OPINION
In sеparate but consolidated actions appellants David Abraham and Scott Len-nander brought claims seeking only money damages against their former employer, respondent Hennepin County, for retaliatory discharge in violation of the Whistle-blower Act, Minn.Stat. § 181.932, subd. 1(a) (2000), and the Minnesota Occupational Safety and Health Act (MOSHA), Minn. Stat. § 182.654, subd. 9 (2000). 1
The district court initially granted the county’s motion for summary judgment, dismissing all claims, and appellants appealed dismissal of the whistleblower and MOSHA claims. The court of appeals remanded, directing the district court to determine whether retaliation more likely than not motivated the county’s discharges, even if the county also had a legitimate reason for the discharges.
On remand, the district court granted the county’s motion for partial summary judgment dismissing the whistleblower claims, concluding that the whistleblower claims and MOSHA claims arose out of the same facts, involved the same proof and the same damages, and thus, could not be concurrently pursued. The court denied appellants’ request for trial by jury. Following trial to the court, the district court concluded that the county had not violated MOSHA by discharging appellants in retaliation for complaining to their supervisors and to the Occupational Safety and Health Division of the Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry (Safety and Health Division), instead finding that the county discharged appellants for intentionally introducing chemicals into their work area on the day of an inspection by the Safety and Health Division, and entered judgment dismissing appellants’ MOSHA claims.
On the second appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the district court’s decision denying appellants the right to trial by jury but reversed the district court’s decision dismissing appellants’ whistleblower claims and remanded.
Abraham v. County of Hennepin,
We conclude that there is a constitutional guarantee to trial by jury for appellants’ *346 actions. We affirm in part and revеrse in part the decision of the court of appeals, vacate the judgment of the district court, and remand for jury trial.
I.
In April 1995 appellants were discharged from employment as offset equipment operators in Hennepin County’s print shop. According to the county, appellant Lennander was discharged for intentionally pouring chemicals on carpeting in the work area during an inspection on March 22, 1995, by the Safety and Health Division; appellant Abraham was discharged for intentionally spraying chemicals into the air during the same inspection. Appellants allege that the county discharged them in retaliation for their complaints to their supervisors in February 1995 that fumes in the workplace were making them ill and in retaliation for appellant Abraham’s written complaint on March 2, 1995, to the Safety and Health Division, which resulted in the inspection. 2 Abraham complained to the Safety and Health Division that the employees of the county’s print shop believed they were faced with an immediate health threat due to chemicals in the air. Appellants were subsequently discharged, and their claims for retaliatory discharge followed.
II.
We first address the issue of whether an employee may pursue concurrently in the same action a whistleblower
3
and a MOSHA
4
retaliatory discharge claim when both claims seek only money damages and arise out of the same facts.
5
Whether statutory claims arising out of the same facts may be pursued concurrently is a legal issue, and we review legal issues de novo.
See Hibbing Educ. Ass’n v. Pub. Employment Relations Bd.,
Ordinarily, unless a statute provides that its remedy is exclusive, a party
*347
should not be prevented from bringing concurrent claims.
See, e.g., Wirig v. Kinney Shoe Corp.,
In
Williams v. St. Paul Ramsey Medical Center,
The district court concluded that appellants could pursue claims only under MO-SHA because the specific provisions of MOSHA prevail over the more general provisions of the Whistleblower Act. The district court relied on the rule of statutory construction that provides that if an irreconcilable conflict exists between a general provision of law and a sрecific provision of law, then the specific provision of law prevails, unless the general provision was enacted later in time and the legislature made it clear that the general provision was to prevail, Minn.Stat. § 645.26, subd. 1 (2000). Section 645.26, subdivision 1, however, is applicable only when laws are irreconcilable. The provisions of the Whistleblower Act and MO-SHA are not irreconcilable. We noted in
Williams
that the MHRA and the Whistle-blower Act are irreconcilable because of the MHRA’s exclusive remedy provision.
