Abrams v. Lamone

A.2d 1223 Stephen N. ABRAMS v. LAMONE,

Linda H. et al. 142, Sept. Term, No. 2005. Appeals Maryland. March Abrams, Rockville, appellant. for Stephen N. (Joshua Schulman,

Andrew Dansicker R. Treem of M. Ravenell, Baltimore), Treem, Kaminkow, P.A., on Gilden & brief, for appellees. (J. Curran, Brockman, Atty. Joseph F. Asst. Gen.

William Baltimore), Jr., Maryland, brief, on Atty. appellees. Gen. BELL, C.J., RAKER, WILNER,* Argued before CATHELL, HARRELL, GREENE and JOHN C. (Retired, assigned), JJ. specially ELDRIDGE BELL, C.J., Plurality which WILNER Opinion CATHELL, JJ., join. first of pertaining eligibility

This case is the two to the office of a candidate for the of the requirements of this case was Maryland.1 genesis The (“Perez”), E. attempt by attorney Thomas Perez Mr. to run for the office of professor, appellees, one * Wilner, J., retired, hearing participated now and conference Court; being this case while an active member of this after recalled Constitution, 3A, IV, participated pursuant Section also to the he adoption opinion. in the of this decision pertaining eligibility requirements case to the candi- second Lamone, Liddy General is 398 Md. date the office v. (2007). WL A.2d Gubernatorial Attorney General V, 4 of the Election. Article Section Primary for that office. It prescribes qualifications Constitution provides: Attorney- shall to the office of person eligible

“No General, State, a qualified who is not a citizen of this therein, Law in this practiced voter and has resided years.” State at least ten for CONST, added). V, § 4 (emphasis Today,

MD art. we in the membership Mary address whether a combination of ten years, years prescribed, land Bar for five fewer than the much of it years, and the of law for more than ten level, done at the federal suffices to meet the constitu being Y, 4.2 In analyzing past tional of Article Section requirements State, bar admission of this present requirements General, Attorney historical role of the and other Constitution al which at provisions were existence the time Article shall for adoption, Section 4’s we hold that candidate office of the Attorney General must be member Maryland Bar for at ten years practition least and must be for period. er an identical requisite

I. Perez announced his candidacy Attorney the office of the so, General on 2006. May doing recognizing Before potential question there was a as to his i.e. eligibility, credentials, of his sufficiency professional serve as General, in a letter dated 2006 and “in May the continued spirit thoroughness diligence and due ... toas whether V,] eligibility requirements met the 4 of [he] [Article Section Constitution,”3 the Maryland requested advisory opin- he dispute 2. There is no that Perez is "a citizen of this State” and "a voter,” qualified who has "resided ... in this State least ten years.” only "practiced issue before us is whether Perez has Law years.” in this State for at least ten General, Perez’s letter to the office of the and the office, subsequent opinion, General’s which related to its own raise a letter, In that Attorney General.4 the office of the ion from career, follows. his Perez related Perez Law School from Harvard graduating After for a and clerked York Bar to the New was admitted 1989. He moved to in until judge Colorado federal with the United accepted position clerkship and after the (“DOJ”), its through of Justice Department States in that position, He remained Program. Honors General’s until Department, functions within performing various in the Criminal prosecutor as a federal position, In his first Division, from 1989 which he held Rights of the Civil Section in the District Columbia which was based pros- investigated Perez Department, of the headquarters In capacity, nationwide. rights civil cases ecuted criminal case, of the directing investigation “responsible he the local Assistant United States the matter with discussing making a determi- investigator, FBI or other Attorney, agent prose- and then prosecution, a case merited nation of whether case, prosecution.” if Some cuting [it] merited cases. on his docket were cases Deputy to the Chief promoted In Perez was super- in that included responsibilities position His Section. him This Maryland. required occurred in vising all cases that desiring pursue in the Section “any attorney with to consult re- Maryland[.]” in He also prosecution investigation he strategies attorneys with the and discussed viewed briefs supervised. de- Perez was remaining employee,

In while a DOJ minority staff Division Rights tailed from the Civil basis, i.e. he fluctuating on a Judiciary Committee the Senate basis, alternating on an staying, in positions, worked both issue, however, present- has been potential interest. This conflict of therefore, and, it. we will not address ed affidavit, 25, 2006, July with the Circuit filed an dated 4. Perez later County professional he reiterated his for Anne Arundel which qualifications for the office of the General. Committee, Judiciary each. While with few months impact widespread on various bills that had Perez worked crime, rights. and civil immigration, juvenile areas such as Attor- Assistant appointed Deputy In Perez was Division, one of the four Rights for the Civil ney General In that he position, the Division. highest ranking positions Sections, Criminal, Education, Employment oversaw the litigation of all activities within the roughly entailed 30% which geographic of the cases had a anchor Division. Several Maryland. Department

In Perez left the Justice and became Department at the U.S. Rights Director of Office Civil In “led a capacity, and Human Perez Health Services. rights was to civil person agency whose mission enforce laws in the health and human service context across acting “legal strategist, supervisor, manag- as a case country,” er, and maker.” His nationwide caseload included cases policy Act of involving Rights from Title VI the Civil Maryland of 1990. None of 1964 and the Americans with Disabilities Act litigation. cases involved joined in January, Perez left federal service 2001. He as an faculty University Maryland of the School Law Assistant of Law Director of Clinical Law and Professor Programs April year, 2001. Also that Perez took the prac examination and was Maryland lawyer’s bar admitted in Maryland.5 tice Programs, supervised

As Director of Clinical Law Perez permitted appear students who handled real cases and were (Rule Maryland’s in court student rule pursuant 16).6 supervised programs He those from 2001 until 2003. 13(d) Maryland, Governing Admission to the Bar of 5. Rule Rules years, requires prior practice experience of ten which “for a total years immediately prior filing least five of the ten to the lawyer’s petition,” governs eligible to take [admission] who is examination. Governing the Bar of 6. Rule 16 of the Rules Admission to (2007) provides, as relevant: When, to the Coun- Montgomery Perez was elected Director, al- Council, his of Clinic resigned position he ty recently Perez faculty. a member of the he remained though of Law to Associate from Assistant Professor was promoted of Law. Professor Perez,7 Attorney provided by information

Based on the Opinions 19, 2006, General, opinion, issued May on (2006), that Perez was Attorney concluding to hold the office General. qualified reasoned: General Curran explicitly requires

‘While the State Constitution practiced General have candidate that the candidate implicitly requires for 10 years State bar, explicitly it neither nor to the State be admitted "Legal assistance law students. "(b) program a clinical is Eligibility. A law student enrolled in provided engage practice of law as in this Rule if eligible to in the

student: school; "(1) is enrolled in a law "(2) Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of and is familiar with the has read Procedure; the relevant Rules of Conduct and Professional (c) "(3) section of this Rule. been certified in accordance with has “(d) program, a law student In connection with a clinical Practice. may appear or the effect trial court for whom a certificate is in Appeals engage in the of law in Special or otherwise (1) attorney supervising satisfied that Maryland provided is (2) assigned, competent perform the duties assumes the student work, (3) responsibility quality of the student’s directs for the necessary, supervising in the attor- the student to the extent assists judgment, participation ney’s professional to ensure that the student’s (4) represents, the client the student is effective on behalf of appears in court or before accompanies the student when the student agency. The student shall neither ask for nor an administrative any compensation for service rendered under personal kind receive this Rule.” cautioned, "[bjecause General General Curran 7. facts, investigating determining we base opinion or is not a vehicle for you provided analysis solely have [Perez] on the information that our at your background.” Opinions about 91 n. 1. all of have accumulated candidate that a requires implicitly Practice bar. member of State while experience law counts federal State authorized Mary- in the requirement experience the durational toward while Constitution, performed if that work even land bar.” member not a attorney was Id. at 116. seen, announced Perez, have as we opinion, on this

Relying and, on Attorney General office of the for the candidacy his the State candidacy with 19,2006, his formally registered June Board”). (“the filing, pursuant By State Board of Elections Article, a certificate 5-301(a)(l)8 Law the Election § that, things, oath,9 among other certified, under candidacy, he Maryland and [met] a citizen of voter and registered “a he was ... office for the [of requirements all other [constitutional] Perez’s certifi- accepted Board The State Attorney General].” Article, 5-601(1)10 Law of the Election and, §to pursuant cate Primary Election. for the his name on the ballot placed 5-301(a) (2003, § Cum.Supp.) of the Election Maryland Code 8. provides: Law Article general "In public "(a) for a become a candidate general. An individual In only party office if: candidacy with "(1) in accordance the individual a certificate of files and_ subtitle; "(2) under of withdrawal file a certificate the individual does not added). (Emphasis title.” Subtitle 5 of this 5-302(a) (2003, Cum.Supp.) § of the Elec- Code 9. See Article, provides: which tion Law form "On "(a) candidacy oath on the shall be filed under A certificate of prescribed form.” 5-601(a) (2003, Cum.Supp.) § of the Election Maryland Code provides: Law Article on the ballot and be submitted candidate shall remain "The name of a primary voters election if: to the “(1) candidacy in accordance has filed a certificate the candidate satisfied of this title and has requirements of 5-301 with the relating to the office which requirements of this article other candidate, provided candidate:" individual is a 13, 2006, July (“Abrams”), On Mr. N. Stephen Abrams appellant, a registered voter and a Republican filed, candidate for the office of Comptroller Maryland,11 the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, pursu- an action 9-209(b)12 12-202(b)13 §§ ant and of the Election Law "(i) candidacy has not withdrawn the in accordance with Subtitle 5 title; of this "(ii) disqualified, has not died or become and that fact is known to 5-504(b) applicable by prescribed § the title; board the deadline of this "(iii) by petition pursuant provisions does not seek nomination to the title; §of 5-703 of this or "(iv) is anot write-in candidate." standing 11. While there was a contention that Abrams did not have bring Republican this action since he Comptroller was a candidate for and, thus, Election, eligible Primary to vote in the Democratic We, therefore, during issue was not raised trial. decline to address it. (2003, Cum.Supp.) § 12. Code 9-209 of the Election provides: Law Article " § 9-209. Judicial review "Timing "(a) days arrangement Within 3 after the content and of the ballots subtitle, placed public display § are regis- on under 9-207 of this may judicial tered voter seek review arrangement, of the content and error, any or to filing petition correct other a sworn with the county. circuit court may granted "Relief that “(b) may require The circuit court the local board to: "(1) error; correct an "(2) corrected; why show cause an error should not be "(3) any required provide appropriate take other action relief. printing "Errors discovered after "(c) printed, If an error is discovered after the ballots have been and error, the local registered may board fails to correct the voter seek judicial Monday review not later than preceding the second added). (Emphasis election.” (2003, Cum.Supp.) Code 12-202 of the Election provides: Law Article " challenges § 12-202. Judicial "(a) general. timely In If adequate remedy provided no other article, registered judicial voter seek act or relief from election, relating omission held, to an whether or not the election has been grounds on the that the act or omission: “(1) is inconsistent with applicable this article or other law to the process; elections Per- Article, injunctive against relief declaratory seeking (“Lamone”), capacity official ez, Lamone her Ms. Linda H. Elections, Board, and the State as the State Administrator sought Abrams order de- appellees.”14 collectively, “the required for qualifications not have the claring that Perez did General, injunction requiring an the office injunc- and an candidacy, his certificate Perez to withdraw from the State Board placing Lamone and prohibiting tion argued He on the ballot for General. Perez’s name (b)15 Article, it that, of the Election Law under 5-301 all of to whether Perez met duty Board’s determine the State laws, including prescribed by election qualifications for, and, run eligibility to his to requirements as constitutional "(2) may election. change changed or has the outcome of the filing “Place and time "(b) registered judicial in the A voter under section seek relief court earlier appropriate circuit within the of: "(1) the act or omission days the act omission or date 10 after petitioner; or became to the known certified, "(2) days unless the 7 results are election after the election election, special primary which gubernatorial primary or was a (Emphasis days 3 the election results are certified.” case after added). date, filed, Complaint, Abrams on the same a In to his addition 14. attempt, again, once to Temporary Restraining Order in an Motion for placing from Perez’s name on the prohibit and the State Board Lamone County The Anne Arundel denied Abrams’ ballot. Circuit Order, believing Temporary Restraining that the Motion for a but merits, Complaint important on the neces- substantial issues raised and adversary sitating hearing, entered an Order to Shorten Time to full days Respond, given respond were 5 in which the defendants five Complaint. Abrams' (2003, 5-30l(b) Cum.Supp.) § Maryland of the Election Code 2006 15. provides: Law board board "Determination state or local "(b) whether an individual appropriate board shall determine article, candidacy filing requirements meets the of this certificate including: "(1) party requirements registration affiliation under voter title; 2 Subtitle of this "(2) reporting requirements under Title 13 of campaign finance this article.” 158

thus, to hold the office of the Attorney General.16 Abrams, Court, in his brief in this asked: "Does the any duty State Board of inquire Elections have into the representations made a candidate for office in when the candidate certifies under oath to the State Board of Elections that he or she meets the requirements?” Constitutional brief, He did Instead, point not further address this at all in the however. primarily he focused eligibility requirements on the of Article Constitution, § 4 of the arguing that Perez did not meet appellant simply them. The did not address in his brief the issue of the duty inquire Board’s qualifications into a candidate's for the office for which that candidate Accordingly, files. we decline to address the 229, Village, issue. See Oak Murphy, Crest Inc. v. 379 Md. 841 (2004) ("An A.2d appellant required to articulate and adequately argue appellant all appellate issues the desires the court to brief"); Davis, appellant’s consider in the initial DiPino v. 354 Md. (1999) ("[I]f point A.2d germane appeal to the is not brief, adequately party’s raised [appellate] in a may, court should, it”); ordinarily 344, 375, decline to address Donnelly, Ritchie v. 324 Md. (1991) court, (holding A.2d appellate in its "discretion”, arguments” need not "consider[ the] that are not made in brief); appellant’s an 651, 664, Health Serv. Cost Hosp., Rev. v. Lutheran 298 Md. (1984) ("[A] question 472 A.2d presented not argued or appellant’s review"). in an properly preserved brief is not See also 8-504(a)(5), Maryland Rule which mandates that: comply "[a] brief shall requirements with the of Rule 8-112 and following include the items in the order listed: “(5) Argument support party’s position.” of the Court, argued In the Circuit Abrams that qualified whether Perez is to run Attorney for the office of the statutory General is a matter of interpretation, by rather than one for determination administrative Attorney decision of the Relying General. on the Code of 33.01.02.01, Regulations Perez, argued Abrams further person that as a considering Board, candidacy, petitioned should have the State not the General, any questions to resolve Perez pertain- have had ing qualification to his for the office of the General. The Code Maryland Regulations provides: 33.01.02.01 “Petition Authorized person may petition “An interested declaratory the State Board for ruling on the manner in apply any which the Board would following person property to a or on the petition: facts set forth in the regulation; "A. A Board order; "B. Board or "C. statute that the Board enforces.” The Circuit Court to address propriety the issue of the declined opinion stating General’s that it "is somewhat of a side issue ... happened whether it should have happened or could have different- whatever, ly or necessarily by this is not imputed the Board.” below, filing dispos- responded by defendants appellees, The Motion a Motion to Dismiss Perez filed itive motions. and/or he that met ground on the Judgment, principally Summary 4V, § by Article prescribed qualifications Board a Motion to and the State filed Lamone Constitution. They contended that Expedite Scheduling. Dismiss and of limita- applicable statute action was barred Abrams’ in the action that their sole interest tions and laches and administration of the election orderly ensuring was if the jeopardized would be the deadlines which process, Court adjudicated expeditiously. The Circuit were not action motions, of which it on at the conclusion hearing held opinion. its oral issued the issue of the timeliness

The first addressed Circuit Court 12-202(b) of the Election § action under of the appellant’s that rejected appellees’ argument The court Law Article.17 omission” judice in the case sub was the relevant “act candidacy, which occurred on Perez’s of his certificate filing should appellant contention that June their Instead, the Circuit filing have known about that earlier. and, and critical date operative concluded that Court therefore, relevant, July statutory determinant 2006, the It “to the extent that filing explained, deadline.18 earlier, pursu- appellant’s Complaint As was also filed 17. mentioned 9-209(b) Law The ant to of the Election Article. Circuit found apply, finding appellant ground did that not challenging. Perez, appellees, including preferred to have the issue who merits, too pressed resolved on the their contention Abrams waited 12-202, long prompting lengthy § to action discussion file this under They argued point. that Abrams should in the Circuit Court on the Attorney Citing, to have known that Perez had filed run for General. Technicality Montgomery e.g., Could Boot Official from C4; Post, Washington May Race? 2006. at OK’d in Race Perez for General, Sun, 5B; Opinion May at AG Baltimore Constitutional, Gazette, 19, 2006; Candidacy May Finds The Perez Perez Post, 20, 2006, General, May Eligible Washington is to Run for highly publicized. they at B noted the occasion was The that duty appellees argued remain informed further that Abrams had a to Moreover, asserted, election, they about so to do. he the he failed ... may there have been errors filing [the deadline] sort of ” bell, was, the if closing you will.... There the court’s opinion, no other more appellant’s reliable measure of the itself, than knowledge filing the deadline when the appellant charged knowledge candidacy. would be with of Perez’s Be- cause, ruled, the court the motion was filed on appellant’s July 13, 2006, deadline, ten it days filing within was within review, and, period prescribed filing judicial there- fore, timely. not persuaded by Circuit also was the laches

argument advanced Lamone and the Board. Noting State that apply laches' would “if the claimant neglected prosecute it way the matter such a that a result of cause[d]—as [the] claiming precluded knowledge should be from that he had no of what vacation, transpiring merely particularly he was on because with advances, Internet, technological disposal. such as at his by testifying personal countered that he Abrams did not have knowl- edge filing formal of Perez’s until after he returned from a three-week July, vacation and checked the State Board’s website on 2006. He submitted that it was over, he then that "knew’ that Perez had filed. More- major newspaper he claimed that no in the area where he was vacationing reported formally that Perez had filed his certificate of candidacy place the State Board's website was best for him contended, however, running. to ascertain who was He that he did not filing check the website until after the actual deadline because he was finding "may” not interested in out have been the race as there who possibility anytime was the that candidates could withdraw before filing only close of Abrams deadline. contended he was interested in final list of candidates. agree, point, appellees. We on this with Section 12-202 of the reasonable, interpreted practical Election Law must be in a but interpretation place obligation manner. reasonable A would aon registered seeking challenge qualifications voter of a candidate to keep as to the relevant acts and informed omissions that candidate. and, simply bury A voter thereby, his her head in sand 10-day triggering statutory period, prescribed by avoid the time 12-202, judicial which .to “seek review from act or omission website, relating along to an election.” The State Board’s with media coverage, principal places would have been the from which Abrams would been pertaining have able find information to Perez’s candida- cy. upon It was incumbent Abrams to avail himself of these sources. . Being adequate, good, on vacation is not an or even excuse for not informed, being being utilizing on vacation did not him from bar keep these sources informed.

