*1 (2004); State, Harrelson n. 4 reason, For the same Daniel’s assertion support charge that there was insufficient evidence to of vehicu- driving lar homicide based on reckless is moot. Id.
Judgment Doyle, Blackburn, J., J., P. concur. affirmed.
Decided June 2009. Culp, appellant.
John C. Attorney, appellee. Currie, Richard E. District A08A2315. ADAMSv. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY. Barnes, Judge. This addresses the amount State Farm Mutual Automo- Company bile Insurance owes uninsured motorist benefits to Randolph seriously injured Adams, a State Farm insured who was undisputed. a car wreck. The facts are Adams sued the tortfeasor to injuries During recover for sustained the car wreck. the course of underlying litigation, Company, Nationwide Insurance the tort- insurer, feasor’s automobile made two that ex- policy $25,000 hausted its limits: the amount of Grady Hospital compromise $9,217.66 to to lien for provided Adams, medical services of to the amount $15,782.34 to Adams for a limited release. sought injuries compensation
Adams then additional for his under his insurance him Farm, with State which dispute $100,000 arose, uninsured A motorist how- coverage ever, over the amount of State Farm’s available. State Farm contended it should be able to set off take credit for the entire paid liability coverage, $25,000 that Nationwide as its total but only get Adams contended that State Farm should credit for the paid personally, paid by $15,782.34 $9,217.66 to him and not the directly Grady Hospital Nationwide its lien. parties
After both filed motions for the trial granted motion, court denied Adams’ motion and allowing State Farm’s paid by $25,000 State Farm credit for the entire Nation- wide. The trial court found that State Farm was entitled to off set $100,000 $25,000 from its uninsured motorist the full from the tortfeasor’s The court held that Adams’ voluntarily liability payment $25,000 election to divert *2 satisfy hospital
Grady Hospital the available bill did not reduce his motorist increase his uninsured $25,000 or below granting by appeal, erred the trial court contends On Adams denying by for summary judgment his motion to State Farm agree summary judgment. the trial court. and thus must reverse We Georgia, In1. summary judg-
[t]he to motions for standards Corp. Haskins, 261 Ga. Lau’s ment are announced 474) (1991). rules on a motion a trial court When SE2d given opposing party summary judgment, should be the court should doubt, and of all reasonable the benefit and conclusions and all inferences the evidence construe opposing favorably toward the most therefrom of a motion or denial On of motion. a de novo review of court conducts disputes Further, are contract and the evidence. the law summary judg- by adjudication particularly well suited ordinarily a of contracts because construction ment of law for court. matter (Citations Corp., Apparel v. Russell Overton is a Insurance
306, 307-308 Grange 712, 716 Co., 266 Ga. contract, Mut. Cas. of Hurst matter (1996), interpretation is a of a statute and the novo on question court, is reviewed de trial which of law for the Bonding Ray 687, 688 appeal. Ga., 284 Ga. Co. v. State Joe of (644 SE2d § by agree parties is controlled OCGA that this case 2. Both (1) (D) (ii), uninsured motor vehicle which defines an 33-7-11 liability but the “available has insurance in which the tortfeasor one coverages” coverage provided motorist limits the uninsured than the of are “less policy.” note insurance We the insured’s
under substantially those amended in but this statute was apply in this case. amendments do not policy limits as the “available
The statute defines
payable
by
under
amounts
which the maximum
amounts
“less
claims or
of other
have,
reason
such limits of
coverage.”
limits of
OCGA
reduced below the
otherwise, been
(b) (1) (D) (ii).
question
before us is whether
33-7-11
Grady Hospital
insurer to
the tortfeasor’s
made
constituted,
to Adams
lien for services
thereby reducing
“payment
otherwise,”
claims or
of other
coverage.”
[the]
payable
limits of
“maximum amounts
statutory
A cardinal rule of
construction is that “the courts shall
diligently
Assembly.”
look
for the intention of the General
(a).
discerned,
Once the
intent is
courts
language employed
should never construe the
in a statute to render
Assembly
futile, unenforceable,
the General
Christy,
ineffectual.
Bd.
See
Trustees &c. v.
288) (1980),
grounds, Mayor
overruled
on other
Stevens,
&c. Savannah v.
(2004).
167-168
*3
language
given
Rather,
must be
a reasonable and sensible
interpretation
carry
Mayor &c.,
in order to
out
intent. See
(272
713)
City Hapeville Anderson,
786,
v.
246 Ga.
787
SE2d
(1980). Additionally,
according
a statute should be read
to its natural
import
language
resorting
and most obvious
without
to subtle
limiting
and forced constructions for the
extending
of either
operation. Burbridge Hensley,
App. 523,
194
v.
Ga.
524
5) (1990),
SE2d
and this court will not construe a statute so
any portion
meaningless.
State,
as to render
21
given
of it
Sikes v.
268 Ga.
(485
they
art,
SE2d
Unless
are words of
words are
(b).
