MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pending is a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction brought by Defendant Arne Duncan, Secretary of the United States Department of Education. (“Secretary”); ECF No. 8. The Secretary claims the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action because the United States has not waived sovereign immunity as to the injunctive relief Plaintiff Karen Adams seeks, and because Ms. Adams’s claim is mooted. Ms. Adams’s action arises from the United States Department of Education’s (“Department”) decision to rehabilitate and sell loans Ms. Adams and thousands of others obtained to attend a for-profit school under the Guaranteed Student Loan Program, now known as the Federal Family Education Loan (“FFEL”) Program, Prior to rehabilitating and selling Ms. Adams’s FFEL loan, the Secretary had found.it and other FFEL loans suitable for discharge due to the school having falsely certified its students’ eligibility for FFEL loans. Ms. Adams’s asks the Court to overturn the Secretary’s decision to rehabilitate and sell group discharged FFEL loans, and the decision, in Ms. Adams’s case specifically, to refund no interest on money she paid under her discharged FFEL loan. Finding subject matter jurisdiction over Ms. Adams’s claims under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 701, et
I. Background
The facts relevant to deciding this motion to dismiss are detailed below in a light most favorable to Ms. Adams. First, some background on the FFEL Program is in order.
A.. Federal Family Education Loan Program.
The federal student loan program formerly known as the Guaranteed Student Loan Program, now known as the FFEL Program,
Under the Department’s regulations, if a borrower fails to repay the loan as scheduled, the lender must attempt to collect the loan using certain procedures. 34 C.F.R. § 682.411. If the lender’s collection efforts are unsuccessful, the loan is considered in default and the lender presents to the guaranty agency a claim for repayment of the loan. The guaranty agency then pays the lender for the loan and receives reimbursement from the Department. 34 C.F.R. § 682.406. However, the guaranty agency is also required to undertake collection efforts. 34 C.F.R. § 682.410(b)(6). If the guaranty agenсy’s collection efforts are unsuccessful, the guaranty agency eventually assigns the loan to the Department, and the Department undertakes its own collection efforts. 34 C.F.R. § 682.409. The required collection activities by the lender and the guaranty agency are called “due diligence,” and the lender and guaranty agency must meet the due diligence requirements in order to receive reimbursement from the Department. 34 C.F.R. § 682.406.
A borrower who has defaulted on a FFEL loan may “rehabilitate” the defaulted loan by making a certain number of qualifying on-time payments within a specific period. 20 U.S.C. § 1078-6(a); 34 C.F.R, § 682.405. If a FFEL loan is rehabilitated, the borrower recommits to paying the loan under the promissory note and receives significant benefits for no longer being in default, including having the default removed from the borrower’s credit history.
The HEA and Higher Education Act Amendments of 1992 (“1992 HEA Amendments”) also permit discharge of FFEL loans under certain conditions. The 1992 HEA Amendments provide that if a student borrower’s “eligibility to borrow ... was falsely certified by the eligible institution ... then the Secretary shall discharge the borrower’s liability on the loan (including interest and collection fees) by repaying the amount owed on the loan.” 20 U.S.C. ■ § 1087(c)(1); Gill v. Paige,
To qualify for a discharge, Department regulations generally require a borrower to file an application and provide certain information and records to demоnstrate that he or she meets the requirements for a discharge. 34 C.F.R. § 682.402(e)(3); see also Salazar v. Duncan, No. 14-1230,
After discharging a FFEL loan held by the Department, the Secretary is obligated by Department regulations to take several actions. First, the Secretary must reimburse the borrower amounts he or she paid voluntarily or through enforced collection on the discharged loan. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 682.402(e)(1), (2)(ii). The Secretary must also report the discharge tо all credit reporting agencies. Id. at § 682.402(e)(iv). Additionally, a parallel regulation in the context of Direct Loans requires the Secretary, upon determining a borrower is eligible for discharge, to notify the borrower by mail about his or
B. Ms. Adams’s FFEL Loan
According to the Complaint, in 1986 Ms. Adams obtained a FFEL loan for $2,500.00 from the now-shuttered Florida Federal Savings and Loan (“FFSL”). Compl. ¶¶ 4, 20. Ms: Adams used the loan to attend the for-profit PTC Institute in Florida. Compl. ¶4. At the time she applied for the FFEL loan, Ms. Adams did not have a high school diploma or a General Educational Development credential (“GED”), Compl. ¶ 2, which made her ineligible for a FFEL loan unless the institution demonstrated, in one of several manners prescribed by regulation, her ability to benefit (“ATB”) from the education or training offered by the institution. 20 U.S.C. § 1091(d); 34 C.F.R. §§ 668.32(e), 668.141-156.