161 it was prejudiced,” adversary ... of time passage not, dilatory in his any way, appellant was that the satisfied prejudiced. not thus, Board was and, the State actions19 to dismiss the motion Court denied the Circuit Accordingly, for laches. issue Court, the constitutional finally, addressed

The Circuit General, to hold the office eligibility Perez’s to be V, Believing question § 4. Article pursuant least ten in this State for at “practiced has Law whether Perez Bar to be a you have specifically: “[d]o more years,” only Maryland a Bar because years for at least 10 member Maryland?,” law the State practice member can Kenne reasoned, on answered, relying It “no.” Circuit 646, 561 A.2d County, 316 Md. Montgomery v. Bar Ass’n dy v. Bridges, 360 Md. (1989), Attorney Grievance Comm’n 200 of R.G.S., 312 Md. (2000) In the Matter 489, 759 A.2d 233 (1988), 626, 637, 977, practice that one “can 541 A.2d 982 Mary being a member without the State does, indeed, Bar” and that Perez’s federal land opined: point, 19. On this the court involving certainly everything the elec- I that ... “Now understand recognize very tight I process very a time line. And toral is on potential greater problems passes every day that creates However, part large those greater expense to the State Board. by anything that Abrams did or timing triggered Mr. issues are not that there is mean the fact of the matter is didn’t in this case. I do relatively get done and a short just a lot of stuff that needs to whole given ... I think within the context this case time do it forth, what he did was complicated nature of the issues and so certainly within reason.” cross-appeal challenging nor the State Board filed Neither Lamone Thus, appeal. they us See rulings. are not before on this these adverse 160, State, Secretary v. 294 Md.

Joseph Company, H. Inc. Munson ("[A (1982) party], having an not filed order of 940 A.2d declaratory judg appeal trial appeal, may not on attack the court’s State, Id., ment”). citing Robeson v. 285 Md. See also 448 A.2d denied, 498, 502, (1979), U.S. cert. 403 A.2d (1980) (holding appellate court will 62 L.Ed.2d 654 S.Ct. by sponte, appellee, if “under sua even not raised address an issue ordinarily ground judgment will be affirmed on principle that a record, on the trial adequately whether or relied shown by party”). court raised satisfy the “practiced Law” under requirement stated, it Kennedy, stood for the “can proposition that one have essentially a federal in the State of even if Maryland Bar,” is not member of the [one] while Florida, Bridges, citing, approval, v. Sperry with 373 U.S. (1963), S.Ct. 10 L.Ed.2d 428 recognized attorney’s an to right legal practice maintain a restricted to the federal prior courts to to that admission state’s bar. The Circuit concluded, Court toas R.G.S.:

“I also find it that of that significant Appeals the Court in approval case cited with General’s '68 opinion, opinion/[20] among things And cited other of provision the opinion recognized that that phrase that the such as ‘prac tice of mean may things law’ different in different contexts as specifically used in Article Section 4 of the relating Constitution qualifications the for the of Office AG, the the ... phrase ‘means something quite different and less than the of meaning phrase restricted the ‘practice of law1 for purpose of 14 or any Rule unauthorized practice.”

The also Circuit Court observed “the plain that language [of V, § says absolutely nothing being 4] about a member of frankly the bar that because had a whole import different in it day back that than Recalling history have now.” Maryland, bar in admissions that Circuit noted formal, there was no state—wide admission process bar until 1898,21that, time, at the there was no “federal we law” as know it today, despite the fact that the framers of the (1983). Opinions 20. See 68 procedures attorneys 21. The admitting current for have this State origin Maryland, their Chapter 1898 Laws of enactment placed jurisdiction. which bar admissions in this Court’s exclusive Chapter provided: applications “All admission to the in this State bar shall be made for by petition Appeals. to the Court A State Board of Law Examiners hereby is created to consist of three members bar of at least ten years' standing, appointed shall be Appeals, who the Court of shall years... applications hold office for term of three .All for to the shall be Appeals admission bar referred the Court of contemplated a situation could not have Maryland Constitution could have Law this State” “practiced phrase in which the they it to mean— than intended something other what meant the Circuit Court Maryland, law in state concluded: inescapable ... to the ... leads plain language

“[T]he Law in this State phrase “practiced that it [the conclusion someone have requires that simply ten years”] at least Maryland, but years ten State least practiced being member that not tantamount is] [it matter he a factual [Perez] Bar ... that as [and] legal That matter has law. practiced Section accordingly under Maryland. occurred And eligible he Constitution 4 of Article for election as General.” stand Summary Judg- Motion for thus Perez’s granted court response In to cross-motion. appellant’s ment and denied the Court, to this appeal an both appellant that the noted ruling, 12-203(a)22 Article, and to of Election Law §to the pursuant filed, addition, In he this Special Appeals. of the Court Examiners, applicant, the of who shall examine State Board Law qualifications to the bar. The said board touching his for admission applicants of to report proceedings examination the their in the shall board desire to Appeals with recommendations said Court of to Appeals applicant then the be the Court shall make. of find If attorney, good to qualified discharge the an and be moral to duties of of admitted, they pass admitting worthy be shall an order character and to him in all the courts the State." to of (ratified 14, 1898) added). April (emphasis Chapter Acts of 1898 12-203(a) (2003, Cum.Supp.) § of the Election Maryland Code 22. provides: Law Article "(a) general. this be conducted proceeding A under subtitle shall In Rules, Maryland except that: with the accordance "(1) jury and proceeding shall heard and decided without the expeditiously require; as the circumstances "(2) request party sponte, the of a or sua the chief administrative on three-judge panel may assign the case to a judge of the circuit court judges; and of court circuit "(3) directly Appeals within appeal be taken the Court shall of days date the court." the the decision circuit of of of added). (Emphasis

Court, Certiorari, a Petition for ofWrit which Court Lamone, granted. Abrams v. 393 Md. 903 A.2d 417 (2006). argument 2006, and, Oral was heard on August on day, that same issued its Order reversing the judgment of the Circuit We Court. now set forth the reasons for that Order.

IL When the framers Constitution assembled in 1774 Act,23 to formulate a Port response they Boston contemplate did not two just years they short later would Constitution, meet this time again, produce a document govern of Maryland. would the citizens the State of The of office was General24 established constitu- tional provision the 1776 Convention. Section 48 the 1776 provided, Constitution as relevant: governor,

“That the the time being, with advice and council, chancellor, may appoint consent and all judges justices, the attorney general, officers, naval service, officers in the regular land and sea officers Act, variously Port The Boston one the measures called the Acts, 31, 1774, Intolerable enacted British Parliament on March discontinue, manner, Was "[a]n act such and for such time as are mentioned, landing discharging, lading therein shipping, wares, merchandise, town, goods, harbour, at the and within the Boston, Massachuset's, province in North America.” Its response protesters throwing enactment was in to Boston 342 chests of tea over board into the during Party. Boston Harbor the Boston Tea protestors destroyed, were billed the tea that was and the (1774). ultimately Harbor closed. 14 Geo. III. c. 19 1776, Although 24. the office was established here in in the General, ¡office Attorney Regis or King’s the Attornatus or Attorney, origins English has its Law and back dates as far as the century, perhaps 13th or exactly even earlier as it is as unclear to When Bellot, originally generally, Hugh the office was See e.g., started. The L.Q. Origin Attorney-General, (1909); 25 the Rev. 400 W.S. Holds of worth, Early General, History Attorney The the and Solicitor 13 Ill. of (1919). Club, Inc., 9, Burning L.Rev. 602 26-32, v. See also State Tree 301 Md. 785, Yates, (1984); 475, Murphy 481 A.2d 794-97 v. 276 Md. 480-88, 837, (1975); State, 306, A.2d 348 840-44 Hawkins v. 81 Md. 32 (1895). A. 278

165 office, all other surveyors, and militia, of land registers the suspend also ... and government of civil officers during commission officer who has remove civil behaviour____” added). (Emphasis good by was later abolished Attorney of The office the 1816, 247, Chapter proposed Constitutional amendment25 1816, ratified, 5, was 1817.26 It re- February Acts of and 146, 1817.27 1818, to Acts of pursuant Chapter established to 1821, pertaining provision In the constitutional changed has time. The of amendment over 25. The mode Constitutional were original amending Constitution was that amendments mode of by Assembly passed one and a Act session to be made sec. With the confirmatory See MD CONST. 1776 59. Act at next. Constitution, adoption amendments were of the 1851 all Constitutional Conventions, purpose. by elected for that to be which were made every following years, returns of people w as taken ten sense of the census, every calling altering Consti- regard to Convention for again process changed art. XI. The once tution. See MD CONST. 1850 Constitution, whereby adoption amendments with of the 1864 could by Assembly long all the proposed as as three-fifths of be the General agreed. people both The sense of the members elected to houses taken, calling every twenty years, regard a Convention. still albeit process substantially has remained See XL The MD CON ST. art. XIV; adoption MD CON ST. 1867 art. the same since in 1864. See its CONST, 337, Maryland, Laws ch. MD art. XIV. See also 1941 476, 3, 1942; 7, Maryland, rejected Nov. Nov. Laws ch. ratified 7, 1972; 1944; Maryland, ch. Nov. 1972 Laws of ratified 1978; Maryland, Maryland, Laws Nov. 1978 Laws of ratified ch. ratified Nov. 1978. Chapter provided, as relevant: 26. every part change and all and of the Constitution and "An act alter as General. Form of Government relates Assembly Maryland, That 1. Be it enacted the General “Sec. every government of part all state, and form of and constitution attorney hereby general, be and the same is which relates annulled, abrogated, and void. made services, enacted, provided now “2. And it That the duties and performed by attorney general, shall be done law to he done and manner, general performed by persons, such as the such and in assembly Maryland shall direct.” hereafter 5, 1817) added). (ratified Chapter (emphasis Acts of 1816 Feb. relevant; Chapter provided, General, providing appointment of an "An act State, Attorneys, in the of this District several Judicial Districts City for Baltimore Court. See

General was and reenacted. repealed Chapter Acts (ratified 1822). of 1821 Jan. very similar to the Although office, previous provision pertaining the of. the General, amendment, ratified, proposed the as and outlined the duties of the Attorney greater General detail and of provided appointment deputies, the providing: nominate, governor shall the by “[T]he and and with advice council, and the consent and commission a appoint of person legal sound shall knowledge, styled who be attor- of ney general Maryland, to, and who and previous during of such, acting state; his as shall reside this it shall and be duty attorney the of the said general, prosecute and state, part defend on the the all now or depending, cases in, to any may brought which hereafter be or removed by state, the counties or the against state or wherein interested, manner, state or may the shall be the same as attorney general the heretofore was to do accustomed or do; have, he could and shall exercise and use all and every powers same, relating and authorities and to the as attorney general exercised, heretofore had used and or have, cases; can and use exercise in similar and he shall give his opinion and advice whenever he shall required be by general thereof, or assembly, either by branch by Assembly “Sec. 1. Be enacted Maryland, it the General That appointed person legal there shall be and commissioned sound knowledge, styled Attorney Maryland, shall who and who, such, previous during acting to and his shall reside in the state, defend, duty prosecute and it be to part whose shall on the state, depending, may all cases now which or hereafter be in, to, brought appeals or removed the court of for the Western or shore, state, by against eastern or or wherein the state shall or interested, may be attorney general in the- same manner that the do, do; have, heretofore was accustomed to or could and he shall use, every powers exercise and all and and authorities in and same, had, rotating attorney general to the as heretofore used and exercised, have, exercise, cases, or can use and in similar and he shall give opinion by his and advice whenever required he shall be thereof, assembly, general council, by governor or either branch shore, any or subject the treasurer of either on or matter them, depending may before or where the interest of the state require. (ratified 7, 1818) added). Chapter (emphasis Acts of 1817 Feb. council, of the Eastern or the treasurer governor Shore, on he any deputy appoint, or and Western add- (Emphasis them.” subject before depending matter ed). years, for the next unchanged remained provision

That 1851, when, a Convention as result of the Constitutional until again once 1850,28 Attorney General the office of the of V, Constitu § Article 3 of the 1850 According to abolished.29 discharged by to were be tion, General’s duties Attorney the City.30It in Baltimore attorney county each and state’s the Attorney per shall that “[t]he as State’s provided, pertinent, commissions as are such fees and the duties and receive form his Attorney by law for the General prescribed now Deputies.” Attorney of the General was reestablished

The office when, for the until 1864 Maryland of the Constitution part February Chapter Acts of which was ratified 28. Pursuant to Maryland calling Assembly proposed voters to entitled, “An constitution. The Act was of a convention to frame new calling a provide taking upon expediency Conven- to for the act and Form Government for tion to frame a new Constitution State, provide Delegates to such Convention.” and to for the election of convention, and, Maryland approved the November voters Maryland delegates a new Constitution. elected met frame III, provided § 32 of Constitution 29. Article Attorney passed creating of the General.” law be the office "[n]o shall Ill, § MD. CONST. 1850 art. at the Constitutional Convention 30. There was much deliberation office of the General should be 1850 as to whether the suggestion; were a number reasons for howev- abolished. There er, due circum- reason seemed to have been to financial the main Proceedings Conven- Debates and stances. See Reform II, (“Debates I”), (Annapolis, Vol. the State Constitution tion Revise 1851) County Dorsey “suggested (Delegate of Anne Arundel Thomas State, attorney each to transact great saving to the for that it would be prepared he was familiar. After he had business with which court, prepared county argue he would be himself to a case in the appeals. compensation would therefore argue it the court of No before required same case another attor- for these examination of the be I, (providing a ney”). I at Vol. 519-550 detailed See also Debates General). of the abolition of the office discussion first time in Maryland history, it was made an elective office.31 Moreover, Constitution, Article captioned, V “At- torney Attorney,” General and State’s provided detailed Attorney General, statement the duties the office of the 3, and, although provisions Article had prior required residency and, by implication, suggested that a candidate for legal practice, General be skilled in the as the duties prosecuting involving included cases defending State interest, time, or in which the had an State the first qualifications position for the were articulated.32 V, § 4 provided: of the 1864 Constitution person eligible attorney

“No shall the office of general who has not practiced resided in this State seven years least next his preceding (Emphasis election.” added). again, just Constitution was revised once V,

three later.33 years Although § the essence of Article V, § provided: 31. Article 1 of the 1864 Constitution Attorney shall be qualified "There General elected the voters of State, ticket, general Tuesday on Monday the on the next first after the November, year eighteen in the month of sixty the hundred and four, thereafter, day every year and on the same fourth who shall years Monday January his office hold for four from the first of next election, ensuing his and until his successor shall be elected and thereto, qualified, re-eligible subject and be shall and be shall to incompetency, neglect duty, removal for of willful or misdemeanor in office, on conviction in Court of Law.” V, added). § (emphasis MD. CONST. 1864 art. Although eligibility requirements 32. the Attorney for the General were Constitution, pertaining first articulated in the 1864 those to the State's judicial already place and candidates were and could be predecessor, found its eligibility the Constitution of The 1850. were, thus, requirements positions clearly, for these other considered V, § adoption the framers in their of Article Maryland’s Although 33. The 1867 Constitution is still Constitution. it particulars, subject has been amended on in some the of the office of General, say the it has remained is unamended. That not to has, during period, always adequate. that it this been viewed as Believ- ing "very to the Constitution be restrictive to the successful operation government of state entirely clumsy an efficient and too and law,” Report as a ineffective document basic see the Constitutional same, changed length provision the new remained from requirements residency and both day. to it has this length ten remained years, to seven provided: V, § 4 1867 Constitution Article Attorney- to office eligible shall be person “No State, General, qualified who not a citizen of Law in this therein, practiced has not resided voter years.” ten State at least added). V, § 4 (emphasis ST. 1867 art.

