Adams v. Terrell, 4 F. 796

4 F. 796 | U.S. Cir. Ct. | 1880

Woods, C. J.

Upon the agreed facts the plaintiffs are entitled to a finding and judgment in their favor, unless their title has been divested by the proceedings in the bankruptcy, and the sale and deed made by the assignee in bankruptcy to the defendant. It is insisted by the plaintiffs that the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction neither of the persons of the bankrupts nor of the subject-matter of the bankruptcy. The defendant claims that the bankrupt court having exclusive jurisdiction of the subject of bankruptcies, and having necessarily decided that it had jurisdiction in this case, and having exercised its jurisdiction, its proceedings cannot be collaterally attacked, and must remain binding until reversed in a direct proceeding. He claims further that as long as debts of the firm of J. Ulrich & Co. remained unpaid the partnership existed, at least for the purpose of the collection of' its accounts and the payment of its debts; that under the terms of the will of Jones, and the peculiar law of Texas cited in the statement of facts, the executors were, in fact, trustees, and that judgments could be recovered against them and the property of the estate taken in execution, and that a partnership so situated might be put in bankruptcy, notwithstanding the death of one of the partners. He claims further that the acceptance by Ulrich of his discharge was an acceptance of service, or, at least, a waiver; the executors of Jones having accepted service, jurisdiction of the court over the persons of the firm was complete.

The first question to be answered is, can the proceedings of the bankrupt co'urt be attacked in this collateral proceeding ?

The rule has long been settled that the jurisdiction of any court may be challenged in any other court where its judgments or decrees are relied on. Elliott v. Peirsol, 1 Pet. 328; U. S. v. Arredondo, 6 Pet. 691; Vorhees v. Bank of U. S. 10 Pet. 475; Wilcox v. Jackson, 13 Pet. 511; Williamson v. Berrn, 8 Pet. 540. In the case last cited the court says: “The jurisdiction of any court exercising authority over a subject may be inquired into in any other courts whore the proceedings in the former are relied on and brought before the latter by a party claiming the benefit of such proceediags." It has in later cases even been held that the record of a judgment may be contradicted as to the facts necessary to give the court jurisdiction, and if it be shown that such facts did not exist the record will be a nullity, notwithstanding it may recite that those facts did exist. Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall. 457; Knowles v. Gas-light & Coke Co. 19 Wall. 58. These authorities, if authorities were needed, fully dispose of the question under consideration; and it is a most reasonable conclusion. No court can acquire jurisdiction and shut out inquiry by asserting or assuming that it possesses it. The validity of the proceedings of the bankrupt court, under which defendant claims, are therefore open to attack in this case.

We are next to inquire whether the individual property of the estate of Jones could be drawn into and administered in the bankrupt court by a proceeding against the linn, of which, when alive, he had been a member. Whatever power the bankrupt court possesses over the subject of bankruptcies it derives exclusively from the bankrupt act. Power not conferred by that act it does not possess. We look in vain through its sections to find any authority conferred to put the estate of a deceased person into bankruptcy. The twofold purpose which the bankrupt act has in view, viz., the equal and just distribution of the bankrupt’s estate among his creditors, and the discharge of the bankrupt from his debts, does not require the application of the law to the estate of the deceased person. The laws of the states provide for an equitable and just distribution of the decedent’s estate, and death has already discharged him of all personal liability.' The bankrupt law could, in the case of a deceased person, accomplish nothing not already accomplished without it.

While there is no direct authority given by the bankrupt act over the estates of deceased persons, the implication from what is expressed is strongly against such a jurisdiction. Section 12 of the act (Rev. St. 5090) declares, if the debtor dies after the issuing of the warrant, the proceedings may be continued and concluded in like manner as if he had lived; that is, the estate of a deceased may be administered after his death if the court has acquired jurisdiction over it in his lifetime.

This excludes the idea that such jurisdiction is conferred unless it is acquired during the life-time of the bankrupt. It lias, therefore, been held that if the debtor, in a case of invol-< untary bankruptcy, dies after the issuing of the order to show cause and before the trial, the proceedings abate, they being analogous to actions at law for torts which abate on the death of the party. McDonald, 8 B. R. 237.

There being then no warrant in the bankrupt aet to Justify an adjudication in bankruptcy against the individual estate of a deceased person, can such proceedings be sustained against his estate by means of a proceeding against the late firm, of which the deceased was a member?

The same lack of authority meets us here. There is absolutely no expression in the bankrupt act which warrants the assumption that the bankrupt court can take jurisdiction over the individual estate of a deceased partner. The law does not in terms confer jurisdiction over the assets of a partnership, one of whose members is dead. Hence it has been held that if a firm is dissolved by the death of one of the partners, the executors of the deceased partner cannot be brought into bankruptcy. In re Stevens, 1 Saw. 397, 5 B. R. 112.

And if the administrator of the deceased partner has given the necessary bond and taken charge "of the partnership property the district court may, in its discretion, even refuse to adjudge the partnership bankrupt. In re Daggett, 3 Dill. 83, and 8 B. R. 433.

’ I conclude, therefore, that over the individual estate of Jones the bankrupt court acquired no jurisdiction by this proceeding in bankruptcy. Nor is this decision to be overturned by the fact that the executors of Jones were not required, under the terms of the will, and by the laws of Texas, to account to the probate court. If they had been purely trustees, deriving no authority whatever from the probate court, the estate committed to them could not be drawn into bankruptcy. The bankrupt law makes no provision for the bankruptcy of trust estates, except by proceedings against the cestui que trust. The only reference to trust property is the provision that “no property held by the bankrupt in trust shall pass by the assignment.”

An indispensable requisite to an adjudication in bankruptcy is the existence of a person who owns, in his own right, either severally or jointly with another, property which it is the purpose of the adjudicant to bring into the bankrupt court. In the case of the private property of a deceased partner there is no person in esse against whom the proceedings will lie. But the plaintiffs insist not only on the want of jurisdiction of the bankrupt court over the subject-matter, but also its want of jurisdiction over the person. It is clear, if what has already been said is true, that the bankrupt court acquired no jurisdiction by a service of its process upon the oxeen tor.

The only method by which the property of a partnership dissolved by death can be drawn into the bankrupt court is by service on the surviving partner, in whom is the title to all the partnership property. Ulrich was the surviving partner of the firm of J. Ulrich & Co. No service of any kind was ever attempted to be made on him. But it is said he accepted a discharge from the bankrupt court. This, however,/ does not cure the want of service, at least so far as it concerns the individual property of Jones, even if it is effectual as to the partnership property. It is, to put it in the best light for the jurisdiction, the entry of an appearance after judgment without process and without service of any kind. The acceptance of the dischago may estop Olrich; it can have no other effect. My view is, therefore, that the bankrupt court,, by the proceedings in bankruptcy against J. Ulrich & Co., acquired no jurisdiction over the individual property of Jones, a deceased member of the firm, and that the title of defendant in this action derived through said proceedings is null and void.

With the bankrupt proceedings must fall the plea of the two years’ limitation prescribed by the second section of th'e bankrupt act against suits between an assignee in bankruptcy and any person claiming an adverse interest touching any property or rights of property transferable to or vested in the assignee. If the bankrupt proceedings are void for want of jurisdiction there was no adjudication of bankruptcy, no bankrupt, no assignee, and no property transferable to or vested in him. In short, all the attempted proceedings in brnkruptey are as if they never had existed. There is, therefore, no basis for the limitation to rest on.

There must be a finding and judgment for the plaintiffs.