4 Vt. 149 | Vt. | 1832
delivered the opinion of the Court. — In the summer of 1827, the plaintiff made a contract with the defendant to labour' for him in haying one month, and therefor the defendant agreed to pay the plaintiff five dollars in money and ten dollars in fulled cloth ; and draw an order on Anson Field for the cloth. The plaintiff performed the labor according to his contract; and
It is a well established rule of law, that an infant has a right to avoid his contracts: and it matters not, whether his contract is fair, or unfair, he has a right to rescind it. But to this rule there are some exceptions. An infant may bind himself to pay for his necessary meat, drink, apparel, physic, and his good teaching and instruction, whereby he may profit himself afterwards. He may also, if marrie^^ake up provision for his wife and children. But it must appe^^ftat the things were actually necessary, of reasonable prices, ana suitable to the infant’s degree, and estate — considerations, which regularly must be left to the jury. — (Bingham on Infancy, 86.) If the jury find that the things were necessaries, and of a reasonable price, it shall be presumed they had evidence for what they thus find j and they, need not find particularly what the necessaries were, nor the price of each. Also, if the plaintifl declares for other things as well as necessaries, or alleges too high a price for those that are necessary, the jury may consider of those things that were really necessary, and of their intrinsic value ; proportioning the damages accordingly. — (Cro. Jac. 560.) The question of necessaries is to be governed by the reaimot the ostensible,circumstances of the infant. —(Peake, 229 ; 1 Esp. Rep. 211.) But if an infant resides with, and is subject to a parent, master, or guardian whose duty it is to provide necessaries, and he is able and willing to provide them according to the degree and estate of the infant, and without the approval of such parent, master, or guardian, the infant purchases necessaries for himself, he is not liable to pay for them. — (2 Black. Rep. 1325 ; 9 Johns. Rep. 141 ; 16 Mass. Rep. 32; D. Chip. Rep. 252.)
But the defendant insists that, “ no case can be found, where an infant has been permitted to rescind an executed contract, un
In the case under consideration, the plaintiff was an infant, when he made the contract, and continued to be so for two or three years afterwards ; therefore, he could not confirm his contract before he brought this action. If the plaintiff had received the fulled cloth of Anson Feld, on the defendant’s order, and the contract had been fully executed ; yet, if the fulled cloth was | not necessary for the plaintiff, he had a right to avoid the contract, t and submit his claim to a court and jury to ascertain what he mer{ited for his work and labour. This is the privilege, which the law affords to an infant, on account of his supposed incapacity to judge of the value of things. But so far as an infant is capable of distinguishing between right and wrong, it is as much his duty to conduct himself honestly, as it is the duty of an adult; therefore, in this case, if the plaintiff had received the cloth,, and had not offered to return it to the defendant, but intended to keep it, and recover the full value of his work and labour, it would be a gross fraud, which should not be tolerated. To prevent such fraud, it might be right for the court to direct the jury according to the principles of law in the above case, (Q Mass. Rep. 78;) that is, if the five dollars,, and cloth received by the plaintiff, were equal in value to the plaintiff’s work and labour, then he should f recover only nominal damages: but if they were of less value ¡.than the work and labour, the plaintiff should recover the differ-jence. But where an infant is defendant, and would avoid his contract by infancy, his defence cannot be avoided by the plaintiff’s showing,, that the infant intends a fraud upon him. If the
I have proceeded thus far, on the supposition that this contract, between the plaintiff and defendant, was fully executed. But the cáse shows that this was not the fact. The plaintiff never receiv'ed the fulled cloth ; but he received an order for the cloth in pursuance of his contract. So long as this contract remained in force, the order was a sufficient authority for the plaintiff to have received the cloth : but his authority ceased the moment the plaintiff, avoided his contract : and then the defendant became entitled to the order. To set up the receipt of this order by the plaintiff in bar of his right to avoid his special contract, cannot be allowed. Iff the law implied a promise on the part of the plaintiff, when he received. the order, to me due diligence in presenting the order for payment, and giving notice back of nonpayment, this implied promise may be avoided by infancy, as well as the express promise, to take cloth in payment. An infant cannot be a party to a bill of exchange; and ii he endorse a negotiable note, he may avoid his endorsement by infancy. Whether the law merchant would apply to an order of this description, in the hands of an adult, and would require him to use diligence in presenting the order for payment, and giving notice of nonpayment, is not necessary to decide in this case.
The judgement of the county court is affirmed with additional costs.