MD. CON III. erred in apply- that the Circuit Court appellant

The asserts 4, to Perez interpretation find ing broad first to office of the He eligible hold the General. below, that, he the canons of constitution- did under argues, one only reading phrase there can interpretation al be years.” for at least ten That is Law this State “practiced so, submits, is clear and appellant phrase because in this eligible “practice in order Law unambiguous; be State,” one to the bar of necessarily must be admitted sum, could appellant In that Perez not have argues State. not law in when he was admitted practicing been so, to, in bar, he have because to have done would had its effect, of law. engage appel- in the unauthorized lant, moreover, not phrase only contends that the should be plain, ordinary meaning liberally its but should given anything construed mean else. (Annapolis: Constitutional Convention Com- Convention Commission Leaverton, 91, 96, mission, vii; 1967) at See v. 181 Md. 28 A.2d Rasin (1942) (“[T]he always possess 1867 constitution of does not supposes”), consistency argument the Governor J. Millard the appointed study the in to Tawes a commission to document an effort was determine whether a new constitution needed. commission proposed be in order to revise the document as a that a convention held

whole, Chapter Chapter see Acts of 1996. See also Acts of 1967 appointment delegates), (providing for the and election of and in resulting the fifth constitutional convention convened. The constitution in the of that failed ratification a referen- from deliberations convention 14, 1968, May dum held on however. The appellant argues, that, next alternatively, V, if Article § 4 is ambiguous, resort to legislative its history supports his contention that the framers intended the office to be held aby person admitted to the bar of the State. The historical role of General, the Attorney coupled essential principles with of bar State, admission in this confirm position, his proffers. he He asserts, further, Constitution, the 1867 with its enumer- ation of the prerequisites for holding the office of Attorney General, clearly understood to pertain to a person admit- ted to practice and, in Maryland when considered in connec- tion with the duties of the it prescribes, who, office to one due to experience, was competent Thus, hold the office. he concludes, 3,34 V, § Article which outlined the duties of the V, originally adopted, As Section of the Constitu- governed tion Attorney the duties of provided: General and duty Attorney defend, "It shall be the of the prosecute General to and State, part on the of the all cases which at the time of his election and qualification, may and which thereafter depending be in the Court of Appeals, States, Supreme or in the Court of the against United or State, interested; or wherein the State be and may give he shall opinion writing his in required by whenever Assembly, the General or thereof; Governor; Treasurer; either branch Comptroller; any Attorney or any State’s subject on or depending matter before them; them, or required by either of and when the Governor or the Assembly, any he shall aid prosecuting State’s suit, any State, brought by State; or action any Court of this suit, prosecute action, and he shall any commence and or defend or Courts, any State, part said on the which the General law, Assembly acting or the according Governor shall direct to be commenced, defended, prosecuted, or and he shall receive for his salary dollars; twenty-five services an annual hundred but shall he fees, any rewards, whatever, not be entitled to perquisites, receive or aforesaid, salary addition on to the performance any for the duty, official poyver appoint any nor have agent, representative, deputy, under circumstances whatever.” CONST, added). MD. §(cid:127) . (emphasis art. As the office of the expanded, General evolved and it became evident that the General could not attend to all of the State’s legal personally, affairs originally as contemplated required by and position. Consequently, the Constitution was amended to address the Chapter issue. See Laws of provision, 1912. The voters,

proposed ratified, to the pertinent part, provided: duty "It shall be Attorney-General prosecute defend cases, part on the of the State all appoint- which at the time of his qualification ment and which thereafter depending-in that the General, in its Attorney explicit requirement prescribed discharge had to all the duties Attorney General then, appellant argues, logical, It is the personally. therein Attorney contemplated that the the Assembly that General Bar, as such member- be member the General a courts of the appear in the would have him ship permitted State. framers of the

Moreover, argues the appellant the Look- language. their choice of precise in Constitution were Constitution, § 10 ie. Article at other the ing provisions eligibility to the IV, respectively pertaining and candidates, he judicial and for State’s requirements provisions. the of the language the difference in emphasizes instances, specifies expressly bar provision In latter the both for, the running holding, and prerequisite membership General, In case office of the office. the however, membership, express of an reference bar instead for a the of law in this State provision specifies the This, his appellant says, supports of time. the specified period framers, asserts, he did not omit bar admis- position. The all; rather, they understood such requirement sion phrase, “practiced in the requirement necessarily subsumed Law.” States, by Supreme United or Appeals, Court of or in Court of the interested; State, against may be and he or wherein the State give opinion writing required whenever General shall his thereof, Governor, Comptroller Assembly of t branch or either any Attorney, any legal subject or Treasury, on matter he o r State’s them; required by or when depending before them either of any Assembly aid General he shall State’s Governor or brought by any any or State in Court of prosecuting suit action State, any prosecute suit or and he shall commence and or defend State, Courts, part action of said on the which Governor, law, Assembly acting according or the shall commenced, defended, prosecuted he direct to shall have perform appoint such other duties and shall such number deputies Assembly may time as the General from to time or assistants prescribe!)]” 8, 1913) (ratified (emphasis

Chapter of 1912 November Acts added). Finally, the appellant denies that Perez’s federal bar mem- and, bership, ultimately, his law as official in the Department Justice and a member federal bar, even if physically done in Maryland, meet the eligibility V, requirements and, therefore, § of Article 4 him makes eligible to Maryland’s Attorney be General. Federal state bar memberships very are two distinct privileges, he Thus, posits. the appellant urges that Perez can not be said practiced to have law in Maryland, within contemplation the of the provision, constitutional at least not until he became of sum, member the Bar in 2001. In it is the appellant’s position that being a Justice Department official protect authorized to the interests of the United States throughout and, country the in that capacity and for that purpose, appear in the state of Maryland, courts or being a of member the bar of the United States District the District of Maryland does not authorize an individual not admitted to the of bar the Court of Appeals Maryland of law in V, the sense intended Article 4,§ Supremacy Clause notwithstanding.

IV.

A. Although 4 has been considered other con- texts,35 the disputed question presented resolution, for our meaning “practiced Law in this State for at least ten years” has not previously by been decided this Court. general tenets of interpretation constitutional are

well settled frequently stated. “Generally speaking, same applicable rules that are to the construction of statutory language employed are in interpreting constitutional ver- See, Elections, e.g., 555, Supervisors Crosse v. Board 243 Md. 561, 431, (1966) 221 (briefly A.2d 435 observing voter”); "qualified General must be a Opinions 68 (1983) (discussing years” General 342 timing aspect the "at least ten eligibility requirement); Opinions 68 48 (discussing "practice aspect of law” eligibility requirement).

173 273, 277, Brown, 412 A.2d Md. Brown v. 287 biagef.]” Slater, 861 (1980). also Davis v. Md. See (2004) (“When provi- interpreting constitutional A.2d rules of construction sions, the same generally employ we language”); of statutory to the construction are applicable G.A.A., Inc., 1, 8, 650 v. 337 Md. Corp. Nominee Fish Market (1994) apply principles we the same (“Generally, A.2d apply as we constru- provisions constitutional construing George’s v. New Central Coal Co. ing statutory provisions”); (1873) (“There Co., can Iron 37 Md. Creek Coal & general [for same principle suggested why no reason good statutes], not also just, wise and should so construction Constitution”). interpretation of the a rule of apply as in Brown: general rule stated We used in the enactment is axiomatic that the words “[I]t the intent that effectuates given the construction should be is first from sought framers ... such intent of its being with each word terminology provision, used ... meaning given ordinary understood popularly its and is terminat- and, ambiguous, inquiry are not if the words ed....” (citations 277-78, 412 omitted and

287 A.2d at 398-99 Md. at added). Davis, 604, 861 See also 383 Md. 599 at emphasis (“[T]o meaning of a constitutional 78 at 81 ascertain A.2d normal, plain meaning ... provision we first look to the 8, 1 650 Corp., Fish Nominee 337 Md. at Market language”); (“[W]e generally provision at 708 construe the A.2d 705 words”); Rand expressed by the clear its meaning effectuate (“To (1977) Rand, 508, 511, 900, A.2d 902 v. 280 Md. 374 look we [provision], the mandate of a constitutional ascertain of its lan- ordinary signification’ to the ‘natural and first County Elect. Co. v. Board Balto. Gas & guage”), quoting 31, A.2d, 241, 244 26, 278 Md. 358 County, Comm’rs Calvert (1976). of an ‘the words “[w]here have further stated that

We [enactment], every according construed to their common plain day unambiguous express are clear meaning, 174 meaning,’ give ‘will effect to the [the Court] as it [enactment] ” 663, 677, 557, written.’ Moore v. 372 Miley, Md. 814 A.2d (2003), State, 255, 261,

566 Jones v. quoting 336 Md. 647 A.2d 1204, Brooks, 1206-07. also 516, See Bienkowski v. 386 Md. 536, (2005) (“If 1122, 873 A.2d 1135 language is clear and th[e] unambiguous, we need not look beyond the provision’s terms ----”), Davis, 604-05, quoting 81; 383 Md. at at A.2d Marie, 489, v. Corp. 886, Arundel 383 Md. 860 A.2d (2004) (“If there is no ... ambiguity inquiry as to legisla- ends; tive intent we do not various, then need to resort to the construction”). inconsistent, and sometimes external rules Thus, court may neither add nor language “[a] delete so as to reflect an intent not evidenced in plain and unambiguous language statute; nor may it construe the statute with forced or subtle interpretations that limit or appli extend its State, cation.” Price v. 378 Md. 835 A.2d (2003). See also Condon v. State Maryland-University 481, 491, (1993) Maryland, 332 Md. 632 A.2d (“[w]here language is clear and unambiguous, a court may not add or delete words to make a statute reflect an intent not language, evidenced ... clearly worded statute [a] must be construed without ‘forced or interpretations’ subtle that limit or application”), extend its Tucker quoting v. Fire Co., 69, 73, (1986) man’s Fund Ins. 308 Md. 517 A.2d (citations omitted).

We, thus, begin our analysis by looking plain lan- guage V, § of Article 4 to determine what it means to have “practiced law in this State at least ten years.” Although this Court has generally refused to adopt precise definition law,” of the term “practice W., see In re Application Mark 1, 6-9, 576, (1985) 303 Md. 491 A.2d 578-81 (recognizing that in determining whether a state applicant’s bar con- activities stitute the “practice of law” ... “the practical more approach is to consider each state of facts and determine whether it falls term”), within the fair intendment quoting Grievance 325, v. Payne, 623, (1941), Committee 128 22 Conn. A.2d 625 we read in “practiced law this State for at years,” least ten as V, 4, in used Article to mean that one who seeks to hold the

175 law for ten practiced of the General must have office Bar. in as a member of the years, Maryland, hold, solely relates not requirement, we practice Mary but its Maryland, of law with Bar. This is consistent land as a member of the of this constitutional language “the context within which [the v. Administration Motor Vehicle provision] adopted,” (1990), Mohler, 219, 225, 929, 932 quoting 567 A.2d 318 Md. 559, 565, 555 A.2d Treasury, 315 Md. Comptroller Rucker v. 1060, (1989), from it as a whole. reading 1063 and comes 577, Resources, 563, Natural 385 Md. 870 Dep’t Kushell v. (“The (2005) A.2d, 186, of a plain language 193 [constitutional] Rather, not in isolation. provision interpreted [the Court] whole”); Blondell v. Baltimore analyze[s] provision as (1996) 680, 691, 639, Md. 672 A.2d 645 City Dep’t, Police 341 provision construes a constitutional as a (noting that the Court whole, context); interpreting part provision each State, 20, 41, 870, v. 641 A.2d 880-81 Outmezguine Md. (1994) can not be (asserting provision constitutional whole); isolation, must analyzed viewed but rather as (1977) State, 596, 1052, v. 281 Md. 380 A.2d Wheeler (“All parts provision] of a are to be read [constitutional part”). to find the intention as to one together Moreover, give provision, specifically we decline to issue, “on such phrase meaning a different theories workable, or a different would make more more meaning [it] with a or more litigant’s good public policy, consistent view times, or that the framers theory] tune with modern [on wrote.” provision actually they did mean what See, Bienkowski, e.g., 386 Md. at 873 A.2d at 1134. Walsh, 565, 595, v. Montrose Christian School 363 Md. (The (2001) ... mean “phrase clearly A.2d does not if it ‘purely’ what is .We decline to construe suggested... State, ”); Davis v. 294 Md. ‘primarily’ were ‘some’ (1982) (refusing phrase 451 A.2d to construe the “his view, religious petitioner’s beliefs” in favor of the as such an re-drafting action would be tantamount the statute under 176 Hornbeck, 84, construction); Mauzy v. 285 Md. guise (1979) to construe the (declining 400 A.2d types certain of’ professional employees” “only “all

phrase professional employees). no appellant. with the There can be point, agree

On this we this as used in the context of phrase, attached to meaning in practicing Maryland than that law other of this admission to the bar State. requires coterminous; in bar admission are and and, indeed, dependent on the other. This one follows from in this The first formal bar long has been the case State. took in 1666 when William Cal- place admission vert, Jenifer, to accepted and John Morecroft were Daniel court, Provincial That formed practice by the Court. council, highest of the Governor and his was the consisting colony, having original court of common law the both See, Pleasants, jurisdiction. e.g., “Early J. Hall Ed. appellate Proceedings County Courts” Maryland County 1936) (“In (Baltimore, xliii 1658-1666 County, Charles Court, sixties, in the are to be found a beginning Provincial court,’ men in their attorneys’ few trained ‘sworn admitted to and en- formally practice, who were profession, records”). Act of generally rolled as such in the court See (1811)) ed., 48, §§ April, (Maxcy p. ch. vol. provided, which as relevant: enacted, advice and by authority

“And be it further of this aforesaid, consent That from and after the end or other present assembly, attorney, person session of no whatsoever, the law in the courts practise any shall being justices this without admitted thereto province, courts, to hereby empowered the several who are admit (salvo coronae) majesty’s until his suspend jure them always, ... That shall be known therein pleasure Provided extend, extend, act shall or b e construed to nothing any province any courts of this to admit give right law, attorney, person practising practise or other his already court that has been refused so do ” (Em- excellency, majesty’s and his honourable council.... added). phasis has formal

This State had state—-wide bar admission re- dating early century. back to the 19th On March quirements 10, 1833, of Assembly Maryland, the General enacted Laws “An act the admission of Chapter regulating entitled to in Attorneys practice law the several Courts of this state.”

Chapter provided, as relevant:

“WHEREAS, state, in existing under the laws of this it is power equity, of the several courts of law and to regulate attorneys according the admission of to their dis- cretion, courts; prevail which different rules in different proper and it is and and terms of right, mode throughout admission should be uniform this state:—There- fore, Assembly

Section 1. Be it enacted the General of Maryland, applications attorney, That all admission as to state, in practice the law this shall be made to some one of courts, the county equity appeals courts or courts of of open court. thereof enacted, 2. And it That upon every applica-

Sec. be such ... practice tion admission to law as aforesaid it shall be of duty application the court to whom such shall be made, to applicant upon day during examine said some thereof, regular touching session his for admis- qualification as an attorney, they require sion and shall also and receive general character, evidence of his if probity upon and and examination, such actual and being satisfied he has law, aforesaid, years been student of at least two and having heard evidence as to his probity general and charac- ter, the said court shall opinion applicant be of that said to qualified discharge the duties of an attorney worthy admitted, to they be shall admit him. enacted,

Sec. 3. And be it That upon any the admission of applicant practice any law the courts record aforesaid, this state as it shall duty be the the court so him, admitting certify proper same with their own recorded, copy and a certificate shall which signatures, county in seal of the county with the authenticated thereof admitted, be available shall shall be party which admitted, practice said so applicant to entitle sufficient state.” courts any 1833) (ratified (emphasis March Acts of 1831 Chapter added).36 remains, thus, been, a threshold has membership,

Bar Maryland. law in practice for the authorized requirement to the Bar” one is “admitted by which Although, process time,37 membership of bar requirement changed has over Maryland was later amended Laws of Chapter 268 of the 1831 by persons to the bar not admitted explicitly the prohibit XI, Laws, Code of Public article in the and codified (1860), pertinent part: provided, in which attorney person the law or other shall "SEC. 1. No being as herein admitted thereto of this State without of the courts directed. attorney practice the law in as to applications for admission "2. All Circuit Courts to some one this State shall be made counties, of city, the Circuit Superior Court Baltimore of (Emphasis Appeals, open city, in court." or to the Court Baltimore of added). X, XI, 1888, § to Article from Article 1 provision was moved In Code, generally, See 1892 until 1989. § where it remained 1 139; 37.; Maryland, ch. 1902 Maryland, Laws of ch. 1898 Laws 3; 10, 399; Maryland, sec. Laws of art. Maryland, ch. 1904 Laws of 3; 509, Maryland, ch. Maryland, sec. 1918 Laws Laws of ch. 1916 426, sec. 3. reenacted, X, 1989, repealed § and in substantive 1 was In Article Occupations and Profes- §§ of the Business part, as 10-206 and 10-601 236, 1; 3, 1;§ § Maryland, ch. ch. Laws of ch. Article. See 1989 sions 631, 2; 632, § § ch. (1989, § Cum.Supp.) 10-206 of Maryland Repl.Vol.2004, 2006 Code provides, relevant: Article Occupations and Professions the Business " required; exceptions. § Admission 10-206. law, “(a) provided general. Except as otherwise In before State, individual shall: may practice law in the individual Bar; "(1) admitted to the be "(2) Appeals any requirement the Court of set meet added). (Emphasis rule.” Article Occupations and Professions of the Business See also 10-601 5.5, 39, n. Lawyers' Conduct Maryland Rules of Professional infra at 39. 268, 1831, (applications for supra at 31-32 Chapter Acts of 37. See

179 never has. Accordingly, beginning with in adoption its and continuing today, phrase to “practiced Law this State” has that a required person seeking to We, be lawfully thus, admitted Bar. reject the Circuit Court’s rationale that it not until was 1898 uniform existed, and, standards for bar admissions accordingly, when the 1867 Constitution adopted, framers could not have intended that an individual who was not admitted to the bar could hold the office of the Attorney General. reject

We also argument Perez’s that this Court should eligibility construe the requirements for a seeking candidate hold the office the Attorney General liberally merely be V, § cause 4 Constitution does expressly require that a candidate for that office be “admitted to” or be “a member of’ the Maryland Bar. In support his argument, Perez authority relies on jurisdictions. from other See State Kelly ex rel. v. Cuyahoga Board County Elec tions, (“Words (1994) 70 Ohio St.3d 639 N.E.2d limiting right person to hold office given are liberal construction favor of those seeking office, to hold order that the public may have the benefit of choice from all those who are in fact law qualified”), quoting State ex Shattuck, rel. Schenck v. Ohio St.3d 439 N.E.2d (1982); (Tex.1990) (“We Sears v. Bayoud, S.W.2d have repeatedly recognized the principle that constitutional provisions which restrict right public hold office should be strictly construed against ineligibility”). also 91 See Opin- courts, admission ... shall be made to county some one of the courts of equity court); 36, appeals or courts of open thereof in n. at 32 (applications for admission ... shall be made to some one of the Circuit counties, Courts for Superior city, Court of Baltimore

Circuit city, Court for Appeals, Baltimore or to the open Court of court). Presently, in order for an individual to be admitted to the bar of the Maryland, State of he or she must take an examination and must be certified generally, this Court. See Governing Rules Admission to the 7; Maryland, Bar of through Rules 2 Section 10-207 of the Business Occupations and Professions Article.

