MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This case is an appeal of the bankruptcy court’s Order of October 12, 2000, as amended on November 21, 2000, which denied a motion by Plaintiffs below and Appellants herein to remand their wage payment and collection action to the Circuit Court of Raleigh County, West Virginia. In their brief, Appellants assert the bankruptcy court erred because it did not have jurisdiction over their state action and the removal petition was procedurally and substantively infirm. American Metals & Coal International, Inc. (American), AMCI Resources, Inc. (AMCI), and West-moreland Coal Company (Westmoreland), Pocahontas Land Corporation (Pocahontas), and Thomas H. Fluharty, Appellees herein, have responded to Appellants’ appeal and assert the bankruptcy court’s decision should be affirmed because the judge properly found Appellants’ case was a “core” proceeding within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 157, there were no dеfects in the removal procedure, and the principles of abstention and equitable remand are unwarranted under the circumstances.
1
The Court disposes with oral argument because the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the briefs and in the record, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument.
See
Fed.R.Bankr.P. 8012.
2
For the reasons set forth below, the Court
I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In an appeal from a bankruptcy court, a district court may not set aside the bankruptcy judge’s findings of fact unless those findings are clearly erroneous. Fed. R.Bankr.P. 8013;
3
In re Bryson Prop., XVIII,
II.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
According to Appellees, Mid-Atlantic Resources Corp. (Debtor) purchased certain real and personal property in 1997 from the bankruptcy trustee of Adventure Resources, Inc. Debtor’s purchases included a coal preparation plant, mining equipment, conveyor systems, and leases of certain reserves collectively referred to as the “East Gulf Operations.” Upon acquiring these assets, Debtor subcontracted with Rhino Mining, Inc. (Rhino), which, in turn, subcontracted with Island Fork Construction, Ltd. (Island Fork), to operate the “Josephine” and “Tommy Creek” mines at the East Golf Operations. Debtor also subcontracted with Mate Creek Loading, Inc. (Mate Creek) to operate a preparation plant and AMCI Coal Sales, Inc. (ACS) to broker Debtor’s coal.
On August 12, 1999, Debtor filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. According to the bankruptcy court, when Debtor filed its bankruptcy petition, it had no working capital and no means “to obtain unsecured lines of credit from any source.”
Amended Order Denying Motion to Remand,
at 3 (November 21, 2000) (citation in footnote omitted). Therefore, one of the first things done in that case was to submit a proposal for post-petition financing. Id. As part of financing scheme, ACS agreed to give Debtor a line of credit and advance it money for payment of sums due to Rhino and Mate Creek, which money primarily was used to pay wages. In exchange, ACS was given,
inter alia,
a first lien on receivables, equipment, and inventory.
Id.
Mining and the related activities continued until on or about January 31, 2000, when Debtor, Rhino, Mate Creek, and Island Fork ceased all operations. Debtor’s bankruptcy case was then сonverted into a proceeding under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code and Thomas Fluharty was appointed as the Interim Trustee.
On February 24, 2000, Appellants, who were employees of Rhino, Mate Creek, and Island Fork filed a mechanic’s lien in the amount of $737,520.16 for unpaid wages, benefits, and payroll withholdings for union dues. According to Appellants, these three Defendants operated an integrated coal mining and processing operation in Raleigh County, West Virginia, as a joint venture with and/or contractors for American and AMCI. This operation ceased on or about January 31, 2000, when Rhino, Mate Creek, and Island Fork stopped doing business and laid-off its employees.
The bankruptcy court found that the lien Appellants filed attached the real and personal property of Rhino, Mate Creek, Island Fork, American, AMCI, Pocahontas, Piney Land Company (Piney), Westmore-land, Timothy McCoy, Richard K. Bailey, Larry McKinney, Robert Massey, and Amon Mahon (Defendants). Id. at 5. 4 In addition to this general lien on the real and personal property of Defendants, the bankruptcy court found that Appellants also claimed a lien on all Defendants’ interests in and to the two mines operated by Rhino and Island Fork for the Debtor and the East Golf preparation plant operated by Mate Creek for the Debtor. The lien extended to all Defendants’ interests in fee, mineral, leasehold, or contract. Id. (citing Notice of Mechanic’s Lien, at 7). The mechanic’s lien does not, however, mention Debtor.
