*1 S02A0974. ADAMS v. THE STATE. Chief Justice.
Fletcher, A convicted jury Johnny Lee Adams of malice in murder beating death of Dorothea Daniels.1 appeals, He contending murder malice statute is unconstitutional because it fails to give notice that the offense can be committed a assaulting person with a large rock. Because Adams failed to raise this issue in a timely manner, it is waived. remaining His enumerations of error have no merit and we affirm.
1. The evidence at trial showed that Adams and Daniels often met after work to do drugs night murder, have sex. On the of the they mall, beer, went to a wooded area behind a strip drank a engaged panel sex on board lying ground. After Daniels Adams about his questioned seeing woman, another Adams became angry and beat her with a rock severely around the head and face. a Daniels died as result of the wounds inflicted by Adams. reviewing After the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s guilt, determination of we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found Adams guilty of the crimes charged.2
2. Adams asserts the statutes under which he was con- victed, 16-5-1, (a), OCGA and 16-5-21 are unconstitu- §§ tionally vague because they give adequate do notice that malice murder, felony murder, and aggravated battery can be committed by a assaulting large with a rock. We need not address the mer- its, if any, of this Adams challenge, because failed to raise it until the motion for new trial.3
3. Adams raises several enumerations of error with
to the
regard
hearing
First,
to determine his
to stand trial.
competency
Adams
challenges
sufficiency of the evidence. At a competency hearing,
the defendant bears the burden of
proving incompetency by prepon-
derance of the
“A
evidence.4
criminal defendant
competent
trial
if he is
capable
understanding
the nature and
of the
object
May 5,
9,
grand jury
September
1998,
The crime occurred
1998. A
indicted Adams on
29, 2000,
September
special jury
Following
and on
him
found
to stand trial.
25-27, 2001,
jury
murder, felony murder,
trial on June
Adams was convicted of malice
aggravated battery;
acquitted
rape.
two counts of
he was
The trial court sentenced Adams
imprisonment
20-year
imposed
aggravated
to life
for malice murder and
two
sentences for
concurrently
battery,
to run
with each
consecutive to the life sentence. Adams
August 6, 2001,
filed a motion for new trial on
which the trial court denied on December
appeal
January 17,
2001. Adams filed notice of
on
and the case was docketed in this
18, 2002,
argument
May
Court on March
and submitted for decision without oral
on
2002.
560) (1979).
Virginia,
Jackson v.
her evaluation of Adams.7 The fact that goes only weight jury degree did not hold a medical to the she testimony.8 may give
Nevertheless, that the was harmless for sev- we conclude error testimony Mullins’s would have been cumulative of a eral reasons: expert testimony psychiatrist Adams; called showed that even schizophrenia, a defendant could be with experts agreed exaggerat- trial; that Adams was stand and all of symptoms. compel Third, it was error to a defense Adams contends that report produce for The record a written the State. shows 5 State, Stripling 261 Ga. SE2d may provides “provide OCGA 43-10A-12 licensed clinical social workers mental, psychosocial cognitive, evaluation ... to determine the nature of an individual’s emotional, behavioral, interpersonal problems or conditions.” 314) (1997) State, (“[qlualification Carr v. 267 Ga. as an requires particular profession, knowledge that the witness be educated in a skill or or derive State, experience”). contrary Dicta to the in Ellis v. behavior, (1983), paranoid police giving regarding which involved a officer unpersuasive. McCoy (jury expert’s considers credentials gives weight appropriate). as it deems only requested report that the State from the witness and the provided directly apparently witness it to the without consult- ing defense counsel. circumstances, Under these we find no revers- ible error.9 admitting
4. Adams contends that the trial court erred in mentally custodial statements because he is retarded, uneducated, hearing, rights and illiterate. The evidence at the Jackson-Denno10 how- ever, demonstrated that Adams was advised of his several acknowledged times, that he them, understood and waived them. challenges ground He also the statements’ admission on the they were the fruit of an unlawful arrest and detention because the police probable lacked cause to arrest record, however, him. The probable shows that cause existed. challenges jury
5. Adams raises several to the instructions. How- ever, a review of the instructions as a whole demonstrates no revers- ible error. preserve panel
6. Adams contends that the failure to board process. on which the victim was found constitutes a denial of due To preserve determine whether the failure to evidence constitutes a process, denial of due we must consider whether the evidence was police deputy material and whether testified that the sheriff’s acted in bad faith.* A sheriff’s
department ability transport had no to or store the board because of its size and its contamination with formal dehyde. department supposed He also testified that the fire was to charge apparently Additionally, board, take of the but did not. Adams has not shown that the board was material or contained evi dence that would have Therefore, exonerated him. we conclude that preserve to failure this board did not constitute a denial of due process. Judgment except concur, Benham, All the Justices Car- affirmed.
ley Thompson, specially. JJ, and who concur concurring specially.
Cajrley, Justice, During hearing competency to determine Adams’ testify trial, the trial court ruled that a social worker could not as an expert schizophrenia.” excluding suggest provisional diagnosis “paranoid-type that she had made a majority
The
concludes that the trial court erred in
testimony.
strongly disagree
holding
I
with that
precedent
opposite
that relevant
mandates the
conclusion.
fully agree
remaining portions
majority
However, I
with the
of the
9
(463
123) (1995) (error
Compare
State,
require
Johnson v.