180 General language that ions of (stating in favor of eligibility). be resolved should persuaded not that a liberal construction This Court is Indeed, V, we construed § 4 have appropriate. is of the strictly, language where eligibility requirements Williams, Oglesby v. is In provision constitutional clear. (2002), example, held that a 812 A.2d 1061 for we Md. residency for did meet candidate State’s V, § 10 by Article requirement prescribed that provision required That a candidate Constitution. in the years, for at least two Attorney have “resided State’s CONST, he elected.” MD county, city, may or which V, concluding the candidate had “resided’ art. 10. In that constitutionally prescribed County less than Worcester months, residency period, year one and eleven approximately Mr. that his intent rejected Oglesby’s argument this Court determining applied be the factor. We instead should were language of the constitutional itself. We plain meaning moreover, reside holding, clear in our words “[t]he shown,” 372 contrary unless a intent is resident mean domicile Lakin, Roberts v. quoting A.2d at Md. at (1995), a strict giving 665 A.2d Md. “domiciled,” terms, as it to the “reside” interpretation case residency requirement. Similarly, to the pertained Law,” judice, sub interpret phrase, “practiced we shall it interpret we plain meaning; consistent with its refuse no intent. contrary as there is semblance otherwise historically contends that this Perez nevertheless Court’s supports of what it means interpretation broad that, Furthermore, says, argument position. his and his he “practice of law” over meaning of has evolved because the term, time, apply usage should the current which, view, membership not required is bar his agree. § 4. We do not under Article sure, that a of activities variety To be this Court has held law,” we have very “practice constitute the but well so held, less that those were suggested, never much activities 181 constituted in this context. have ad contrary, On we in only discipline, dressed this issue the context of attorney see, e.g., Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Hall Maryland of (“[T]he mon, 390, 510, (1996) 397-98, 343 Md. 681 A.2d 514 documents, preparation legal interpretation, giving of their advice, of of legal application legal principles prob law”), any complexity lems of considered of practice are Bar quoting County, Lukas v. Ass’n 35 Md. Montgomery of (1977) denied, 442, 448, 669, App. A.2d cert. 371 673 280 Md. Baur, (1977), quoting Agencies 733 F.T. vom Administrative Law, 715, 48 Unauthorized Practice A.B.A. J. 716 of (1962); James, v. Grievance Comm’n Maryland of (1995) 318, 324, 1246, 340 666 1248 that (recognizing Md. A.2d meeting prospective may, depending with clients on the cir cumstances, law); Kennedy constitute the of v. Bar practice Inc., 666, Ass’n 316 Md. 561 Montgomery County, A.2d of (1989) 210 (holding interviewing, analyzing, and law”). rights explaining legal “practicing constitute See also 68 Opinions (concluding 65 Law”), Dean of “practiced determining law school had eligibility of an attorney Maryland out-of-state take the R.G.S., attorneys’ 637-41, examination. supra, See 312 atMd. 541 that, A.2d at But 982-84. we have held in expressly order State, in practice one to law one must be authorized to See, do so. e.g., Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. (2003) Alsafty, (attorney 379 Md. 838 1213 A.2d was en- gaged the unauthorized practice law when practiced he both state in Maryland being and federal courts admit- before court); ted to the bar either Grievance Comm’n of (2002) Barneys, v. 370 Md. 805 A.2d 1040 (attorney admitted to practice District of engaged Columbia was the unauthorized of law when he represented multiple clients state courts); Briscoe, Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. 357 Md. (2000) (appearing A.2d 1037 in court representing client in a criminal matter after having been decertified constituted law). unauthorized See Farley, Ginn v. (1979) Md.App. A.2d (lay person, who was not an appeal, who notice of memoran- party prepared but aggrieved Court, law, and noted case before Circuit argued dum of neces- Special Appeals, preparing to the Court appeal extract, in the unautho- engaged brief and record sary law). of practice rized Court, for the

Perez, the Circuit relies on R.G.S. as had practicing that Perez could have been indeed proposition being prac- the unauthorized engaged without agree. of law. We do not tice R.G.S., to

In this Court was asked determine whether eligible, in North practice Carolina was attorney admitted 14,38 Mary- to take to former Rule the abbreviated pursuant currently is Rule 14 which this Court referred in R.G.S. The Rule (2007). Governing to the Rules Admission Bar 13 of the part part Rule 14 and new. 13 is derived in from former Rule provides, relevant: Rule 13 as Attorneys “Out-of-State "(a) Attorney Examination-Generally. A Eligibility Admission for eligible State this person is for admission to the Bar of this under person Rule if the state; "(1) Bar is a member of the of a state; "(2) passed examination in a has a written bar Rule; "(3) experience required by professional this has the "(4) attorney completes prescribed successfully examination Rule; and this “(5) necessary good for the possesses the moral character and fitness practice of law. "(b) experience Required Experience. professional Professional required for this Rule shall be on a full time basis admission under Rule; (2) (c) (1) provided of this a practitioner of law as in section a approved by a law the American Bar teacher of law at school Association; state; (4) (3) judge of a a a a court of record in combination thereof. (2), (3), (1) (4) "(c) Subject paragraphs Law. and Practitioner of section, person regularly is a who practitioner of law has practice of law engaged in the authorized state; "(A) ain livelihood; "(B) earning principal and as the means of "(C) professional responsibilities experience and have been whose petitioner satisfy should be admitted the Board that sufficient under this Rule. "(2) pur- requisite professional experience, As evidence consider, Rule, (c)(1)(C) may poses of of this the Board subsection among things: other "(A) petitioner’s experience practice; general the extent of the a distinction lawyers. land bar examination for We drew law,” it as used that Rule and as “practice between law, proscribed by unauthorized pertains practice to the (1989, § 10- Repl.Vol.2004, Cum.Supp.) Maryland Code and Professions Article. Occupations of the Business explained: We "(B) petitioner’s professional responsibilities, the ex- duties and responsibility and to clients or other beneficia- tent of contacts with skills, professional petitioner’s professional ries of the extent practicing lawyers judges, petitioner's contacts with and and the lawyers

professional reputation among judges; and those "(C) petitioner specialist, if the is or has been a the extent of the petitioner's experience reputation competence spe- in such cialty, any professional petitioner articles or treatises that the has written. “(3) equivalent practice The Board consider as the of law in States if the Board concludes that state outside the United equivalent makes it the functional the nature practice within a state. "(d) (1) person Experience. A shall have the Duration of Professional (b) (A) professional experience required by section of this Rule for (B) years, years immediately total of ten or at least five of the ten preceding petition pursuant filing of a to this Rule. cases, “(e) exceptional may Exceptional Cases. In the Board treat a petitioner's although experience, meeting actual not the literal re- Rule, (c)(1) (d) quirements equivalent subsections or this as professional experience required by of the otherwise this Rule. "1) Attorney petitioner pass attorney Examination. The must define, prescribed by by the Board. The shall examination rule, Board examination, examination, subject prepare matter of the passing grade. establish The Board shall administer attorney during on a date a time examination and at administra- regular pursuant publish tion of the examination to Rule 7 and shall days at least 30 in advance notice of the date and time of the grade The send examination. Board shall the examination and shall mail, by regular notice of examination results to each examinee postage prepaid. only Successful examinees shall be notified that they passed. given have their Unsuccessful examinees shall grades appropriate. in the detail the Board considers Review provisions unsuccessful examinees shall be in accordance with the 8(b).” Rule (1989, Repl.Vol.2004, Cum.Supp.) § Code 10-601 of relevant; Occupations provides, the Business and Professions Article as " Practicing § 10-601. without to Bar. admission in the of law” as used “practice persuaded

“We are synony- be read as statutes need not practice unauthorized The Rule 14. of law” as used “practice mous with each enactment and the objective or goal is the question goal are used. The which the words context within is to practice protect against unauthorized prohibition competent not upon by those being preyed from public unethical, or irresponsible incompetent, law-from practice practice requirement representation. purpose seen, degree minimum is to assure a as we have Rule ... support presumption ... competence: legal his in the on the basis of competent law applicant [the] as his success another as well experience full State’s bar examination.” (citations quota- and internal 541 A.2d at 983 312 Md. at added). omitted) (emphasis tions suffice, did not competence” degree legal That “minimum to the clear, lawyer the out-of-state bar were to admit we to take the State, having him or her to avoid just this to allow R.G.S., question In in this State. full bar examination attorney practicing was was not whether before State; legal experience whether his simply in this it was such, caliber, to take the eligible of a that he was bar examination. lawyers’ abbreviated law, "(a) provided person general. Except otherwise In attempt practice, law in the State practice, offer added). (Emphasis admitted to the Bar." unless (2007), Maryland Lawyers' Conduct 5.5 Rules of Professional See also provides, pertinent part: which in "(a) jurisdiction violation of lawyer practice in a in A shall not jurisdiction, legal profession in that or assist regulation of the the doing so. another in "(b) practice jurisdiction lawyer in this shall A who is not admitted to not: law, "(1) by establish an except as these Rules or other authorized jurisdiction systematic presence in this other and continuous office or law; for the of "(2) lawyer public represent that the is out to the or otherwise hold jurisdiction." law in this admitted

185 City and Council Mayor on Norris v. Perez also relies (1937) Baltimore, of his support A. 531 172 Md. 192 Norris, voting examined whether In this Court argument. elections, when could be used State lawfully machines that all required § 1 Constitution Article of the voting machines by opponents ballot. The shall be elections for the term “ballot” impossible it was contended machines, did not exist when as such machines voting include with the adopted. disagree § 1 We do was We do not argument. Perez bases this theory upon which however, analysis he reaches. Our with the result agree, conclusion. a different causes us reach Norris, In opined: we unchangeable, constitution are the principles

“[W]hile it by they expressed, the which are interpreting language meaning permit application which will given will be economic, social, and changes principles those which the did not and people, political life of framers could not foresee determining meaning .... In the true used, at the courts consider the mischief language aimed, remedy, temper provision which the framed, common at the time it was spirit people history and the people, well known to the usage long contempo- ... continued growth the] or evolution [and with the charged raneous construction officials adminis- Legisla- government, especially tration of the ture.” (citations omitted); Benson v.

Id. 675-76, A. at 535 State, (2005); Boyer v. 615, 633, A.2d 389 Md. Thurston, Johns 279, 292, (1967); 231 A.2d 247 Md. Williams, v. 382, 386, Hopkins University 199 Md. 86 A.2d (1952). This further asserted: employed susceptible of the words meaning “[W]here complete significance so as to include a expansion spirit purpose the instrument harmony with the a gratify legislative present will intent or serve which ” need, they may interpreted.... be so 676, 192 at A. at 535.40 Md. to Norris. analogous Although is this case at all Nor meaning “practice in that the of law” correct his assertion sub in judice evolved, “change” not involve a has the case does in it means to law this “practice “practice of law.” What earlier, consistent. As noted albeit the State” has remained law and by practice which one becomes authorized process authority may have been different when authorizing nonetheless, were adopted, there Maryland Constitution prac- for an individual to requirements some formal admission Someone, simply not anyone tice law in the could State.41 try qualifica- of law and a case. His or her walk into court It be by judge. tion to do so had to be evaluated would therefore, hold, for this Court to as Perez and the illogical, be, case to that the evolution of the Circuit Court contend the proposition thus far lends credence to the one who of the need not be a seeks to hold the office would, at “logic” bar all. This member effect, undermine, ultimately change, principle the basic today. as knew it 1867 and as we know it construction we looking This is not averse at the evolution they practice Having relate to the of law. circumstances however, cannot, not, so, and will reference simply done we County, v. Anne 40. See also Clauss Board Education Arundel (1943). examining 30 A.2d 779 In the evolution of "edu- Md. cation,” this Court remarked: supposed of 1867 did "It is not that the framers Constitution expect system changed that the of education then in force to be not improved. come, not, course, They changes could foresee what were to they they wisely attempt so did not to define what meant They light interpreted that to at education. conditions left question any given when such a should arise.” time added). (emphasis Id. at 30 A.2d at 783 Similarly, attempt the framers did not to define or list the kinds of We, however, "practice do activities that would constitute the of law”. suppose they anytime phrase intended the to denote the unlawful of law. 175-77, requirements, supra at 41. See discussion of bar admissions at 1241-42. A.2d circumstances, complete disregard to those restrict, requirements expand, or language, constitutional extent, agree we with To this for the of law. of Article interpretation Court’s that the Circuit appellant Norris court cautioned § true that the 4 too broad. It is our of interpretation restrictive in are not to be too that we however, it nor neither provisions; or constitutional statutes interpret so constitutional broadly demands that we logic or unworkable.” provision as to that “absurd provision make v. Elections County Supervisors Comm’rs Montgomery See 208, 735, 740 196, 63 A.2d 192 Md. Montgomery County, (1948). Bienkowski, 548, 873 A.2d at 1141 also 386 Md. at See (“[I]t statutory constitutional principle is a well settled be construed so as that a should not provision construction Treasury v. C. Comptroller it John nugatory”); render (1979) 527, 1045, Co., Inc., 539, A.2d 1053 Md. 404 Louis 285 (“Results unreasonable, with that or inconsistent illogical are interpretation avoided and an should common sense should be results”). will not lead to absurd or anomalous given which Court should take reject Perez’s that argument We go “practice view of it means to law” this would liberal what the the purpose the intent of framers and against provision as a whole.

Thus, the Perez correctly Court observed that Circuit of law when he engaged practice was not the unauthorized It Department lawyer. was his duties as a Justice performing follow, however, that, concluded, merely as that court does practice licensing another authorized because and authority purpose for a limited then State, physically within the confines of occurs State,” “practice suffices of law this as the as the V, concluded, § have such is used Article As we term practice, by plain meaning, implies membership its actual bar in Maryland Bar.

B. on relies appellant’s argument legislative next that, 4. This has held when history 188

attempting to discern the intention of the Legislature proposing particular constitutional provision, “it is permissi ble to into inquire prior law, state of previous contemporary history of the people, the circumstances attend ing law, the adoption organic as well as broad consider ations of expediency.” 278, Brown 287 Md. at 412 A.2d at See, 399.42 e.g., Luppino 194, 8, v. Gray, 336 Md. 204 n. (1994) (“One 429, A.2d 434 n. 8 of the sources to which the court look to discern the framers’ purpose in enacting the provision [constitutional] is the proceedings of the constitu convention”), McKeldin, tional citing Reed v. 207 Md. (1955); 115 A.2d Cohen v. Governor Maryland, 255 5, 16, 255 (“The Md. A.2d intention a constitutional [of provision] “is primarily discovered by considering the words draftsmen”); used McMullen v. Shepherd, Md. (1918) (“In 160, 104 A. construing the Constitution we are the circumstances attending adoption its consider appears what to have been the understanding of the people it, when they adopted and one of the useful helpful and most Convention”). sources is the debates of the Accordingly, we look, now, V, to the history purpose § of 4 Article in an attempt to determine the scope and applicability the framers people and the it intended to have to this case. appellant argues

The the Attorney General could not discharge the position, duties the as in V, outlined Article 3,§ unless he were Bar, a member of the Maryland as V, 42. legislative history This Court’s examination § of the of Article 4 should not be attempt, part, misconstrued as an on our to resolve an stated, ambiguity provision. in the As we have it is holding this Court’s phrase, “practiced that the years,” Law in this State for at least ten is unambiguous. clear and inquire legislative We history into the as both interpretation response confirmation our arguments and in to the See, by parties. e.g., Mayor offered both City Council Baltimore Chase, 121, 131, (2000) ("[T]he v. 360 Md. 756 A.2d resort to legislative history confirmatory process; is a it is not undertaken to statute”); plain meaning contradict the of the George's Morris v. Prince 597, 604, County, (1990) ("Even 319 Md. 573 A.2d when the carry words of a statute meaning, 'precluded a definite we are not from consulting legislative history part process as determining of the the law"), Swanson, legislative purpose goal’ quoting the Wilde v. 80, 92, (1988). Md. 548 A.2d ability the to courts the in the state appearance to to necessary being are able practice without restriction framers must have he contends that the Consequently, do so. to Attorney for to be admitted the General intended hand, Perez, the argues on other in the State. the V, fact, granted Attorney § of Article language thus, courts, allowing power appear to state General mandate, him rather than do so to under constitutional process. bar through traditional admission V, V, § 3 and Article is no between Article There conflict that, § constitu- appellant asserts when correctly 4. Attorney of the tional office provisions pertaining Attorney required were General adopted, f and that could the courts o this State he appear personally of the not have done so unless he were member contention, hand, V, § 3 Perez’s on the other that Article Bar. procedures was intended to circumvent the bar admission Y, 3,§ enumerating is Article simply unpersuasive. indeed, General, and, the Attorney duties of does not address to the of a candidate contest qualifications is irrelevant General; application it no until Attorney the office has and, result, has as candidate been declared the winner say, the office. That Section 3 does not come assumes until play into one becomes the General. actually Thus, contrary argument, qualification require- to Perez’s V, General, prescribed by Article ments 4,§ are superseded are the duties that outlined V, § 4 in context with the Reading Article role to the consistent historical General leads did, indeed, framers office to conclusion that the intend is admitted to law the State. be held one who C. 4, §

In Article addition its current interpreting in the sub dispute the reason for the case language, which is has judice, parties changes that language examine sure, time, To adoption.43 its initial undergone, over since 168-69, provisions, supra at 919 A.2d at 1236-37. 43. See constitutional V, § Article 4 has undergone various changes. There was a very distinct difference between what proposed was with regard to Attorney eligibility, in their several itera- tions, and what ultimately adopted. was proposed, As V, § 4 would have read: person

“No shall be eligible the office of attorney general, who has not been admitted practice State, the law in the and who has not practiced the law for_years, and who _ has not resided at least years in the State.” added). (Emphasis

As adopted, the bar admission and length-of-practice provi- sions were merged into a single requirement, that the candi- date have practiced law for specified period. It is that merger which is the point contention in the instant case.

