139 Ind. 178 | Ind. | 1894
This appeal was taken from a judgment rendered by the Randolph Circuit Court in a case originally begun by the appellee against the appellant in the Jay Circuit Court, asking for a dissolution of copartnership and an accounting.
The complaint was in one paragraph, with a copy of the agreement of copartnership filed as an exhibit.
There was a prayer for the appointment of a receiver, and, later on? an additional application for a receiver was filed.
The defendant demurred to the complaint, and the demurrer was overruled, to which he excepted.
Issues were then formed, and the cause was submitted to the court for trial on the 2d day of February, 1891, and, on the following 11th day of December, it made its finding for the plaintiff, and rendered a judgment against the defendant for $9,116.56.
' The first specification of error challenges the sufficiency of the complaint, upon the grounds that the complaint does not show a compliance by the plaintiff with all the conditions of the contract on his part; that there is no averment in the complaint that the appellee had served upon the appellant a written notice thirty days before the last six months of their copartnership, of his intention to withdraw from the partnership, as provided in the contract; that there is no averment in the complaint as to whether the business of the firm was carried on at a profit or a loss, nor as to the amount of money invested in the partnership business by the appellee, and that there is no allegation that the partnership debts were paid.
It appears, from the complaint, that the appellant and appellee entered into a written copartnership on the 14th of August, 1888, for the purpose of buying timber and manufacturing and selling staves and heading at Port
There is a prayer for the appointment of a receiver to take charge of the assets and close up the business of the partnership, and for all other proper relief.
Appellant’s entire attack upon the sufficiency of the complaint is predicated upon the theory that in its general scope and tenor, it is an action at law based on contract for the recovery of money, and not a suit in equity,
In Barnes v. Jones, 91 Ind. 161 (167), it is laid down, “that not only willful acts of fraud and bad faith, but gross instances of carelessness and waste in the administration of the partnership, as well as the exclusion of the partners from their just share of the management, so as to prevent the business from being conducted on the stipulated terms, are sufficient grounds for the dissolution of the contract by a court of equity. So also, it seems clear that a habit on the part of one partner of receiving moneys and not entering a receipt in the books, or not leaving the books open to inspection of the other partners, whether such conduct arise from a fraudulent intent or not, is good ground for a dissolution. ’ ’
In Kimble v. Seal, 92 Ind. 276, it was held that when a partner, on demand, refuses to account with his copartner, a suit for dissolution and an accounting may be maintained, and the complaint need not aver either the amount put in or taken out by either party, these being incidental matters to be ascertained by the proof.
It is needless to cite authorities in support of the doctrine that the court is vested with the power to appoint a receiver on proper application, in this class of cases pendente lite. Applying these tests to the complaint under consideration, it was abundantly good for a dissolution and an accounting, and the demurrer was properly overruled.
It is contended that because the agreement of the parties provided that dissolution could only be had at the end of sis months, and after thirty days’ notice had been given, appellee would be remediless until he had complied with its terms.
Appellant loses sight of the fact that every partner not only has his rights as given him by contract; but those guaranteed by law, and if he is being defrauded, he has access to the courts for relief. It would be a strange condition of things, if a court of conscience would allow a partner, hopelessly insolvent, to loot a concern of $7,000 or $8,000 of its contents, and then barricade himself behind his own fraud, and take advantage of the wrong so perpetrated. Men’s estates are not despoiled by courts of justice in this way. It is urged that as the complaint concludes with a demand for' $10,000, it is a complaint for a mere demand for money due, but it has been ruled otherwise, and the position is not tenable. Miller v. Rapp, 135 Ind. 614 (618). The contention that the court could not ascertain the amount due, can not be 'considered here, as the evidence is not in the record. It is urged by appellant that the court erred in sustaining the motion to strike out the second and third
The decision of the court below will have to be affirmed.
The judgment is affirmed with costs.