurance company liable.
The underlying history giving rise to this matter is that Ronald Miller, while driving a car owned by his girlfriend’s mother, hit and injured appellant David Adamski, who was riding nearby on a motorcyсle. Following a bench trial in the Northampton County Court of Common Pleas, the jury awarded $305,000.00 in' damages to appellants Adamski and his wife. 1 Because the car Miller used was insured by Allstate Insurance Company, appellants then filed an action to garnish the policy limits under the mother’s automobile insurance policy claiming that Allstate, as the insurer of the mother’s car, was liable under the insurance poliсy for partial payment of the damages Miller caused. 2 Allstate denied coverage arguing that it was not liable for any damages because it was only liable under the policy for damages if the drivеr had permission from the insured to drive the insured’s car, and Miller did not have the mother’s permission to drive her car. 3
*319
Following a bench trial, the trial court found that Miller had the mother’s implied consent to use the vehicle and entered a verdict in favor of appellants and against Allstate in the amount of $50,000.00. Allstate filed post-trial motions requesting,
inter alia,
that the trial court enter a judgment notwithstanding the verdict because it believed appellants failed to establish that Miller had the mother’s consent to drive her automobile. The trial court denied appellee’s post-trial motions. On appeal, the Superior Cоurt found that the trial court had abused its discretion in finding that implied consent existed and reversed the trial court’s ruling in favor of appellants.
Adamski v. Miller,
The proper standard of reviеw for an appellate court when examining the lower court’s refusal to grant a judgment n.o.v. is whether, when reading the record in the light most favorable to the verdict winner and granting that party every favorable inference therefrom, there was sufficient competent evidence to sustain the verdict.
Wenrick v. Schloemann-Siemag Aktiengesellschaft,
*320 Viewing the evidenсe in its proper light, with all reasonable inferences therefrom, the record reveals the following: Miller testified that he began dating the insured’s daughter in 1992. Sometime in 1994, the insured arranged for appellee and her daughter to live together at an apartment complex after the daughter became pregnant. 4 Shortly thereafter, on July 19, 1994, while appellee drove the daughter from her brother’s housе back to their apartment due to her feeling ill, he collided with appellant Adamski’s motorcycle.
At all times pertinent, the daughter had possession of the mother’s car (which was kept at the apartment complex where the daughter and Miller resided) and control of the keys. At no time did Miller have a vehicle of his own, a situation of which the mother was aware. The daughter permitted Miller to use thе car to travel to and from his work, to go the store, visit his family and for other occasions. Miller further testified that he was the person that handled the maintenance of the car and that he did so at his own expense. When asked whether the mother was aware that he drove the car, he testified that on at least one instance before the collision, when driving home from work during the afternoon, she actually saw him driving the car and talked to him after he stopped the car to talk to her. He further testified that at no time did the mother tell him that he should not or could not drive her car.
The mother testified that she had repeatedly told her daughter that only she, her husband and her daughter could drive the car, and that the day before the collision she had expressly told her daughter that she was the only person allowed to drive the car to her brother’s the following day. The mother further testified that she was unaware that Miller was going to the brother’s house the next day, that she never told Miller he could not drive her car, that she knеw Miller and' her daughter were living- together, that she knew Miller did not own a car, that Miller had never asked for permission to drive her car, that she was the person that maintained the car, that she had never sеen Miller drive her car and that after the accident she took the car away from her daughter *321 since her daughter had violated her rules by allowing Miller to drive the car.
The daughter testified via deposition 5 that on the day of the accident, Miller had been drinking at her brother’s house, that around 3:30 p.m. she decided it was time for them to leave so that they could get home before dark, that she told Miller he could not drive the car since he hаd been drinking and because her mother did not allow him to drive the car but that he took the keys from her and drove her home over her objections. She further testified that she did not keep the car, that her mоther only let her use the car on occasion, that she never willingly let anyone use the car other than herself although Miller had taken the car without her express permission on at least two occasions before the accident, that as a result of Miller threatening her she had lied in a prior statement that she was not feeling well on the 19th and that she allowed Miller to drive the car, that Miller never maintained her mother’s car, that her aunt had seen someone driving the car other than hefself and informed her mother, that upon learning that someone else had driven the car, her mother repеated to her that she was not to let others drive her car, and that her mother did not like Miller. The daughter further testified that after the accident Miller broke up with her to go back to a former girlfriend.
Notwithstanding thеse conflicting accounts, the trial court found Miller’s testimony to be more credible and found that the evidence demonstrated that he had the mother’s implied consent to use the covered automobile. Given this evidence, we must now determine whether the trial court properly found that Miller had the mother’s implied consent to use her car thereby making Allstate liable for a portion of the damаges.
In speaking to the issue of whether a third-party’s actions are covered under another’s insurance policy, this Court has stated:
*322 the operator must be shown to have obtained possession оf the car lawfully and with permission, express or implied, of the named [insured]; if there is a complete lack of permission to use the car for any purpose, the operator is clearly not within the coverage of the policy.
Brower v. Employers’ Liability Assurance Co.,
We find the evidence found by the trial court to be credible and amply supported the trial court’s verdict and that, accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Allstate’s motion for a judgment n.o.v. 6 Id.
*323 Accordingly, the Superior Court’s order reversing the trial court’s ruling is, itself, reversed.
NIX, Former C.J., did not participate in the decision of this case.
Notes
. The jury awarded $265,000.00 to Mr. Adamski for his injuries and damages and $40,000.00 to his wife for loss of consortium.
. The pоlicy limit was $50,000.00 per person, with a $100,000.00 limit each occurrence.
. The policy at issue provided, in pertinent part, that:
Persons Insured
*319 (1) While using your insured auto
(a) You
(b) Any resident relative, and
(c) Any other person using it with your permission.
Reproduced Record at 211 (italics added). "You” or "Your” is defined under the policy as: "the policyholder named on the declarаtions page and that policyholder's resident spouse.” R.R. at 215. Miller testified that the policyholder’s spouse never saw him drive the car or gave him permission to do so; thus, it is clear that permission could not have been obtained from the "resident spouse.”
. Miller was seventeen years old at the time of the collision at issue.
. The trial court determined the daughter to be unavailable since she lived in Massachusetts and was beyond the subpoena power of the court; hence, her deposition taken in this case was admitted as evidence.
.
The cases cited by appellants and the Superior Court in support of the argument that implied permission did not arise in this matter are not compelling in that none of these cases involved circumstances where the insured had actual knowledge of the so-called prohibited use and failed to voice an objection to it, as was the case in the instant matter.
See, e.g., Volk v. Cacchione,