Both justification sides offer for the Convention’s merger of qualifications. Viewing it as an apparent omission of the phrase “who has not been admitted to State” from the final enactment, version of the appellant that argues the framers did not mean to remove the bar admission requirement all, but, instead, recognized that it necessary, provide explicitly the Attorney General be admitted to the bar to practice law in Maryland would have been duplicitous. hand, Perez, On the other on proceeding the same premise, contends that the phrase was omitted because the framers did not intend that such a requirement apply to candidates for the office of asserts, General. He on relying this Court’s holding Kadan v. Supervisors Board Elections Baltimore County, 273 (1974), Md. that, 329 A.2d 702 if the framers had intended to impose a bar membership requirement on Attorney General candidates, they, like the framers in states, numerous other would, could, have retained that express language.44 provisions Perez cites to governing eligibility for the office of the sure, General contained in other states’ constitutions. To be other states explicit have used language more to reach the conclusion see, appellant, advanced e.g., Connecticut Gen.Stat. Ann. 3-124 (requiring that Connecticut attorney General be "an at law of years’ state.”); at least ten active at the bar of this Colorado Kadan, the Orphans’ of of judge In for the office candidates Bar, an brought Court, of the who were members on placing it from prohibit Board against action the State who were not of for that office the ballot the names candidates plaintiffs Bar. maintained members to be IV, § Court required judges Orphans’ of Article Bar. not We agree. This Court did members held, instead, Orphans’ for Court judge that candidates lawyers. to be required were not Kadan, lan- that, express as the lack of argues in

Perez membership qualifica- a prerequisite guage requiring bar for the office of indication that a candidate tion is an Maryland Bar. need not be member Attorney General with, with, indeed, analysis Perez’s quarrel agree do not We case, Kadan. Kadan does not argument his this support sub is, the case fact, distinguishable It from however. any IV, § 40 not make reference whatev- judice. Article does matter, or, of law for that indicia er indicate, is a membership much that bar suggest, would less Thus, being Orphans’ judge. for Court prerequisite IV, Constitution, Supreme § (requiring for Court Art. nominees for five justice licensed to law in Colorado at least to have been years, attor- requiring General nominees to be licensed and ney Virginia (requiring § good standing); 24.2-501 nomi- Code have to the bar of the nees for General to been admitted election); years directly preceding the Commonwealth for at least five however, necessarily not persuaded we are that bar admission was language encompassed "practiced Law State" of Article in the in this thus, Therefore, 4, and, comparison § requirement. Perez’s provisions compel provision explicit does not a different other more result. IV, requirements eligibility Orphans’ governs 45. judges provides, pertinent part: Baltimore, City qualified the several "The voters of the Counties, County, except Montgomery County and shall Hartford Counties, Orphans' City Judges of Courts of elect three residents, respectively, shall be citizens of the State and who they may City County preceding, months in the for which twelve be elected.” CONST, IV, § MD art. Kadan, there simply was that could inferred nothing about issue, from provision, the constitutional used or words omitted, as there is in the instant case. Kadan, words,

In in other this was not faced with the of interpretation specific language pointing qualification, to a the of are in perimeters dispute, which this case. Rather, this Court had to discern the of significance the of any absence to the language tending support claimed qualification. Although the election for “judge,” was a the only qualifications citizenship enumerated were and residency. The to provision did not refer at all bar or membership law Here, practice. to the contrary, provides Section explicitly that “practiced the candidate have Law this State.” Conse- quently, given the and rules pertaining law to the of law, provision reasonably that bemay expressly construed to clearly contemplate, albeit perhaps implication, bar of any admission. The láck at all express language with Kadan, to bar or respect admission as in practice, simply can be equated the sub judice, with situation where there State, is a of the of requirement clear law in the for length, some no explicit requirement but that the candidate be 4,§ to words, “admitted the bar.” Article in other is not devoid of all that language require would a for candidate the thus, General to a lawyer, be arguably opening the to position non-lawyers. reflects, On contrary, the it we clearly, purposeful merger believe the requirements, two which, together, taken make clear being attorney that is a necessary to to requirement being for, hold, run able office of the Attorney General. interprets

This Court the framers’ actions attempt as an to being avoid repetitive. rewording the provision was not, claims, as Perez result of an attempt change to meaning language change the. to the eligibility require- ments for the office of General. Confirmation of our interpretation provided is proceedings During debates. the debates of the 1850 Constitutional Con- County, of Baltimore Howard46 vention, Delegate Benjamin C. requirements prosecuting discussing eligibility albeit stated: attorneys, altogether unneces- ... it [is] framing

“In Constitution detail, ought when we sary all matters to introduce general rules or down certain laying with content ourselves are legislature. If we guidance principles a book which the making it will way, on in this end go than do old Consti- they no understand will more people all, impossible us itself, it will be found and after tution To a man who contingencies. that specify for all provide must be a attorney of prosecuting to the office is elected It entirely superfluous. preposter- is practitioner laws ... it details of sort ous fill the Constitution with applicant for the office must understood generally business, practi- he must know something apprehensive people law. If we are that the tioner of to entirely incompetent perform one is the elect some who office, give we not the it will be better that should duties of right them the to elect.” added). See also The I at Vol. II, 14

Debates (emphasis State Convention the the Constitutional Debates of (Mr. (“Debates 1864) II”), Maryland DU- (Annapolis, 369 maintain, to or say ‘frequent, “If it is correct contrib- VALL. ute,’ superflu- ‘maintain’ is ‘frequent’ then the ‘or’ between and (Mr. ous.”); I have no Debates II at SCHLEY said: stands; deeming it but it objection proposition to the as “no”). I superfluous, vote V, IV, § 10 of on and Article

Perez also relies Article Constitution, which, judi- respectively, require Maryland the law in cial candidates to “have been admitted to this to for office of and candidates the State’s have State” this argument, law in His “been admitted to State.” study congressman. Delegate Howard was a His inter- 46. Army rupted by during the the War of where his service in U.S. brigadier general returning to reached the rank of before he bar complete legal his studies. He was admitted to in 1816 and ran for Governor the framers’ use express language requiring bar member- intent, these that ship provisions is indicative their 4,§ expressed Article was not to it require there. IV, § Perez and Circuit read Article and Article § 10 to that only attorney V mean candidates for state’s and judge are to be admitted to the bar that required because the constitutional provisions governing say each so. hand, continues, theOn other he absence the same or V, § similar language possible indicates that it is for the General candidate to practice law without having ever been admitted to the Bar. We decline to so interpret the framers’ intent. That mean would that state’s attorney judicial candidates are required be admitted to bar, lawyer, “top” while State’s for the lawyer only lawyer civil, State—and at times the for State Federal, and not appellate proceedings—need be.

Moreover, assumption underlying argument may be It correct. is not at all clear requiring that candidates judge attorney and state’s to be members of the bar was as a more imposed stringent requirement than that for Attor- Court, General. To this it ney is far more it likely that was be, rather, intended a more one. relaxed The framers’ require intent was to of candidates for State’s judge solely they be admitted the bar. That is to say, very they deliberately impose did not on those to be a seeking state’s or a attorney requirement judge actually having law,” “practiced in Maryland elsewhere, whether just they members the bar. The opposite is true of Attorney office the General. Because the General Attorney was, is, and to lawyer State, intended be the foremost for the it not surprising is that a that candidate for office would be to required qualification have more than simply a bar mem- bership, that it required would be that a person to aspiring position that required law, would be to be both learned in the as his or evidenced her membership, bar and experienced practice, its as reflected in his or her length of practice. earlier, to be provisions need

As stated constitutional Mohler, supra, a whole. See 318 Md. and read in context Rucker, supra, 315 Md. at quoting at at 567 A.2d Wheeler, at supra, 1063; 281 Md. 555 A.2d at for the that a candidate A.2d 1055. The concedes appellant at member of the Attorney only need be a office of the to so hold. On eligible urges and this Court bar in order to be hand, “practice” to hold that urges Perez this Court other Thus, the required. time all that is requisite period for the 4,§ Law” “practiced out of Article appellant reads and language narrowly Perez that same reads language,47 manner, to it its common and refusing give in a constrained Neither, words, in other reads ordinary signification.

V, § a whole. 4 as Conven-

Turning again to the debates the Constitutional City, Delegate Stirling Jr. of Baltimore tion of Archibald General, salary Attorney stated discussing while attorney must have Maryland] citizens “[the cases, or will general man who is accustomed trying he During II at 1461. not fit for the office.” Debates be debate, Negley Washington County Peter Delegate same County spoke E. also Delegate John Smith Carroll occupy the “kind” of individual who should the office that “if Delegate Negley [the General. observed salary, put [they get could] in an insufficient framers] anything. of a man services be worth [would] services whose office, And have rate man in the rather than a second third II provision entirely,” Debates [they should] strike out the Delegate while Smith stated: argues appellant Perez had been a member 47. if Bar, past years than the New York Bar for the rather possessed professional qualifications, eligible he would be the same agree. noted We do not As hold the office of General. earlier, Attorney General must one who seeks to hold the office of the years Bar for at least ten and must be both a member thus, years; Perez’s practiced for at least ten have appellant’s hypothetical is at eligibility General under open question. least 196

“I think a man is upon who called to fill this responsible position, ought practiced years to have law for ten at least. It is the important one most and responsible positions of the And the State. from circumstances that now surround us, from the changes proposed by be made this constitu- tion, it is evident that we require position in this the services one who has a occupied leading position, in the of profession ten at least.” Debates II years at 1465. added) (Emphasis

Delegate further: Smith stated

“I there are instances know of rather men. extraordinary law, But a be gentleman learned yet knowing attorney about the duties of I general. think ten years is enough require short time to one of who will be upon apply practice called himself to law in all its of ” branches. Id.48 framers, It apparent that the position of viewing one, Attorney General as a highly important requiring branches, of law all the government’s desired have an experienced attorney role, fill that measured of term ten A mere years. years member the bar a few would be insufficient—whilethey recognized that there may be instances of brilliant attorneys who could perform duties years General without ten bar membership, framers felt secure in promoting a seasoned Delegate proposal Smith's that a candidate for the office of the practiced years General needs to have law in State for ten Convention, rejected by yeas nays. was vote and 26 The ultimately Delegate rejecting Delegate Smith’s well as Frederick Schley’s proposal length the minimum should years, years requirement, adopting settled on seven as the proposal by Delegate County. Ezekiel Forman Chambers of Kent The minimum practice required subsequently of a candidate for the changed years adoption was to ten with the of the 1867 proposed It Constitution. was Constitutional Convention practice period years. that the be reduced to five See Constitutional Comparison Convention 1967-1968 Present Constitution Convention, 77-78, (Baltimore, 1968). Proposed and Constitution V, 4, proposal rejected, That language however. of Article thus, unchanged century. has remained for over one who was admitted position, for the attorney practicing fact, had, pre- for the practiced Bar contemplate not ever The framers did period.49 scribed not, did at the an who held individual the office would be length prescribed, of the least, record professional a possess Thus, we their decision. the voters could base upon which must Attorney General hold, office of the candidate for the and a years Bar ten Maryland of for a member the be both years.50 in for ten Maryland of law practitioner framers, fashioning that the in from these debates It can be deduced V, 4, years § ten requirement in felt that "practiced Article the Law” attorney, having an adequate of time which amount after and, thus, time, sufficiently capable tested practiced would be the entire length Attorney change of handling the of General. The of duties the 1867, years, requirement requiring an additional three from 1864 to the of only holding for office the Court's candidate confirms this attorney practice experienced admitted to Attorney must be an General Maryland. law in Mary- Attorneys State of past General of the 50. An examination land, eligibility present, period the the from which from 1864 to the now, that all those who requirements first articulated to reveals were Attorney been members of occupied General have have the office of the experience. practice requisite the All Maryland Bar and have had Maryland, as Attorneys practiced law in past of State's General Bar, years. period ten This for at least members been, be, thus, Court, to depart from what has and continues declines to clear, requirements To allow unambiguous eligibility for this office. prescribed by qualifications, meet an individual who does not 4, Attorney this State would serve to become the General of long history only also the to the intent the framers but undermine competent performed of this who have the duties those individuals important office. Attorneys Maryland’s to following General from 1864 is a list of experience: detailing requisite professional Alexander present, their 1824, (1865-1867), engaged private Bar in in admitted Randall 1824-41; (1871-1875), Syester K. admitted from Andrew 1853-71, 1853, partner State's Bond of Westminster from Bar in A.C. 1854; (1875- County Attorney Washington for Charles J.M. Gwinn 1843, 1883), B & O the Bar in lead counsel admitted to Railroad, Telephone Co. General Counsel for Western Union 1843-49, Attorney City Telephone for Balto. and & P Co. State’s C 1857-61; (1883-1887), Boyle Bar Roberts admitted Charles 1864-75, 1879-83; 1864, Pinkney Whyte private practice William 1846, 1849-51, (1887-1891), private practice to the Bar in admitted 1883-87; 1857-68, 1874-75, (1891-1895), Poe John Prentiss admitted 1857, private practice/founder law firm of John P. Poe & to the Bar in 1857-71, Law, University Maryland Sons Professor of School of Law 1869-71, Dean, University 1871-1909, School Law 1882-84; (1895-1899), City Harry Clabaugh Baltimore Counselor M. 1878, 1878-91; private practice George Riggs admitted to Bar in Gaither, (1899), 1886-99; private practice Jr. admitted to the Bar (1899-1903), Rayner private prac- Isidor admitted the Bar in 1871-78, 1894—99; (1903-1907), Bryan, Shepard tice William Jr. admit- 1882-90, 1892-96; private practice City to the ted Bar Solicitor (1907-1911), 1892, private Isaac Lobe Straus admitted to the inBar 1892-1902; (1911-1915), Edgar Allan Poe admitted to Bar 1895-1900, private practice Deputy John P. Poe & Sons State’s 1900-07, City Deputy City and State’s for Baltimore 1908-11; (1915-1919), City Solicitor and Albert Solicitor C. Ritchie Steele, Seemes, private practice Carey admitted to the Bar in & 1900-03, 1903-19, Janney City Bond and Ritchie Assistant Solicitor 1903-10, Law, University Maryland Baltimore Professor of School of 1907-20; (1918-1919), Ogle Marbury Law admitted to the Bar private practice Marbuiy & partner Perlman later with Lee I. -1910, Attorney County Hecht 1904 for the Commissioners of Prince 1914-18, 1937-41, George’s County Attorney for Bd. of Education 1916-37, 1916-20; County George's Assistant Prince (1919-1923), 1904, Armstrong City Alexander admitted to the Bar Attor- 1904—06, ney Hagerstown Attorney Washington County for State’s for 1908-12, 1912-19; private practice Armstrong & Scott H. Thomas (1923-1930), 1883, private practice Robinson to the admitted Bar 1883-1923; Lane, (1930-1934), William Preston Jr. the Bar admitted to 1916, (later Lane, private practice Keedy Byron) & Bushong Lane & 1919-30; (1934—1938), 1919, Herbert R. O’Conor admitted to the Bar 1920-21, General Counsel for American Merchant Marine Institute 1921-22, Attorney City for Attorney Assistant State’s Baltimore State’s 1923-34; City (1938-1945), for Baltimore William C. Walsh admitted to 1912, 1913-16, private practice City the Bar Apr. Solicitor 1920— 1921, 1921-24, Sept. Judge Associate Fourth Judicial Circuit Chief Judge Appeals Fourth Judicial Circuit and member of the Court of 1924—26; (1945-1946), 1910, William Curran to admitted the Bar 1910-45; (1946-1952), private practice Hall Hammond to admitted 1925, 1925-29, practice Hudgins private Bar Private Willis & practice 1929-38, 1938-46; Deputy Attorney Maryland General of Edward D.E. (1952-1954), Attorney Rollins to Bar admitted State’s for 1930-1943; Sybert (1954—1961), County Cecil C. Ferdinand to admitted 1925-31, private practice County the Bar Counsel for Howard 1931-34, County Attorney of Bd. Commissioners State’s for Howard 1934—46; (1961-1966), County Thomas B. Finan admitted to the Bar 1939-41, 1945-48, private City practice for Solicitor Cumberland 1948-50, 1952-59; (1966), C. Murphy Robert admitted the Bar 1952-54, Maryland University Special Counsel to the of to the Assistant General, General, Attorney Deputy Assistant and 1956-66; Maryland (1966-1978), General of B. Francis Burch admitted Allen, 1945-61, practice private to the Bar in Burch and Baker 1961-63; City (1979-1987),- Stephen of Solicitor Baltimore Sachs H. Attorney Maryland admitted to Bar Assistant U.S. 1961-

D. Perez’s federal argument final addresses appellant’s that, practiced has argues because he membership. Perez bar he years, meets federal law in over so, is Perez in That “practiced requirement. Law this State” his contends, membership position because his federal bar in him to Department authorized with Justice involving Maryland and that his cases oversight this State courts in in federal any appearances State,” within the he has law “in this practiced evidence that Again, agree. § 4. do not meaning of Article we (2007) § his on 28 argument Perez bases U.S.C. 701(l)(b) Rules of the United States and Rule of the Local (2007). 28 U.S.C. District Court for the District provides: General, or any Department officer of the “The Solicitor Justice, any General to State be sent to attend the interests or district in the United States a in a court of United pending States in suit the United State, or in court of other States, any or to attend interest the United States.” authorized, sure, beginning

To that he was Perez correct ser- government until he left federal continuing vice, any court federal which appear State pending, suit the interests the United States was affecting to practice, he admitted even those to whose had been bar That “to attend to interests United States.” authorization, however, of law equate does not to the V, § A State, 4. member contemplated any of to the federal bar of any may the bar state be admitted state, the of in or admitted to bar the state which whether Consequently, court is located physically.51 federal 1964-67, 64, Rosenberg Gallagher Tydings, U.S. private & practice 1970-79; 1967-1970, Maryland Joseph private practice for J. 1959, (1987-2007), Attorney 1959-87. Curran admitted to the Bar Appellate provides, Rule which See Federal Rules of Procedure 51. as relevant: 200 of

entry appearance in a federal court located in this State someone not this to practice admitted here is not to practicing tantamount law in this Nor State.52 is the in appearance Maryland state courts “to to the attend inter- ests of the United to practice States” authorization law in this purposes State for of Article 4. As with Pro Hac Vice admissions, 14,53 see Rule its duration is its purpose fixed and Attorneys. 46. "Rule "(a) Admission to Bar. "(1) Eligibility. attorney eligible is An admission the bar of a appeals attorney good professional court of if that is of moral and practice character and is Supreme admitted before the Court of the States, state, highest

United court another United States court appeals, (including or a United States district court the district Guam, Islands, courts for Islands).” Virgin the Northern Mariana true, know previously attorney 52. We this to be as we have held that an practice Maryland who was authorized to in a federal violated court attempted Rules Professional Conduct when she at the state bar membership. level without See Johnson, 598, 628, Grievance Comm'n v. 363 Md. 770 A.2d 148 18-20, (2001); 1223-24; Alsafty, See also 379 Md. at 838 at A.2d 202-03, 509-12, Bridges, at 919 A.2d at 360 Md. at 759 A.2d infra 244-45; Harris-Smith, at Grievance v. Comm’n Md. 83-84, (1999); 202-03, Kennedy, 737 A.2d at 919 A.2d at infra 667-68, holdings Md. at A.2d in these cases practice Maryland could not be correct unless in federal courts were differently practice Maryland viewed than in state courts. Governing 53. Rule of the Rules Admission to the Bar of (2007) provides, as relevant: "Special attorneys. admission out-of-state “(a) special Motion admission. A member of the Bar of this State attorney is pending who an record in any an action court of State, or agency any before an administrative of this State or of its subdivisions, political representing taking a client in an arbitration law, place involving application Maryland may this State move, writing, attorney good standing who is a member in Bar of another state be admitted in this State for the purpose appearing participating limited action as co- court, pending counsel with the movant. If the action motion shall be pending filed in court. If the action is before an agency or panel, administrative arbitration the motion shall be filed county in the circuit principal court for in which the office of the agency is hearing located or in which the arbitration is located or in other circuit to which appealed the action and shall signed copies include the movant’s certification that of the motion Until he case. ordinarily pending limited to the is defined—it simply in Perez Maryland of Bar a member became law the practice to authorization not carte blanche did have court or in only federal practice could Maryland; of he state panel, and to all agency the arbitration furnished to the or have been parties of record. attorney “(d) spe- attorney’s practice. An on Limitations out-of-state by party represented may only for a cially as co-counsel admitted act practice in this attorney action who is admitted to of record in the attorney may participate the court specially admitted State. The only accompanied by Mary- proceedings when or administrative judge presence by the or is waived attorney, unless the latter's land Any presiding out-of- over the action. hearing officer administrative Maryland Lawyers’ subject Rules attorney is to the state so admitted of Professional Conduct.” Governing to the Bar of of Rules Admission See also Rule 15 (2007), provides, as relevant: which attorneys practice this “Special to authorization out-of-state state. Rule, “(a) provisions of Subject of this a member Eligibility. to the by or with an employed associated the Bar of another state who approved by sponsored or organized legal program that is services Bureau, to may practice pursuant Legal in this State Aid Inc. (1) graduate individual is a organized legal program, if services 4(a)(2), (2) legal requirements of Rule meeting a law school State, provides legal indigents in this program services assistance (3) supervision of a practice mem- the individual will under ber of the Bar this State. “(b) practice eligibility. under To obtain authorization Proof of attorney of the Court file with the Clerk this Rule the out-of-state shall (1) by gradua- request accompanied Appeals a written evidence 4(a)(2), (2) a as defined in Rule certificate tion from a law school attorney certifying is a state that the highest court of another state, (3) a statement good standing of the Bar of that member in Inc., Bureau, by Legal Aid that the signed Director of the Executive by approved currently employed associated with an attorney is or organized legal program. services time, Court, “(e) in its suspension. or At discre- Revocation tion, practice under this Rule suspend or authorization to revoke attorney or amendment deletion written notice to the either of this Rule. attorneys “(£) au- not Out-of-state Special admission. authorization not, represent practice and shall not under this Rule are thorized State, be, except in connec- of the Bar of themselves to members They this Rule. shall be that is authorized under tion with required of the Bar payments to the Protection Fund to make Client Disciplinary Maryland and the Fund.” state court the interest the United States. 28 U.S.C. does obviate the requirement one desiring law in must be admitted to the Bar. 701(l)(b) no

