61 Mass. 361 | Mass. | 1851
This suit m equity was brought by the children and grandchildren of Samuel Forbes, who died in Connecticut, the place of his domicil, in 1827; and they alleged themselves to be devisees under his will, or the heirs of those devisees. They are all the descendants of Abigail Adam', wife of John Adam, and only daughter and heir at law of Samuel Forbes. It was objected by the defendants, that the will of Samuel Forbes had not been filed in, or proved and allowed by any probate court in this commonwealth, and so that the plaintiffs could not claim title under it. An amendment was afterwards allowed, by which the plaintiffs described themselves as heirs at law of Samuel Forbes. The defendants, having previously filed a general demurrer to the original bill, relied upon the same demurrer to the amended bill, and thereby admitted the claim of the plaintiffs, as such heirs at law.
The bill sets forth that, on the 21st of December, 1790, Jared Lane was the owner in fee simple of three undivided fourths of lot No. 62, in the second division of lots in Lanes-borough, (which lot contained one hundred acres,) and was seised and possessed of the same, and then sold the same to John and Titus "Wood and Jonathan Weed, and executed to them a deed thereof, in due form of law, reserving, saving and excepting from said grant, a full and ample right to all the iron or other ores in and upon said premises, with the right of way to pass and repass, to dig for, to cart and carry away the same from said premises. Of this deed, a copy is annexed, and referred to as part of the bill. In comparing this averment with the deed, there is some variance in the phraseology. In the deed it is thus expressed, “ excepting, saving and reserving a full and ample right to all the iron and other ore, that may be found on the surface or in the bowels of the earth, of said one hundred acres of land, with liberty to pass and re-pass, cart and carry away the same.” This lot of one hundred acres is further described as originally laid out to John Peck.
The bill then avers, that the defendant corporation, well •knowing the premises, and being apprised in particular of the record title of Forbes, and the peculiar grant in the deed from Lane to Wood, Wood and Weed, with reservation and exception of the ores, as aforesaid, purchased a title to the soil, wherein the plaintiffs are entitled to an easement, and other incorporeal rights, as aforesaid; and are now digging and carrying away the ore from said beds in a wasteful and unprofitable manner, and intend great waste and destruction; and expresses the plaintiffs’ fears that the defendants intend the entire destruction of said ore, and irreparable injury to the plaintiffs. It alleges, that a person attempting, under the authority of the plaintiffs, to exercise their incorporeal rights in the premises, was driven away by force by the defendants’ servants, whereby the plaintiffs were disturbed in the exercise of their incorporeal rights, and great wrong was thereby done thereto, to the nuisance of the plaintiffs in the premises. The bill prays for an account, an injunction and general relief.
The case came on to be argued upon the demurrer, the defendants insisting upon the ground, that this court had no jurisdiction in equity; because the facts set forth did not show a case of waste or nuisance. To constitute waste, they insisted there must be some relation, some privity of estate between the parties, and that no such privity was set forth in the present case. Whereupon, the plaintiffs, by their counsel, stated to the court, that they did not claim the jurisdiction on the ground of waste.
It was insisted in argument, that the case may be brought within the equity jurisdiction of this court, on the ground that
It appears to the court, that the substance of the plaintiffs’ complaint is, that they were possessed of an estate in the ore and ore-beds of the whole tract of land described, to the extent of three quarters thereof, with the right to dig for the same, place it on the grounds and carry it away—an incorporeal hereditament, indeed, but still an estate and real interest, that the defendants, being owners and in possession of the whole of the soil of said lot, denied their right to such ore and ore-beds, and right of opening them and taking and carrying away the ore, and forcibly resisted them and their servants in their attempts to do so. This, if true, might entitle the plaintiffs to an action of trespass, or trespass on the case, alleging or not alleging force; but the interruption of the right of way is mentioned merely as incidental and dependent, and not as the gravamen of the complaint. Were the plaintiffs’ right to the ore and ore-beds, with the right of digging and carrying away the ore, admitted, and had they complained only of an interruption in going to and from the ore-beds, then the gravamen of their complaint, perhaps, would be a disturbance of their right of way only, and properly designated as a nuisance.
It was urged in argument, that the facts showed a case of tenancy in common of the mine, and therefore the court had jurisdiction. The objection to that view is, that no such case is set out in the bill; it nowhere asserts that the defendants are tenants in common with the plaintiffs in the mines. If it were so, and if the relief sought were to obtain a special decree, in the nature of a special partition, because, the common right being in its nature indivisible in the ordinary mode, it would be competent for this court to direct an equitable mode of using the right, which should do justice to both parties, the case would have stood very differently. On the contrary, the plaintiffs have rather studiously avoided alleging that the defendants had any interest in the mine, though they have alleged that the defendants had acquired a title in fee to
The case again comes before the court on the question both of jurisdiction and of title.
