ABIGAIL GINSBERG, AN INFANT, BY HER MOTHER TAMAR GINSBERG, AS GUARDIAN AD LITEM; TAMAR GINSBERG, INDIVIDUALLY; AND ARI GINSBERG, INDIVIDUALLY v. QUEST DIAGNOSTICS, INCORPORATED, ET AL.
Supreme Court of New Jersey
October 26, 2016
147 A.3d 434
It is ORDERED that the decision of the Disciplinary Review Board in DRB 15-411 is hereby dismissed as moot, and the Order to Show Cause issued in this matter is hereby discharged.
147 A.3d 434
ABIGAIL GINSBERG, AN INFANT, BY HER MOTHER TAMAR GINSBERG, AS GUARDIAN AD LITEM; TAMAR GINSBERG, INDIVIDUALLY; AND ARI GINSBERG, INDIVIDUALLY, PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS AND CROSS-APPELLANTS, v. QUEST DIAGNOSTICS, INCORPORATED, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT, AND ANDREW RUBENSTEIN, M.D.; HACKENSACK UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER; HACKENSACK UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER DEPARTMENT OF PEDIATRICS GENETICS SERVICE; AND JUDITH DURCAN, M.S., DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS AND CROSS-RESPONDENTS, AND QUEST DIAGNOSTICS, INCORPORATED, THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFF, v. THE MOUNT SINAI MEDICAL CENTER, INC., THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT. ABIGAIL GINSBERG, AN INFANT, BY HER MOTHER TAMAR GINSBERG, AS GUARDIAN AD LITEM; TAMAR GINSBERG, INDIVIDUALLY; AND ARI GINSBERG, INDIVIDUALLY, PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS AND CROSS-APPELLANTS, v. QUEST DIAGNOSTICS, INCORPORATED, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT, AND ANDREW RUBENSTEIN, M.D. HACKENSACK UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER; HACKENSACK UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER DEPARTMENT OF PEDIATRICS GENETICS SERVICE; AND JUDITH DURCAN, M.S., DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS AND CROSS-RESPONDENTS, AND QUEST DIAGNOSTICS, INCORPORATED, THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFF, v. THE MOUNT SINAI MEDICAL CENTER, INC., THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT. ABIGAIL GINSBERG, AN INFANT, BY HER MOTHER TAMAR GINSBERG, AS GUARDIAN AD LITEM; TAMAR GINSBERG, INDIVIDUALLY; AND ARI GINSBERG, INDIVIDUALLY, PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS AND CROSS-APPELLANTS, v. QUEST DIAGNOSTICS, INCORPORATED, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT, AND HACKENSACK UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER; HACKENSACK UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER DEPARTMENT OF PEDIATRICS GENETICS SERVICE; AND JUDITH DURCAN, M.S.; AND ANDREW RUBENSTEIN, M.D., DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS AND CROSS-RESPONDENTS, AND QUEST DIAGNOSTICS, INCORPORATED, THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFF, v. THE MOUNT SINAI MEDICAL CENTER, INC., THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT. ABIGAIL GINSBERG, AN INFANT, BY HER MOTHER TAMAR GINSBERG, AS GUARDIAN AD LITEM; TAMAR GINSBERG, INDIVIDUALLY; AND ARI GINSBERG, INDIVIDUALLY, PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS AND CROSS-APPELLANTS, v. QUEST DIAGNOSTICS, INCORPORATED, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT, AND ANDREW RUBENSTEIN, M.D.; HACKENSACK UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER; HACKENSACK UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER DEPARTMENT OF PEDIATRICS GENETICS SERVICE; AND JUDITH DURCAN, M.S., DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS AND CROSS APPELLANTS, AND QUEST DIAGNOSTICS, INCORPORATED, THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFF, v. THE MOUNT SINAI MEDICAL CENTER, INC., THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.
Argued September 13, 2016—Decided October 26, 2016
Michael R. Ricciardulli argued the cause for appellant and cross-respondent Andrew Rubenstein, M.D. (Ruprecht Hart Weeks & Ricciardulli, attorneys; Mr. Ricciardulli and Daniel B. Devinney, on the brief).
Victoria E. Phillips argued the cause for respondents and cross-appellants Abigail Ginsberg, Tamar Ginsberg, and Ari Ginsberg (Phillips & Paolicelli, attorneys; Ms. Phillips and Daniel J. Woodard, on the briefs).
Thomas J. Cafferty argued the cause for respondent Quest Diagnostics, Incorporated (Gibbons, attorneys; Mr. Cafferty, Mark S. Sidoti, Nomi I. Lowy, and Lauren James-Weir, of counsel and on the briefs).
Benjamin H. Haftel argued the cause for respondent The Mount Sinai Medical Center, Inc. (Vaslas Lepowsky Hauss & Danke, attorneys).