Perez fares better under Rule of the Local Rules of the United States District the Court for District of 701(l)(b) Rule Maryland. provides: “An attorney who is a member of the Federal Public Office, Defender’s the Office of the States Attorney United District, for this or federal government lawyer, other is qualified admission to the bar of District if this a attorney is member in good standing highest court state.” 701(l)(b) Rule qualifications outlines attorney who District,” wishes to a of “the become member bar of this must meet. It not does the bar or address admission rules require- Maryland, ments of in the State which it is located. 517, 701(l)(b) however,

Unlike 28 U.S.C. Rule draws distinction expressly a between federal bar admittance and significant state bar admittance. This and consistent with our to approach practice issue. This Court federal/state has a lawyer held that admitted to the in federal bar this State is not practice courts, authorized to law in the State unless also to admitted Bar. noted,

As the Kennedy, Circuit Court supra, Md. A.2d 200 and Bridges, supra, 360 Md. 759 A.2d permit non-Maryland a lawyer, to admitted the bar another bar, state to and to federal maintain practice a federal in They this State. do not stand the proposition that the of such practice practice maintenance a satisfies the of law 4,§ requirement however. Kennedy and fact, Bridges, in illustrate the difference maintaining between in federal State law in practicing this State. In Kennedy, an attorney, who was a member the federal bar and of the Court of Appeals Columbia, the District of bar, but not a of Maryland member was determined to in have engaged practice in Maryland, law unauthorized in connection documents prepared advised clients and when he issues, in his legal law and state involving with matters state A.2d at office, Maryland. 316 Md. located principal on argument “turn[ed] holding attorney’s at In that the applicable applicable potentially substantive matter,” at we 561 A.2d differentiated client’s Id. and the he have permitted the federal between permitted: not practice, which was state law his the bar “Kennedy may not utilize admission Washington, or his admission Maryland, court federal by asserting that D.C., injunctive relief against as a shield sort triage. permitted He is operate he will Mary- his may present clients themselves at through who matters only legal those whose represent office and land court or Washington, D.C. suit or defense require would acts of very because in the federal court interview, rights constitute analysis explanation legal and For an unadmitted practicing Maryland. person law in from a office is regular Maryland principal on a do so basis Maryland.” of law in practice the unauthorized 666, Id. 561 A.2d at 210. at holding attorney that an like effect. In

Bridges jurisdictions, other than practice admitted to in a number of bar, engage including the federal did Maryland, in in his law before practice the unauthorized Bar, admission to the this Court examined 511, at A.2d at activities. 360 Md. 759 Bridges’ substance that, in rather the unautho- engaging concluded than We law, very in practice he limited his this State practice rized also to federal court and federal law. Id. See specifically Harris-Smith, 83-84, Md. 737 A.2d at 573 356 at supra, court attorney that an to the federal district (holding admitted State, bar, unautho- engaged to the State but not she her firm’s clients law when screened rized held out to as a bankruptcy practice public her and herself 628, Johnson, 363 Md. 770 general supra, practitioner); attorney an admitted to the federal (holding A.2d at 148 of law he met bar the unauthorized when engaged with, advised, office, clients in a Maryland telephone made calls to clients from his Maryland home, executed retainer agreements in Maryland and did not jurisdictional include his letterhead, limitations on the firm’s which only bore a Mary- address). land

Perez, finally, relies on Sperry, supra, 373 U.S. 83 S.Ct. 10 L.Ed.2d to support his argument that his federal membership bar him allowed to practice law in this State and that practice counts toward his eligibility be the Attorney In Sperry, General. Supreme Court of Florida held that petitioner, non-lawyer registered to practice before the Office, United States Patent had engaged the unauthorized practice of an maintaining State, office in the preparing legal documents, holding himself public out as a Patent Attorney. Supreme Court of the United States reversed, holding:

“A State not enforce licensing which, requirements though valid absence federal regulation, give ‘the State’s licensing board power a virtual of review over the federal determination’ that a person or agency is qualified perform functions, entitled to certain or which impose upon performance of activity sanctioned by federal license additional conditions not contemplated by Congress. ‘No State law can hinder or obstruct the free use of a ” license granted under act of Congress.’ U.S. at 83 S.Ct. at 432-33, 10 L.Ed.2d at quoting Pennsylvania v. Co., Wheeling & Belmont Bridge 518, 566, U.S. 518, 566, (1851). How. 14 L.Ed. Perez’s reliance on Sperry, and, effect, in on Supremacy the Clause, is misplaced. While we agree with the principles Sperry, context, enunciated in in the case simply is inapposite. It is true that a non-lawyer was authorized to practice law in pursuant Florida to federal regulations; however, law and that practice was limited to a specialized federal practice and federal law. What the Supreme did, Florida which the Supremacy permit, Clause did not was to prohibit what feder- allowed; al law it denied Sperry the to right do in Florida do On the other him to there. permitted federal law what to hand, Sperry practice patent that permitted the federal law not, and not non-lawyer, did law, he was a did though even to, engage practice in a State law Sperry to purport authorize bar admission him to avoid the State in Florida or to enable requirements. case, to and Local this U.S.C.

The statute relevant to in 701(l)(b), “practice” authorized Perez Sperry, Rule as the the United only protect but to interests Maryland, court; rule, in or, neither in the case the federal States authorized, to, of law the unrestricted purported or, practice. State law Unlike point, more therefore, construing practice, not Perez’s federal in Sperry, that occurred in have even that which issues, of law in this State as the involved General qualifying of his to be purposes Perez the federal way rights in no denied this State rule him. as the gave ruling local Just statute more than those that give petitioner rights did not Sperry him, simply our does not already upon ruling conferred were he is virtue of rights on which not entitled confer Perez the federal statute rule. clear, Perez not

To it is not this that has holding Court’s Indeed, requisite year for the ten we practiced period. practicing law since his agree continuously he has been Rather, New York Bar in 1988. we decline admission V, § 4 “practice” as to credit all of that to construe Article so complying provision’s “practiced Law this State” with requirement.

On Perez contends that the framers were point, person occupying with the the office of concerned having legal connec experience General sufficient but, instead, “merely were Maryland, tion with he or she law, legal maturity sufficient undertake steeped Opinions of the office.” See 68 the duties moreover, his argues, 54. He that because federal practice took place Maryland, has, fact, he been practic- ing law “in this State.” reject V,

We this argument. 4,§ Article conjunc- read in tion with the V, 3,§ duties delineated in clearly Article reflects the intent of the framers that the Attorney General be a Maryland lawyer, specified with a amount of experience. The Attorney General’s first and foremost duty “prose- is to cute and defend on part the State all cases in the of State, appellate courts in the Supreme Court United Courts, States or the inferior Federal or against the ” State, or in may which State be interested .... MD CON V, 3(a)(1) added). § ST. art. (emphasis addition, In Attorney General is required to:

“(2) Investigate, commence, prosecute or any defend civil or criminal or suit action or category of such suits or actions in any the Federal or in any Courts State, or administrative agencies and quasi legisla- before bodies, tive on part the State or in which the State interested, which the General Assembly by law or joint resolution, Governor, or the shall have directed or shall direct to be investigated, commenced prosecuted or defended.

“(3) When required by the General Assembly by law or joint resolution, Governor, or by the any aid State’s Attor- ney or other authorized prosecuting in investigating, officer commencing, and prosecuting any criminal suit or action or category such suits or actions brought by the State in any Court this State.

“(4) Give his opinion writing required whenever by the General Assembly thereof, Governor, either branch the Comptroller, the Treasurer or State’s on any legal matter or subject.” CONST, 3(a)(2)-(4) V, added). §

MD art. (emphasis In order for the Attorney to discharge the various duties prescribed 3, by he or she would have be not merely law, steeped generally, steeped Maryland but law, both as a member of its bar and as an practitioner, active relevant who, result, familiarity with the acquired has as a General’s enveloped therein. Given procedures on and transactions behalf litigation responsibility courts, his or her administrative coupled in state with State that duties, require for the framers to quite logical it was to have for the office candidates that thereby ensuring years, in State for ten practiced law the law and its Maryland familiar with are conversant and they practice. in that the relevant condition holding this case is

The critical V, § have person forth in Article that the set eligibility is not years,” in this for at least ten “practiced law State (1) by admitted this Court person unless the has been satisfied (2) pursuant and Maryland period, in for that practice to law admission, has, fact, period. in for that practiced here to that determine, mean, any categor- to in Opinion, not in this We do not sense, activity practicing does or does constitute ical what things of Article 4. Two are purposes in this State for law note, to however. important not creating first is to make clear that we are

The holding person are not that a dichotomy. a Federal-State We in practice Maryland been admitted this Court by who has not, fact, simply in here because he or she practice does in courts or mostly, only, or even the Federal practices Federal law. practice involving devotes his or her matters in practice in does include practice Maryland The of law in agencies. Many court and before Federal cases Federal courts, court, in Bankruptcy and involve especially Federal in practice Lawyers by law. admitted State, in the employed by agencies who are Federal Federal Attorney’s such as the United States Office Office, in Maryland do law practice Public Defender’s indeed Article, V, § 4. A works for a purposes lawyer who however, not Maryland, outside of will be agency Federal simply as law in this because he or regarded practicing State represent law to the Government by she is authorized Federal State, may, in and on a litigation any including Maryland, period, few isolated occasions over extended have some in a involvement case here. point person may regarded

The second is that a be if court. practicing person appears law even never are not. It is Lawyers litigators, many do not have counts, kind of or the nature of the that law person, years, but for at least ten have been only admitted this Court to she, time, has, basis, period

he or for that on a done regular so. Perez, first, for Mr. is that he was not problem practice Maryland years.

admitted this Court to for ten Second, work, his equally significant, Washington, and, part- from 1989 to 1999 on a Department Justice basis, Committee, Judiciary though time for the Senate it an occasional that 10-year period included involvement over unquantified apparently with an but small number of cases not as in this for Maryland, qualify practicing does State V, f period, contemplation § that within the o Article reasons, For the we reverse the Circuit Court’s foregoing has, fact, ruling “practiced that Perez Law in this for State years,” thereby eligible ten him to run for of making the office Attorney Maryland. General Perez’s admission to the 2001, coupled primarily, Bar with his but lengthy, practice federal of law is not sufficient to meet the require- Attorney ments of the office of the General as prescribed We, thus, 4 of Constitution. hold Perez as a for ineligible Attorney Mary- candidate General of land the 2006 Election.54 Primary Gubernatorial sure, concurring opinions response. 54. The merit be some To Court, 193-95, supra at see 919 A.2d 1252-54 and the concurrence Lamone, 146, 220-22, Judge Eldridge, see Abrams v. 398 Md. 919 A.2d J., (2007), (Eldridge, concurring) 1269-70 have contrasted the requirements judges Attorney, constitutional and the State's and used indicate, Doing them as illustrative. so was never intended to and it certainly suggest, requirements does not that the are interrelated or that they—those Attorney—define judge and State’s for those for the Attor- General; ney they entirely were set for and to serve different reasons language entirely purposes. Our use of the differences in the different indicated, was, provisions comparison those as for and illustra- used in law,” practice opposed purposes. expression “admitted to as contrary tive The different, latter, Law,” “practiced strikingly with the Judge language concurring opinion Eldridge that “the stronger for this Constitution furnishes basis judicial professional activity of for office than it review the candidates professional activity the Court to review the of candidates for does for 221-22, General,” Attorney imposing id. at 919 A.2d at an additional, stringent requirement, if a more for those who would Attorney General. If the framers had intended run for the office of the bar, could, simply they a member of the for the General would, word, likely By “practiced,” using have said so. and most they required. indicated that much more was has, term, law,” already acknowledged, “practice of as we have The variety ways. past, supra See in the been defined this Court in 180-82, judicial at 919 A.2d at 1244-45. It is not inconceivable that might within It would be service well be included those definitions. incongruous for who calls the balls and strikes on those who one and, thus, superior, “practice occupies oversight, law” if not a credited, position qualification purposes, practicing not to be with professors, Opinions Judges, him or herself. like law see (concluding "prac- at 65 that Dean of law school had involved, Law”), continually engaged, ticed are if not in the law, they daily legal knowledge use See their and skill on a basis. R.G.S., 14, 36, 637-38, supra citing at 312 Md. at 541 A.2d at (1936) Heery, (holding v. 183 Ga. 187 S.E. Gazan judicial "may qualifications candidate’s] service enhance more than [a practitioner during period”). an active at the bar the same While defining "judging” of law to include is not at all inconsis- case, opinion tent with this Court's in this it is an issue with which we time; need not concern ourselves at this neither the candidates for year’s the office of the General in this election were former judges, eligibility whose tenure such is critical to the determination. concurring opinions unnecessarily state that we have decided a 215-16, J., (Eldridge, constitutional issue. 398 Md. 919 A.2d at (Harrell, J., concurring); concurring) 398 Md. at 919 A.2d at 1276 (2007). Judge Eldridge's proffers concurrence "[t]he Court’s ineligible unanimous decision that Mr. Perez is Attorney to be a candidate General, ground on the that he has not been a member of the Maryland years, dispositive Bar for ten is of this case. There is no go beyond holding perceived reason for the Court to that on and rule requirement additional constitutional the clause under final of Article V, 215, J., (Eldridge, concurring), 4.” 398 Md. at 919 A.2d at 1266 states, Judge satisfy while Harrell "Mr. Perez failed to the threshold V, requirement Maryland of Art. Sec. 4 of the Constitution in that he years. had not been admitted to the Bar of for at least ten (and ought) go is as far That present as the need in order to decide the dispositive case. The criterion that is of this matter is thus 232, easy straightforward and for all to understand.” 398 Md. at 919 J., (Harrell, concurring). A.2d at 1276 The concurrences are incorrect. 4,§ interpreted nothing We have more. Indeed, only presents to is a constitutional issue this case this Court meaning phrase we have construed. The issue—determining the be, phrase, although having prongs, two cannot meaning that be, separating by parsing those determined or otherwise should not eligible holding is that in order for one to be prongs. This Court's General, Attorney one "must be a member of the the office of the hold years practitioner and must be a of law in Bar for at least ten 151, requisite period.” Supra at 919 A.2d at Maryland for an identical 208, 1240-41, 1254-55, 1226; 1261. supra at 919 A.2d at see membership may independently dispositive in this well be Perez’s bar case, is, fact, single prong interpretation of a not, but it but one membership is as the phrase, "practiced Law in this State.” Bar it, only eligibility. would have criterion concurrences great focusing Judge Eldridge’s spends a deal of time on concurrence eligible hold the office of the who would not be 159, 166-67, A.2d at ruling, see 398 Md. at under this Court's so, J., however, 1230-31, doing (Eldridge, concurring), it statutory pertinent constantly interpretation of the reads out of the opinion’s language. provision State” He claims that "the the "in this being 'steeped Maryland law’ is not consistent with the emphasis on respects many practices, which in several is modem law nature We, at 1230-31. or world-wide.” Id. at 919 A.2d nation-wide stated, inferred, however, disagree. this Court At no time has Court, law, practice by lawfully practicing admitted to someone i.e. law, State, Maryland, solely or a mixture of whether in this requisite period, ineligible to run for the would be provided that it is for, thus, supra General. See at 207- hold the office OS,919 A.2dat 1261. "prac- goes phrase Judge Eldridge's concurrence on to state that See 398 Md. at 220- analogous to "learned in the law.” ticed law” is J., (Eldridge, concurring) Court addressed at 1269-71 This 919 A.2d law,” 195-97, supra see at 919 A.2d at of "leamedness in the the issue 1253-54, Judge Eldridge largely disagree with what does not however, Leamedness, membership simply goes to bar saying. requirement; to, equated equal, and cannot be it does not is, again, supra See in line with the framers’ intent. of law. This once 196-97, concurring opinion 919 A.2d at 1254. The references in his at debates, 224-26, see 398 Md. at 919 A.2d at 1271- to the Constitutional J., position—as proof (Eldridge, concurring), support of his law”—actually equivalent "practiced of "leamedness in the law” is only position. Judge Eldridge’s reference to the solidifies this Court’s the fact that of the Constitutional Convention of reinforces debates holding the office of the the framers wanted an individual law,” they phrase "practiced used that numerous General to have fact, up" something, impossible "give for one to times. In it would be Eldridge’s concurring opinion Judge which he or she has never done. speaks “quality” the individual whom the framers were to the 1272-73, 225-27, quality was seeking, at 919 A.2d at but that see id. words, based, by practice experi- framers’ own on the individual’s 196-97, supra at ence. See 919 A.2d Moreover, Eldridge support proposi- Judge cites do not the cases fact, cases, see, analogous. e.g., phrases those tion that the two are In (1965); Justices, Opinion 279 Ala. 181 So.2d 108-109

211 799, (Ark. 1998); Scarrella, Raff, Heathscott v. 973 S.W.2d 803 In re 500, 351, (1974); Daly, 300 562 Minn. 221 N.W.2d In re 294 Minn. 200 913, 917, denied, 1041, (1972), 528, N.W.2d 920 cert. 409 U.S. 93 S.Ct. Schmahl, (1972); 533, 34 L.Ed.2d 491 State ex rel. Jack v. 125 Minn. (1914); Meier, 94, (N.D.1974); N.W. 425 Pearce v. 221 N.W.2d 98 (1910); Schuylkill County, Pa.Super. Wig Freiler v. gin, v. Jamieson (1899), contrary 12 S.D. 80 N.W. 137 are not we have what They simply said on the issue. define "learned in the law” in terms of demonstrate, membership; they suggest, bar do not not to mention manner, should, be, phrase interchangeably that the and can used "practiced with law.” addition, by required In those cases cited him which that a candidate "practiced similarly have Thurman, law” offer little assistance. In Whitmer v. (1978), applied 241 Ga. 247 S.E.2d 104 the court statute, provision, person constitutional prohibiting also codified being attorney from a district “unless at the time of his he election shall practiced years have ... law preceding for three next his election.” having three-year practice The trial court requirement, ruled that he had met the not appellant proffered his admission to the California Bar, arguing practice that it should be determining considered in requirement. Supreme Georgia rejected time ment, argu- Court of issue, reiterating prior holding its on language "that the 'shall practiced’ contemplated practice have prac- lawful and defined lawful practice tice as the of law 'an as active member of the State Bar of " Wallace, Georgia good standing,’ quoting Wallace v. 225 Ga. and, (1969), case, particularly 166 S.E.2d relevant to this stating; "Appellant's argument practice requirement that the legal include practice directly judicial policy other states conflicts with the Georgia lawyers practice licensed to in other states will not be practice Georgia comity. law in on the admitted basis Rule 2- Regulations Organization 101 of the Rules and Government Georgia, Appendix State Georgia Bar Title 9 Code Annotated. legislature "It is clear that the imposed intent of the when it practice requirement was to insure that the individuals who were attorney experienced elected to the office district would be in the practice of law they required before the courts in which would be perform attorneys. their contrary functions as district It would be this intent to allow practice individuals who have not been licensed to superior before our courts to include their time in other 24-2901, partial §§ states satisfaction of Code 2-4201 and three-year practice requirement.” Whitmer, 247 S.E.2d at 106. Cleland, Littlejohn (1983), In v. 251 Ga. 308 S.E.2d 186 Supreme Georgia qualifications Court examined the of a candidate who was "not nor he [then] ha[d] ever been a member of the State Bar Georgia," 308 S.E.2d at to run for office as a Justice of the Supreme Georgia. provided Court of The State Constitution that "[n]o person unless, Supreme shall be a Justice of the Court ... at the time of election, practiced his years.” he shall ... have law for seven Id. (brackets original). constitutionally The court held the candidate run, ineligible to explaining person may “[s]ince J., RAKER, J., ELDRIDGE, which Concurring Opinion JJ., II GREENE, join I and joins; HARRELL and Parts only.