We hold that claims for retaliatory discharge, seeking only money damages, brought under the remedy provisions of both the Whistleblower Act, Minn.Stat. § 181.935(a), and MOSHA, Minn.Stat. § 182.669, subd. 1, may be pursued concurrently in one action.
III.
We turn next to the issue of whether Article I, Section 4 of the Minnesota Constitution guarantees the right to trial by jury in an action, such as this, in which an employee seeks only money damages for retaliatory discharge from employment in violation of the Whistleblower Act and MOSHA. This court reviews de novo a lower court’s interpretation and application of the Minnesota Constitution.
Olson v. Synergistic Techs. Bus. Sys., Inc.,
Neither the Whistleblower Act nor MOSHA specifically provides for the right to jury trial in its remedy provision,
see
Minn.Stat. §§ 181.935, 182.669, subd. 1, so that right, if it exists, must arise under the constitution,
Ewert v. City of Winthrop,
Appellants argue that they are entitled to have their actions tried to a jury because their actiоns are legal in nature and seek the recovery of money only. 8 The county argues that neither the Whistle-blower Act nor MOSHA provides for trial by jury, and that there is no constitutional right to trial by jury since these actions, created by statute, did not exist when the constitution was adopted. 9 The county argues that when the constitution was adopted, the common law did not permit actions for wrongful discharge against employers, and the doctrine of sovereign immunity forbade actions against a municipality. According to the county, since these actions were nonexistent, in fact not allowed, when the constitution was adopted, there can be no right to trial by jury.
In
Bond v. Welcome,
*349 If [the action] is an action at law for the recovery of money only, the plaintiff is entitled absolutely to a trial by jury, although it involves the examination of a long account on either side, for the constitution guaranties to him this right. But if the action is equitable in its nature * * ⅝ the plaintiff is not entitled to a jury trial * * * for in such cases, at the time of the adoption of the constitution, there was no absolute right of trial by jury.
Id.
at 43-44,
In
Tyroll,
we held that the third-party defendant tortfeasor was entitled to a jury trial in a subrogation claim brought against the third-party defendant by an employer after settlement of the employee’s negligence suit left only the employer’s subrogation claim for trial.
This court has not held that only those causes of action that were identified in 1857 as causes of action at law carry today an attendant right to jury trial. Rather, the constitutional right exists for the same type of action for which a jury trial existed when the constitution was adopted, any cause of action
at law. See Olson,
While it has been suggested that wrongful discharge is contrary to the common *350 law tradition of employment at will and therefore cannot be a cause of action known at the common law, we disagree. The nature of the employment relationship at the time the constitution was adopted is immaterial to a determination of whether a claim for retaliatory discharge today is a cause of action at law, and thus carries an attendant constitutional right to jury trial.
In
Olson
we considered whether a claim for promissory estoppel carries a constitutional right to jury trial, and we held that there is no such right to trial by jury, because the action is equitable in nature as distinguished from legal in nature.
We examine the nature and character of the controversy in this case, as determined from the pleadings and by the relief sought. Appellants claim they were discharged in retaliation for their complaints concerning the air quality in their workplace. Appellants’ retaliatory discharge claims are similar to the employee’s claim in
Phipps v. Clark Oil & Refining Corp.,
Like the claim in
Phipps,
the claims for retaliatory discharge in this case are a species of the common law action of wrongful discharge.
See id.; see also Phipps,
In Minnesota, wrongful discharge existed at common law as early as 1861.
Mackubin v. Clarkson,
In 1936 this court recognized that, absent an employment contract for a specified term, employment is “at will,” meaning either the employee or the employer may еnd the employment relationship at any time for any reason.
See Skagerberg v. Blandin Paper Co.,
In
Phipps,
Because of the enactment of the Whistleblower Act, we acknowledged in
Phipps
thаt we did not have to resolve the policy question whether Minnesota should recognize a common law cause of action for wrongful discharge.
A wrongful discharge claim sounds in tort.
