214 Wis. 240 | Wis. | 1934
The finding of the jury that there was no provision made by appellant under which the stock in his possession could be sold at any time when in their judgment respondent and his co-owner A. W. Golz saw fit to sell, is not sustained by the evidence. This leaves respondent without grounds on which to base his claim that the stock was converted by the appellant to his own use. The arrangement under which that opportunity was afforded respondent and Golz appears from the testimony of the parties and is abundantly corroborated by their acts. Respondent and Golz
“He gave me the certificates indorsed in blank to be put in this pigeonhole and if any of them were sold to take them out, or if we wanted to sell one to take a hundred share certificate and sell it and give him whatever he was entitled to after cleaning up our note. I told Mr. Adams about it when I learned about it in April, 1929. Walter (respondent) knew everything that I knew in connection with this stock.”
The respondent testified with relation to the demand alleged to have been made on May 3d, that he talked with appellant about selling, and when asked: “Had you ever asked Mr. Maxcy to put in an order to sell for you?” he
It also appears that there was a reason for having the stock issued in one hundred share lots. It was testified that:
“When sold in less than one hundred shares lots the amount realized would be one-eighth of a point less than the market price on that day. It is the same with buying. ... By that arrangement by permitting Mr. Maxcy to sell one hundred shares of stock we would have realized one-eighth of a point more for the fifty-six shares than we would have realized if we had just sold the fifty-six shares.”
There was testimony also that the reason for permitting the original twenty-five shares of Wisconsin Parts stock to continue in appellant’s name was to save the cost incident to transfer and the expense of a reissue. With all these facts
In 26 Ruling Case Law, p. 1098, § 3, “conversion” is defined as follows:
“Conversion is any distinct act of dominion wrongfully exerted over another’s personal property in denial of or inconsistent with his rights therein, such as a tortious taking of another’s chattels, or any wrongful exercise or assumption of authority, personally or by procurement, over another’s goods, depriving him of the possession, permanently or for an indefinite time.”
Circumstances do not exist in the present case of a nature sufficient to bring appellant’s acts within this definition, and respondent must fail on this account. Consequently, it is unnecessary for us to consider the claim that the complaint is defective because of neglect to join Golz as a party plaintiff, or the effect upon respondent’s rights of the acquiescence of Golz in the appellant’s course of action.
By the Court. — Judgment reversed. Cause remanded with direction to answer questions in accordance with this opinion and to enter judgment in defendant’s favor dismissing the. complaint.