ELDRIDGE, J., concurring: Mr. agree ground

I the result this case on the that with ten has a of the Bar for Perez not been member however, Judge opinion I Bell’s years. disagree, with Chief joined is two other of the Court. which members V, § Article of the of sets forth Constitution person for a office of qualifications eligible be for the Attorney Maryland. provides (emphasis of Section added): Qualifications

“Section 4. of General. person No shall be to the office of eligible State, General, is not a citizen of this and a qualified who therein, not practiced and has resided and Law in this voter years” at least ten State for Bar, person qualify he a member State a cannot unless or she is of the requiring for an unless he or she a member of the office is context, not, Judge Eldridge’s State Id. In the court did as Bar.” it, "practiced requiring have concurring opinion would define law” as only. complete It was of bar membership bar the candidate's lack membership led the court that the "[did] to conclude candidate requirement position meet the to seek or hold the of constitutional id., Supreme ciy Georgia,” a far Associate Justice of the and that is actually a defining from it means to law when what someone particular Daly, at member bar of a state. See also 200 N.W.2d of the persons seeking judge (recognizing that none become Bar). admitted to the Minnesota Furthermore, appears far as the record of cases cited in so Judge concurring opinion, only provision bearing on the Eldridge’s being meaning phrase provision construed was the constitutional judice, appear case sub does not to have been itself. Unlike in the there different, related, provisions containing other but lan- constitutional guage meaning subject provi- bore on and which informed V, 4,§ judice, interpretation of

sion. In the case sub Article IV, 2, earlier, supra § § 10 and stated is informed Article 193-96, 208-12, 1252-54, 1261-64, at at at n. 54 at both n. 54 A.2d admission, qualification terms bar of which define the for office in provisions these would "practice rather than of law.” Not to consider interpretation. principle afoul run of a basic constitutional dispute The in this case is over the meaning final clause 4,§in containing single professional that, requirement be eligible General, the office person must have “practiced Law in this State for at least ten years.”

Chief Judge plurality Bell’s opinion position takes the the final clause in 4 actually contains two professional requirements, namely person, that a eligible for the (1) General, office of Attorney must years have for ten been a (2) member of the Maryland Bar and must years have ten engaged professional activity Maryland which is suffi- cient, view, in this Court’s to be deemed the “practice of law” in Maryland. opinion 196-97, (opinion states at 919 A.2d 1254) added): (emphasis

“Thus, hold, we a candidate for the office of the Attorney General must be both member the Maryland Bar for and years ten practitioner of law in Maryland for ten years.”

See also opinion 150-51, at 919 A.2d at 1225-26. At other places, the plurality opinion says that a candidate for Attorney General must “have more qualification than simply bar membership” and must be “experienced in its [the law’s] practice” (opinion 194-95, 1253). at 919 A.2d at The three judges constituting the plurality that, “do not agree” “if Perez had been a member of Bar, the Maryland rather than the New York bar for past 17 years and possessed the same professional qualifications, he would eligible be to hold the (id. office of Attorney 195, 47, General” at n. 1253, 919 A.2d at 47). n. The plurality opinion states “that a candidate for the office of the Attorney General must be an experienced attor- (id. ney” 49, at n. A.2d at n. emphasis added), and that a person, eligible be for the office of Attorney General, must “be not merely steeped law, in generally, but steeped law, in Maryland both as a member of (id. its bar and as an practitioner” active 206-07, at 919 A.2d 1261). at Chief Judge that, Bell concludes if even Mr. Perez had been a member of Maryland Bar from 1989 to his work for Department of Justice and the Senate Judi- not in this qualify practicing “does

ciary Committee V, of Article contemplation for that within the period, State 1261). (id. 207-08, A.2d 4” at I. indicated, I with that the plurality previously agree

As V, § 4, of the Constitution Maryland final clause Article General, that, office of eligible means be to have required resident is been member Maryland 4§ It is years. Bar for ten true does expressly require Maryland membership; consequently, Bar Nevertheless, view, § some ambiguous. 4 is to extent my duties conjunction § 4 is with the constitutional when read V, 3,§ prescribed Article Constitution, to the Maryland admission Bar would of the Attor- required. seem to be constitutional duties General, essentially unchanged which have remained since ney only a member of the performed could Bar.

Furthermore, attorney being giv out-of-state except case, try specific the court to one argue en permission state, attorney concept legally practicing of an law a bar, un being likely a member of that state’s without 4,§ language in 1864 and 1867 when the known adopted. authorizing The statute a United was formulated and Department attorney represent of Justice the United States alia, in, State,” was inter “the courts of not enacted States 150, 16 22,1870, until 1870. See Act of June Ch. U.S. Statutes (1870). concept At dealing Cases with Large fields, in certain in a state where the legally practicing law See, bar, came much attorney was not a member of later. Florida, 379, 1322, 10 83 L.Ed.2d e.g., v. 373 S.Ct. Sperry U.S. (1963); v. 360 Bridges, 428 Grievance Commission 233, (2000); v. 489, 508-511, Kennedy 759 A.2d 243-245 Md. (1989), Ass’n, 646, 661-668, 200, 561 208-211 Bar 316 Md. A.2d cases there cited. V, 4, § final should be Consequently, clause Article if it in this [admitted read as said “and Law to] [ ] Mr. has years.” for at ten Since Perez not been State least years, Bar for ten does not at this Maryland member of he set forth professional eligibility requirement time meet 215 V, 4,§ Maryland Constitu- the final clause of Article only proper view, basis for this nay In this is the tion.1 the eligibili- that Mr. Perez does not meet prior order Court’s V, 4,§ Maryland in Article ty requirements specified Constitution.

II. plurality Preliminarily, puzzling why three-judge it is holding that Mr. Perez fails to meet the beyond ventures V, 4,§ of Article on the eligibility requirements ground years. has not a member of the Bar for ten he been policy “This established is to decide constitutional ‘Court’s ” v. Insurance Commissioner only necessary.’ issues when 596, 614, 862, (1995), Equitable, 664 A.2d 871 quoting 339 Md. Jackson, 556, 565, 562, Mercy Hospital v. 306 Md. 510 A.2d Health, (1986). v. Christopher Department See also 381 566 Baltimore, v. 188, 217, 46, (2004); Murrell Md. 849 A.2d Baltimore 170, 191 (2003); Md. n. 829 A.2d 560 n. 8 Baltimore, v. 653, 659, Sun Md. 755 A.2d (2000), and cases there cited. ineligible

The Court’s unanimous decision that Mr. Perez is General, to be a candidate for on the that he ground years, has not been a member of the Bar for ten is case, During argument present the oral before this Court in the appellee counsel for the Perez was asked the Court whether Mr. court, challenged challenging Perez had Court, in the trial or was in this validity under the United States Constitution of the final V, 4, Constitution, § providing clause Article that the practiced General must have “resided Law this State years.” specifically for at least ten Counsel’s attention was directed to equal protection principles applied the federal constitutional Goodsell, v. Board 279, 286-293, (1979), 284 Md. 396 A.2d 1036-1040 Supreme opinions opinions and other discussed in Goodsell. Elections, 127, 162-163, Party See also Green v. Board 377 Md. (2003). A.2d 234-235 responded by stating Counsel for Mr. Perez that Mr. Perez had not court, Court, challenged challenging trial and was not in this validity § of Article under the of the United States. Constitution Consequently, validity regarding no issue the federal constitutional V, 4, directly presented in this case. go is no reason for the Court of this case. There dispositive consti- additional perceived and rule on a beyond holding V, § of Article final clause under the requirement tutional however, beyond dispositive goes plurality opinion, Perez, and states that Mr. membership Bar issue of Bar, member of the ten-year if he had been even V, 4,§ because his under Article ineligible would still be in this “practicing not constitute law activity did professional 1261). 207-08, at at 919 A.2d (opinion for ten years, State” deciding this unnecessarily for justification The plurality’s interpreted issue is that have “[w]e constitutional latter issue is membership and that the bar nothing more” interpretation single phrase, prong “but one ” 208-12, n. (Opinion in this Law State.’ “practiced 54). here, this is 1261-64, the circumstances n. Under A.2d at the second constitutional justification deciding for not a valid issue. are set requirements and federal constitutional

Many state the constitutional example, For single phrases. forth as of the laws” process “equal protection “due of law” phrases Neverthe- put jeopardy” single phrases. are each or “twice less, phrases one of these interprets applies if a court provi- the constitutional particular action violates decide dispositive and if that decision is respect, sion in one court, court necessary it is not case before the whether phrase and decide interpret single further Ex- respect. other phrase the same some action violates appropri- phrase all of a constitutional ploring aspects not, however, It does or law review article. ate for a treatise characterize restraint which should type judicial reflect the appellate opinions. opinion Bell’s reach constitu- only Judge

Not does Chief but it an issue that was unnecessarily, upon issue rules tional Steven appellant-petitioner, to the Court. The presented Abrams, to the presented following questions N. two Court:

“QUESTIONS PRESENTED that a can- Maryland require “I. Does the Constitution be admitted to didate courts of Maryland before all of the courts the State years prior commencing for at least ten to his or her their term as General? any duty

“II. Does the State Board Elections have representations into the made a candidate inquire in any Maryland office when the candidate certifies Board of Elections that he or under oath to the State the Maryland require- she meets Constitutional ments?” argument

Mr. Abrams’s sole constitutional was that Mr. Perez ineligible to be General because he had been years. a Bar for ten Mr. Abrams Maryland member added): (emphasis in stated his brief short, “In Law in this phrase ‘practiced because State’ well-understood, common, ordinary meaning has a that law in necessarily implies Maryland, admission meaning adopted, should be and there should be no analysis.” need for further Court,

During argument oral before this the following colloquy occurred:

“Judge If person passes Maryland Cathell: Bar and Court, Maryland job admitted Bar has a out of law in right judge school with federal the District of Columbia, goes directly to the District of Columbia and Then, judge. gets job directly works for that federal from with in agency there some federal the District of Columbia never, later, and has twenty years actually practiced law geographical Maryland, confines but he has been a Maryland member of the Bar.

“Mr. And membership Abrams: maintained his over that ten year period.

“Judge Cathell: Granted.

“Mr. Right. Abrams:

“Judge Maryland? Is he law practicing Cathell: Honor, I that he is both argue, your “Mr. Abrams: would law, initiating practicing requirement and he meets continuously practicing year period----” for that ten requirement law under V, before this that Article There was no contention Court 4, professional requirements. § two distinct embodied issue raised and this Court was only argued constitutional 4, required membership whether Article case, of this years. Bar for ten Under the circumstances of this should not reach other constitutional judges 8-504; v. issue. Rules 8-131 and Simmons See 1031, State, 1023, n. 1 292-293 n. 896 A.2d 392 Md. (2006); Mortgage, v. First 388 Md. Sweeney Savings (2005); Murphy, n. A.2d 1040 n. 8 Oak Crest v. State, 229, 241, (2004); v. Md. 841 A.2d Moosavi (1999); 651, 660, v. Langworthy 736 A.2d 290 355 Md. State, 595-596, (1979), 399 A.2d 582-583 cert. 284 Md. (1981). denied, 67 L.Ed.2d 384 S.Ct. U.S. III. I a agree judges reaching do not with three

Although one which unnecessarily, particularly constitutional issue “only I comment on that issue appeal, was not raised on shall to do so.” [plurality] because the the Court has decided McNeece, 194, 213, A.2d County v. 311 Md. Montgomery (1987) I with (concurring opinion). strongly disagree that, constitutional in addi ruling Chief Bell’s second Judge years, Bar a ten- membership Maryland tion to for ten to for the office of year Maryland, eligible resident be General, in such Attorney engaged professional must also have that, activity judgment judiciary, in the of the renders the years” “a of law in for ten or an person practitioner is law.” practitioner” “steeped Maryland (opin “active who 1254, 1260). 197, 206-07, ion at 919 A.2d Court, This of the position, by three members adopted 4,§ nor supported by language neither Article history provision. of that the constitutional supported by not provisions should position principle also violates the results. leading in a unreasonable interpreted be manner disqualified lawyers could long-time Maryland Numerous judges if views of the three Attorney being from General plurality in the Another result of the future. prevail were to Court, four have every years, might opinion would be the legal performed nature work quality or evaluate period, by a each candidate ten-year over General, meets the whether such work Attorney determine in this State. actively practicing Maryland standard in their Moreover, Judges and Greene intimate Harrell concerning requirements concurring opinion, plurality’s member ten-year or the law quality nature Bar, be a for that member to order difficult, if General, not would be Attorney candidate for the Board of Elections to administer. State impossible, constitutional Finally, plurality’s interpretation state validity raise as to its under provision might questions constitution. federal

(a) V, 4, require- single professional forth the setting law in must “practiced ment that the General have language for at least contains no furnish- years,” this State ten ten-year ing any basis for court to review evaluate seeking of a professional “experience” Maryland Bar member General, for the reject candidate become grounds on the that he was office of sufficiently not sufficiently “practitioner” “active” as a A of Bar Maryland Maryland law.” member the “steeped representing “practicing the United Government is States law.”2 Rights that 2 of It should be noted the Declaration Supreme federal be the the State. mandates that law "shall Law of Consequently, "Maryland "federal law” is law.” See R.A. Ponte Archi- Alert, 689, 698-701, tects, 857 A.2d 6-8 Ltd. v. Investors’ 382 Md. (2004), and cases there cited. plurality The at opinion, place, correctly one acknowledges “ ”

that the phrase ‘practice law* “a encompasses variety 1244). 180-81, (opinion activities” at opinion A.2d at goes on to discuss several of this opinions Court’s that holding meaning phrase the depending upon varies the context. (Id. 1244-48). 180-86, Then, at 919 A.2d at somewhat incon sistently, plurality opinion states meaning “ phrase ‘practice law in this State’ has remained consistent” (Id. phrase “is clear and unambiguous.” at 42). 1247-48, 1248 188 n. Later, A.2d at n. opinion adopts a narrow definition of phrase, taking the position that Mr. Perez would not have been practicing law if State even he had been member of the Bar for 1261), ten years (opinion at 919 A.2d at only and that lawyer “steeped who is in Maryland law” as an “active practi (id. 1263) 210-11, tioner” 919 A.2d at eligible be Attorney General. prior

This Court’s opinions consistently have taken the position many that there are different definitions of phrase law,” “practice of depending upon the context and the circum- W., stances. See In re Application Mark 1, 7-18, 303 Md. (1985) (“Numerous 491 A.2d 579-584 definitions of what * * * constitutes practice law are to be found.” “These * * * definitions have arisen in a variety of circumstances.” “ ‘[Attempts to define of law have been ”), particularly successful’ and cases there cited. The predom- professional inant many lawyers, activities of legal such as research, law, etc., teaching regarded are “practice law,” although such activities would not constitute the “unau- thorized of law” if by non-lawyers. done As indicated previously, plurality’s limited definition of the phrase might large render a number of lawyers ineligible to Moreover, General. despite plurality’s dis- claimer, the opinion’s emphasis on being “steeped Maryland law” is not consistent with the many nature of modem law practices, which in respects several is nation-wide or world- wide. discussed,

As V, earlier the final of clause Article when 3,§ considered light Article reasonably means that a candidate the office of Attorney General must be admitted years.” Except for ten in this State a least Law “practice[ ] profes- makes the this ten-year period, interpretation for the the same as the for qualification sional Attorneys.4 for and State’s judges3 qualifications professional V, 4,§ requires profes- in the of Article language Nothing membership Mary- in the over and above qualification sional ten years.3 Bar for land furnishes fact, Maryland of the Constitution

In the language professional this to review basis for Court stronger it for the judicial office than does for activity candidates for activity candidates professional review IV, Maryland § Constitu- Article Attorney General. one V, professional § more than tion, contains unlike Article district, IV, § requires for judges. qualification circuit, and appellate judges “be selected from those ^[1] who have been admitted to practice law in this State, and ^[2] who legal and for wisdom sound distinguished integrity, most are IV, Maryland provides § Constitution follows: 3. Article of the Qualifications judges. 2. "Section citizens State of Judges of the said Courts shall be "The of all Constitution, have Maryland, qualified and shall and voters under this years, not less months than five than six resided therein not less be, election, may preceding appointment, or as the case their next district, circuit, judi- county, judicial appellate city, intermediate be, they may judicial for which appellate circuit or circuit cial thirty appointed. They not respectively, or shall be less than elected appointment, he age at or and shall years of the time of their election in this who have been admitted to selected those from State, distinguished integrity, sound who wisdom and are most added). knowledge." (Emphasis legal V, 10, § states: Constitution 4. Article Qualifications Attorneys. State’s "Section Attorney, person eligible to of State’s who "No shall be the office State, and who has not been admitted resided, Law in has he county, city, years, in for at two which least be elected.” ten-year namely requirements, residence two 5. Article contains years membership in the Bar for ten ten i.e., impose ten-year requirement, years. plurality would a third practic- activity years judges’ concept for ten which meets the three ing law. knowledge.” No one has suggested ever that this Court is authorized to review judicial the careers of candidates to determine if they meet the qualitative standards contained in IV, the last Instead, clause of Article it is for the Governor the voters to upon decide such qualifications. and/or if a Similarly, ten-year resident, seeking the office General, of Attorney years has for ten been a in good member Bar, standing it should be for the voters to decide whether the professional candidate’s activity is suffi- cient for him or her to be elected to the office of Attorney General. law,”

The words “practiced or the more frequently used law,” phrase “learned in the constitutions, found in state have regularly been construed to mean simply admission to the bar particular state involved. To the extent that such phrases constitutional have been viewed as providing for a higher or quality level of legal experience, courts have held that the matter is for the voters appointing authorities and/or and not a subject judicial See, review. e.g., Opinion Justices, 38, 40-42, (1965) 279 Ala. 105, 181 So.2d 108-109 (“The phrase ‘learned in the law5as used the framers of the “ Constitution” did ‘not contemplate[ ... ] qualifications of ... candidate should be determined by a referee or jury ” in a case,’ contested election but means “lawyers admitted to practice Alabama”); 249, 257, Heathscott v. Raff, 334 Ark. 799, (1998) (“Based 973 S.W.2d 803 on the American and English phrase, use of the ... we hold that the constitutional qualification phrase ‘learned in the law5 means an attorney licensed to practice state”);6 law the Littlejohn Cleland, v. 597, 251 598, (1983) (Constitutional Ga. 186, 308 S.E.2d 187 “ ” phrase ‘shall ... practiced have law for seven years’ means that “a person cannot ... qualify unless he or she is a member Bar”); of the State Thurman, Whitmer v. 569, 241 Ga. 570- 571, (1978) 104, (Constitutional 247 S.E.2d 106 eligibility re- Supreme case, 6. As the Court of Arkansas discussed in the Heathscott 253, 802, 334 Ark. at 973 S.W.2d at language appeared similar in the 1215, Magna Carta specific phrase and the "learned in the law” was English used in a 1344 statute.