Supposing the plaintiffs to have established their title to an undivided interest in the mines, ores and ore-beds, with the defendants, whether they be regarded as joint tenants, tenants in common, or partners, jurisdiction in equity of all questions and controversies between them, is conferred on this court, where there is not a plain and adequate remedy at law. Rev. Sts. c. 81, § 8. Supposing that there may be a right and estate in a mine, distinct from that of the soil in which it lies there seems to be a peculiar fitness in resorting to equity, to adjust and regulate the mutual rights of the parties. It is manifest that partition cannot be made by setting off the surface by metes and bounds, because the quantity and value of the mines and ores, and the capacity and facility of access for
The impossibility that each party should work his own undivided part of amine, practically prevents that mode of enjoyment, and manifestly requires some judicial proceeding to secure their respective rights. The working of a mine, in which there may be many owners, and in which each may set out an aliquot part of his whole interest, is regarded in England as a species of trade and partnership, which requires the interposition of equity jurisdiction, to adjust controversies. Jefferys v. Smith, 1 Jac. & Walk. 298. So where real property, as in mines and ore-beds, is so situated, that dower cannot be conveniently assigned at law, equity will take jurisdiction. Stoughton v. Leigh, 1 Taunt. 402.
But the main question, after all, is, whether the plaintiffs have proved any tenancy in common between themselves and the defendants in the ore and ore-beds.
We suppose it well settled, that there may be a separate estate in mines and ores, distinct from that of the land in which they are found. But prima facie, the owner of freehold lands is entitled to all the minerals and strata of coal, clay, ore, lime, marble and the like, not as a separate estate, but as a part of the fee and inheritance, and they will all pass by descent, or by conveyance, without special designation. But this presumption may be rebutted by evidence, showing a severance of the mines, and a distinct estate and interest in them, by grant or reservation ; that is, the owner of the fee, having the general power of disposal, may grant all the ores and minerals, or any particular species of them, as lead, coal, marble, or the like, and still remain general owner of the land
But when so severed by the general owner, and thus consti tuted a distinct estate, mines are still regarded as real estate, and the general laws regarding real estate will apply to them. They must be transferred by deed; contracts in relation- to them are within the statute of frauds; dower is to be assigned in them; Billings v. Taylor, 10 Pick. 460 ; and all other rules regulating title to real estate, so far as they are applicable, will apply to them. In this commonwealth, in case of the decease of the owner intestate, they will descend equally to all the children ; and in that respect are similar to the ease of a descent in coparceñary to sisters in England. There, if the property consist only of mines, and these are incapable of convenient and separate partition, the respective rights of the owners will be regulated, and the profits divided, by a commission out of chancery. Bainbridge on Mines, 116. It appears therefore, that the rights to ores and minerals, though em braced in the fee, are capable of being severed by the owner but have no distinct existence until severed; but when si severed, they are capable of being held, conveyed and trans mitted, by will or inheritance, and of being a separate estate carved out of the fee.
It is contended on the part of the defendants, in the presen; case, that the relation of tenants in common of these ores does not exist between the. parties, because.' the deed under which the plaintiffs claim, although it conveys three fourths of the land only, excepts and reserves, in terms, all the iron and
This brings us to the specific ground of defence, which is, that the attempt to sever the ore from the general interest in the land, is void, as a grant by a co-tenant, whether it be regarded as an incorporeal hereditament, or as a distinct estate ; because it is an attempt to create a new and distinct tenancy in common, between the one co-tenant and others, in distinct parts of the common estate, which is contrary to the rules of law. And the court are of opinion that this is a good ground of defence.
It is entirely settled as a rule of law, in relation to land, that the conveyance of any separate estate, by a tenant in common, by metes and bounds, is void as against the co
We have seen that it is competent for a general owner not only to divide his estate by metes and bounds, and convey one parcel to one, and one to another, but also to divide it in another mode, by conveying mines to one, and quarries to another, and retain the general interest in the soil; and these special estates, when thus legally severed, may pass to heirs, devisees and purchasers, and be attended with all the incidents, and be governed by the common rules applicable to the holding of real estate. But if the owner of an undivided part of a real estate could do this, it would be attended with all the inconveniences to the co-tenants, arising from a conveyance of his interest in a particular part by metes and bounds. Suppose the defendants had not acquired the three quarters of the general estate, which was conveyed by Lane to Wood. Wood and Weed, they would still have had one quarter of the entire estate, under their anterior title, with all the ores,
This view of the effect of the deed, which lies at the foundation of the plaintiffs’ title, renders it unnecessary to consider whether the reservation was personal to the grantor for want of words of limitation to his heirs and assigns, or whether, by implication, a reservation out of a grant in fee was the reservation of an inheritable interest. It is also unnecessary to consider many other questions, both of fact and of law, which have been incidentally discussed.
Decree accordingly for the defendants.