Opinion op the Court by
Affirming.
This аppeal involves the construction of a contract. Appellants, who were doing business under thе firm name of Bell County Lumber and Supply Company, leased a small tract of land in Middlesboro from apрellee on February 1, 1919, for a term of one year, agreeing to pay as rental therefor $50.00 a mоnth. The contract of lease gave appellants the option of leasing the premises for the -succeeding year, provided the parties -could agree upon the rent to be paid. It also gave to them certain options in respect to the purchase of the property during thе year 1919. That part of the contract by which these
“At any time therein from January 1st, 1919, the lessee may have the privilege, under the provisions exercisable herein, of purchasing the property from the lessor, in which event the purchase pricе shall be twenty-five ($25.00) dollars for a front foot, fronting on Fitzpatrick avenue from the aforesaid officе building to said canal reserve.
“If lessor has an offer for the purchase of said property herеin described he shall give the lessee the privilege of purchasing said property at the figure offеred, but in the event that lessee fails to promptly exercise this privilege by purchase of and pаyment for said property, it shall not be binding. ’ ’
In October, 1919, appellee received an offer of $50.00 a front foot for the property. He gave appellants the option of taking it at that price. They refused it but offered him $25.00 a foot. The offer was declined and appellants then requested that thеy be allowed to lease the property for another year. Appellee refused the request but did offer to let them have it until July 1, 1920, if they would release their option and pay $75.00 a month rent. Appellants rejected the offer and demanded that the property be sold to them at $25.00 a front foot, wherеupon appellee gave them formal notice of a cancellatioji of the lease and demanded possession of the premises. Appellants refused to surrender possession, аnd appellee filed this suit for a cancellation of the lease and for damages for the rеtention of the property. By answer and counterclaim appellants asked for-an injunction restraining appellee from interfering with their occupancy of the premises, and further that appellee be compelled to convey the property to them at the price of $25.00 a front foot, which they offered to pay. The court granted the relief sought by appellee and awarded him $1,437.60 in damages.
It is the contention of appellants that the contract gave to them an option to buy the property at $25.00 a front foot at any time during the-year 1919, and also an option, as a рreferred vendee, to purchase it at les^
The question is one of construction. The language of the two pаragraphs is not as clear as it might be, but we construe it to mean that appellants had the option of buying the property at $25.00 a front foot, but,, if they failed to exercise that option before aрpellee received :an offer that he desired to accept, appellants then had the option of purchasing “at the figure offered,” whatever that might be, whether less than $25.00 a front foot or more than that amount. That was the view of the trial court, and in our judgment it is correct.
The evidence shows that appellee offered to sell the property to appellants at $50.00 a foot, whiсh was the price that he had been offered, and, appellants having declined that offer, he thеn agreed to extend their lease until July 1, 1920, believing that the property would not depreciate in value during that period. The latter offer was on the condition that appellants pay $75.00 a month rent. They rejected the offer of extension and stood on what they conceived to be their rights under the cоntract. Not agreeing to the offer of rental, but retaining possession of the property after the expiration of the term of one year, the court treated the contract as having been terminated on February 1, 1920, and awarded appellee damages in an amount equal to the interest оn the sum for which the property could have been sold in the autumn of 1919, and also gave judgment for the rent for the three months of November and December, 1919, and January, 1920. This, in our opinion, was right.
The judgment is affirmed.