58 Ga. App. 663 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1938
C. C. Adams instituted proceedings under the workmen’s compensation act against Forrest R. Davis et al., to procure an award for injuries arising out of and in the course of his employment by Forrest R. Davis. The bill of exceptions recites that “W. R. Adams was made a party in the case before the hearing, . . and . . was present at the hearing and waived notice.” The finding of the hearing director, which is fully set out in the bill of exceptions is as follows: “It is the finding of this director, after a careful study of the evidence, that the claimant, C. C. Adams, did not receive an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment while in the employ of Forrest R. Davis, but that claimant at the time of the alleged injury was in the em
The first question with which we are confronted is whether there is merit in the motion to dismiss the writ of error, because the bill of exceptions “seeks to assign error upon the antecedent ruling of the Industrial Board and the antecedent ruling of a director of the Industrial Board,” and “does not except to or assign error upon the decision and judgment of the court below, or undertake so to do.” The bill of exceptions recites that “on the 23rd day of December, 1937, in Pulton superior court, before the Hon. E. E. Pomeroy, presiding, [came on] the case of C. C. Adams vs. Forrest B. Davis et al., the same being an appeal from the Industrial Board of Georgia, growing out of the ruling of the Hon. Harry Monroe, director of the Industrial Board, denying jurisdiction as of August 23rd, 1937, and the ruling of all the directors of said board, affirming said single director, as of September 20, 1937. . . On the 8th day of January, 1938, the Hon. E. E. Pomeroy affirmed the previous ruling of the Industrial Board, adversely to your movant. To this adverse ruling of live lion. E. E. Pomeroy, judge then and there presiding, affirming the previous ruling of the entire Industrial Board of Georgia, which also was merely affirming the ruling of the Hon. Harry Monroe, single director of said board, to which ruling he then excepted, now excepts, and assigns same as error [italics ours], and the more specific 'errors alleged: 1. The facts found by the directors did not support the decree. 2. There was not sufficient competent evidence in the records to warrant a finding for the defendant, affirming the directors. [Italics ours.] 3. The order or decree is contrary to the law.” The exception, while somewhat confused,
If, as found by the director, W. B. Adams was an independent contractor, the Industrial Board was without jurisdiction as to him, because the evidence failed to show that he was operating under the provisions of the workmen’s compensation act. If, as found by the director, the claimant at the time of his alleged injury was in the employment of W. E. Adams, an independent contractor, and not in the employment of Forrest R. Davis, the Industrial Board was without jurisdiction of Davis, because the relation of master and servant did not exist between him and the claimant. Therefore the controlling issue in the case is whether W. R. Adams was an independent contractor. “In claims for compensation under the workmen’s compensation act, where the question is whether the injured person, or the person under whom he was working, occupied the relation of an employee or of an independent contractor toward the alleged employer, the line of demarcation is often so close that each case must be determined upon its own particular facts. The chief test to be applied, however, in determin-' ing whether the relationship of the parties under a contract for the performance of labor is that of employer and servant, or that of employer and independent contractor, lies in whether the contract gives, or the employer assumes, the right to control the time, manner, and method of executing the work, as distinguished from the right merely to require certain definite results in conformity to the contract. Home Accident Ins. Co. v. Daniels [42 Ga. App. 648, 157 S. E. 245]; Cooper v. Dixie Construction Co., 45 Ga. App. 420 (2) (165 S. E. 152); Poss Lumber Co. v. Haynie, 37 Ga. App. 60 (2) (139 S. E. 127).” Liberty Lumber Co. v. Silas, 49 Ga. App. 262 (2) (175 S. E. 265). “Findings of fact made by the Department of Industrial Relations within its powers are, in the absence of fraud, conclusive, provided there is any supporting evidence. With respect to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain an award by that department, the award stands in this court upon the same footing as the verdict of a jury approved by a trial judge in other cases. Maryland Casualty Co. v. England, 160 Ga. 810 (129 S. E. 75); Home Accident Insurance Co. v. Daniels, 42 Ga. App. 648 (157 S. E. 245); London Guarantee &c. Co. v. Shockley, 31 Ga. App. 762 (122 S. E. 99).” Liberty Lumber Co. v. Silas, supra.
In addition to the cases already cited, we wish to mention the recent case of Richards v. Marco Realty Co., 57 Ga. App. 242 (194 S. E. 880), where the facts strikingly resemble those in the instant ease, and the question of independent contractor was involved. Applying the rules of law hereinbefore quoted to the facts of this case, we are satisfied that the finding of the Industrial Board was correct, and that the judgment of the superior court affirming that finding was not erroneous.
Judgment affirmed.