Under the United States Judicial Code. § 356, as amended, U. S. C. A. title 28, § 371, the Federal courts have-exclusive jurisdiction "of all suits for penalties and forfeitures incurred under the laws of the United States.” This statute was in force on June 35, 1938, when Congress passed the wage and hоur act, sometimes referred to as the "fair labor standards act.” Section 16(a) of the latter act made violation of designated provisions a penal offense, and prescribed certain penalties. In this *61 connection no сourt was mentioned. Section 16(b) provided that any person violating the provisions as to minimum wages or as to overtime compensation should be liable for the unpaid minimum wages or overtime compensation, as the case may be, and an additional equal amount “as liquidated damages;” and that “action to recover such liability may be maintained in any court of competent jurisdiction,” which in case of recovery may “allow a reasonable attorney’s fee tо be paid by the defendant.” In section 17 of the same act it was declared that the district courts of the United States should have jurisdiction to restrain violations. U. S. C. A. title 29, §§ 216(a), 216(b), 217.
The first question propounded by the Court of Appeals calls for determination of whether the foregоing provision as to recovery of an “additional equal amount as liquidated damages” (§ 16(b)) is a provision for recovery of a penalty or forfeiture within the meaning of the previously quoted section of the United States Judicial Code, wherеby jurisdiction to recover penalties and forfeitures is vested exclusively in courts of the United States. It is insisted by counsel for the defendant that the term “liquidated damages,” as used in section 16(b) is a misnomer, that the additional amount to be recoverеd is in truth and in fact a penalty, and that the phase “in any court of competent jurisdiction” means a United States court only. On the other side, it is contended that the fact that Congress has itself denominated the extra compensation for which thе employer is liable as liquidated damages is decisive, that the term “penalties and forfeitures” as used in the former statute has acquired a definite, narrow, and technical meaning, that actions under section 16(b) are not suits for penalties within thе meaning of such statute, and that State courts are courts of “competent jurisdiction” within the meaning of section 16(b). If the contention last referred to be sound, to wit, that State courts are courts of competent jurisdiction within the meaning of section 16(b) of the fair labor standards act, then it becomes immaterial whether or not an action brought against an employer under this section is a suit for such a penalty as is contemplated by the former statute. It was, or would have been, сompetent for Congress in passing the act of 1938 to provide that an action to recover the liability created thereby might be brought in a State court, even though such be a penalty incurred under the laws of the United *62 States, because it сould repeal its own former statute either in whole or in part, and could do so either expressly or by implication. But we need not and do not rest our conclusion upon any theory of repeal. There are other and more cоnvincing considerations.
It seems to be a principle frequently applied by the Supreme Court of the United States, that, unless Congress specifically restricts jurisdiction to the Federal courts, the State courts, where competent under the Stаte laws, have concurrent jurisdiction of suits of a civil nature arising under Federal laws. Claflin
v.
Houseman,
It may be significant that the Congress, in declaring what courts shall have jurisdiction to
restrain
violations of the act, stated that “The districts courts of the United States and United States Courts of the Territories and possessions shall have jurisdiction,” while in the previous section of the same act, in making violation a criminal offense (§ 16(a)), it mentioned no court, and in dealing with suits for unpaid minimum wages or compensation and an additional equal amount as “liquidated damages” (§ 16(b)) it declared that “Action to recover such liability may be maintained in any court of competent jurisdiction.” It is argued, however, that sincе it is a penalty that is sued for, and Congress had already enacted that suits for penalties and forfeitures incurred under the laws of the United States should be brought only in the courts of the United States, the words “any court of competent jurisdiction” must mean а Federal court only. We can not assent to either branch of this contention. First, as to courts. Before the passage of the act referred to as the fair labor standards act of 1938, the courts had ascribed to the words “any court оf competent jurisdiction” a definite meaning, as including within its purview any State or Federal court having jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject-matter. The 420 Mining Co.
v.
Bullion Mining Co.,
According to the reasoning in several decisions by the United States Supreme Court, the words “penalties and forfeitures,” as used in U. S. Judicial Code, § 256, as amended, U. S. C. A. title 28, § 371, supra, “refer to something imposed in a punitive way for an infraction of a public law, and do not include a liability imposed for the purpose of redressing a private injury, evеn though the wrongful act be a public offense and punishable as such.” Meeker
v.
Lehigh Valley Railroad Co.,
The only decision to the contrary brought to our attention by counsel (and our own investigation has found none other) is the case of
Anderson
v.
Meacham,
62
Ga. App.
145 (
Thus, petitions are frequently denied without determining whether the decision of the Court of Appeals was correct, or probably correct. Under our interpretation of the constitution and laws, the decisions of that court were intended to be final, except in a narrow class of cases; and it was not the purpose of the foregoing provision of the constitution tо make of the Supreme Court a court for hearing appeals from the Court of Appeals generally. As to most cases, that court is and should be considered as a court of last resort, though technically it is not such. If this had not been the рurpose of the constitution, there would have been little need for another court to share the work formerly coming to the Supreme Court. Primarily, as before, this court’s jurisdiction is to review certain decisions and judgments of law made by nisi prius judges in сertain classes of cases, and the power to entertain applications for certiorari to the Court of Appeals is merely incidental to the other. So, whenever the power is in fact exercised, it is not so much for the benefit of the parties in the particular case, as in aid of the law itself and its administration. Among other rules, which have been adopted are the following: “The petition [for certiorari] must specify plainly [a] the decision complained of, and [b] the alleged errors.” Rule 45, 178 Ga. xv. “The denial *66 of a writ of certiorari shall not be taken as an adjudication that the decision or judgment of the Court of Appeals is correct. The writ may have been denied for the want of a sufficient assignment of error in the petition, or for other failure to comply with the rules, or because the ease was not considered as one falling within the class which may be reviewed on certiorari.” Rule 54, 187 Ga. 844.
We denied the petition in Anderson v. Meacham, supra, for the reason that we thought it did not comply with Rule 45, as to specifying the decision complained of and “the alleged errors.” For other illustrations of cases which may or may not be so reviewed, see rule 53, supra.
It follows that the first question propounded should be answered in the negative. As shown in the other questions, answers thereto were not desired unless the first question should be answered in the affirmative.