In 1992, Ms. Adams moved to West Virginia and was later awarded Soсial Security Supplemental Income (“SSI”) benefits for mild mental retardation, minimal literacy, and dependent personality syndrome. Compl. ¶ 2. Her SSI benefits were around $700 a month at that time.
Eventually, Ms. Adams defaulted on her FFEL loan. Pursuant to the provisions of the FFEL Program, the loan was assigned to the Department, which became the holder of Ms. Adams’s loan.
In 1995, the Secretary conducted an investigation and found sufficient evidence to provide a group discharge to borrowers who used their FFEL loans to attend PTC Institute from January 1, 1986 through June 30, 1990. Compl. Ex. C; Compl. Ex. E. The Secretary’s determination was based on a finding by the Department’s Inspector General that PTC Institute had falsely certified the eligibility of its students for FFEL loans during this time period. Compl. Ex. C.
In March 2006, Ms. Adams, not knowing about the 1995 group discharge, applied to have her FFEL loan discharged. Compl. Ex. E. In her application, however, Ms. Adams identified incorrectly the school she attended as the Chi Institute, rather than PTC Institute. Id. Ms. Adams’s application was denied on the ground that attendees of the Chi Institute were not eligible for a group discharge. Id. The Secretary’s records indicate the letter rejecting Ms. Adams’s application was dated April 14, 2006.
After. the Department denied Ms. Adams’s discharge request, it recognized her loan as rehabilitated and sold it along with FFEL loans originated by PTC Institute. More specifically, in 2007 a collection contractor working for the Department contacted Ms. Adams and suggested she rehabilitate her loan. Compl. ¶ 14-16. Not realizing her loan was subject to the 1995 group discharge, Ms. Adams rehabilitated her loan оn October 8, 2007. Id. In 2008, the Department sold Ms. Adams’s loan along with others subject to the 1995 group discharge to SunTrust. SunTrust in turn hired American Education Services (AES) to collect on Ms. Adams’s loan. Pursuant to AES’s efforts, Ms. Adams started paying $78.00 a month on her rehabilitated but group discharged loan.
On October 8, 2012, Ms. Adams received notice from the guaranty agency for her loan, the Educational Credit Management Corporation (“ECMC”), that her rehabilitated loan was in default. Compl. ¶¶ 24, 26; Exhibit E. But she was later informed, through counsel,-by ECMC that her loan was eligible for discharge based on the Secretary’s 1995 group discharge. Ms. Adams applied for the discharge; the discharge was recognized by the Department; and Ms. Adams received a refund for all payments she made on the loan beginning in 2007, totaling $2,572.96. Compl. ¶29. Ms. Adams was not refunded interest on the money she had paid since 2007.
In her Complaint, Ms. Adams seeks review under the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 701, et seq., and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, et seq., of at -least twо Department decisions that harmed her. Compl. ¶,6. First, she contends the Department’s decision to sell group discharged FFEL loans to institutions intending to collect on those loans was in violation of law, namely the agency’s rules and prior group discharge finding. Compl. ¶ 12. More specifically, the Department violated its own rules surrounding proper sale of rehabilitated FFEL loans when it sold Ms. Adams’s group discharged loan to SunTrust for collection purposes while the Department either (1) knew the loan was not rehabilitated and unenforceable under the Department’s regulations, or (2) did not first determine whether the loan was actually enforceable. Compl. ¶¶ 35-39, 41. As a result, Ms. Adams unnecessarily made payments on her previously discharged loan, for which the Department reimbursed her without paying interest to her. Compl. ¶¶ 12, 30, 31. On this first APA claim, Ms. Adams asks to overturn the Secretary’s decision tо rehabilitate and sell her FFEL loan and those of others’ similarly situated. She also asks for equitable relief, including enjoining the Department from attempting to collect on or sell group discharged FFEL loans, and requiring the Department to direct guaranty agencies and others to cease and desist from collection efforts for group discharged loans. Compl. ¶ 48, 49, 52, 53, 63, 65, 70.
Second, in her response to the Secretary’s motion to dismiss, Ms. Adams clarifies that she also asks to overturn the Secretary’s decision to refund the money she paid under her discharged loan since 2007 without paying interest on that money. Compl. ¶¶ 64; Pl.’s Resp. 10, ECF No. 13. Ms. Adams claims the. Secretary’s decision to not refund her money with interest was arbitrary, capricious, or not in accordance with law. Compl. ¶¶ 64; Resp. at 10. In her APA claim for interest, Ms. Adams seeks relief not already accorded to her by the discharge and refund, including, interest on the money she was refunded.