On March 3, 2000, Appellants filed suit against Defendants in the Circuit Court of Raleigh County, West Virginia, seeking to obtain $971,170.91 in alleged unpaid wages, fringe benefits, medical benefits, payroll deductions for union dues, and liquidated damages pursuant to common law and the West Virginia Wage Payment and Collection Act, West Virginia Code § 21-5-1 et seq. In the action, Appellants also sought to enforce their mechanic’s lien and sought an injunction to prohibit the removal, sale, or disposition of any property or other assets from the preparation plant and mine sites. Appellants further requested a jury trial.
On April 13, 2000, American, AMCI, and Westmoreland (the Removing Defendants) filed a Notice of Removal of Appellants’ action from state court to the bankruptcy court. In their Notice, the Removing Defendants allege original jurisdiction over Appellants’ action exists by virtue of one or more claims arising under the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 101
et seq.,
and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1101
et
On May 15, 2000, Appellants filed a motion to remand the case to the Circuit Court of Raleigh County. After the Removing Defendants filed a response and Appellants filed their reply, the bankruptcy court held an expedited hearing on June 28, 2000. 6 Three days prior to the hearing, on June 20, 2000, Thomas H. Fluharty, the Chapter 7 Trustee for Debtor, filed a motion to intervene. 7 Appellants objected to the Trustee’s motion, but on August 18, 2000, the bankruptcy court entered an Order conditionally granting the Trustee’s motion, giving the Trustee thirty days to file an Answer or other pleading as necessary to protect the estate’s claim.
On October 12, 2000, the bankruptcy court entered an Order denying Appellants’ motion to remand. Specifically, the bankruptcy court found the procedure used for removal was sufficient, the requirements for commencing an adversary proceeding under Rule 7003 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure were satisfied, and the adversary proceeding fell within the meaning of a “core proceeding.” This Order was amended on November 21, 2000, to correct some of the factual findings and it also gave Pocahontas and the other Removing Defendants ten days from entry of the Amended Order to file a statement in accordance with Rule 9027(e)(3) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. 8 Appellants now appeal.
III.
DISCUSSION
A.
Removal
Appellants’ first argument is that the bankruptcy court erred in finding the removal of their claim from the circuit court was proper. Specifically, Appellants assert that the removal is procedurally infirm because all Defendants did not join in the removal and because neither Defendants nor the Trustee filed a statement of jurisdiction as required by the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. The Court will consider these arguments one at a time.
Although Appellants are correct that ordinarily all defendants must join in or register their consent to removal, this case involves bankruptcy and, as such, the bankruptcy removal statute found in 28 U.S.C. § 1452 controls.
11
As noted by the Removing Defendants and as found by the bankruptcy court, the Fourth Circuit has held that under the bankruptcy removal statute “any one pаrty has the right to remove the state court action without the consent of the other parties.”
Creasy v. Coleman Furniture Corp.,
In
Creasy,
the trustee of a Chapter 7 liquidation action filed an adversary proceeding in bankruptcy court to determine what rights existed to monies held in the debtor’s employee pension fund.
Id.
at 657. The bankruptcy trustee also sought to recover any excess monies as part of the debtor’s estate.
Id.
However, an employee covered by the fund filed a declaratory judgment action in state court to determine her rights in the pension fund.
Id.
Appellants argue this case is distinguishable from
Creasy
because in that case the state court action was identical to the issue being litigated in the bankruptcy court and it would have had a direct impact on the assets of the bankruptcy estate. To the contrary, Appellants assert the case they filed in state court will not likely be litigated in the bankruptcy court. Assuming for the moment that Appellants’ assertion about its state court action is correct, the Court finds this distinction irrelevant as to whether § 1452(a) requires all defendants to join in the removal of the action. Although Appellants’ argument may touch on other aspects about the appropriateness of removal, as will be discussed
infra,
it does not negate the fact that consent of all the parties is not needed under § 1452(a) for removal of a case to bankruptcy court. Therefore, the Court rejects Appellants’ argument that the removal of this case was procedurally infirm because not all Defendants joined in or consented to the removal.
