Yolanda Adame appeals from a Douglas County jury’s verdict finding her guilty of aggravated assault and second degree criminal damage to property. We affirm her conviction.
Viewed in a light to uphold the jury’s verdict, 1 the charges arose from an incident wherein Adame, while intoxicated, became enraged *258 at her boyfriend, J. M., for an insult he leveled at her housekeeping skills. As a result, Adame kicked in J. M.’s china cabinet. When he tried to stop further damage by grabbing Adame’s arms and wrestling her onto a sofa, Adame pulled away. She retrieved an aluminum baseball bat from an adjacent porch, with which she reentered the house and hit J. M. in the head, tearing off half of his ear; she exited into the carport and broke out several windows on J. M.’s 1996 Ford Mustang; she again reentered the house and located J. M. in the bathroom trying to staunch the bleeding; she beat him in the back with the bat; then, she again exited into the carport and broke out the remainder of the Mustang’s windows. Held:
1. The trial court refused to permit expert testimony regarding the battered woman syndrome, and Adame challenges this ruling. We find no error. “The battered woman syndrome describes a series of common characteristics that appear in women who are abused physically and psychologically over an extended period of time by the dominant male figure in their lives.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.)
Johnson v. State,
Here, Adame did not testify at trial. Instead, to establish the pattern of battering necessary for admission of evidence of the battered woman syndrome, Adame relied upon testimony from her former employer and two of Adame’s friends that sometime prior to the incident in question they saw Adame with bruises on her body However, none of these witnesses had personal knowledge of how the bruises were inflicted; there was no evidence that the bruises were the result of battering by J. M.; Adame did not testify that the bruises were the result of a battering by J. M.; no witness had ever seen J. M. hit Adame; there was no evidence presented that J. M. ever hit Adame; J. M. presented undisputed testimony that he had never hit Adame; and Adame’s son, who lived with the couple, presented undisputed testimony that he had never seen J. M. hit his mother.
So, “[t]his is in no manner a battered woman syndrome case.”
Selman v. State,
supra at 200. At trial, no evidence established a pattern of abuse/battering by J. M. against Adame. Thus, there was no
*259
evidence that J. M. was an “abusive mate” so as to make relevant testimony regarding the battered woman syndrome. See
Smith v. State,
[w]e find that this evidence does not rise to the level of battering necessary to rely on the battered person syndrome as a basis for a self-defense claim. Therefore, the trial court did not err in preventing the defendant’s expert from giving her opinion that [Adame] suffered from the battered person syndrome.
Mobley v. State,
2. Next, Adame challenges the admission of similar transaction evidence. “Absent an abuse of discretion, we will not disturb a trial court’s determination that similar transaction evidence is admissible. [Cit.]”
Arnold v. State,
(a) A similar transaction hearing was held pursuant to
Williams v. State,
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“In determining the admissibility of similar transaction evidence, the court should focus on the similarities, not the differences, of the two occurrences.”
Dunbar v. State,
Further,
in the present case we hold that evidence of [Adame’s] prior [assaults], which [were] sufficiently similar to the offense charged as to establish a logical connection between the two, was relevant to rebut [her] claim of justification by showing [her] bent of mind to commit the present offense. It follows that the evidence was properly admitted for that limited purpose.
Menefee v. State,
(b) One incident of domestic violence between Adame and R. S., the man she married five months after the incident in question, resulted in the death of R. S. and was held inadmissible as a similar transaction by the trial court, which found that its probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial nature. However, the trial court did permit the introduction of other incidents of violence that Adame, while intoxicated, perpetrated against R. S. during their approximately seven months together before his death. For example, Adame hit R. S. over the head with a large metal spoon and then hit him in the head with a wine glass. Adame threw a large rock at R. S.’s car and then threw bleach on his clothes and cut his clothes with scissors. Because R. S. was deceased at the time of trial, the trial court admitted such evidence under the necessity exception to the hearsay rule and permitted testimony from the deceased’s ex-wife and his coworker. Adame challenges the trial court’s ruling, contending that such evidence was inadmissible hearsay. We do not agree.
The two requirements for the admission of hearsay under the “necessity” exception are necessity/unavailability and particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.