13
We recognized in
Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States,
A retaliatory discharge claim is also a claim for which the law recognizes a right to consequential money damages in an action in district court. See Minn.Stat. §§ 181.935(a) & 182.669, subd. 1. As a tort action seeking only money damages in a district court, it is a cause of action at law.
In the case before us, the claims are tort claims, brought in the district court, seeking only consequential money damages. Thus, the nature and character of the controversy support the conclusion that a whistleblower claim seeking only money damages is an action at law.
We also consider the theory for relief.
Olson,
However, because we look to the nature and character of the controversy as determined from all the pleadings, including the relief sought, the nature of the relief sought is important in determining whether a claim is legal or equitable, and as noted, claims for consequential money damages are typically legal claims. 17 We note again that appellants do not seek the equitable reliеf provided by the Whistle-blower Act, Minn.Stat. § 181.935(a), and MOSHA, Minn.Stat. § 182.669, subd. 1, but seek only money damages. Examination of the relief sought further supports the conclusion that a whistleblower claim seeking only money damages is an action at law.
Our analysis is not altered by our decisions in
Breimhorst v. Beckman,
In Ewert, we held that the Minnesota Constitution does not provide the right to trial by jury to one who appeals a special assessment. 278 N.W.2d at- 550. We stated that the right to appeal a special assessment arises exclusively from statute and does not exist at common law, and as such, there is no attendant right to jury trial in appeals from special assessments. Id. We did not hold in Ewert that all statutory causes of action are equitable actions with no right to jury trial. See id. When a statutory cause of action is legal in nature, it falls within the parameters of those “cases at law” for which there is a constitutional right to jury trial.
We acknowledge our conclusion in
Whallon,
4 Minn, at 115 (
We hold that an action brought in district court under the Whistleblower Act, Minn.Stat. § 181.935(a), and MOSHA, Minn.Stat. § 182.669, subd. 1, alleging the tort of retaliatory discharge and seeking only money damages, is a cause of action at law with a constitutional right to jury trial.
IV.
We now turn to the issue of whether an employee’s whistleblower claim fails if he reports the violation of a law or rule that does not implicate clearly mandated public policy. The county argues that appellants’ claims reflect only appellants’ self-interest and do nоt implicate clearly mandated public policy. In our recent decision in
Anderson-Johanningmeier v. Mid-Minnesota Women’s Center, Inc.,
V.
We are also asked whether an employee’s whistleblower claim fails if the employee does not specifically identify the law or rule he alleges that the employer violated. Appellants did not identify in their pleadings a specific federal or state law or rule adopted pursuant to law that they suspected the county of violating. Appellants’ complaints to their supervisors and to the Safety and Health Division, however, implicated suspected violations of MOSHA, and their pleadings consequently implicated suspected violations of state law. A whistleblower claim need not iden
*355
tify the specific law or rule that the employee suspects has been violated, so long as there is a federal or state law or rule adopted pursuant to law that is implicated by the employee’s complaint, the employee reported the violation or suspected violation in good faith, and the employee alleges facts that, if proven, would constitute a violation of law or rule adopted pursuant to law.
See Obst v. Microtron, Inc.,
VI.
The final issue is whether appellants are collaterally estopped from pursuing their whistleblower claims. The county argues that remand for jury trial is improper because, after trial to the court alone, the district court directed that judgment be entered for the county, dismissing appellants’ complaints with prejudice. Thus, the county argues that appellants are collaterally estopped from trying their claims again to a jury. A right to a jury trial ordinarily may not be abridged by the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
18
Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc.,
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Notes
. Abraham also brought a claim under the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), Minn. Stat. § 363.14, subd. 1 (2000), and both appellants alleged defamation. Those claims were dismissed by the district court, and appellants did not challenge the dismissal.
. The inspector cited the county for two violations, both unrelated to air quality.
