314 S.E.2d 847 | S.C. Ct. App. | 1984
The issues involved in this domestic case are whether the trial court erred in terminating the parental rights of a
Roger Keith Abercrombie, the natural father of Joshua Keith Abercrombie, a minor child, brought this action against Karen Anne LaBoon, his former wife and the natural mother of the child, to enforce the visitaton rights granted him in a prior divorce decree. He also sought a determination as to the amount owed by him as delinquent child support and a reduction in child support payments. The mother interposed a counterclaim in which she petitioned the court to terminate the father’s parental rights on the ground of abandonment. The child was not made a party to the termination action and neither a guardian ad litem nor an attorney was appointed for him.
The trial court found that the father had abandoned the child and terminated his parental rights. It also determined the child support arrearage to be $3,528.94.
We need not determine, in this instance, whether there exists clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court’s finding of abandonment. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U. S. 745, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 71 L. Ed. (2d) 599 (1982); Richberg v. Dawson, 278 S. C. 356, 296 S. E. (2d) 338 (1982). Not all necessay parties to the termination proceedings were before the court and without them the court lacked jurisdiction •to render a valid judgment in that regard. See 59 Am. Jur. (2d) Parties § 259 at 722 (1971); 67A C.J.S. Parties § 121 at 944 (1978); Prather v. Tupper, 267 S. C. 636, 230 S. E. (2d) 712 (1976); see also South Carolina Dept. of Social Services v. McDow, 276 S. C. 509, 280 S. E. (2d) (1981); cf. McLaughlin v. Strickland, 309 S. E. (2d) 787 (S. C. App. 1983). A minor child is a necessary party to any proceedings in which a statute requires that the child be made a party [see Cribbs v. Floyd, 188 S. C. 443, 199 S. E. 677 (1938) ] or a guardian ad litem be appointed. Cf. 2 C.J.S. Adoption of Persons § 76 at 507 (1972).
We do not agree with the mother’s argument that Section 20-11-30, as amended, applied only to the South Carolina Children’s Bureau, and other licensed child-placing agencies. She cites no authority in support of her position and we know of none. In any case, where the terms of a statute are clear and unambiguous, they must be held to mean what they plainly state. Jones v. S. C. Highway Department, 247 S. C. 132, 146 S. E. (2d) 166 (1966). The statute applied to either an “agency or an interested party.” Obviously, the mother is the “interested party” in this instance. If the mother were not an “interesed party,” as that term was used in Section 20-11-30; then she herself could not maintain a termination action.
Because he was never served with a summons and a copy of the petition to terminate his father’s parental rights, it was error for the trial court to proceed without him; therefore, the finding that the father abandoned the child is reversed and the issue remanded for a new determination after the child is made a party. See South Carolina Dept. of Social Services v. McDow, supra; Prather v. Tupper, supra.
Regarding the father’s assertion that the trial court erred in not determining that the child support arrearage amounted to $1,381.76, the burden was upon him, as the appellant, to convince us that the greater weight of the evidence supported such a finding. See Baron v. Dyslin, 309 S. E. (2d) 767 (S. C. App. 1983).
The problem with the father’s contention is that the record does not reflect that, as of April 3, 1980, the amount of arrearage was $750.00. Rather, the mother’s April 3, 1980 petition alleges that the father was “delinquent in an amount in excess of... $750.00” [emphasis added] and her testimony at trial was that the arrearage was “in excess of seven hundred whatever it was.” Because the father has not persuaded us that the trial judge erred in not finding that the sum of $1,381.76 was due from him as past due child support, we affirm the sum of $3,528.94 as representing the amount of arrearage owed by the father.
The judgment appealed from, therefore, is
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.
Section 20-11-80 in its amended form read in part as follows:
When a child is voluntarily abandoned for a period in excess of six months ..., the agency or an interested party may petition a court of competent jurisdiction ... for an order determining whether or not the child has been abandoned ...
The summons and petition shall be served upon the parents of the child and also upon the child ...
See S. C. Code annot. § 20-11-30 (1976), as amended by 1978 S. C. Acts 634 at 1829.
Section 20-11-30 was repealed altogether on May 19,1981. See 1981 S. C. Acts 71 at 257.