Abramyan v. StateAbramyan v. State
During the 2015 General Session, the legislature amended certain statutes governing Certificates of Public Necessity and Convenience (“CPNCs”) — also known as taxi medallions — and created new provisions authorizing (and regulating) ride-sharing programs throughout the state. Appellants, taxicab drivers who operate in the City of Atlanta and own CPNCs, filed suit in Fulton County Superior Court claiming that the Act resulted in an unconstitutional taking and inverse condemnation of their CPNCs. The State moved to dismiss, arguing, inter alia, that Appellants had failed to state legally cognizable claims; the trial court agreed and granted the motion. We affirm the judgmеnt of the trial court.
Prior to May 6, 2015,
In July 2015, Appellants filed a complaint claiming that Act 195 resulted in an unconstitutional taking and inverse condemnation.
We begin with the well-settled standard that
[a] motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted should not be sustained unless (1) the allegations of the cоmplaint disclose with certainty that the claimant would not be entitled to relief under any state of provable facts asserted in support thereof; and (2) the movant establishes that the claimant could not possibly introduce evidence within the framework of the complaint sufficient to warrant a grant of the relief sought. If, within the framework of the complaint, evidence may be introduced which will sustаin a grant of the relief sought by the claimant, the complaint is sufficient and a motion to dismiss should be denied. In deciding a motion to dismiss, all pleadings are to be construed most favorably to the party who filеd them, and all doubts regarding such pleadings must be resolved in the filing party’s favor.
(Footnotes omitted.) Anderson v. Flake,
As an initial matter, “ ‘[t]he (s)tate has the authority under its police powers to enact reasonable laws regulating the use and operation of motor vehicles upon the public highways.’ ” (Citаtion omitted.) Quiller v. Bowman,
Though it may be true that an occupational or business license — once secured — cаn become a protected property right, see, e.g, Goldrush II v. City of Marietta,
Appellants contend on appeal, as they did below, that the CPNC system granted them an “exclusive right” to operate “vеhicles for hire” within the City of Atlanta and that it was this exclusivity that created value in the CPNCs; according to Appellants, the Act permits ride-share companies to operate an unlimited number of vehicles for hire in the City, thus severely damaging the value of the CPNCs. Though the City of Atlanta capped the number of CPNCs at 1,600, the ordinance setting the cap reflects that the limit arises out of the correlation “bеtween the number of taxicabs operating within a geographic area and the quality of service they provide” and that “[a]n excessive number of taxicabs results in a reduced level of serviсe and more passenger complaints.” Atl. City Ord. § 162-61 (a). Thus, this limitation — which was set over twenty years ago — is plainly contingent on unfixed variables, such as city boundaries, quality of service, level of service, and consumer passenger complaints. Appellants have pointed to no law that would have prevented the City of Atlanta or the legislature from increasing the CPNC limit (and thus, the number of drivers) as those variables changed, and there is no reasonable basis to conclude that any property interest Appellants may have in their respective CPNCs extends to exclusivity or a limited supply of CPNCs. See Minneapolis Taxi Owners Coalition, Inc. v. City of Minneapolis,
Rarely, perhaps, does any new law which acts with vigor upon commerce, local or general, fail to impair the value of more or less property Surely the damage clause in our . . . constitution was not intended to make the State or the legislature an insurer against all shrinkage of values that might result from the passage of laws intended for the public good. Can it be seriously thought that the State must literally pay its way to the establishment of a sound and wholesome system of internal police and public order?
Menken v. City of Atlanta,
Accordingly, because Appellants have failed to identify the deprivation of or damage to a protected property interest, their taking and inverse condemnation claims fail as a matter of law, and they were properly dismissed.
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
Act 195 also implicates the regulation of other forms of transportation for hire, such as limousines, but we need not discuss or address those here.
Appellants do not challenge the constitutionality of Act 195. Instead, they ask this Court to decide the novel constitutional issue of whether the City of Atlanta CPNCs establish a constitutionally protected proрerty interest taken by the Act.
It is not the existing CPNC cap, alone, that sustains the value of the CPNCs. As Appellants recognize, the City of Atlanta still retains dozens of unsold-but-available CPNCs, and the persistent value of thе CPNCs arises, at least in part, from provisions in the City of Atlanta ordinance which require any remaining CPNCs to be sold at a price equal to or more than the sales price in previous years. See Atl. City Ord. § 162-61 (с) (“For purposes of this article only the term ‘market value’ shall mean the value calculated by the department based upon the sales prices for each CPNC during the prior year.”). Just as the Aсt does not divest Appellants of their CPNCs, the ordinance maintaining the value of the CPNCs remains intact. Further, any anticipated profit or monetary benefit as part of a transfer of a CPNC — whether dependent on the “market value” as established by the City or on a secondary market — is not a protected property interest. See Minneapolis Taxi Owners Coalition,