. The Whistleblower Act, Minn.Stat. §§ 181.931~.935 (2000), provides a cause of action for an employee against the employer when the employee is discharged from employment for blowing the whistle. The Whis-tleblower Act prohibits an employer from discharging, disciplining, threatening, otherwise discriminating аgainst, or penalizing an employee who in good faith reports a violation or suspected violation of law or rule adopted pursuant to law. Minn.Stat. § 181.932, subd. 1. The act provides an employee who has been injured by a violation of section 181.932 with the remedy of bringing a civil action to recover any and all damages recoverable at law, together with- costs and disbursements, including reasonable attorney fees, and such injunctive and other equitable relief as determined by the court, in addition to any remedies otherwise provided by law. Minn.Stat. § 181.935(a).
. MOSHA, Minn.Stat. ch. 182 (2000), also provides a remedy for a whistleblower-type claim when the reported violation of law implicates MOSHA. The act provides that no employee shall be discharged or in any way discriminated against because the employee has filed a complaint, or instituted or caused to be instituted an inspection under or related to the act, or because of the exercise by the employee of any rights afforded by the act. Minn.Stat. § 182.654, subd. 9. Any employee believed to have been discharged or otherwise discriminated against for exercising any of the rights afforded by the act may file a complaint with the commissioner of labor and industry, who shall cause an investigation to be made as the commissioner deems appropriate, which could result in a hearing before an administrative law judge and injunctive relief. Minn.Stat. § 182.669, subd. 1 (2000). MOSHA also provides that "[a]n employee may bring a private action in the district court for relief under [section 182.669].” Id.
.We are not presented with the issue of concurrent claims that seek different equitable relief under two different statutes, which may present a different issue.
. "[A]s to acts declared unfair by section 363.03, the procedure herein provided shall, while pending, be exclusive.” Minn.Stat. § 363.11 (2000).
. While the county correctly points out that this provision failed to allow concurrent claims in
Williams,
we disagree that the provision therefore has no effeсt here. In
Williams,
the provision for other remedies in the Whistleblower Act was trumped by the exclusive remedy provision of the MHRA.
See
. Both the Whistleblower Act and MOSHA also provide for equitable relief, Minn.Stat. §§ 181.935(a) & 182.669, subd. 1, but appellants did not seek equitable relief.
. As a threshold matter, the county argues that appellants conceded at the district court that they have no right to jury trial on their MOSHA claims. The record below suggests that appellants did not concede that they have no right to jury trial on their MOSHA claims, but instead argued before the district court that if the county's argument for no right to jury trial under MOSHA were applied to appellants' whistleblower claims, then the county’s own argument would suggest a right to jury trial under the Whistleblower Act. Moreover, in their memorandum opposing partial summary judgment appellants did argue that they werе entitled to a jury trial.
. In
Phipps,
the employee alleged that he had been discharged in retaliation for his refusal to engage in unlawful activity.
.
See, e.g., Cummins v. EG & G Sealol, Inc.,
. The court of appeals stated that, "[t]he exception began as a narrow rule permitting employees to sue their employers when a statute expressly prohibited their discharge. The rule later expanded to include any discharge in violation of a statutory expression of public policy. The broadest formulation of the rule permits recovery even in thе absence of a
*352
specific statutory prohibition.”
Phipps,
. See, e.g., Tameny v. Atl. Richfield Co.,
. The court of appeals in
Phipps
also characterized a claim for wrongful discharge as a tort claim.
.
See supra
note 12;
see also Martin Marietta Corp. v. Lorenz,
. Rule 38.01 provides, in relevant part, that “[i]n actions for the recovery of money only * * * the issues оf fact shall be tried to a jury.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 38.01.
. Much the same as Minnesota’s approach of examining the nature and character of the controversy, the U.S. Supreme Court, when determining whether a claim is a legal claim with an attendant right to jury trial under the Seventh Amendment, looks at the nature of the claim and at the nature of the relief sought, and places greater emphasis on the latter.
See, e.g., Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry,
.
Cf. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore,