146 P. 469 | Mont. | 1915
delivered the opinion of the court.
This action was instituted to recover a balance due upon a judgment rendered by a district court of North Dakota. Upon the trial, plaintiff offered in evidence a certified copy of the judgment-roll from the North Dakota court, but it was excluded upon the ground that it was not exemplified as required by law. Plaintiff then had the original files constituting the judgment-roll identified, and these were received in evidence, but afterward stricken out. A motion for nonsuit was sustained, and
1. The copies of the papers constituting the judgment-roll were attested by the clerk with the seal of the court annexed, and following his attestation there was a certificate by the judge : “That said certificate of said clerk of said district court is duly authorized by law to be issued by said J. 0. Seibert, as such clerk of said district court, and full faith and credit are due to all his official acts as such.”
Section 1, Article IV, of the Constitution of the United States, provides: “Full faith and credit shall he given in each state to the public acts, records and judicial proceedings, of every other state. And the Congress may by general laws prescribe the manner in which such acts, records, and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof.” In compliance with that mandate, the Congress in 1790 enacted what is now section 905, United States Revised Statutes, as follows: “The records and judicial proceedings of the courts of any state * # * shall he proved or admitted in any other court within the United States, by the attestation of the clerk, and the seal of the court annexed, * * # together with a certificate of the judge, chief justice or presiding magistrate, that the said attestation is in due form,.” Section 7911, Revised Codes of Montana,
Tested by these statutory provisions, the trial court’s ruling upon the first offer was correct. To entitle the copy of the judgment-roll to be admitted in evidence, it must have been duly attested by the clerk of the North Dakota court. Whether
But it is insisted that, while the certificate of the judge of the North Dakota court is not in the form prescribed by statute, in substance it is the same. If we understand the language employed in the certificate, it does not mean anything more than that the laws of North Dakota authorize the clerk of a district court of that state to certify copies of judicial records in his charge. It would impeach the intelligence of the judge who made this certificate to say that he intended it to conform to the requirements of the federal statute. The language of that statute is so plain that anyone who attempts to comply with it cannot possibly fail in the attempt. The addition of the words “and full faith and credit are due to all his official acts as such” do not aid the certificate. In the connee
We are unable to agree with the supreme court of South Dakota in Davis v. Davis, 24 S. D. 474, 124 N. W. 715, holding contrary to these views.'
2. Conceding, for the purposes of this appeal, that the
Some contention is made that a memorandum in the
The validity of the judgment must be determined by the laws of the state where it was rendered. (Caruthers v. Corbin, 38 Ga. 75.) In Amundson v. Wilson, 11 N. D. 193, 91 N. W. 37, the supreme court of North Dakota, after referring to certain sections of their Codes, said: “Under these sections this court has held that ‘there can be no judgment capable of being docketed or enforced in any manner until it is entered in the judgment-book’ ” — citing In re Weber, 4 N. D. 119, 28 L. R. A. 621, 59 N. W. 523.
Since these original files did not tend to prove a valid judgment under the laws of North Dakota, they were properly excluded.
The judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.