Ms. Adams also seeks to represent two classes of people who have had their group discharged loans sold for collection purposes. Compl. ¶47. Within-these classes are people like Ms. Adams, who have had their group discharged loans sold, made payments on the loans, and were refunded their money without interest. The classes would also include people unlike Ms. Adams, who have had their group discharged loans sold and who are currently making payments on their loan, having no notice of the group discharge. According to Ms. Adams, people in this second group are entitled not only to interest, but also refund of money they paid on their discharged loan and other money.
Having recited the regulatory background and factual developments, the Court will next explain the legal stаndard for resolving the Secretary’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and then discuss the Secretary’s motion.
II. Legal Standard
■ Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) governs motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. As Plaintiff, Ms. Adams bears the burden of proving that subject matter jurisdiction exists. See Evans v. B.F. Perkins Co.,
III. Discussion
The Secretary argues dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is proper for two reasons.
A. Sovereign Immunity
The Secretary contends this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to grant Ms. Adams’s requested injunctive relief because the HEA does not waive sovereign immunity with respect to injunctive relief. In support of his position, the Secretary points to the HEA section waiving sovereign immunity and granting jurisdiction to federal district courts, which says the Secretary may sue and be sued in any district court of the United States, “but no attachment, injunction, garnishment, or other similar process, mesne or final, shall be issued against the Secretary.” 20 U.S.C. § 1082(a)(2). Ms. Adams responds that she brings this action pursuant to the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 701, et seq., not the HEA.
The APA waives sovereign immunity of the United States in suits against administrative agencies brought by individuаls who have been adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2014); Hire Order Ltd. v. Domenech, No. 10-1464,
Ms. Adams seeks declaratory and injunctive relief under .the APA, namely overturning two of the Secretary’s decisions that harmed her. Specifically, she asks the Court to overturn the Secretary’s decision in 2007 to rehabilitate loans that were group discharged in 1995 and to sell them in 2008 to entities intending to collect on those loans.
In reply, the Secretary makes three arguments specifically for dismissal of Ms. Adams’s APA claim for interest.
Second, the Secretary argues the APA incorporates all limitations on the waiver of sovereign immunity prescribed by other statutes, and therefore, Section 1082(a)(2)’s anti-injunction provision requires the Court to dismiss Ms. Adams’s APA claim for interest. In support of this position, the Secretary points out that nothing in the APA “ ‘confers authority to grant relief if any other statute that grants consent to suit expressly or impliedly forbids the relief which is sought.’ ” Def.’s Reply 3, EOF No. 14 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 702(2)). This argument fails. The HEA does not expressly prevent suits like Ms. Adams’s, which ask, in part, to overturn a decision by the Department allegedly arbitrary and capricious or in violation of law. Furthermore, as discussed above, several courts have recognized that individuals harmed by the Secretary’s FFEL Program decisions may have the Secretary’s decision overturned and seek injunctive relief pursuant to the APA. See Jordan,
Lastly, the Secretary cоntends Ms. Adams’s APA claim for interest must be dismissed because the United States has not waived sovereign immunity with respect to interest awards. The APA waives sovereign immunity only for actions seeking “relief other than money damages.” In re Howard, No. 13-5261,
In sum, the APA grants this Court subject matter jurisdiction over Ms. Adams’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against the Secretary for the Department’s decisions made under the HEA. Ms. Adams does not bring her claims under the HEA, and any limit on the waiver of sovereign immunity in the HEA as to in-junctive relief has no bearing on jurisdiction over this APA action. Ms. Adams’s APA claims are timely and she may challenge the Secretary’s decision that she was not entitled to interest on the money refunded to her in 2014.
B. Mootness
The Secretary contends Ms. Adams’s case is moot because Ms. Adams has had her FFEL loan discharged and received a refund of money she paid under the loan since 2007, which the Secretary claims is all the relief to which she is entitled.
Article III of the U.S. Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to deciding “cases” and “controversies.” U.S. Const, art. Ill, § 2. Therefore, federal courts are prohibited under principles of justiciability, from deciding cases that become moot before or during litigation.