SE2d
to
defense
State).
experts
reports writing
supply
to reduce
10
908) (1964).
opinion
witness, may give non-expert
lay
other
worker,
like
A social
stating
support-
insanity
or
after
sanity
as to
testimony
App.
145 Ga.
Currelley and circumstances.
ing facts
(1978).
testimony
(3) (243
admitted the
have also
“Courts
SE2d
remained within
testimony
when that
social workers
psychiatric
Zola, 548 A2d
State v.
[Cit.]”
specialization.
areas of
experts’
1988).
(III) (E) (N.J.
T,
Interest
S.
See also In the
1022, 1041
312) (1991).
(1) (410
SE2d
App.
Ga.
outside
are
diagnoses
generally
“However,
psychiatric
because
courts have
workers, appellate
competence
psychiatric
testimony.
excluded such
trial courts that
the discretion of
sustained
(III) (E).
Zola,
at 1041
supra
State v.
original.)
(Emphasis
[Cits.]”
relating
terms
are medical
schizophrenia
paranoia
Since
psy
a psychiatrist,
such as
disorders,
“only qualified
mental
diagnose
would
medical doctor
chologist or
State, 168 Ga.
App.
Ellis v.
a mental disorder.”
define such
(3) (309
Extermina
Morris v. Chandler
See also
(1991),
rev’d on
816, 818
tors,
Morris,
Moreover, a even witness were to a qualified diagnose mental disorder, such not testimony would be relevant in the absence of some evidence that an effect condition had adverse Indeed, defendant’s to stand trial. “a ill competence mentally can to competent [Cits.]” stand trial. Morrow v. (1995). she social worker testified that was not to
qualified give opinion an as whether Adams was trial. stand of background any
[H]er recorded is bereft indication that [has she in the knowl- expertise] application psychiatric edge to the law. processes psychosomatic Doubtless ail- play ments and other can a organic problems significant role in trial, defendant’s assessing competence doubtless unqualified [she] own admission make such an assessment. (Mich. 1977). (II)
People Parney, NW2d “ or Acceptance rejection proffered qualifications within expert witness is judge the sound discretion the trial will not be disturbed on absent manifest appeal [Cits.]” abuse.’ Tur- (1988). 97,100 ner v. The trial court did not abuse discretion finding its social worker was as qualified psychiatric a medical or and did not err refus- express to allow her opinion specific an as to mental disorder. (3). that, See Ellis I State, supra at 759 fear as a result of today’s trial will opinion, courts be reluctant to exercise their discretion on prevent witness an issue expressing if experience even such witness is not to so qualified by training or testify.
I am authorized to state that Justice Benham Justice in this Thompson join special concurrence. *5 12,
Decided November 13, 2002. December Reconsideration denied B. appellant. Michael for King, Keller, Jennings, Jack S. Jane E. Attorney, E. District
Robert Baker, Grabowski, Attorney E. Attorneys, Assistant District Thurbert General, Zubler, General, appellee. for Attorney Jill M. Assistant v. STOKES et al.
S02A1067. CROSS
(572 SE2d
Benham,
Justice.
II
Robertson, a
of
War
and the
George Guess
veteran
World
of
of
from the United States
Veterans
Department
benefits
recipient
(“DVA”),executed a will in 1999 and died a few months later.
Affairs
cousin,
will,
In
Mr.
left
of his
to his
Robertson
one-half
estate
Cross,
Stokes,
Zetta
and the
half to
John P.
appellant
appellee
years
attorney
family
an
who had served Robertson’s
for over
serving
when Robertson executed
guardian
who was
as Robertson’s
executor,
the
presented
probate by
will.1 When the will was
for
circumstances,
court,
citing
the
“somewhat
probate
unusual”
litem
guardian
possible
ad
for
unknown heirs.
appointed
the
guardian
product
ad litem filed a caveat
will was
suggesting
influence,
of
of
and undue
but withdrew
testamentary
capacity
lack
In
the caveat four months later.2
his withdrawal pleading,
guard-
(c)
questioned
disqualified
ian ad litem
whether OCGA 29-6-11
§
any
Cross
to the will of his
taking
bequest pursuant
appellant
2000,
In
an
DVA ward.3
court issued
order
probate
November
incompetency regarding
In
the Veterans Administration issued a certificate of
required
appointment
guardian
property
prece
Mr. Robertson and
of a
of
See
as a condition
payment
VA’s
29-6-3.
Robert
§
dent to the
son’s father served
benefits Mr. Robertson.
OCGA
Mr.
guardian
as
at
until his death in
which time Mr. Robertson’s
court,
guardian
probate
property. After she
mother was named
of her son’s
died in
minister,
appellant
petition
appointed
of Mr.
John Cross as Mr. Robert
Robertson’s
guardian.
son’s
guardian
appointed
pro
[war]
. for
has
under
“Anadult
veteran . .
whom a
been
§§29-6-2,
is,
receipt
[OCGA
benefits]
for the
VA
.
where not
visions of
29-6-3
.
.
shown
mentis,
legal
compos
rights,
prima
personally
his full
non
facie
exercise
court,
Caldwell,
affecting
respect
with
such
Morse v.
out of
to all matters not
benefits.”
Anderson,
Anderson,
hn. 1
55 Ga.
(80
SE
See also
1988) (the
807) (1954);
Roosa,
(Wyo.
In the Matter