89 W. Va. 504 | W. Va. | 1921
On May 12, 1919, the circuit court, by a decree agreed to and signed by the attorneys representing all parties' to the cause, after reciting therein that the court had ascertained and decreed all liens and debts on the property of the Davy Pocahontas Coal Company, and disbursed on the prior liens as adjudged and decreed in prior decrees all the available funds in the hands of its special receivers except such as had been received by them since the last preceding term of the court, in accordance with the opinion and mandate of this court on a former appeal, and it still appearing that there were various creditors who had not been paid by the dis
And pursuant to said decree of sale, said special commissioners, having first qualified by giving bond as required, and' after advertising the sale as directed, proceeded to and did' sell said property upon the terms decreed, on said 2nd day of September, 1919, at which sale they reported to the court on September 9,. 1919, that the Marine and Commerce Corporation of America, a corporation of the state of Delaware,,
Upon the filing of the report of sale, on September 9, 1919, the defendant Davy Pocahontas Coal Company, by James Thomas, its solicitor, and Henry Rawie, a stockholder, tendered and filed three several exceptions in writing thereto, substantially alike, in substance and effect as follows:
First, that on the day of sale and before the sale was completed, the said company through its said solicitor tendered and offered to pay to said special commissioners a sum of money sufficient to cover and be equal to all arrears of interest upon said bonds with interest upon overdue installments of interest, and that said special commissioners would
Second, that the said Marine and Commerce Corporation of America and Walter .L. Taylor, president and director of said coal company, who had bought and bargained for certain of the securities, open accounts and indebtedness of said coal company, but not, as the exceptors verily believed, bought or secured all of the indebtedness, securities or common stock outstanding against said company, publicly represented themselves before the date set for the public sale of said property, namely, September 2, 1919, as having acquired all but a minute percentage of the stock, bonds, securities, open accounts, judgments and other indebtedness of said company, and further holding out to the public that said property through their efforts would be withdrawn from public sale or auction thereof, under the provisions of said .Section 2, Article 14; and the exceptors believed and state the fact to be that such statements, rumors and affirmations nullified the effect of the notice of sale of said property as
Third, that the entire property of the said Davy Pocahontas Coal Company, as the decree directed, was not included in the advertisement of the public sale thereof, nor the decree therein properly set forth, in that there was included therein only the one-half undivided interest in all that certain real estate which was conveyed to said company by Killey S. French and others, by deed of February 5, 1912, when in fact the said company was the owner in fee of the whole estate in said property; and that the said property was sold for a grossly inadequate price.
We find in the record no substantial bases for either of these three exceptions. As to the first there is not a particle of evidence to show any tender or offer of the Davy Pocahontas Coal Company, or of any one for it, to the said special commissioners on the day of sale, to comply with the provisions of said Section 2 of Article 14 of said mortgage. The exceptors stand wholly on the unsupported statements of their exceptions. Besides, the special commissioners were not authorized to entertain or accept any such offer. No such tender was made to the court prior to the sale, nor af-terwards, on the report of the sale, nor before confirmation of the sale, a sale in fact made in open court following said report of sale and an upset bid made after the sale conducted by said special commissioners, at which sale so conducted by the court, the exceptors, if they were acting in good faith, were given the opportunity to make, their proposition; but they did nothing of the kind, so far as the record shows, and thereby waived their rights, if any they had, at the time, to comply with the provision of said mortgage.
But at the time of the alleged offer to redeem, the court, at the suit of others than the mortgage creditors, had decreed
The second exception was also without foundation in 'fact to support it. It stood upon the unsupported and unverified statement in the exception.- Besides, whatever may have been the fact as to'the efforts of the purchaser at the sale by the special commissioners to stifle bidding, that sale was not confirmed, but disregarded in the subsequent sale by the judge in open court, on receipt of an upset bid, and the final sale of the property by the court to the same purchaser at an advance of $40,000.00 over its bid at the first sale, or $440,-000.00, to which sale no exceptions were filed by any of the parties, and the same was confirmed. That the court had the power and jurisdiction to make sale of the property without'intervention of special commissioners, is well settled in this state. Core v. Strickler, 24 W. Va. 689, 696 ;Castleman’s Adm’r v. Cattleman, 67 W. Va. 407, 412-413; Klapneck & White v. Kelty, 50 W. Va. 331, 334-335; Kable v. Mitchell, 9 W. Va. 492; Estill v. McClintic, 11 W. Va. 399.
Nor do we see any merit in the third exception, of default in the advertisement of 'the one-half interest instead of the
For the foregoing reasons we will affirm the decree.
Affirmed.