12
See also Plowman v. Bedford Fin. Corp.,
Rules 7008(a) and 7012(b) were amended in 1987 to requirе parties to allege in pleadings whether a proceeding is core or non-core and, if non-core, whether the parties consent to the entry of final orders or judgment by the bankruptcy judge. Subdivision (a)(1) is amended and subdivision (f)(3) [now (e)(3)] is added to require parties to a removed claim or cause of action to make the same allegations. The party filing the notice of removal must include the allegation in the notice and the other parties who have filed pleadings must respond to the allegation in a separate statement filed within 10 days after removal. However, if a party to the removed claim or cause of action has not filed a pleading prior to removal, there is no need to file a separate statement under subdivision (f)(3) because the allegation must be included in the responsive pleading filed pursuant to Rule 7012(b).
Fed.R.Bankr.P. 9027 advisory committee’s note to the 1991 amendment.
In this case, the bankruptcy court recognized that not all the parties had complied with the bankruptcy rules, stating:
A review of the removal notice indicates that AMCI Resources, Inc., American and Westmoreland made an assertion as to the nature of the proceeding. Though untimely, Pocahontas filed a response to the removal notice on June 30, 2000. Richard K. Bailey and Piney have filed responsive pleadings with this Court. Yet, the pleadings do not include the assertion required by Rule 7012(b). Further, Bailey and Piney did not take the alternative measure of filing a responsive statement as required by 9027(e). The remaining defendants have taken no action.
B.
Core Versus Non-Core Proceedings
The next issue presented to the bankruptcy court was whether it had jurisdiction to hear the action and enter a final order and judgment. As mentioned in the previous section, bankruptcy judges may enter final orders or judgments only in actions involving core proceedings or upon consent of the parties in non-core proceedings. Otherwise, final orders and judgment will be entered by the district court. 28 U.S.C. 157(b)(1), (c)(1) & (2). 19 Thus, it falls upon the bankruptcy court to make an initial determination as to whether an action is a core or non-core proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(3). 20
Appellants assert, however, the bankruptcy court erred in finding their action fell within the definition of a core proceeding as contained in § 157(b)(2)(E) because their action and the mechanic’s lien was filed only against the non-bankrupt Defendants and in no way impacts the bankruptcy estate. Appellants specifically point to the introductory paragraph оf the lien, which provides, in part:
You are hereby notified that the undersigned, on behalf of the unpaid employees of Mate Creek Loading, Inc, Rhino Mining, Inc. and Island Fork Construction, LTD, (hereinafter referred to as the “Employees”) claim a mechanic’s hen for unpaid wages and benefits due them on all real estate and personal property of MATE CREEE LOADING, INC., RHINO MINING, INC., ISLAND FORE CONSTRUCTION, LTD, AMERICAN METALS & COAL INTERNATIONAL, INC., AMCI RESOURCES, INC., (collectively “AMCI”), POCAHONTAS LAND CORPORATION, PINEY LAND COMPANY, WESTMORELAND COAL COMPANY, TIMOTHY MCCOY, RICHARD E. BAILEY, LARRY MCEINNEY, ROBERT MASSEY AND AMON MAHON (hereinafter referred to as the “Corporations”).
Notice of Mechanic’s Lien, dated February 24, 2000. Appellants argue it is clear from this paragraph and the remainder of the hen document that they have not asserted any direct or indirect claim against Debtor. In fact, Appellants correctly point out that Debtor is never even mentioned in the hen. Nevertheless, in reviewing the hen, the Court agrees with the bankruptcy court that, in substance, Appellants are asserting a claim against Debtor’s estate. Amended Order Denying Motion to Remand, at 11-12.
