82 Mass. 146 | Mass. | 1860
There are no facts in the case, from which it can be fairly inferred that the plaintiff’s debt secured by the mortgage under which he claims to recover the premises was a debt contracted prior to the passage of the homestead act of 1855. On the contrary, by taking a new note in lieu of the former one, with a mortgage to secure its payment, it is clear that the parties intended it as a new debt, and that the old debt was intended to be extinguished and paid. It is not a case where a party having a note secured by a mortgage surrenders it and takes a new note in its place, still retaining the mortgage
The conveyance in mortgage to the plaintiff was therefore made to secure a debt contracted subsequently to the enactment of the homestead act of 1855. The wife did not join in the conveyance, except for the purpose of releasing her dower. The conveyance was therefore invalid, and conveyed no title to the plaintiff as against the defendant, to whom the estate was subsequently, and before this conveyance was confirmed by St. 1857, c. 298, § 13, conveyed by a deed in which she joined and conveyed her homestead right. This last statute expressly excepts from its operation all rights in real estate acquired by purchase or otherwise prior to its enactment. Johnson v. Fay, ante, 144. The provisions of St. 1855, c. 238, are substantially the same with those of St. 1851, c. 340. The only difference is that the former extends the homestead exemption from five hundred to eight hundred dollars. The decision of the court in Richards v. Chace, 2 Gray, 383, is therefore applicable, and the demandant is not entitled to recover the lot of land first described in the mortgage to him.
Sufficient facts are not stated to show that the second described parcel of land was used and occupied as part of the homestead of the mortgagor. The demandant is therefore entitled to recover possession thereof. Judgment accordingly.