274 Mass. 453 | Mass. | 1931
This suit in equity concerns the management of the William B. Plunkett Memorial Hospital in the town of Adams. The case was reserved upon the pleadings and an agreed statement of facts for determination by the full court.
The pertinent facts are, these: In February, 1917, William B. Plunkett, a lifelong resident of Adams, publicly announced his intention of building a hospital and giving it to the town of Adams. The location and extent of the lands which were to constitute the hospital grounds were made known to the officers of the town in the following month. The erection of the building was commenced and its entire cost was paid by Plunkett so long as he lived, and after his death in October, 1917, his executors completed and equipped the hospital at the expense of his estate. He talked with his executors about the hospital and communicated to them his desires in respect to the board to manage and control the hospital. He said that he considered it of the utmost importance to keep the hospital “ out of politics ” and that the managing board should be chosen in some other manner than by popular vote. The warrant for the annual meeting of the town in March, 1918, contained this article: “ to see if the town will take land, together with a Hospital erected and fully equipped thereon, known as the W. B. Plunkett Memorial Hospital, the same to be accepted as a gift to the town by the late W. B. Plunkett; subject to the condition that the same shall be used forever as a Hospital for the reception of persons who require relief during temporary sickness, and also subject to the condition that such ordinances, rules and regulations necessary and expedient for the appointment of trustees and their successors and all other officers and agents necessary for the future management of such Hospital shall be made by the present Board of Selectmen and shall be approved in writing by the executors of the will of the said W. B. Plunkett. And to raise and appropriate such sum or sums of money as may be necessary for the maintenance and support of such
Shortly thereafter one of the executors of Plunkett’s will conferred with the selectmen of the town touching the o organization of the managing board of the hospital, telling them that Plunkett considered it of the utmost importance that the management of the hospital be kept out of politics and that the gift was made upon condition that this board be chosen and vacancies therein filled in some other manner than by popular vote. In pursuance of the wishes thus expressed and in compliance with the conditions of the vote of the town already quoted, the board of selectmen in April, 1918, made and adopted ordinances, rules and regulations respecting the hospital and its management. After a recital that by the great beneficence “ of a loyal and devoted life-long citizen of Adams, the late William B. Plunkett, the Town is the recipient of a beautiful Memorial Hospital surrounded
On June 22, 1918, the executors of the will of Plunkett conveyed to the town the real estate, together with the buildings thereon and all the equipment and appliances constituting the hospital property. The deed contained the following: “This conveyance is made subject to the condition that the premises described herein shall be used forever as a Hospital for the reception of
By St. 1930, c. 32, it was provided that the town of Adams “ shall elect at a special town meeting ... a board consisting of seven trustees to manage ” the W. B. Plunkett Memorial Hospital, two to hold office for a term of one year, two for two years and three for three years, with provision upon the expiration of these terms for elections for a term of three years to fill these vacancies, and that “ upon the qualification of the trustees so elected, the terms of office of all the trustees of said hospital then in office shall expire.” Provision was further made that the act should become operative only upon its acceptance by the affirmative vote of the majority of the voters voting thereon in answer to a question to be printed on the official ballot for the annual town meeting in 1930. Pursuant to the terms of that act the vote was to accept the act, and in April, 1930, at a special town meeting held pursuant to said c. 32, the petitioners were elected as trustees to manage the hospital. At this special town meeting a representative of the board of trustees at that time attended and publicly read a protest based upon the conditions of the gift of the hospital, which was filed with the town clerk and recorded in the records of the meeting. Thereafter the plaintiffs, as the elected trustees under said c. 32, made demand upon the individual defendants as the preexisting trustees to turn over the control of the hospital to them. That demand was refused. Thereafter they brought the present suit against the individual defendants (who will hereafter be called the
The question thus presented for decision is whether St. 1930, c. 32, is valid and binding upon the town of Adams and the defendants.
The facts narrated show that the completed hospital, including buildings and grounds, in June, 1918, was conveyed to the town of Adams in fee but upon the express conditions that it should forever be used as a hospital and that its control and management should be vested in a self-perpetuating board of trustees originally named by the selectmen of the town, all of whom should at all times be residents of the town. This method of selecting the original members of the board of trustees and of filling all vacancies therein from time to time occurring was an essential factor in the scheme of benefaction resulting in the gift of the hospital to the town. The gift in this particular is phrased, not in the form of a direction but of a condition. It would commonly be presumed that the town would not fail to the extent of its legal powers to carry out the wishes of the donors of such a gift. It may be assumed that, if a condition of such gift undertook to impose obligations which the town could not lawfully assume, it would be repugnant to the grant and void. Drury v. Natick, 10 Allen, 169, 183. It was said in Cary Library v. Bliss, 151 Mass. 364, 372-373, respecting a gift for the establishment of a library: “ That part of the donor’s scheme which relates to the management and control of the fund and of the library cannot be disregarded as unimportant. It prescribed the method of administering the charity which she thought best adapted to the accomplishment of her purpose. She chose to give her money to be used in that way. She did not authorize the use of it in any other way, unless for some reason it should become impracticable to pursue the course which she prescribed. It is fair to presume that, before founding this charity, she carefully considered the subject of its
It is therefore essential to examine the proposal, the vote of the town, the rules adopted by the selectmen and the terms of the conveyance by the executors, to determine whether they were in accordance with powers vested in the town and were binding upon the parties.
