Adams v. United States, 474 U.S. 971

Adams v. United States

474 U.S. 971

SCOTUS

1985

Check Treatment

ADAMS v. UNITED STATES

No. 85-5046

C. A. 3d Cir.

971

Association of Trial Lawyers of America, and Asbestos Victims of America for leave to file briefs as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied.

No. 85-364. DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES OF RUSK COUNTY ET AL. v. J. C. Ct. App. Wis. Motion of National Association of Counsel for Children for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied.

No. 85-366. KING v. LOVE. C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied. JUSTICE BRENNAN would grant certiorari.

No. 85-388. DILLON v. POTOMAC HOSPITAL CORP. Sup. Ct. Va. Motion of Virginia Brown et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae granted. Certiorari denied.

No. 85-463. MEYERS INDUSTRIES, INC. v. PRILL ET AL. C. A. D. C. Cir. Motion of petitioner for leave to intervene denied. Certiorari denied.

No. 85-482. FIRESTONE TIRE & RUBBER CO. v. COUSINEAU, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF COUSINEAU, ET AL. Ct. App. Mich. Motion of National Association of Manufacturers for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae granted. Certiorari denied.

No. 85-607. BURCHE v. CATERPILLAR TRACTOR CO. C. A. 7th Cir. Motion of respondent to strike purported revision of the petition denied. Certiorari denied.

No. 85-5046.

ADAMS v. UNITED STATES. C. A. 3d Cir. Certiorari denied.

JUSTICE WHITE, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins, dissenting.

This case presents the issue of the agreement necessary to support a conviction for so-called RICO conspiracy. For his part in a large-scale narcotics distribution scheme, petitioner Adams was convicted of both the substantive RICO offense defined by 18 U. S. C. § 1962(c)^* and conspiracy to commit this offense. Petitioner requested a jury instruction that he could not be found guilty on the conspiracy count unless the evidence showed that he had personally agreed to commit two acts of racketeering activity. The District Judge refused this instruction. In affirming petitioner‘s RICO conspiracy conviction, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that, to be convicted of conspiracy to violate § 1962(c), a defendant need only agree to the commission of two predicate acts of racketeering activity, and need not agree to personally commit those acts.

759 F. 2d 1099, 1116 (1985).

The Courts of Appeals disagree as to the proper interpretation of 18 U. S. C. § 1962(d), the RICO conspiracy statute. Some require, as the predicate for conviction under § 1962(d) of conspiracy to violate § 1962(c), an agreement to personally commit two acts of racketeering activity. See, e. g.,

United States v. Ruggiero, 726 F. 2d 913, 921 (CA2), cert. denied sub nom. Rabito v. United States, 469 U. S. 831 (1984); . Other Courts of Appeals agree with the Third Circuit that § 1962(d) also makes unlawful an agreement that another violate § 1962(c) by committing two acts of racketeering activity. See, e. g., .

Surprisingly, even the Government‘s interpretation of the RICO conspiracy statute has not been wholly consistent. In

Winter, supra, the Government conceded that a count under § 1962(d) of conspiracy to violate § 1962(c) requires proof that the defendant “agreed to commit personally two or more predicate crimes constituting a pattern of racketeering activity.” .

In other cases, including this one, the Government has argued for the interpretation of § 1962(d) adopted by the Third Circuit.

“The legislative history [of the RICO statute] clearly demonstrates that [it] was intended to provide new weapons of unprecedented scope for an assault upon organized crime and its economic roots.”

Russello v. United States, 464 U. S. 16, 26 (1983). If the Third Circuit‘s interpretation of § 1962(d) is correct, Congress’ intent is being frustrated in those circuits which adhere to the narrower view of RICO conspiracy. If the Third Circuit‘s interpretation is incorrect, defendants are being exposed to conviction for behavior Congress did not intend to reach under § 1962(d). I would grant certiorari to resolve the conflict among the Courts of Appeals.

No. 85-5141. DEGARMO v. TEXAS. Ct. Crim. App. Tex. Certiorari denied.

JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL joins, dissenting.

Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153 (1976), six Justices concluded that a capital sentencing scheme that directs and limits the jury‘s discretion minimizes the risk of arbitrary and freakish imposition of the death penalty and thereby cures the defects that led the Court in , to invalidate capital punishment as unconstitutionally cruel and unusual. I dissented in because I do not believe that the unconstitutionality of capital punishment depends upon the procedures under which the penalty is inflicted. In my view, the constitutional infirmity in the punishment of death is that “it treats ‘members of the human race as nonhumans, as objects to be toyed with and discarded‘” and is thus “inconsistent with the fundamental premise of the [Eighth Amendment] that even the vilest criminal remains a human being possessed of common human dignity.” (BRENNAN, J., dissenting) (quoting ).

I have adhered to this view that capital punishment is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. I do so again today. But even if I agreed that capital punishment is constitutional if imposed in a rational and nondiscriminatory manner, I remain convinced that the Court deludes itself when it insists that the infliction of the death penalty, as currently administered, is not

Notes

In writing the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U. S. C. § 1961 et seq., Congress defined three new substantive offenses, 18 U. S. C. §§ 1962(a), (b), (c), and also made it unlawful to conspire to commit these substantive offenses, 18 U. S. C. § 1962(d). Title 18 U. S. C. § 1962(c), the relevant substantive offense in this case, provides:

“It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise‘s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.”

Title 18 U. S. C. § 1961(5) provides that the term “pattern of racketeering activity” requires at least two acts of racketeering activity, a term which in turn is defined at 18 U. S. C. § 1961(1).