Ms. Adams’s case seeks APA review of two Department decisions; both of her claims based on these decisions are live and she has a legally cognizable interest in their outcome. First, she asks to
Even if Ms. ■ Adams’s claim seeking to overturn the Secretary’s decision to rehabilitate and sell group discharged FFEL loans was moot, the exception to the mootness doctrine for cases challenging conduct capable of repetition yet evading review should be applied in this case. Generally, the capable of repetition yet evading review exception applies when (1) the challenged action is too short in duration to be fully litigated prior to cessation or expiration; and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be subject to the same action again. Lux v. Judd,
To conclude, Ms. Adams’s case is not moot. The Secretary fails to ‘ carry his heavy burden of demonstrating that Ms. Adams’s claims are not live and that she has no personal stake in this matter. Even if Ms. Adams’s case were moot, this is an appropriate case for applying the capable of cessation yet evading review exception because the Secretary’s challenged action constitutes a government decision that continues in force and adversely effects Ms. Adams and others. Therefore, the Secretary’s motion to dismiss on mootness grounds must be denied.
IV. Conclusion
For the preceding reasons, the Court DENIES the Secretary’s 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity and mootness.
The Court DIRECTS the Clerk to send a copy of this written Memorandum Opinion and Order to counsel of record and any unrepresented parties.
. The regulations require the borrower seeking false-certification discharge to submit a written request and sworn statement stating that he or she received funds during the relevant time (i.e., on or after January 1, 1986), was admitted to the school on the basis of an ability to benefit from the school’s training, and did not meet the requirements for admission on the basis of ability to benefit. 34 C.F.R. §§ 682.402(e)(3)(ii).
. Although one court has held that a borrower, after a group discharge, must still request a discharge from the loan holder and sign a sworn statement in order to have his or her loan discharged, See Salazar,
. Though not directly applicable to the GSL program, other courts have looked to Direct Loan program regulations when deciding cases about loans under the GSL or FFEL programs. See, e.g., Salazar,
. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Department’s Inspector General went across the nation auditing and investigating proprietary schools like PTC Institute. S. Rep. No. 102-58, at 11(1991) [hereinafter Nunn Report], The results of these investigations were incorporated into a 1991 report prepared by the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations chaired by then-Senator Sam Nunn. See generally id. In the Nunn report, the Subcommittee found "fraud and widespread abuses” committed at every level of the Program, and as a result:
the [P]rogram’s intended [beneficiaries]— hundreds of thousands of young people, many of whom come from backgrounds with already limited opportunities—have suffered further because of their involvement with the [Program]. Victimized by unscrupulous profiteers and their fraudulent schools, students have received neither the training nor the skills they hoped to acquire and, instead, have been left burdened with debts they cannot repay.
Id. at 33. Lastly, the Subcommittee found "the Department of Education had all but abdicated its responsibility to the students it [was] supposed to service .... ” Id. at 33. Based on its findings, the Subcommittee recommended several actions by the Department and others to return the program’s "focus to serving the interests of the students.” Id. at 34. Specifically, the Subcommittee stated “[w]hen abuse and/or fraud are found, the Department ... must act swiftly and decisively” because "inaction, delays and unnecessary procedural hurdles have halted effective action in the past. The Department should review and streamline current hearing and procedural requirements, eliminating unnecessary delays.” Id. at 36. The Subcommittee also recommended the Department:
develop ways tо assist those students who continue tó be victimized by fraud and abuse within the [Program], Because the Department’s oversight systems have failed, students who have not received the education promised have been left responsible for loans that they cannot repay and, therefore, on which they all too often default. The Department must ... work with stu*638 dents to ease financial burdens imposed as a result of past abuse.
Id. at 37 After the Nunn report, Congress enacted the 1992 HEA Amendments, which require the Secretary to discharge FFEL loans belonging to students whose eligibility to borrow was falsely certified by their school. See Salazar,
.- The Secretary’s 1995 letter appears inconsistent with the Department’s regulation setting forth the group discharge procedure discussed above. The group discharge regulation provides a borrower’s loan may be discharged without an application if the Secretary determines that the borrower qualifies for a discharge based on information in the Secretary’s possession. 34 C.F.R. § 682.402(e)(15). The 1995 letter says the Secretary had enough information to determine that borrowers who used their FFEL loans to attend PTC Institute from January 1, 1986 to June 30, 1990 qualify for a discharge. However, the 1995 letter, apparently in violation of regulation, requires borrowers in this category to submit additional material, namely an ability to benefit certification, in order to have their loan discharged. Because the Court must construe facts in a light most favorable to Ms. Adams, and because the Secretary’s letter cannot impose discharge requirements inconsistent with those of the Department’s regulation, the Court finds for .purposes of this motion to dismiss that Ms. Adams's FFEL loan was group discharged in 1995. Additional proceedings may reveal that Ms. Adams’s loan was not in fact group discharged in 1995, But based on the Department’s regulations and record before this Court at present, the Secretary’s 1995 letter indicates Ms. Adams’s loan falls within the category of FFEL loans group discharged by the Secretary in 1995. As such, her loan was discharged in 1995 without her needing to file an application.