223 “ law for attorney practiced have that district ‘shall quirement ” licensed to must have “been years’ person three means Wallace, courts”); 225 v. our Wallace superior before (1969) 102, (same); Candidacy In re 166 S.E.2d 718 Ga. 917, 920, 351, 357, 362, cert. 200 N.W.2d Daly, 294 Minn. (“To (1972) denied, 93 34 L.Ed.2d 491 409 U.S. S.Ct. have been” person in the law means that the must be learned disbarred); suspended must not admitted to the bar and (1974) (same); Scarrella, 500, 221 562 In re 300 Minn. N.W.2d Schmahl, ex v. 147 N.W. 425 State rel. Jack Minn. (N.D.1974) Meier, (1914) (same); Pearce v. 221 N.W.2d (“Our in the is synony ‘learned law’ phrase view is or ‘admitted to mous with and means ‘admitted to the bar’ State”); Freiler v. Supreme Court of our practice’ by (1910) (same); Jamieson Schuylkill County, Pa.Super. (same). (1899) Wiggin, v. 12 S.D. 80 N.W. review, judicial Judge under Chief qualitative

The type a opinion, professional experience candidate’s Bell’s office, for constitutional is eligibility his her determine contrary law. Maryland as a matter It is unprecedented candidate for jurisdictions. long the cases in other As a Bar, has Attorney Maryland General been member for ten the should not further good standing, years, judiciary activity. review is a professional review the candidate’s Such voters. matter for the

(b) opinion The on in the history plurality constitutional relied its the final of Article support does conclusion that clause V, § professional qualifications, two both of contains distinct I judicially Although which reviewable. the agree are history supports holding constitutional the that a candidate for have been a member of the General must years, history actually plurality’s Bar ten refutes the professional that there is an additional position qualification, evaluate pursuant professional to which this Court candidate, ten-year activity of an who is Bar, to determine whether member candidate is sufficiently “experienced” and is an practi- “active tioner” who is “steeped Maryland law.”

Chief Judge points Bell out that an earlier proposed version V, Article contained expressed two professional re- quirements, namely that the Attorney General have “been admitted to law in the State” and that General had “practiced law” a certain or years. number 1250). (Opinion at 919 A.2d at The plurality opinion then observes that professional two eligibility requirements “were merged {ibid.). into a single requirement” opinion goes to say that it “interprets on the framers’ actions as an attempt to avoid being repetitive” 191-92, at {id. 919 A.2d at 1251).

I fully agree with the plurality that the bar admission requirement and the law requirement were viewed as meaning the same thing and were merged into a single requirement repetition. avoid Later in the opinion, howev- er, Chief Judge Bell takes the position that there are two separate professional eligibility requirements and that final V, clause of 4,§ Article means that “the Attorney General must be both member of Maryland Bar for ten years practitioner of law in Maryland for years.” ten {Id. 196-97, 1254). 919 A.2d at This position later taken plurality flatly inconsistent with its earlier position based on the- legislative history. In my view, sparse legislative history of the provision indicates that there is a single profes- sional eligibility requirement 4,§ which is mem- bership Bar for years. ten The plurality also upon relies the debates at the 1864 Constitutional Convention regarding salary of the Attor- ney General ten-year and the bar membership. Thus Dele- gates Negley and Bond stated Debates {The the Constitu- 1460): tional Convention at Negley. I am as much in favor of keeping down

. “Mr. salaries as anybody. But you better strike out this provi- altogether sion than to put an inadequate salary. Be- cause if you put in an insufficient salary, you cannot get services of a man whose services will be worth anything. in the or third rate man rather than have a second And office, provision entirely. strike out the you better for an enough is little such

“Three dollars a year thousand are of the bar who younger are the members They officer. calling attorneys, they continually will be State’s elected opinion, perhaps for his attorney general upon He to be at the trial. is his assistance require personal comptroller, trea- governor, legal adviser besides have his hands surer, he will legislature; and even large. is Let us year dollars a not too full. Three thousand officer, have a or let us salary enough good to secure have all. none at a of three thousand my judgment, salary

“Mr. Bond. In lawyer. year enough good a is little a dollars any by this is receive attorney general, report, forbidden whatever, his As except salary. fee or compensation other gentleman Washington from has been well remarked (Mr. this you strike out county Negley,) provision better office; you a man in this entirely, get good than not one, good compen- him a get you give unless good cannot sation.” 1460-1461): (id. at

Delegate Stirling commented Stirling. my I from think the views friend “Mr. (Mr. so far as the Washington Mayhugh) general are correct myself I have on several occasions principle concerned. no high. too I have put voted here not to these salaries attorney general salary objection putting I $2,500, suggested I think is full low. But though sum, indisposition pay large I know because there is salaries. attorney have who is you general

“Now must man cases, or he not be fit for the trying accustomed to will good man who has a cases practice trying office. And money every year trying makes considerable sum if against accepts the State. But such a man cases office, up he must give entirely portion that of his practice. consideration, all Taking things these into I com- believe a petent attorney at three will general year thousand dollars a be a to the State at saving least a thousand dollars a year.” Later, with to the regard ten-year requirement, Delegate emphasized importance position type Smith and the lawyer be Attorney who should General. It is important keep these mind what debates related they to and what not. The salary did debates concerned the needed to attract and good experienced lawyers and concerned the ten-year bar admission were requirement. delegates not suggesting ten-year that Bar member type must have a certain or quality experience order eligible to be seek office of General. theOn that, low, contrary, they salary were afraid if the were too highest quality Maryland lawyers would be candidates the office and that lesser quality attorneys would candi- be and elected Attorney dates would be General.

The need to higher quality setting attract candidates high salary is inconsistent with the notion that a court could ten-year declare ineligible members Bar upon the court’s evaluation professional experi- based of their prescribing ence. Instead of qualitative experience require- reviewable, ments which might judicially the framers V, 4,§ high attract sought quality applicants for the office of Attorney General what was then setting consid- high ered a salary by ten-year Maryland bar member- ship requirement.

Consequently, history the constitutional discussed in the opinion plurality opinion’s undermines the conclusion that a court can quality review the or nature of the professional activity of a ten-year Maryland Bar member.

(c) Court, time, that, This after emphasized time has in inter- and other preting legal provisions, enactments we them “give interpretation, their ‘most in accord reasonable with logic ” are constructions sense,’ we “avoid common ” unreasonable, or common sense.’ inconsistent with ‘illogical, Nationwide, 82, 89, 878 A.2d v. 388 Md. Johnson State, 423, 429, 419, v. 701 A.2d Greco (2005), 347 Md. quoting 106, State, 125, 137, 647 v. A.2d and Frost (1997), 336 Md. 422 (1994). from a of enact refrains construction The Court 112 quite would be “consequences [that] that leads to ments Alert, 689, 717, 857 v. Investors’ 382 Md. Ponte strange.” State, also, Stoddard v. (2004). Md. e.g., See 1, 395 18 A.2d State, v. (2006); Twine 1245, Md. 653, 663, 1250 395 911 A.2d v. Mountain (2006); Oakland 1132, 539, 550, 910 1138 A.2d v. 1036, (2006); Lake, Gwin 316, A.2d 1045 Md. 896 392 Administration, 440, 462, A.2d Vehicle 385 Md. 869 Motor (2005). plurality’s the principle by This is violated V, something more requiring § Article of interpretation membership residency ten-year and ten-year Maryland than Bar for one to be General. Maryland in the in of numer- result the exclusion plurality opinion could more, been, years who have for ten or Maryland lawyers ous For Bar. and members Maryland residents for Attorney apparently ineligible it render example, would Maryland lawyers ten-year Maryland residents and federal who, ten-year period, employed by for were part of the or firms in District of law Columbia government agencies nearby in in District of or states.7 Columbia ten-year Maryland might Bar who be group members Another of plurality opinion ineligible to General under the consists be circuit, practice judges who did not law appellate, and district standards, years Maryland, plurality’s ten with the accordance opinion says judges. Although Judge’s that prior becoming Chief might be judicial service well included” is not inconceivable "[i]t 208-09, (opinion at n. A.2d at "practice of law” its definition of 1261-62, 54), prohibited judges by law from n. it is clear that are l-203(a) (1974, § Repl.VoL), practicing law. Code Article, pertinent part Proceedings provides in Courts Judicial and follows: as law, during an judge may his of office maintain term "[N]o law, for the or have interest in office office law, part or in practice of whether conducted whole himself ” * * * by others. The plurality opinion, adopted if ever majority Court, unprecedented could also lead to an totally unrea- non-judicial performed by sonable function this Court reiterate, every years. four To opinion takes the position that, if Mr. even Perez “had been a of Maryland member Bar, than the years rather New York for the past [B]ar possessed the qualifications,” same his practice would “not qualify practicing years], law in this State for within [ten contemplation 4.” (Opinion at n. 47, 47, 1261-62). 208-09, 919 A.2d n. This conclusion is plurality’s based on the evaluation the nature Mr. Perez’s professional activity, upon discounting Mr. Perez’s prac- attorney tice in as an for the United States Depart- Justice, ment of upon the view “appearance Maryland state courts ‘to attend interests United ” not the “practice States’ law in for purposes [of] this State (Id. V, 1256). 199-200, § 4.” at 919 A.2d at . type professional indulged evaluation in by the plurality could well set a precedent for future elections for Attorney Every years, General. four long-time members of the Bar, filing certificates of candidacy for the office of General, challenged could be in court on the theory years that their ten or professional activity more in Maryland qualitatively insufficient them to eligible General candidates. In light cases, they nature such will find always way their to this Court. I cannot believe that 4, the framers Article IV or Article of the Maryland ever Constitution contemplated the courts should be type involved in this of politically-charged evaluation activity. electorate; This is for the it is not the appropriate business of judiciary.

(d) “ It is will, a settled that a ‘principle court whenever possible, reasonably apply construe and [an enactment] ” casting avoid serious upon doubt its constitutionality.’ Television, Burch v. United Cable 687, 703, 391 Md. 895 A.2d 980, (2006), quoting Yangming Marine Transport v. Re- 989 U.S.A., Inc., von Products 496, 509, 633, 311 Md. A.2d 536 640

229 (1988) that allows prefer interpretation will . “[T]his question.” Nationsbank a constitutional reaching us to avoid (2003). Stine, 86, 727, As Chief 76, A.2d 733 v. 379 Md. 839 Price, 334 v. Curran for the Court stated Judge Murphy (1994), 93, a 149, 172, [provision] 638 104-105 “[i]f Md. A.2d of which interpretations, one susceptible of two reasonable pre- constitutionality, a to its would involve decision the determination of is that which avoids ferred construction also, County, Rios e.g., Montgomery v. See constitutionality.” (2005); Ponte Investors’ v. 104, 1, 121, A.2d 10 386 Md. 872 18; Alert, Edwards v. 857 A.2d at supra, 382 Md. (2004); Corbin, 278, 293-294, 841 A.2d 854 379 Md. Walsh, 565, 594-595, v. Montrose Christian School 363 Md. (2001). 111, 128 770 A.2d principle a of constitutional

It is also well-established ... is invalid ... if it discriminates regulation state “[a] it deals.” or those with whom against the Federal Government States, 423, 435, 110 S.Ct. v. North Dakota United 495 U.S. cases there cited. See (1990), 1986, 1995, 109 L.Ed.2d also, Virginia, 509 U.S. Harper v. e.g., S.Ct. Trea Michigan Department Davis v. (1993);

L.Ed.2d 1500, 1509, 103 sury, 489 U.S. L.Ed.2d 891 S.Ct. (1989) (state gov local “favoring enactment retired state and employees” federal held un employees ernment over retired constitutional). opinion, Maryland employed plurality attorney

Under the office, State’s by Maryland General’s office, office, attorney’s Maryland county Attorney’s Maryland government agency, practicing another would be V, Article Maryland purposes eligibility law in for under hand, § 4. a Maryland attorney employed On the other or other Department agency United States of Justice federal in Maryland and Capital, working located the Nation’s as elsewhere, law in practicing well as would not be plurality opinion. under the government employment discrimination between state government plurality’s

and under employment, federal V, 4,§ interpretation of Article and present would serious as to constitutionality 4,§ issue of Article under the United States principles, Constitution. Under settled an in- V, 4,§ terpretation Article which avoids this federal consti- preferred. tutional issue would be opinion, Raker this Judge joins Judges and Harrell and join I II Greene Parts of this opinion.

Concurring Opinion by WILNER, J.

Concurring by WILNER, Opinion J. I join concur with and Chief Bell’s Judge Opinion and write separately only respond to Judge Eldridge’s peculiar con- clusions the Constitution not mean it plainly does what that, did, if it says even the Court say shouldn’t so. V, § 4 of the Constitution states with marvelous that a clarity simplicity person is not eligible to office has “practiced who not in this law State Now, for years.” whether, at least ten fairly one debate for of that purposes provision, certain conduct constitutes the school, of law in State—teaching this law at a law for example, serving arbitrator, or or judge or administrative judge law examiner. hearing But that it conclude does not require law at all simply extraordinary.

Judge Eldridge thinks that all that is required is that a person have been to Maryland admitted Bar ten years. That is what says, the Constitution As however. Chief out, points sections, Bell Judge other the Constitution makes explicitly membership Bar the effec- defining tive criterion. In qualifications of the Attorney General, however, People deliberately chose different requirement. Upon the recommendation of the Convention that, delegates, they eligible determined for the office Attorney General, a person actually must have practiced in years. State ten view, the Bar pass Eldridge’s person a could Judge

Under store, open liquor Examination, practice, admitted be definition, any conceivably, under that could anything never do active, law, politically become practice constitute Maryland. years later elected ten be or the delegates that is what Convention The notion that It is absurd. is really in mind People had provision the Constitutional language by plain belied in the Constitutional well the debates and is belied as Conventions. that had not candidacy was he challenge to Mr. Perez’s

The focus on his not for ten years. law in practiced part period Bar for that being to the admitted lawfully not Perez had by Abrams that argument for, is here, person extent that except law practiced in Federal courts and appear law to permitted Federal admitted to the Bar being without agencies before Federal are or is admitted appearances such made the State which case, must in a one participate particular hac vice to pro Maryland by this Court to the Bar of ordinarily admitted practice here. That Mr. may lawfully he or she law before ten practice requisite not admitted Perez had been not, fact, practiced law strong that he had years is evidence period. here for that go togeth- that the two Judge correctly

Chief Bell concludes er; anticipates the Constitution that candidate for ten lawfully practiced General will have that necessarily requires the candidate have years, and that period. here for that Because the been admitted to law, practiced is that the candidate have eligibility condition is that candidacy Mr. Perez’s challenge and because the sole so, it that Court examine necessary he not done had Mary- engaged he in lawful resolve whether had not period. Merely holding land for that Mr. Perez years question for ten does answer been admitted adequately properly does not presented and therefore decide the case.

Judge Eldridge suggests, without support, a ten- year practice requirement may create Federal Constitutional issues because it against persons discriminates in Federal employment. Government I am not aware that the Supreme held, intimated, Court has ever or even that a could not State impose a requirement officer, such for its chief legal chosen to represent advise and its State and and agencies, officials but if requirement even such a issues, did raise they such would be raised as well that the requirement person here, practice law here, even be admitted to year. one conjured ghost is, of a me, Federal issue reddest of herrings. red If Assembly the General believes requirement changed—that should be years ten is too long or that “practiced law in this State” should be better defined—it may propose People an appropriate amend- V, § ment to Article

Concurring Opinionby GREENE, HARRELL and JJ. Concurring Opinion GREENE, HARRELL and JJ. agree We with generally Judge Parts I and II of Eldridge’s concurring opinion. Mr. Perez failed to satisfy threshold requirement of Art. Sec. 4 Constitution in that he had not been admitted to the Bar of Maryland for at (and years. least ten That as far as the Court need ought) ingo the present order decide case. The criterion that is dispositive of this straightforward matter is thus easy all to understand. The State Board Elections adminis- ter such requirement by objective reference Bar admission records of this Court.

Case Details

Case Name: Abrams v. Lamone

Court Name: Court of Appeals of Maryland

Date Published: Mar 26, 2007

Citation: 919 A.2d 1223

Docket Number: 142, September Term, 2005

Court Abbreviation: Md.