PER CURIAM
When a conflict-of-law question arises in the setting of a personal injury case, New Jersey courts have used principles set forth in the
Finally, the court determines whether the presumption in favor of the law of the place of injury has been overcome by virtue of a competing state‘s “more significant relationship to the parties and issues.” Camp Jaycee, supra, 197 N.J. at 143, 962 A.2d 453. In assessing the relationship between the other state and the parties and issues, the court considers a series of “contacts“: (1) “the place where the injury occurred“; (2) “the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred“; (3) “the domicil[e], residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties“; and (4) “the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.”
In its determination of whether a competing state bears a more significant relationship to the issues and parties, the court also relies on factors identified in
II.
This interlocutory appeal raises a question not addressed in our prior choice-of-law jurisprudence: whether a court should apply the Restatement‘s principles uniformly to all defendants in a given case, or undertake a defendant-by-defendant choice-of-law analysis when the defendants are domiciled in different states.
The appeal arises from the trial court‘s application of the Restatement‘s choice-of-law rules to the cause of action asserted by plaintiffs Tamar Ginsberg and Ari Ginsberg against New York and New Jersey individuals and entities named as defendants in this matter. Plaintiffs’ claims arose from the birth, illness, and death of their daughter, Abigail Ginsberg. When she was seven months old, Abigail was diagnosed with Tay-Sachs disease, a genetically inherited, incurable neurological disorder. Tragically, at the age of three, Abigail died of Tay-Sachs disease.
Plaintiffs, who are now New Jersey residents, lived in New York during Tamar‘s pregnancy and at the time of their daughter‘s birth. They sued a New York laboratory owned and operated by defendant Quest Diagnostics Incorporated (Quest), a New Jersey-based medical testing company. They alleged that Quest‘s New York laboratory negligently failed to provide correct blood test results to plaintiff Ari Ginsberg, who sought genetic testing prior to plaintiffs’ marriage to determine
Plaintiffs also sued several New Jersey-domiciled defendants. They alleged that defendant Dr. Andrew Rubenstein (Dr. Rubenstein), a licensed New Jersey physician, failed to review Ari Ginsberg‘s genetic testing results, and that he negligently advised and treated plaintiff Tamar Ginsberg in New Jersey. They also claimed that defendant Judith Durcan, M.S. (Durcan), a New Jersey genetic counselor; defendant Hackensack University Medical Center (HUMC), a New Jersey hospital; and defendant University Medical Center Department of Pediatrics Genetics Service (Genetics Service), a division of HUMC, negligently advised and treated plaintiff Tamar Ginsberg in New Jersey.1
Plaintiffs contended that by virtue of defendants’ negligence, they were deprived of critical information about Ari Ginsberg‘s status as a Tay-Sachs carrier. They alleged they were consequently denied the opportunity to seek prenatal testing for Tay-Sachs disease and to terminate Tamar Ginsberg‘s pregnancy. They asserted claims for wrongful birth, wrongful life, negligence, negligent hiring, and medical malpractice.
After filing initial pleadings, the parties alerted the trial court to a significant distinction between New York law and New Jersey law with respect to plaintiffs’ claims for wrongful birth. A wrongful birth claim, premised on a plaintiff‘s lost opportunity to terminate a pregnancy when it is anticipated that the child will suffer from congenital defects, is recognized in the laws of both states. See Canesi ex rel. Canesi v. Wilson, 158 N.J. 490, 501-03, 730 A.2d 805 (1999) (defining wrongful birth cause of action under New Jersey law); Schroeder ex rel. Schroeder v. Perkel, 87 N.J. 53, 66-68, 432 A.2d 834 (1981) (same); Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 413, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 386 N.E.2d 807, 813 (1978) (defining wrongful birth cause of action under New York law); Foote v. Albany Med. Ctr. Hosp., 16 N.Y.3d 211, 919 N.Y.S.2d 472, 944 N.E.2d 1111, 1113 (2011) (discussing limited remedies in wrongful birth actions under New York law).
However, the two states’ laws substantially differ with respect to the damages that a plaintiff may recover in a wrongful birth case. New Jersey recognizes damages for “the emotional injury of the parents” and “the special medical expenses attributable to raising a child with a congenital impairment” but not damages for “the birth defect or congenital impairment itself.” Canesi, supra, 158 N.J. at 502, 730 A.2d 805 (citing Schroeder, supra, 87 N.J. at 70, 432 A.2d 834; Berman ex rel. Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 429-30, 433-34, 404 A.2d 8 (1979)). New York, in contrast, limits damages in wrongful birth cases to “the pecuniary expense which [the parents] have borne, and must continue to bear, for the care and treatment of their infants” and New York specifically bars damages for “psychic or emotional harm” resulting from the birth of the child “in an impaired state.” Becker, supra, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 386 N.E.2d at 813; see also Alquijay ex rel. Alquijay v. St. Luke‘s-Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr., 63 N.Y.2d 978, 483 N.Y.S.2d 994, 473 N.E.2d 244, 245-46 (1984) (limiting damages to pecuniary expenses). That distinction between New Jersey and New York law gave rise to the choice-of-law issue at the heart of this case.
