Section 5004 of the Criminal Code under which the special venire in this сase was drawn, provides as follows: “When any capital case or cases stand for trial, the court shall, at least one entire day before ¡the same are set 'for trial, cause the box cоntaining the names of jurors to be brought into the courtroom, and after having the same well shaken, the pre
At the time of setting a day for the trial of the defendant there were two capital cases pending in the circuit court, that of the defendant and one of the State v. Dan McGuire. These defendants were separately indicted and for separate and distinct felonies. Both eases were by order of the court set for trial on the same day, and by order of the court only one drawing of speciаl jurors was had, which together with the regular jurors drawn and summoned for the week -of the trial, constituted one and the same special venire for the trial of both cases. On the day of the trial a jury of twelve was first selected from the special venire for the trial of the defendant Dan McGuire, and thereupon and then the court proceded to the selection of a jury of twelve for the trial of the appellant, all аgainst this defendant’s objection. Before a jury had been completed, the names of all of the persons who had been .selected for the first jury, were drawn, - and as each was drawn, the slip containing thе name, was directed by the court to be laid aside, and the defendant denied the right of passing on said jurors by challenging or accepting.
From the foregoing statement it is apparent that the defendant did nоt have the number of jurors from which to select a jury for his trial, which the former order of the court, made in setting a day for his trial gave him, and this by the action of the court. It . is
The case of Chamblee v. State, reported in
The statute under consideration in the case of Thomas v. State,
Our conclusion is that the circuit court committed еrror in ordering one special venire for the trial of two separate and distinct cases.
The defendant requested in writing many charges, quite a number of which were refused by the court. Some of the refused charges contained correct expositions of the law, and others did not. According to the order in which, they appear in the record, the first refused charge which should have been given is numbered 14. This charge was held good in Compton v. State,
If charge No. 13, as copied in the record, is a correct copy of the charge as asked — and we cannot say that it is not — then it can hardly be said to be intelligible. Charge No. 1 is subject to like infirmity. Charge No. 22 is indefinite and uncertain, with tendenсy to mislead.
The evidence without conflict showed that the defendant- after the killing fled from the State, and was apprehended in Arkansas and brought back from that State. This was all of the evidence as to flight — no explanation was offered. Under this state of the evidence, charge 6, whether abstractly good or not, was properly refused.
There was evidence tending to show that the defendant brought on the difficulty, and under this phase of the evidence, charge 8, if bad for no other reason, was properly réfused.
Charges hypothesizing self-defense in general terms which omit- to set out the constituent'elements of self-defense, have been condemned by this court in' Miller v. State,
It would unnecessarily prolong this opinion to attempt to deal with the refused charges separately. What we have said is sufficient for the purposes of another trial. For the errors pointed out the judgment of the circuit court must be reversed and the cause remanded.
Reversed and remanded.