Ward v. State,
Also, the evidence exhibits sufficient reliability to satisfy the second prong of the necessity exception. “Uncontradicted statements made to one in whom the deceased declarant placed great confidence and to whom [he] turned for help with [his] problems are admissible under the necessity exception. [Cits.]”
Ward v. State,
supra;
Fetty v. State,
3. J. M. testified at trial that he had never hit a woman and that he had not been accused of such. Adame sought to impeach J. M.’s testimony with (a) the pleadings in a 1981 divorce action and (b) a 1980 accusation for simple battery. The trial court refused to admit such evidence for impeachment purposes. We agree.
(a) Statements made by J. M.’s former wife in the 1981 divorce pleadings would not be admissible against J. M. in the trial of a criminal case.
134 Baker Street, Inc. v. State,
(b) An accusation is not competent evidence to disprove the facts to which a witness testifies.
Williams v. State,
*262
Adame argues that the accusation may not show that J. M. had actually hit a woman, but it showed that he had been
accused
of such, in contradiction to his trial testimony. However, whether J. M. had ever been
accused
— perhaps falsely since the accusation was nol prossed — of hitting a woman 17 years ago was wholly immaterial to the issues on the trial of this case. Such allegations, alone and completely unsubstantiated, would not go to the issue of Adame’s guilt of the crime as charged or to the merits of Adame’s justification defense, since the unsubstantiated accusation would not serve to support Adame’s claim that she had a reasonable fear of imminent harm from J. M. “[A] witness may not be impeached because of a discrepancy as to a wholly immaterial matter.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.)
Hightower v. State,
4. The evidence did not require a charge on justification insofar as Count 2, criminal damage to property, was concerned. 3 We reject Adame’s contention that evidence of justification on Count 2 was provided by testimony from Adame’s son that Adame told J. M., “if you come any further, I will break the windows out of your car.”
(a) The testimony upon which Adame relies was the “self-serving statement of a defendant and was inadmissible hearsay” without probative value; thus, a jury charge based on such statement was not warranted.
Jones v. State,
(b) Adame’s son did not so testify. At trial, the son testified that Adame stated, “if you don’t stop I’ll break the windows out of your car.” The record shows that the statement was made after Adame had kicked in J. M.’s china cabinet and in response to J. M.’s attempts to restrain her on the sofa. Adame’s son also testified — repeatedly — that J. M. never hit Adame. He testified that J. M. did not follow Adame onto the carport and that “the only thing I remember is her walking outside and hearing the car windows break.” J. M.’s testimony went uncontroverted that he did not hit Adame; that Adame was intoxicated; and that Adame came after him and his car with a baseball bat because she was enraged. “[A] charge on the defendant’s sole defense is mandatory
if there is some evidence to support the charge”
(Emphasis in original.)
Hayes v. State,
5. Our decision in Division 1, supra, renders meritless Adame’s *263 contention that the trial court erred in failing to charge the jury on the battered woman syndrome.
6. “Contrary to [Adame’s] contentions, the trial court did not introduce new evidence into the case, confuse the jury, or commit reversible error by instructing the jury on the law related to noncustodial investigatory detention and
Miranda
4
warnings.”
Threatt v. State,
7. Under the First Amendment there exists a right of access to criminal trials on the part of the press and general public.
Globe Newspapers v. Superior Court of Norfolk County,
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
Jackson v. Virginia,
Adame also argues that evidence she was hit by a former boyfriend, D. Q., two years prior to the incident in question was sufficient to permit the introduction of expert testimony regarding the battered woman syndrome as justification for her violent actions toward J. M. However, we will not consider this argument since it was not made at trial as a basis for the admission of battered woman syndrome evidence. “It is well settled that a reason urged by enumeration of error on appeal which is different from that urged below will not be considered for the first time on appeal.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.)
Estep v. State,
The trial court gave a thorough charge on justification/self-defense, but limited the jury’s consideration of such to Count 1, aggravated assault.
Miranda v. Arizona,
“[E]ither party shall have the right to have the witnesses of the other party examined out of the hearing of each other.” OCGA § 24-9-61.