. Ms. Adams has not yet filed a motion for class certification, and so the Court does not delve into her two putative classes. See Compl. ¶¶ 48, 49.
. At the end of his memorandum in support of dismissal, the Secretary argues in one sentence that Ms. Adams has lost standing to bring a class action on behalf of people who continue to pay under their rehabilitated group discharged FFEL loans because her loan has been discharged and she has been refunded money she paid under the discharged loаn since 2007. Def.’s Memo in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss 13-14, ECF No. 9. The Secretary’s standing concern is of central importance to the Court because whether or not a class is certified, the threshold standing issue also determines whether this Court has subject matter jurisdiction to hear Ms. Adams’s APA claim seeking to overturn the Secretaty’s FFEL rehabilitation and sale decision. However, the standing issue, not being fully briefed, is preserved for another occasion.
. The Secretary rehabilitated Ms. Adams’s group discharged loan around 2007 and sold it with the other group discharged loans in 2008. However, based on Ms. Adams’s claim for relief, the Court treats these as one decision, for present purposes.
. Although Ms. Adams has already received some relief—the Department refunded her the money she paid under her discharged loan— she claims she is entitled to additional injunc-tive relief, namely overturning the Secretary's decision to not pay her interest on the money refunded to her. Resp. at 4-6; see also Compl. ¶ 20.
. As for Ms. Adams’s request to overturn the Secretary's decision to rehabilitate and sell group discharged loans, the Secretary argues this claim for injunctive relief is moot because even though perhaps thousands of people continue to pay on their rehabilitated but group discharged loans, Ms. Adams has already been refunded the money she paid on her own group discharged loan. The Court will analyze with the Secretary’s mootness argument in Section III.B infra.
. A decision that, as discussed above in n.3, might be in violation of the Department’s group discharge regulation. Again, the Court stays a ruling on this until further proceedings.
. Moreover, the Fourth Circuit has held that equitable relief-sought under the APA for government conduct in violation of law does not impinge the United States' sovereign immunity unless the sovеreign would be stopped in its tracks and the injunction would cause substantial bothersome interference with the operation of the Government. See Littell v. Morton,
. The Court does not render an opinion on whether Ms. Adams, if successful in this administrative review action, may ultimately obtain equitable relief despite Section 1082(a)(2)’s prohibition on equitable relief against the Secretary. The Court simply makes a distinction between jurisdiction over an APA claim and relief obtainable upon finding an APA claim meritorious. If Ms. Adams's APA claim is successful, the Court may be able to redress Ms. Adams’s injuries by merely remanding the case to the Secretary for further actions and proceedings, instead of enjoining the Secretary. Accordingly, the issue of relief obtainable is preserved for a later time, if it must be addressed at all.
. Furthermore, based on the Complaint, it is unclear whether Ms. Adams was refunded interest and collection fees she mаy have incurred and paid to entities other than the Department. For instance, HEA Section 1087(c)(1) provides, in relevant part:
[I]f such student’s eligibility to borrow under this part was falsely certified by the eligible institution or was falsely certified as a result of a crime of identity theft, ... then the Secretary shall discharge the borrower’s liability on the loan (including interest and collection fees) by repaying the amount owed on the loan and shall subsequently pursue any claim aváilable to such borrower against the institution and its affiliates and principals
20 U.’S.C.A. § 1087 (emphasis added). Additionally, although the Secretary has refunded Ms. Adams the money she paid on her discharged loan since 2007, Ms. Adams also went into default on that discharged loan and default carries additional fees. “One of the most serious consequences of default and delinquency for the borrower is that lenders may assess collection costs, feés, or penalties that the borrower must pay in addition to any principal and interest.” Doug Rendleman & Scott Weingart, Collection of Student Loans: A Critical Examination, 20 Wash. & Lee J. Civil Rts. & Soc. Just. 215, 241 (2014). At this time, the Court is unable to ascertain based on the facts alleged whether Ms. Adams paid additional fees for her default in 2012, and if so, whether she received any of those fees in her 2014 reimbursement.
. The Court notes that Ms. Adams has not pointed to specific statutes, regulations, or other rules that may require the Secretary to pay interest on money refunded to her. But because the briefing did not touch on the merits of Ms. Adams's APA claims, ’the Court leaves for another day the substance of Ms. Adams’s APA claim for interest.
. If such borrower had not applied for individual discharge, the APA's finality requirement would be unmet and the borrower's suit would be dismissed on that ground. See Salazar,