No discussion is required to demonstrate that in general a hospital like that here in question is a public charity which the town had a right to accept and administer. Drury v. Natick, 10 Allen, 169, 177-178, 182. Burbank v. Burbank, 152 Mass. 254. Benton v. Boston City Hospital, 140 Mass. 13. Peirce v. Attorney General, 234 Mass. 389. Roosen v. Peter Bent Brigham Hospital, 235 Mass. 66. It was provided by R. L. c. 81, § 25, as amended by St. 1915, c. 143, in force at the time of these occurrences in 1918, that “A city or town may purchase or take land, and erect, establish and maintain thereon a hospital for the reception of persons who require relief during temporary sickness. City councils and selectmen may make such ordinances, rules and regulations as they may consider expedient for the appointment of trustees and all other officers and agents necessary for managing such hospital.” See now G. L. c. 40, § 5 (20). There was no requirement that such ordinances, rules and regulations be approved by any officer or body as a prerequisite to their validity. See R. L. c. 25, § 26; St. 1904, c. 344; G. L. c. 40, § 32. Thus the town had authority to accept the gift of the hospital and its selectmen were empowered to make rules respecting the selection of trustees to manage it.
The precise method of selecting the trustees to manage the hospital was not set forth either in the article in the warrant for the town meeting of March, 1918, or in the vote then adopted. But it is manifest from that article and vote that the subject of the appointment of such trustees was before the town and that action was taken on that point. The town apparently preferred that the
There was nothing unreasonable about the plan adopted by the parties for selecting the trustees. It conformed in this particular to a special statute for the management of a municipal hospital which was considered in Ware v. Fitchburg, 200 Mass. 61. There is nothing at variance with this in Attorney General v. Lowell, 246 Mass. 312, 322, where a quite dissimilar point was presented for determination.
The trustees selected according to the plan of the gift do not constitute a corporation or a private instrumentality. They are to manage a public trust solely for the benefit .of the public. While they are not specified by any statute governing municipal corporations as public officers, they perform duties strictly public. They stand on the same footing as many committees and boards of trustees selected by the municipalities for definite purposes. The authority of towns to choose special committees to perform municipal duties not vested by law in designated officers is beyond doubt. Damon v. Granby, 2 Pick. 345. Haven v. Lowell, 5 Met. 35. Hunneman v. Grafton, 10 Met. 454. Adams v. Townsend Schoolhouse Building Committee, 245 Mass. 543.
The question arises whether St. 1930, c. 32, providing a scheme of management for the hospital different from that established by the gift, is a valid exercise of legislative power. That question is answered in the negative by Cary Library v. Bliss, 151 Mass. 364, a case indistinguishable from the one at bar. The discussion of Mr. Justice Knowlton in that opinion is clear, comprehensive and decisive; nothing can be added to its cogent logic, its forceful reasoning, or its irresistible conclusion. It has been cited many times. Its authority has never been doubted. See, also, Crawford v. Nies, 224 Mass. 474, 478, 488. Opinion of the Justices, 237 Mass. 613, 617. The ground of that decision was that a completed gift for a public
A main contention of the plaintiffs is that the situation is changed by virtue of the Forty-sixth Amendment to the Constitution of this Commonwealth, adopted subsequently to those decisions, and that it is now no longer lawful to appropriate public money to be expended by the defendants as trustees. It is provided by that article, in § 2, so far as here material: “. . . no grant, appropriation or use of public money or property or loan of public credit shall be made or authorized by the commonwealth or any political division thereof for the purpose of founding, maintaining or aiding . . . any . . . infirmary, hospital, institution . . . which is not publicly owned and under the exclusive control, order and superintendence of public officers or public agents authorized by the commonwealth or federal'authority or both, except that appropriations may be made . . . to carry out legal obligations, if any, already entered into . . .” This amendment was ratified and adopted by the people on November 6, 1917, and by its § 5 did “ not take effect until the October first next succeeding its ratification and adoption ”; that is, to say, it took effect on October I, 1918. It is to be observed that this amendment was not
There are several answers to this contention of the plaintiffs. So far as the gift constituted a contract between the donors and the town, it could not be impaired even by an amendment or other change in the Constitution of this Commonwealth. It was said in Opinion of the Justices, 234 Mass. 597, at page 607, with the citation of numerous, supporting authorities, that “A State can no more violate a provision of the Constitution of the United States by its own Constitution than it can by the act of its legislative, executive or judicial authorities.” To the same effect are White v. Hart, 13 Wall. 646, 652; Florida v. Mellon, 273 U. S. 12, 17; Wisconsin v. Illinois, 281 U. S. 179, 197.
Another answer to the contention of the plaintiffs is that continuance of the support of the hospital by taxation falls within the exception in § 2 of art. 46, which exempts from its inhibition appropriations to carry out legal obligations already assumed. The gift here in question carried with it an implication that it should be reasonably supported by the town. The conveyance to the town was upon the express condition that the property should be used forever as a hospital. Since no endowment accompanied the grant, the acceptance of the gift upon this condition imported an obligation to maintain and support the hospital at public expense so far as necessary. If the town is to retain title to the hospital, it must do something to make it useful as a public charity. That was an obligation arising out of the contract constituting the gift. It had already been entered into by the completion of the gift before the operative date of the Forty-sixth Amendment to the Constitution. Appropriation of public money to satisfy that obligation is, therefore, within the express permission of the amendment. The case of Jenkins v. Andover, 103 Mass. 94, is plainly distinguishable because the appropriation there in question was for the benefit
Finally, we think that appropriations by the town from time to time for the support of this hospital are not within the prohibition of the amendment. This hospital is “publicly owned.” The legal title to it is in the town. It is under the “exclusive control, order and superintendence” of the trustees prescribed by the terms of the gift. As already pointed out, these trustees constitute “public officers or public agents.” They were selected in a way permitted by the statute governing the management of towns at the time of the gift. They act exclusively under their obligations to the public for the proper administration of their trust in accordance with the terms of the gift by which it was established, and with general public law to that end.
Bill dismissed.