78 Ala. 489 | Ala. | 1885
The questions presented by this record arise on charges given and refused. We will consider only such as are pressed in argument before us.
The fifth charge given at the instance of the plaintiffs is in the following language: “ Fraud is not by law, or in common charity, imputable, when the facts and circumstances out of which it is supposed to arise may consist with purity of intention. To justify the imputation of fraud, the facts must be such that they are not explicable on any other reasonable hypothesis.” The objection to the charge is, that in its second clause it exacts too high a measure of proof, when fraud is sought to be established.. This charge was, in substance, copied from the language of this court in Tompkins v. Niohols, 53 Ala. 197, which was itself copied from Steele v. Kinkle, 3 Ala. 352, opinion by Ormond, J. This strong statement of the principle was scarcely called for by the facts in either of those cases; but some authorities may be found which state the principle in substantially the same terms. — Lyman v. Cressford, 15 Iowa, 229; Schofield v. Blind, 33 Iowa, 175; Dallam v. Renshaw, 26 Mo. 533. So, in Bump on Fraudulent Conv. (3d ed.) 603, it is said, “ Fraud will never be imputed, when the circumstances and facts upon which it is predicated may consist with honesty and purity of intention.”
In support of the principle as stated in Tompkins v. Nichols, supra, three former rulings of this court are cited: Steele v. Kinkle, supra; Smith v. Br. Bank, 21 Ala. 125, and Ala. Life Ins. Co. v. Pettway, 24 Ala. 566. The last named two authorities do not support the principle for which they are cited. Bump, in his treatise on Fraudulent Conveyances, 602-5, says: “ Fraud in the transfer of goods or land may be shown by the same amount of proof as will establish any other fact in its own nature as likely to exist. In any case, the number and cogency of circumstances from which guilt may
We have cited two decisions of this court — Steele v. Kinkle, 3 Ala. 358, and Tompkins v. Nichols, 53 Ala. 197 — which support the correctness of the charge we are considering. We have many rulings which express the principle differently. We are not allowed to infer fraud, “when the facts out of which it is supposed to arise may well consist with honesty and pure intention.” — Smith v. Br. Bank, 21 Ala. 125 ; Stiles v. Lightfooot, 26 Ala. 443. “ If the circumstances relied on to sustain that allegation [fraud] are fairly susceptible of an honest intent, that construction should be placed upon them.” Ala. Life Lns. v. Pettway, 24 Ala. 544; Crommelin v. McCauley, 67 Ala. 542. “The law never presumes fraud, and it wall not be imputed when the facts and circumstances from
Charge 5, properly interpreted, lays down the same measure, and requires the same fullness of proof, as is required to authorize a conviction of crime; for facts proven, which are not explicable on any other reasonable hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused, will authorize a jury to convict of a criminal offense. This is not the correct rule in any civil case. Fraud requires no higher measure of proof for its establishment in any civil proceeding, than is required in many other cases, where the presumption of honesty, official uprightness, or kindred presumption, is to be . overcome. The assailing party encounters the presumption of honesty and fair dealing; but it is a disputable presumption, the burden of overcoming which rests on him. When he produces facts and circumstances in evidence, which not only cast a suspicion on the transaction, but show a state of facts which are not fairly or reasonably reconcilable with fair dealing and honesty of purpose, then he has overcome the presumption of purity of intention, and is entitled to a judgment of condemnation. We approve the statement of the principle as found in Smith v. Br. Bank, 21 Ala. 125, Stiles v. Lightfoot, 26 Ala. 443, Ala. Life Ins. Co. v. Pettway, 24 Ala. 544, Thames v. Rembert, 63 Ala. 561, Pickett v. Pipkin, 64 Ala. 520, and Crommelin v. McCauley, 67 Ala. 542. We disapprove and overrule the principle as expressed in Steele v. Kinkle, 3 Ala. 352, and Tompkins v. Nichols, 53 Ala. 197. The Circuit Court erred in giving charge No. 5.
Charge No. 6 confines the inquiry, and the effect of it, to propositions or suggestions alleged to have been made by Wellborn, one of plaintiffs, in the office of the attorneys to whom he and Adams had gone for mutual counsel. It had been testified that, before visiting the office of the attorneys, Wellborn “asked Adams if he could not give him, Adams, notes for double the amount due him, so that in this way Adams
There'is another objection to this charge. It partakes more of an argument, or of an answer to an argument, than it does of an assertion of a principle of law. Such mode of charging juries should not be encouraged.
Charges A and B, asked by defendant, were properly refused. The hypothesis of each of them contains an element, or sub-phrase, of which we find no proof. Thus, in charge A is this language: “Where a person not related might think it best for the interest of the creditors, to employ other personé.” There was, and probably could be, no testimony of what a person not related might think would be best for the creditors. The charge is not so framed as properly to raise the question intended to be raised, and is, at most, more an argument than a question of law. So, in charge B, we find [this language: “If the jury believe that Thornton & Wellborn intended, at and before the issuance of the attachment, to assign their whole property for the benefit of their creditors, and did so assign such property for that purpose, in pursuance of such intention, regardless of such attachment,” &c. There is no evidence in this record that Thornton & Wellborn entertained any thought of making an assignment, regardless of the attachment. On the contrary, the testimony was, that they considered their condition and financial standing too sound to justify such course, unless they were attached, or their northern creditors interfered with their business.
For the errors pointed out above, the judgment of the Circuit Court is reversed, and the cause remanded.