Before the trial court, Quest, Mount Sinai and the New Jersey defendants moved for a determination that New York law governs plaintiffs’ claims against them. After authorizing discovery on the choice-of-law dispute, the trial court denied defendants’ motion to apply New York law. Significantly, the trial court considered itself constrained to apply the law of a single state to all of the claims and defenses asserted in this case. Acknowledging the conflict between New Jersey and New York law as applied to this case, the court reasoned that, for purposes of conflict-of-law analysis, New Jersey was the place of injury and, accordingly, New Jersey law was presumed to govern this case. The trial court further found that based on the contacts set forth in
An Appellate Division panel granted defendants’ motions for leave to appeal and reversed the trial court‘s determination in a published opinion written by Judge Sabatino. Ginsberg ex rel. Ginsberg v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., 441 N.J.Super. 198, 117 A.3d 200 (App. Div. 2015). The panel concurred with the trial court that New Jersey and New York law diverged in material respects. Id. at 223-24. It concluded, however, that New York, not New Jersey, constituted the place of injury for purposes of
The Appellate Division panel then considered the contacts set forth in
Accordingly, the Appellate Division panel undertook separate choice-of-law analyses for the New Jersey and New York defendants. Weighing the contacts enumerated
We granted the New Jersey defendants’ motion for leave to appeal, challenging the application of New Jersey law to the claims against them, and plaintiffs’ cross-motion for leave to appeal, challenging the application of New York law to the claims against Quest and Mount Sinai. 223 N.J. 552, 127 A.3d 698 (2015); 223 N.J. 553, 127 A.3d 699 (2015); 224 N.J. 242, 130 A.3d 1245 (2016).
III.
We affirm the Appellate Division panel‘s determination, substantially for the reasons stated in Judge Sabatino‘s thoughtful and comprehensive opinion. The panel properly articulated the governing Restatement principles and applied those principles to the facts presented in the record. Ginsberg, supra, 441 N.J.Super. at 223-49, 117 A.3d 200.2 We add the following comments regard-
ing defendant-by-defendant choice-of-law determinations under New Jersey‘s Restatement approach to conflicts-of-law issues in civil cases.
We concur with the panel that, in the majority of cases, a defendant-by-defendant analysis furthers the Restatement principles and provides the most equitable method of resolving choice-of-law questions. Id. at 229-32; see also Camp Jaycee, supra, 197 N.J. at 143, 962 A.2d 453;
Second, When a court applies the factors set forth in Similarly, a state may have a strong interest in ensuring that the expectations of its citizens as to the law that governs them are met under Third, we have long recognized that it is appropriate to analyze choice-of-law questions issue-by-issue, even if that approach complicates the trial. Camp Jaycee, supra, 197 N.J. at 143, 962 A.2d 453; Erny, supra, 171 N.J. at 95-96, 792 A.2d 1208; Veazey v. Doremus, 103 N.J. 244, 248, 510 A.2d 1187 (1986). A defendant-specific choice-of-law analysis does not diverge from our traditional approach to conflicts of laws or fundamentally alter the trial court‘s task. In a case such as this, involving the law of only two states, a defendant-by-defendant approach is unlikely to prove impractical should the matter proceed to trial. By virtue of the distinct claims asserted against several individuals and entities, the trial court would be required to instruct the jury about several different claims even if no choice-of-law issue had arisen. The application of New York law to some aspects of the case, and New Jersey law to others, need not unduly complicate the jury‘s determination. Assisted by seasoned counsel, the trial court will be in a position to incorporate the relevant law into a charge that will guide the jury as it considers the elements of each claim against each defendant. We acknowledge that a defendant-by-defendant choice-of-law analysis is not feasible in every matter. In very complex cases with many defendants and multiple claims, a defendant-specific choice-of-law analysis may generate a jury charge that is unwieldy and unclear. We have held that an instruction that confuses the jury may compromise the fairness of the trial. See Komlodi v. Picciano, 217 N.J. 387, 409, 89 A.3d 1234 (2014) (noting importance of appropriate and correct jury charges in civil cases); Scafidi v. Seiler, 119 N.J. 93, 101-02, 574 A.2d 398 (1990) (noting potential for proximate cause charge to mislead jury). In a complex case with many parties from different states, the trial court retains the discretion to decline a defendant-by-defendant approach and, utilizing a Finally, we note the New Jersey defendants’ concern that they could be liable for a disproportionate share of an award of damages for emotional harm, notwithstanding what they characterize as their minor roles in the events that gave rise to this action. Their concern is unfounded. In accordance with the New Jersey Comparative Negligence Act, in negligence and strict liability actions in which liability is disputed, the factfinder makes two determinations: The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed, and the matter is remanded to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LAVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in this opinion.IV.