§
ordinary signification.
their
OCGA 1-3-1
In this case we must determine whether “other claims or
directly Grady Hospital.
otherwise” includes the
made
meaning
“[t]he
We first
‘or,’
note
natural
where used as a
present
implying
connective,
an
choice,
is mark
alternative and
an
(Citation
things.”
punctuation
election to do one of two
and
omit-
ted.)
Gearinger Lee,
169
clearly
phrase
just
Thus, “or” otherwise
does not limit this
“other
give
weight
claims.” As we must
meaning, Falligant
all the words of a statute due
(65
(1909),
Barrow,
92
SE
we
disregard
cannot
the word “otherwise.” “Otherwise” is defined in
(3d
Heritage Dictionary
College
“[i]n
The American
ed.
as
way; differently;
circumstances;
another
in
under other
other re-
spects;
supposed; different,”
other than
and Black’s Law Dictio-
(6th ed.)
nary
ways.”
“[i]n
way,
manner;
different
another
Co.,
We find that Thurman v.
Farm
State
&c. Ins.
ingly, required we conclude that when a federal by [Federal laws] to reimburse the of benefits and fully compensated the federal has not been injuries sustained, the amount reimbursed to the benefits providers constitutes a reduction in the limits of by the tortfeasor’s insurance reason of or other- wise.
(Citation
punctuation
Thurman v. State Farm &c. Ins.
supra,
Supreme
In manner, Toomer, this court found that amount of the available was reduced the amount of a Medicare lien. We held: meaningful
We find no distinction between Toomer’s situ- argues ation and that of Gail Thurman. Allstate that distinguishable Thurman is because in case, that the in- jured party was a federal whose reimbursement obligations arose under FEHBA, FECA and here, whereas is not a federal and her reim- obligations bursement arise under Medicare law. Allstate why offers no reason these matter, factual variances and we requires discern none. In cases, both federal law an party party being compensated repay provider resulting of benefits, in the party’s
in an amount less than policy Georgia’s public UM cases, limit. And both complete compensation by holding is furthered that “available under the UM statute are reduced providers. reimbursements to federal benefits Thurman governs by holding and the trial court erred otherwise. supra, App.
Toomer v. Co., Allstate Ins. 292 Ga. at 63. presented imposed this case we are not with a lien law, under federal meaningful we find no distinction between the lien in this case imposed law and the federal liens in Toomer v.Allstate supra, supra. Ins. and Thurman v. State Farm &c. Ins. provides [a]ny person, hospital authority, corporation oper- firm, or ating hospital, nursing physician practice home, a or or providing practice traumatic burn care medical this state shall, charges hospital, have a lien for the reasonable nursing physician practice, home, or traumatic burn care practice injured person, medical which care and treatment of upon any shall lien be and all causes action accruing person to the to whom the care was furnished or to legal representative person of such on account of injuries giving rise to the causes of action and which hospital, nursing physician practice, necessitated the home, practice care, traumatic burn care medical subject, any attorney’s however, to lien. The lien against for in this subsection is a lien such causes of against injured person, action and shall not abe lien such legal representative, property such or assets of persons person’s such and shall not be evidence of such pay failure to a debt. against patient’s damages. Hosp. The lien is those liable to (1957). Boyd, App. 705,
Auth. &c. v. showing patient, Moreover, a that the tortfeasor a hospital may directly patient. Hosp. recover from the Dawson v. &c., Auth. 793-794 See McClure, also Thomas v. (1999) (A hospital against money paid by could enforce its lien *5 carrier.). patient’s uninsured motorist $9,217.66 the dissent finds that Adams “chose to use hospital argument applied bill,” to off his the same could have equally provision Thurman, to Toomer and as we in are aware of no prevented paying federal law which would have them from the giving amounts rise to the federal liens with their own resources.
Therefore, the distinction between the liens Thurman and imposed Toomer that those cases the liens were under federal hospital imposed law, but in case lien was under OCGA (b). As we 44-14-470 find that this is a distinction without a real treating types difference, this distinction does not warrant the two of differently. Grady Hospi- liens Thurman, Pursuant to Toomer and meaning tal’s lien is an “other claim or otherwise” within the of (b) (1) (D) (ii) and State Farm is not allowed to take paid directly Grady Hospital by $9,217.66 credit for the to tortfeasor’s carrier.
Accordingly, by granting we find that the trial court erred summary judgment by denying to State Farm and Adams’ motion for judgment
summary judgment. Therefore, of the trial court is to trial court with direction to and the case is remanded reversed summary judgment. grant Adams’ motion for Ellington Judgment Miller, J.,C. reversed with direction. Phipps, J., J., Blackburn, J., Smith, JJ., Johnson, P. P. concur. P. dissent. Presiding Judge, dissenting.
