Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Shirley Fingerhood, J.), entered on or about January 22, 1990, which denied defendant’s motion to compel plaintiff’s counsel to appear for deposition and produce certain documents, and granted plaintiffs motion to quash the subpoena duces tecum directed at plaintiffs counsel, unanimously affirmed, with costs and with disbursements.
Plaintiff, a steel importer, commenced this action against defendant, an insurance broker, for breach of contract for failure to procure "all risk” insurance coverage, i.e., inclusive of both fresh and sea water rust damage for a shipment of steel en route from Korea. Defendant obtained coverage through its Brussels agent, but when plaintiff submitted a claim for rust damage, the claim was denied because the rust was not caused by sea water. Prior and subsequent to commencement of this action, plaintiffs counsel, along with defendant’s previous counsel, through meetings and correspondence, attempted to obtain indemnity from the Brussels underwriters and subagent.
Defendant thereafter moved to depose plaintiffs counsel, and sought production of documents pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum. Plaintiffs counsel refused to appear, and moved to quash on the basis that the requested documentation was immune from disclosure as "attorney work product” and
An attorney’s work product encompasses "materials which are uniquely the product of a lawyer’s learning and professional skills, such as materials which reflect his legal research, analysis, conclusions, legal theory or strategy” (Hoffman v Ro-San Manor,
Although plaintiff offered to submit the documents for an in camera inspection, the court, after reviewing both parties’ positions, properly exercised its discretion in choosing not to require such inspection.
The court also properly denied defendant’s motion to depose plaintiff’s counsel, ruling that such testimony was similarly immune from disclosure as both "attorney work product” and material "prepared in anticipation of litigation.” The present situation differs from one in which an attorney, involved as agent or negotiator in a commercial venture which gives rise to litigation, may properly be deposed regarding his knowledge of factual issues concerning the underlying transaction (see, Slabakis v Drizin,
