106 N.Y.S. 978 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1907
This action is .brought to foreclose a mechanic’s lien and to set aside a conveyance of the real property involved, which the complaint alleges was made by the defendant Finkelstein to her brother, the defendant Flyer, with intent to defraud the plaintiff. Tlié complaint was dismissed for an alleged defect in the notice of lien. The only question presented on this appeal is whether the notice of lien, construed as the statute requires, substantially complied with the requirements of section 9 of the Lien Law (Laws of 1897, chap. 418).
The statement of the name of the owner against whose interest the lien was claimed and of the interest of such owner was in the following language, viz.: “ The name of the owner of the real property "against whose interest therein a lien is claimed, Katie Finkelstein or Julius Myer, and the interest of said owner as far as known to the lienor,, is the fee.” This statement Was held to be bad for being in the alternative. The argument is made that such a statement is not the affirmation of any fact, and should be treated precisely as though no name had been stated. The respondents cite cases which held that a statement, in the alternative, of labor performed or to be performed or materials furnished or to be furnished, was not a compliance with subdivision 4 of said section 9. (Bradley & Currier Co. v. Pacheteau, 71 App. Div. 148 ; 175 N. Y. 492; New Jersey Steel & Iron Co. v. Robinson, 85 App. Div. 512; 178 N. Y. 632; Bossert v. Fox, 89 App. Div. 7; 180 N. Y. 546; Armstrong v. Chisolm, 100 App. Div. 441.) But the reason for the rule declared in those cases has no application to the question before us. The statute requires the lienor to state explicitly or by plain inference- the value or the agreed price .of the labor performed or materials furnished at the time of the filing of the lien. (Finn v. Smith, 186 N. Y. 465.) Hence a statement in the alternative of the labor performed or to be performed, etc., is not an affirmation of any fact required to be. stated. The fact may be either the one or the other, whereas the statute requires an explicit statement of what the fact is. The statute plainly contemplates that a mistake-may be made in the statement of the name of the owner, hence the following curative provision of said section 9, subdivision 7, viz.: “ A failure to, state the name of the true owner or contractor, or a mis
The respondents also contend that the notice was defective for not stating the kind of labor performed and of materials furnished and" the amount of labor performed and materials -furnished at the time of the filing of the notice'of lien. We think it is plainly to he inferred from the entire" notice that the- lienor had furnished'all
The interlocutory judgment, in so:far as appealed from, should be reversed.
Hirschberg, P. J., Woodward, Jemes and Booker, JJ., concurred.
Interlocutory judgment, in so far as appealed from, reversed and new trial granted, costs to abide the final award of costs. ■