JOHNSON, agree off I the trial court that State Farm was entitled to set coverage by $100,000 $25,000 the full from the tortfea- UM liability policy. respectfully I, therefore, dissent from the sor’s voluntarily majority’s position. divert Adams’ election liability payment hospital his bill did not reduce $25,000 $25,000 below or increase his UM the available legislative contrary Here, assertions, the intent of the to Adams’ place whole, but “to insureds UM statute is not to make insureds position they if in relation to would be injuries causing at least the minimum tortfeasors prescribed liability had obtained of the General insurance.”1 The intent by reducing Assembly the amount of “available is not served coverage” by hospital or lien. If the the amount of a bill hospital payment of “other claims or bills or liens constituted a coverage, UM otherwise” such that it reduced limits coverage available every automatically instance where would be increased hospital hospital and the insured receives treatment at a In this receives for such treatment $25,000 insurance carrier Adams received from the tortfeasor’s pay $9,217.66 his bill. I find no error and chose to use off summary judgment to State Farm. the trial court’s argument Thurman v. Farm &c. Ins. Co.2 Adams’ State persuasive. requires Thurman addressed a a different result is involving injured party’s settlement, claims on an situation mandatory regard- federal claims was where reimbursement fully compensated.3 or not the had been less of whether *6 specifically provides statute, The 5 USCS 1 (Punctuation omitted.) App. and footnote State Farm Ins. Crafter (2001); Young Maryland 644 see also Cas. 390 839) (1997). 2 Ga. 162 278 policies’ provision The of the federal of reimbursement insured’s programs receipt proceeds of insurance is to minimize the of the federal to the federal cost Thurman, government, fully compensated. supra at not to ensure that the insured has been 164. mandatory adjustment recovery party: after from a third injury compensation payable If an or death for which is subchapter [5 seq.] under this USCS 8101 et is caused creating legal liability person under circumstances in a pay damages, other than the United States to and a benefi- ciary compensation entitled to from the United States injury money property or death receives or other satisfaction of that as the result of suit or settle- beneficiary, him behalf, ment or in his after deduct- ing attorney’s therefrom the costs of suit a reasonable fee, shall refund to the United States the amount of compensation paid by any the United States and credit surplus payments compensation payable on future to him injury. attorney, court, insurer, No or other person pay beneficiary shall or distribute to the or his designee proceeds of such suit or settlement without satisfying assuring first or satisfaction of the interest of the United States.4 Supreme Georgia policies
The Court of noted that the federal directly mitigate issue, contradicted law on the and to policies, financial harm inflicted the federal the Thurman Court providers held that the amount reimbursed to the federal benefits liability coverage.5 Supreme constituted a Georgia, reduction Court of carefully apply only however, limited Thurman to when a required by federal providers, resulting federal law to reimburse benefit comp receiving in the federal full ensation.6 Similarly, Toomer v. Allstate Ins. Co.7 addressed a situation involving repayment lien, of a federal Medicare where Medicare payments. for the collision-related medical In that we again specifically required noted that federal law
repay regard of benefits without to whether the fully compensated: “[N]o attorney, court, insurer, had been person beneficiary shall or distribute to the of Medicare proceeds suit or settlement without first satisfying assuring satisfaction of the interest of the United public Georgia’s complete in Thurman, States.”8 As com 4 (Emphasis supplied.)
5 Id. at 164-165.
6 Id. 8 (Punctuation and footnote Id. at 63. *7 by holding
pensation cover furthered that “available could be ages” are reduced reimbursements under the UM statute providers. federal benefits Toomer, nor state
Here, in Thurman or neither federal unlike provider. required payment to the benefits law hospital provides a cause of statute that a lien arises lien mandatory language employ con- action, not it does Toomer,9 Thus, federal laws Thurman tained voluntarily paid a claimant whose Nationwide, consent, Adams’ mandatory. repayment do not control Thurman and Toomer was this case. Presiding Judge Blackburn and
I am authorized to state that join Presiding Judge Smith this dissent. April 14, 2009
Decided denied Reconsideration June Clyde appellant. Rickard,
Chambers, III, E. Rickard for Aholt & Harper, Copeland Jr., Stair, Cheves, Carlock, & M. William Kimberly Craig, Waldon, McNamara, A. Russell D. Jane Waldon & Rodney Shockley, appellee. Ryan Wilkes, Johnson, S. N. A. Nasrallah, Robertson, Nasrallah, A. & Mathew G. Jonah Bodoh Flynn, amici curiae. TIMS et al. HASSELBERGER.
A09A0035.
Doyle, Judge. Hasselberger wrongful against death action
Dolores filed Anthony 16-year- Michael Tims after her Frances Nadine Tims and Murray, consuming Greg died after alcohol and son, old Wade they pills the Timses’ son while were methadone at a hosted filed a motion for out of town.1 The Timses negligence part, arguing no on their that there was evidence Upon application our of their the trial court denied motion. interlocutory appeal, the Timses the denial of their motion summary judgment by reverse, the trial court. We for reasons that follow. 44-14-470;compare OCGA 5 USCS 8132. guardian Murray Hasselberger capacity legal filed suit in her and as the
administratrix of his estate.