125 Va. 530 | Va. | 1919
after making the foregoing statement, delivered the following opinion of the court:
The assignments of error by the defendant raise but three questions for our consideration, which we will pass upon in their order as stated below.
The first portion of the question must be answered in the affirmative and the latter portion in the negative.
In such case it is obvious that the damages in question are general and not special damages.
The damages in the case before us arose, not out of any
As pointed out above, the property delivered for transportation in the case before us had but one use; and that was also its particular, and ordinary, as well as its only possible use. Hence, the statement of the law by the learned author last quoted is directly applicable to the case before us.
The case is the same in principle as those involving delay in transportation of traveling theatrical companies or their properties, in which the authorities are generally in accord in holding the carrier liable for damages occasioned
The defendant especially relies on the case of Chapman v. Fargo, 223 N. Y. 32, 119 N. E. 76, L. R. A. 1918 F, 1049, Ann. Cas. 1918 E, 1054, as sustaining a contrary view of the law. But an examination of that case discloses that it sustains, in principle, the view above expressed. That case involved the shipment of a moving-picture film and the court held that it did not fall within the principle under consideration, because, while the carrier was held to have had notice at the time of the contract of carriage that the films were to be exhibited by some one, yet, in view of the fact that such films are sent out originally by a central company and are shipped from one place of exhibition to another and finally back to the original sender, it was held that
A great number of other cases are cited and relied on by the defendant. But all of them are either cases involving the transportation, of parts of mill machinery, as to which the rule has been settled, since the Hadley and Baxendale Case, that loss of profits resulting from the shutting down of the mill cannot be recovered as general damages; or they involve transportation of articles of which the intended use was unusual, being different from their ordinary use; or the damages claimed were unusual, being different from those which would ordinarily arise from the loss of the ordinary use of the article. These cases involve the trans
As to details of fact concerning the quantum of damages, such as, in the instant case, the number of hogs the plaintiff might lose because of unreasonable delay in the transportation of the serum for their treatment and the value of such hogs, the law never requires notice of such details as a basis for recovery of such damages. The sole requisite as to the general damages recoverable is that they must arise “naturally — that is, according to the usual course of things —from the breach of the contract itself,” as aforesaid, for then they are “such as may be reasonably supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties at the time they made the contract as the probable result of the breach of it,” as aforesaid. Hadley v. Baxendale, supra. It is not required that the parties should have then actually considered such damages. The law in such case itself draws the conclusion that they were so considered on the ground that it may be fairly supposed they were so considered. 8 R. C. L., sections 25 and 26, pp. 458-9.
This is not a ease in which there was a declared or released valuation of the article shipped. The amount of “fifty-six and 75/100 dollars,” is entered in the express receipt as the “C. O. D.” charges which the carrier was to collect; and there is no “inserting” of the words “not exceeding $50,” as the value by which the rate of charge for transportation was to be fixed, and “in which case the company’s liability is limited to an amount not exceeding the value so declared or released,” as stipulated, in the “note” on the face of the receipt. In view of such express provisions, those on the back of the receipt set forth in the statement preceding this opinion are ambiguous, and it is not clear therefrom or from the other provisions on the subject. on the face of the receipt that there was in fact any actual reduction of rate of charge in view of an actually agreed valuation of the article shipped'— i. e., it is not entirely clear that this particular contract attempted to limit the liability of the carrier.
But if it were conceded that the contract of carriage attempted to limit the liability of the defendant to the sum of-fifty dollars, in consideration of the rate of charge for the transportation of the property notwithstanding some difference of opinion on the question when it arose under another statute (see Richmond & Danville R. R. Co. v. Payne, 86 Va. 481, 10 S. E. 749, 6 L. R. A. 849, and C. & O. Ry. Co. v. Beasley, 104 Va. 788, 52 S. E. 566, 3 L. R. A. [N. S.] 183), the rule in this State is now firmly settled that under our statute (sub-section 24 of section 1294-c, 1 Pollard’s Code, 1904 — which was enacted subsequently to the decisions last cited and is in addition to and different in its phraseology from the statute in this State on the subject previously existing, sec. 1296, Code 1887; sub-sec. 25 of sec. 1294 — c, 1 Pollard’s Code 1904), as to intrastate shipments, such attempted limitation of liability is void where
On the whole, therefore, we find no error in the judgment' complained of, and it will be affirmed.
Affirmed.