In the hen document, Appellants specifically make a claim agаinst “the Corporations in and to the mining operations in Raleigh County known as the Josephine
extends to all interest of the Corporations set forth above, whether fee, minerals, leasehold, or contract, and whether legal or equitable, and in particular includes, but is not limited to, the following:
(1) All underground mine fixtures and improvements including belt, belt structure, water, power, and communication lines relating to all the Corporations’ current operations generally known as the Joseрhine and Tommy Creek mines underground belt mines;
(2) Underground mining equipment consisting of the equipment set forth in the inventory list attached ...
(3) The East Gulf Preparation Plant, together with all surface equipment associated with such plant and other outside facilities.
(4) All above ground coal conveying structures, loading facilities and electrical substations, power lines, and roadways and other improvements utilized in the operation of the Josephine and Tommy Creek mines;
(5) All existing raw coal and clean coal stockpiles, together with any receivables due upon such stockpiles; and
(6) The mining permits associated with operation of the foregoing mines, ... together with all bond deposits and other intangible rights necessary for the operation of the mines and related facilities.
Id. at 7-8. Although Debtor is never mentioned in the lien document, it is clear that Appellants are asserting a lien against Debtors’ real and personal propеrty — as Debtor owns the coal preparation plant, mining equipment, conveyor systems, and leases of certain reserves collectively referred to as the East Gulf Operations, which includes the Josephine and Tommy Creek mines. Moreover, as noted by the bankruptcy court, even if Appellants are merely attempting to attach any interest the defendants named in the mechanic’s lien have in the Debtor’s estate, the validity, extent, and priority of the defendants’ liens in the estate must be determined by the bankruptcy court in order for the mechanic’s lien to be enforced. Amended Order Denying Motion to Remand, at 11.
In addition to finding the mechanic’s lien fell within the parameters of § 157(b)(2)(E), the bankruptcy court also found the lien is a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b), as interpreted by
Bergstrom v. Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust (In re A.H. Robins Co.),
In applying these principles to the action before it, the bankruptcy court recognized that, in form, Appellants’ mechanic’s lien did not name Debtor and such a hen could normally exist outside of a bankruptcy case. Amended Order Denying Motion to Remand, at 12. However, as explained earlier, the lien substantively asserts a claim against the estate for unpaid wages and benefits. Id. In addition, the court noted that there was never any objection to the post-petition financing arrangement in which ACS would receive, inter alia, a first lien on Debtors’ receivables, equipment, and inventory, in exchange for ACS giving Debtor a line of crеdit and a cash advance to pay Rhino and Mate Creek, so they, in turn, could pay their employees’ wages. Id. at 12-13. By filing the lien, however, the court found Appellants were attempting to obtain priority status to those assets. Therefore, the court determined the proceeding “necessarily involves issues that are not only related to the Debtor’s bankruptcy case, but which arose from within the case during the chapter 11 reorganization process.” Id. at 13. Moreover, the court stated “[h]ad post petition financing not been provided, which contributed substantially to the continued operation of the mines through the Autumn and early Winter of 1999, the claims of ... [Appellants’] for unpaid wages earned in the last two to three weeks of January 2000 would not likely exist.” Id. (footnote omitted).
Upon review of the facts of this case and the lien, this Court agrees with the bankruptcy court’s conclusion. It is clear that Appellants’ claim exists by virtue of the post-petition financial arrangement which kept them employed from on or about September of 1999 through January of 2000. Without this arrangement, Appellants would have no claim for unpaid wages and benefits in January 2000. Thus, the Court finds Appellants’ claim necessarily arose in a case under title 11, as described in § 1334(b), and is a core proceeding.
Appellants also argue that this action does not fall within the scope of § 1334(b) because it only involves state-law claims. In support of their position, Appellants cite
New Horizon of N.Y. LLC v. Jacobs,
As Appellants concede,
Interstate Petroleum Corp.
does not involve bankruptcy. Instead, the plaintiffs filеd suit in federal court, alleging federal question subject matter jurisdiction existed under the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act. 249 F.Sd at 218. The Fourth Circuit found, however, that the issue presented in the case was purely a contract dispute arising under state law and that neither party, nor the district court, invoked any federal statutes. Therefore, the Fourth Circuit found the district court did not have jurisdiction because there was no federal question to resolve.
