92 Iowa 610 | Iowa | 1894
“Sec. 6. When a conveyance for a valuable consideration is made to one person, and the consideration thereof paid by another, no use or trust shall result in favor of the latter, but the title shall vest in the former, subject to the provisions of the next two sections.
“Sec. 7. Every such conveyance shall be presumed fraudulent as against the creditors of the persons paying the consideration therefor. And where a fraudulent intent is not disproved, a trust shall, in all cases, result in favor of prior creditors to the extent of their just demands and also in favor of subsequent creditors, if there be sufficient evidence of fraudulent intent.
“See. 8. The provisions of the section next before the last shall not extend to cases where the alienee shall have taken an absolute conveyance in his own name without the consent of the person with whose money the consideration was paid, or where such an alienee, in violation of some trust, shall have purchased the land with money not his own, or where it shall be made to appear that by agreement and without any fraudulent intent the party to whom the conveyance was made, or in whom the title shall vest, was to hold the land, or some interest therein, in trust for the party paying the purchase money, or some part thereof.”
They also pleaded and proved the statute of frauds in that state, which is as follows (Gren. St. Kan. 1863,
Beach on Modern Equity (section 226) says: “There are, therefore, two well defined classes of constructive trusts, corresponding with the two classes of fraud, viz.: (1) those which are raised in actual fraud; and (2) those raised in presumed or constructive fraud. ” In this case, defendant practiced no fraud or deceit upon either Abrams or Mrs. Priest. The conveyance was made to him at the direction of Abrams, upon the request of his (Priest’s) wife. So far as shown, defendant had nothing to do with the conveyance, except to accept it. He did not sustain such a fiduciary relation to the other parties as that he can not, in perfect good faith, hold the title to the land, as the authorities before cited clearly demonstrate. Even had he taken title under an express promise to hold it in trust for his wife, — which the evidence shows he did not do,— his denial of the trust would not be such fraud as to raise a constructive trust, unless it be shown that such promise was part of a scheme to get the title in himself to defraud his wife. McClain v. McClain, 57 Iowa, 167, 10 N. W. Rep. 333; Wheeler v. Reynolds, 66 N. Y. 227; Tatge v. Tatge, 34 Minn. 272, 25 N. W. Rep. 596, and 26 N. W. Rep. 121; Burden v. Sheridan, 36 Iowa, 125. We do not think there was a constructive trust in the Kansas lands.
III. In the abstract it is stated that the law action was tried, by consent of the parties, upon the testimony adduced in the equity cause, and that the pleadings were the same, except that it was alleged in the law case that defendant had converted the trust funds to .his own use, and damages were demanded on account thereof. These statements are denied by appellees. As the equity cause is affirmed upon its merits, it is sufficient to say that, if appellants’ contention is correct, the law case must also be affirmed. The judgment and decree in these cases will be affirmed.