On thе evening of June 16, 1945, a large grocery store in Evansville was robbed and $4,300.00 in United States currency, done up in described packages, was carried away. An affidavit was filed against the appellant, and a jury found him guilty of armed robbery and he was sentencеd to 15 years imprisonment in the Indiana Reformatory.
Appellant asserts two grounds for reversal. The first is that the verdict is contrary tо law because the jury found, appellant guilty of a crime not embraced in the affidavit upon which he was tried.
The Indiana simple robbery statute reads as follows:
“Whoever tаkes from the person of another any article of value by violence or by putting in fear, is guilty of robbery, and on conviction shall be imprisoned not less than ten (10) years nor more than twenty-five (25) years, . . . § 10-4101, Burns’ 1942 Replacement.
The armed robbery statute reads as follows:
“Any person who being over sixteеn (16) years of age, commits or attempts to commit . . . the crime of . . . robbery, . . . while armed with a pistol, ... or any other firearm or аny dangerous or deadly weapon, ... upon conviction shall be imprisoned for a determinate period of not less ■thаn ten (10) years, nor more than twenty (20) years, to be fixed by the court: . . . § 10-4709, Burns’ 1942 Replacement.
*474 *473 The affidavit upon which appellant was tried and convicted alleges that he. “unlawfully, feloniously and forci *474 bly and by violence and putting Finas Heseman in fear, did with the use оf a deadly weapon, to-wit: a pistol, rob, take and steal from the possession of Finas Heseman lawful, current money of the United States of America amounting to forty-three Hundred Dollars ($4300.00). . . .” Appellant takes the position that the affidavit chargеd only the offense of simple robbery, and not the offense of robbery while armed and that therefore the verdict that he wаs guilty of robbery while armed was contrary to law. Appellant bases his contention upon two grounds. The first is that the allegation thаt appellant committed the robbery “with the use of a deadly weapon, to-wit: a pistol” is not sufficient to bring the charge within a statute which makes it an offense to commit “robbery while armed with a pistol,” and the second is the failure to allege in the аffidavit that he was over 16 years of age. He argues that the Constitution of Indiana, (Article 1, § 13) guarantees. that criminal accusations shall be pleaded so that every material fact constituting’ the offense is charged in direct and unmistakable terms so that the accused may know definitely what he has to meet. It seems to us that a charge that an accused committed robbеry with the me of a pistol' is not substantially different from a charge that he committed robbery while armed with a pistol. Also in this case it appears affirmatively from the recоrd that the appellant was not misled. The record shows that “the defendant being duly arraigned and' required to plead, for plеa says he is not guilty of armed robbery as charged in the affidavit herein and-that he is 22 years of age.” This makes it clear that he knеw that he was charged with armed robbery and his admission long before trial that he was over 16 years of age'rendered harmless thе failure to allege his age in the affidavit. By this plea and stipulation as to *475 age the failure to state his age in the affidavit was cured and the fact that he was charged with robbery while armed was brought specifically to his attention in ample time to еliminate any prejudice that might have accrued to him by possible uncertainty in the affidavit as to which offense was intended.
The second error upon which appellant relies in this court, is with reference to the introduction in evidence of an automobile license list prepared by the Secretary of State and distributed to county offices pursuant to statute. Section 47-2624, Burns’ 1.933 (Supp.) provides that the department of motor vehicles shall prepare annually a complete offiсial typewritten or printed list of the names and addresses of all persons to whom automobile licenses have been issued for the current calendar year,. together with the registration numbers in numerical order and certain other information cоncerning the vehicle so registered, and the statute further provides that the department of motor vehicles shall distribute one copy of such list to each county sheriff in Indiana. In the trial of this case the sheriff of Vanderburgh County identified such a list for 1945 which he sаid had been furnished to him as sheriff by the Secretary of State. Objection was made to this exhibit upon the ground that it was not propеrly certified and upon further ground that the exhibit was hearsay and not the best evidence of the facts shown by the list. It may well be argued that this exhibit was properly admitted as a public document or official statement. Wig-more on Evidence, 3rd Ed., Vol. 5, §1630, et seq.; 32 C. J. S. 477, 478, 489, 506, 507; Am. Jur. 931, et sеq.;
Steel
v.
Johnson
(1941), 9 Wash. (2d) 347,
But we need not decide that question, because error, if any, in the admission of this exhibit was harmless. Its only value to the state was that it listed appellant as the owner of a Plymouth Sedan bearing License No. 50671. Already five persons had identified appеllant as participating in the robbery and using a pistol in connection with the robbery. Two persons had identified him as driving1 a Plymouth Sedan with License No. 50671 and two state police officers had testified that they had arrested him in a Plymouth Sedan bearing the License No. 50671 and that in the automobile at the time of his arrest was $4,200.00 in currency, packaged in the same manner as the money which hаd been stolen from the grocery store. In the light of this •uncontradicted evidence the mere fact that an official list of аutomobile license numbers showed License No. 50671 to have been issued to appellant upon a Plymouth Sedan added nothing substantial to the sum total of evidence against him. In our view of the record it could not have prejudiced the substantial rights of thе defend *477 ant and therefore under our statute it should not be regarded on appeal. §9-2320, Burns’ 1942 (Supp.).
Of course where improper evidence is such as to be influential on an issue to be determined by a jury, it will be presumed to have been prejudicial.
Davis
v.
Cox
(1912),
The admission of improper evidence which tends only to disclose a fact which is clearly proved by other legitimate evidence is harmless error,
Shockley
v.
State
(1924),
No harmful error appearing, the judgment is affirmed.
Note.—Reported in 69 N. E. (2d) 21.