Id.
at 221-22. To the contrary, although Appellants contend the present case involves only state-law issues, the Court finds, as previously mentioned, that this case arose in a case under title 11, Thus, the holding in
Interstate Petroleum Corp.
does not apply to this case. Moreover, merely because state-law issues arise in a case “does not by itself determine that it is non-core, rather than core.... It is the nature of the proceeding-its relation to the basic function of the bankruptcy court-not the state or fedеral basis for the claim, that makes the difference here.”
Arnold Print Works, Inc. v. Apkin (In re Arnold Print Works, Inc.),
C.
Abstention and Equitable Remand
Appellants next argue that the bankruptcy court erred by failing to abstain under the doctrines of mandatory and discretionary abstention and by failing to remand the action on equitable grounds. As both the bankruptcy court and this Court have determined that this case is a core proceeding because it arose in a case under title 11, this Court further agrees with the bankruptcy court that the mandatory abstention statute found in 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2) is inapplicable here. 24
With respect to discretionary abstention, the Court finds that the bankruptcy court did not specifically address the issue in its
Amended Order.
25
Never
(I) the court’s duty to resolve matters properly before it; (2) the predominance of state law issues and non-debtor parties; (3) the economical use of judicial resources; (4) the effect of remand on the administration of the bankruptcy estate; (5) the relatedness or remoteness of the action to the bankruptcy case; (6) whether the case involves questions of state law better addressed by the state court; (7) comity considerations; (8) any prejudice to the involuntarily removed parties; (9) forum non conveniens; (10) the possibility of inconsistent results; (II) any expertise of the court where the action originated; and (12) the existence of a right to a jury trial.
Blanton v. IMN Fin. Corp.,
In their brief, Appellants’ argue discretionary abstention should be applied because the link between the state and bankruрtcy case is too tenuous. For the reasons stated above, the Court rejects this argument. Appellants’ further argue that there are essentially no assets left in the bankruptcy case because the Trustee already has disbursed, or agreed to disburse, 95% of the proceeds of the sale of Debtor’s assets to “AMCI.” 26 Appellants’ Brief, at 4 & 20. Thus, Appellants assert there would be little to no effect on the bankruptcy estate if their action is tried in state court. The Court finds, however, that this factor only emphasizes the importance of the bankruptcy court resolving the hen issue because the priority given to that lien will have a direct impact on the ability of the Trustee to sell Debtor’s assets. 27
Finally, Appellants makes a cursory comment that having the case in bankruptcy court deprives them of their Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. In support of that position Appellants cite
Bright v. Southern Technical College, Inc. (In re Southern Technical Collеge, Inc.),
If the right to a jury trial applies in a proceeding that may be heard under this section by a bankruptcy judge, the bankruptcy judge may conduct the jury trial if specially designated to exercise such jurisdiction by the district court and with the express consent of all the parties.
28 U.S.C. § 157(e). The Court recognizes that this section does not “create any right of jury trial; it simply authorizes a bankruptcy judge to conduct a jury trial ‘[i]f the right to jury trial applies,’ and the other conditions of the statute are met.... [S]ueh a right exists if the action being tried is one in which, under the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, a right to jury trial would exist in a nonbankruptcy forum.”
In re Tamojira, Inc.,
No. 94-34438-DOT,
Having found no compelling reason why discretionary abstention should be applied, the Court rejects Appellants’ argument in this regard.
30
Similar
IV.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the Court FINDS: (1) the failure of some Defendants to file an appropriate statement or responsive pleading is not a fatal jurisdictional defect; (2) Appellants’ claim is a core proceeding because it arose in a case under title 11, as described in § 1334(b); and (3) application of abstention and equitable remand principles are not warranted. Therefore, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the bankruptcy court and REMANDS this action to the bankruptcy court for further proceedings consistent with this Memorandum Opinion and Order.
The Court DIRECTS the Clerk to send a certified copy of this Order to Judge Pearson, counsel of record and any unrepresented parties and to publish it on the Court’s website.
Notes
. Piney Land Company and Richard K. Bailey joined in the Appellees’ brief.
