62 Wash. 65 | Wash. | 1911
The plaintiff, a carpenter by trade, thirty-three years of age and in good health, had his right hand crushed on July 31, 1908, so that it was necessary to amputate it on that date at a point about one inch above the wrist. At the time he received the injury, he was in the employ of the defendant and engaged in the work of driving piles. The trial of the case began on the 8th day of February, 1910, eighteen months after the injury was sustained. Between the date of the injury and the trial of the case, he had earned about $50.
The appellant contends that the court is powerless to grant a new trial in an action of this kind for the recovery of unliquidated damages, “unless the amount is so unreasonable and excessive or inadequate as to be indicative of passion, prejudice, partiality, or corruption of the jury.” This is merely a statement of the provisions of the statute, in a somewhat different phraseology. It will not be denied that the purpose of the action is to recover compensation for the loss the respondent has suffered as a result of the injury. We are aware that there is no fixed standard by which the damages can be determined in a case of this character. Despite the fact that the respondent’s damages could not be measured with exactness, it was the duty of the jury to compensate him for his loss. The verdict established the appellant’s liability.
The court instructed that, if the jury found for the respondent, they should consider his age, occupation, the nature
The trial court has the same discretion to set aside a verdict for inadequate damages as it has to set it aside for excessive damages. The one verdict stands upon no higher plane in law than the other. McDonald v. Walter, 40 N. Y. 551; Benton v. Collins, 125 N. C. 83, 34 S. E. 242, 47 L. R. A. 33; Chouquette v. Southern Elec. R. Co., 152 Mo. 257, 53
In the Collins case, it was said that: “The power to correct prejudiced and grossly unfair verdicts must be vested somewhere, and, in our judgment, it is best that such power be confided to the judges who preside over the trials.” In the Chouquette case, there was a verdict for the plaintiff and a new trial granted upon his motion. It was held that it is the peculiar and special dúty of trial courts to grant new trials when the verdict is arbitrary or manifestly wrong, or where it appears that the jury were swayed by passion and prejudice.
In Alton v. Chicago M. & St. P. R. Co., 107 Minn. 457, 120 N. W. 749, the jury gave the plaintiff a verdict for $3,450, for personal injuries sustained while in the discharge of his duties as a brakeman. His injuries were so serious that it was necessary to amputate his left leg. He also sustained such injuries to his right leg as to leave it weakened and not strong enough to support him. There were other minor injuries. The order granting a new trial was affirmed. In Mariani v. Dougherty, 46 Cal. 26, the plaintiff’s intestate was killed by a rock thrown by a blast which the defendant caused to be exploded. The plaintiff recovered a verdict for $200, and a new trial was granted upon his motion. In affirming the order, the court said: “A new trial may be granted where the damages are too small, as well as where they are too large.”
Kilmer v. Parrish, 144 Ill. App. 270, announces the doctrine that “the modern rule is that a new trial may be granted where the verdict is grossly inadequate, for the same reasons as those governing where the verdict is excessive. . . . A verdict for a grossly inadequate amount stands on no higher ground on legal principles than a verdict for an excessive or extravagant amount.” In that case there was a verdict for the plaintiff for one dollar, for personal injuries inflicted upon her through the defendant’s negligence. There
Anglin v. Columbus, 128 Ga. 469, 57 S. E. 780, was reversed because of the abuse of discretion of the trial court in denying the plaintiff a new trial when she had sustained a serious injury and the jury had awarded her $100. In Hill v. Union R. Co., 25 R. I. 565, 57 Atl. 374, the judgment was reversed and a new trial ordered. In that case the jury gave the plaintiff a verdict for $200 for personal injuries. The court said that a new trial would not be granted in such cases unless, “it is very clear that the jury have been influenced or controlled by other considerations, or have acted under the influence of a perverted judgment in fixing damages.” In Caldwell v. Vicksburg S. & P. R. Co., 41 La. Ann. 624, 6 South. 217, a verdict for the defendant for $1,000 where the injuries were much less serious than in the case at bar, was increased on appeal to $2,000.
The appellant has cited a great many cases, but in practically all of them a new trial was denied by the trial court. As we have said, a broad discretion is vested in the trial court to grant or refuse a new trial. Appellate courts are always reluctant to interfere where that discretion has been exercised, and will never do so unless it seems clear that the discretion has been abused. ,
We think that there was no abuse of discretion, and the judgment is affirmed.
Dunbar, C. J., Parker, Mount, and Fullerton, JJ., concur.