4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 338 | Conn. App. Ct. | 1966
Lead Opinion
The plaintiffs are children of Mary Adamczyk and as aggrieved persons have appealed under § 17-2b of the General Statutes from the action of the defendant in denying to Mary Adamczyk medical assistance for the aged as provided for in § 17-135a. A fair hearing as required by § 17-2a was held, and the transcript of the hearing together with the hearing decision constitutes the record in the trial court. § 17-2b. On such an appeal there is no trial de novo; the court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the commissioner; its basic function is to determine whether the commissioner acted illegally or so arbitrarily and unreasonably as to abuse his discretion. Ouellet v. Shapiro, 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 268, 270-71.
There is no dispute that absent the life support agreement of February 8, 1957, the plaintiffs’ mother would be eligible for old age assistance under § 17-109. Subsection (e) thereof provides that a person is so eligible who “has not made an assignment or transfer or other disposition of property without reasonable consideration or for the purpose of qualifying for an award; provided
Long after the execution of the life support agreement, special provisions for medical assistance for the aged were enacted by the General Assembly. Public Acts 1961, No. 578, as amended, General Statutes §§ 17-135a to 17-135h. The purpose of this legislation, as stated in § 17-135a, was to provide “all or part of the cost of necessary medical services which the income and resources of such persons are insufficient to provide.”
The plaintiffs did not seek any corrections in the finding but have attacked the trial court’s conclusions, thereby presenting as a question of law the effect of the two agreements above mentioned upon the eligibility of Mrs. Adamezyk for state aid. The agreement of February 8, 1957, between the two plaintiffs (the mother not being a party to it), whereby the entire proceeds of the sale of the premises in which the mother had a life interest were to be divided equally between the plaintiffs and each agreed to pay 50 percent “for all her expenses, for the support, maintenance and care of Mary Adamezyk; namely, food, clothing, shelter, medical expenses and church costs,” to be binding upon them “until she dies,” was a valid contract for the benefit of a third party. The benefits thereunder were accepted by the mother, as she received not only the consideration she gave for it but additional sums as well. It is the general rule that when a contract for the benefit of a third party has been
The provisions of the statutes relating to assistance for the aged are contained in §§ 17-108 to 17-135h, in part 3 of chapter 302, entitled “Public Assistance,” of title 17 and provide a comprehensive system and procedures for such state aid. Section 17-116 recognizes life support contracts, but only those entered into with a boarding home or institution, and grants assistance to any otherwise eligible person in any such home or institution although he is cared for under such a life contract. The statute is silent as to any life care agreement of the kind involved in the case at bar. No similar exception may be read into the statute in respect to such a contract. If there is any inequity, it is for the legislature, not the court, to remove it.
The 1957 agreement provided a full measure of support for the mother. If she had died shortly thereafter, the plaintiffs would have profited; because she has lived on, the agreement has become burdensome. Such is the risk the plaintiffs took
We conclude that the defendant, in denying the application for medical assistance for the aged for the plaintiffs’ mother, did not act illegally or so arbitrarily or unreasonably as to abuse his discretion.
There is no error.
In this opinion Deaeiagtov, J., concurred.
Concurrence Opinion
(concurring). I agree with the majority that the statute, § 17-116, has no application to the plaintiffs in this case. It appears to be limited to contracts with eleemosynary institutions; this would not include noncharitable organizations or individuals who might enter into contracts for annuities or provision for future support, furnished either in money or in kind. In the present case, it is obvious that the plaintiffs had undertaken full support of their mother in return for the conveyance, and they also undertook to discharge thereby the other brothers and sisters who might otherwise be liable. They took the risk and cannot now be heard to say that they miscalculated the risk and should not be held to their bargain.