. Rule 8012 provides, in part: “Oral argument shall be allowed in all cases unless the district judge ... determine!» after examination of the briefs and record, or appendix to the brief, that oral argument is not needed.” Fed.R.Bankr.P. 8012.
. Rule 8013 provides:
On an appeal the district court ... may affirm, modify, or reverse a bankruptcy judge's judgment, order, or decree or remand with instructions for further proceedings. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the bankruptcy court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.
Fed.R.Bankr.P. 8013.
. In footnote 13 of the Amended Order, the bankruptcy court noted that Appellants allege Pocahontas, Piney, and Westmoreland are the landowners of the property upon which they worked and American, or its subsidiary AMCI, was the prime contractor of the East Golf Operations or was in a joint venture with one or more of their employers. The individually named Defendants are the corporate officers of Appellants' direct employers. Id. at 5 n. 12 (citations omitted).
. In ruling on Appellants’ motion to remand, the bankruptcy court did not reach the ERISA issue.
. On July 19, 2000, Pocahontas filed a brief in which it asserted it filed a “Response to Notice of Removal’’ on June 30, 2000.
. The Trustee attended the hearing held on June 23, 2000.
. Rule 9027(e)(3) provides:
Any party who has filed a pleading in connection with the removed claim or cause of action, other than thе party filing the notice of removal, shall file a statement admitting or denying any allegation in the notice of removal that upon removal of the claim or cause of action the proceeding is core or non-core. If the statement alleges that the proceeding is non-core, it shall state that the party does or does not consent to entry of final orders or judgment by the bankruptcy judge. A statement required by this paragraph shall be signed pursuant to Rule 9011 and shall be filed not later than 10 days after the filing of the notice of removal. Any party who files a statement pursuant to this paragraph shall mail a copy to every other party to the removed claim or cause of action.
.Section 1446(b) provides:
The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed 'within thirty days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which such action or proceeding is based, or within thirty days after the service of summons upon the defendant if such initial pleading has then been filed in court and is not required to be served on the defendant, whichever period is shorter.
If the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a notice of removal may be filed within thirty days after receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable, except that a case may not be removed on the basis of jurisdiction conferred by section 1332 of this title more than 1 year after commencement of the action.
28 U.S.C. 1446(b).
.
See also Wilkins v. Correctional Med. Sys.,
. Section 1452(a) provides, in part: A party may remove any claim or cause of action in a civil action ... to the district court for the district where such civil action is pending, if such district court has jurisdiction of such claim or cause of action under section 1334 of this title. 28 U.S.C. § 1452(a).
. The Court also notes that Appellants incorrectly allege that the bankruptcy trustee removed the action in
Creasy.
Instead, it was one of the pension fund trustees who removed the action, not the bankruptcy trustee.
See Creasy,
. The Court further rejects Appellants' argument that Creasy may no longer be good law in light of the 1987 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code. The Court has reviewed those amendments, together with the 1991 amendments, as they relate to Rules 7012(b) and 9027. As will be discussed infra, jurisdiction is not dependent upon those amendments which require the parties to file statements declaring, inter alia, whether the proceeding is core or non-core. Thus, Creasy is not superseded.
Although this Court is bound by the Fourth Circuit's ruling on this issue, the Court recognizes that there are some jurisdictions which have applied the unanimity rule in bankruptcy cases. For instance, in
Ross v. Thousand Adventures of Iowa, Inc.,
. See note 8, supra.
. Rule 7012(b) provides:
(b) Applicability of Rule 12(b)-(h) F.R.Civ.P. Rule 12(b) — (h.) F.R.Civ.P. applies in adversary proceedings. A responsive pleading shall admit or deny an allegation that the proceeding is core or non-core. If the response is that the proceeding is non-core, it shall include a statement that the party does or does not consent to entry of final orders or judgment by the bankruptcy judge. In non-core proceedings final orders and judgments shall not be entered on the bankruptcy judge’s order except with the express consent of the parties.
Fed.R.Bankr.P. 7012(b).
. Identical language is contained in the bankruptcy court's Order Denying Motion to Remand, at 9 (October 12, 2000).
