After completion by the City of Irvine and the County of Estill of the construction *160 of a joint city-county hospital building, financed by voted bond issues of the city and county and by a grant of federal funds under the Hill-Burton Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 291 et seq., the governing authorities of the city and county found that they did not have adequate financial resources to operate the hospital. They sought in vain for some time to find a private organization willing to undertake the operation and finally obtained an agreement to do so from the St. Walburg Monastery of Benedictine Sisters of Covington, Kentucky. The legislative bodies of the city and county authorized the execution of a long-term lease of the building to the Sisters, at a rental of one dollar per year, and such a lease was executed. The lease requires that the Sisters use the property for “charitable hospital and/or charitable nursing home purposes;” that they not commence operation of the hospital until receiving approval and acceptance by the Division of Hospital Facilities of the State of Kentucky and the Health Facilities Section of the United States Government; that they maintain the property in reasonably good condition at their expense, and keep the property insured against loss by fire or storm. In order to comply with regulations under the Hill-Burton Act the Sisters further were required to agree that they would operate the facility as a public nonprofit hospital for a period of 20 years, they would accept a reasonable number of indigent or charity cases, and would not deny admission to any patient solely because of race, creed ■or color.
A group of citizens and taxpayers of the city and county brought this action asking that the lease be declared invalid and that the city and county officials be •ordered to take over the control, management and operation of the hospital. The judgment of the circuit court declared that so much of the lease agreement as divested the public officials of the city and county •of control of the management of the property and of the hospital operation was void, but the judgment dismissed that part of the complaint asking that the city and county officials be ordered to take over the operation of the hospital. The plaintiffs have appealed and the defendants have cross-appealed.
The first contention of the appellants is that the city and county had no power or authority to enter into any lease of the hospital property. We find no merit in this contention. In Perkins v. City of Frankfort, Ky.,
The second contention of the appellants is that under KRS 216.040, relating to county hospitals, and KRS 216.240, relating to city hospitals, the city and county were required to control and operate the hospital and could not surrender this duty to others. In substance, the argument *161 is that if a city or county, or both jointly, once undertake a hospital proj ect they must continue to maintain it as a governmental institution. We think, however, that the statutes relied upon mean only that so long as a hospital is operated as a governmental institution the appropriate public officials must manage and control it. Here the county and city found themselves unable to operate the hospital as a governmental institution, and they chose to accomplish the purpose of making hospital facilities available for the community by leasing the hospital building to the Sisters, for operation by them of a private hospital serving the public. The statutes do not demand that a county or city maintain a hospital as a function of government; they merely require that if a hospital is maintained as a governmental institution it be controlled and managed by public officials. Under the lease here involved the city and county have no financial obligation in the hospital operation, so there is no need for operational control by them.
A related contention of appellants is that the city and county could not delegate part of their functions and responsibilities to a private organization. The circuit court, in upholding this contention, relied on Booth v. City of Owensboro,
The final contention of the appellants is that the lease gives public property to a religious organization in violation of Sections 1, 3 and 5 of the Kentucky Constitution and the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. This contention is fully answered and refuted by the opinion in Kentucky Building Commission v. Effron,
On the direct appeal the judgment is affirmed; on the cross-appeal the judgment is reversed to the extent that it declares the lease invalid on the ground of divestiture of public control, with directions to enter judgment declaring the lease to be valid.