. Section 157(c) provides:
(c)(1) A bankruptcy judge may hear a proceeding that is not a core proceeding but that is otherwise related to a case under title 11. In such proceeding, the bankruptcy judge shall submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court, and any final ordеr or judgment shall be entered by the district judge after considering the bankruptcy judge's proposed findings and conclusions and after reviewing de novo those matters to which any party has timely and specifically objected.
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1) of this subsection, the district court, with the consent of all the parties to the proceeding, may refer a proceeding related to a case under title 11 to a bankruptcy judge to hear and determine and to enter appropriate orders and judgments, subject to review under section 158 of this title.
28 U.S.C. § 157(c).
. Although Appellants complain that these procedural defects remain even today, these defects are not appropriate grounds for remand. As indicated by the bankruptcy court, they will, however, negatively impact the expeditious resolution of claims. Amended Order Denying Motion to Remand, at 9.
. Sections 157(b)(1) provides:
(b)(1) Bankruptcy judges may hear and determine all cases under title 11 and all core proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in a case under title 11, referred under subsection (a) of this section, and may enter appropriate orders and judgments, subject to review under section 158 of this title.
28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1). For § 157(c)(1) & (2), see note 17.
. Section 157(b)(3) provides:
The bankruptcy judge shall determine, on the judge’s own motion or on timely motion of a party, whether a proceeding is a core proceeding under this subsection or is aproceeding that is otherwise related to a case under title 11. A determination that a proceeding is not a core proceeding shall not be made solely on the basis that its resolution may be affected by State law.
28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(3).
. Section 157(b)(2) contains a nonexclusive list of fifteen statutorily created categories of core proceedings.
. Section 1334(b) provides, in full:
Notwithstanding any Act of Congress that confers exclusive jurisdiction on a court or courts other than the district courts, the district courts shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 11, оr arising in or related to cases under title 11.
. Section 1334(b) provides for three categories of civil proceedings in which district courts have original but not exclusive jurisdiction. Those proceedings are ones that arise under, arise in, or are related to cases under title 11. 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (providing, in part, "the district courts shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings
. Section 1334(c)(2) provides:
Upon timely motion of a party in a proceeding based upon a State law claim or State law cause of action, related to a case under title 11 but not arising under title 11 or arising in a case under title 11, with respect to which an action could not have been commenced in a court of the United States absent jurisdiction under this section, the district court shall abstain from hearing such proceeding if an action is commenced, and can be timely adjudicated, in a State forum of appropriate jurisdiction.
28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2) (emphasis added).
. In their brief, Appellees assert the bankruptcy court's decision regarding discretionary abstention should be reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. Although the Court agrees such a standard applies when a bankruptcy court rules on a discretionary abstention issue, there was no mention of discretionary abstention in the bankruptcy court’s Amended Order. Thus, there is no
. In its brief, Appellants refer to American Metals & Coal International, Inc. and AMCI Resources, Inc. collectively as AMCI.
. If there are no assets left is be disbursed, Appellants may ask the bankruptcy court to reconsider abstention and remand to the state court.
. "Once in the bankruptcy system, the entitlement of the parties in a removed action to a jury trial would be determined in the same fashion as if the action had been commenced in the bankruptcy court.” 1 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 3.08[4],
. For the procedures governing withdrawals of reference, see 28 U.S.C. § 157(d), Rule 5011 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy, and Rule 1.01 of the Local Civil Rules Relating to Bankruptcy Referrals аnd Appeals (General Order of Relief).
.Although not briefed by tire parties, the Court recognizes that there is some disagreement about whether it is even possible to abstain in a removal situation because there is no action pending in state court without a
. Section 1452(b), provides, in part: “The court to which such claim or cause of action is removed may remand such claim or cause of action on any equitable ground.” 28 U.S.C. § 1452(b). Although virtually identical factors are used in determining whether discretionary abstention and equitable remand should be applied, the Court recognizes that the concept of equitable remand is broader than abstention.
See Ernst & Young, LLP v. Devan (In re Merry-Go-Round Enterprises, Inc.),