523 F. App'x 19

2d Cir.

2013

Habibah ABDUL-HAKEEM, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Cara PARKINSON, Corrine McCarthy, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 12-748-cv.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

June 21, 2013.

uncontested signatures, and that, with respect to certain items offered as collateral, Apazidis did not own most of the items in question. Accordingly, we find that there was sufficient evidence for conviction. With respect to his Section 1957(a) convictions, we reject Apazidis‘s argument that, because the money used in the transactions for which he was convicted came from repayment of a loan of the unlawful proceeds, and not the original proceeds themselves, the jury could not convict.

Next, Apazidis makes several evidentiary arguments, which we review for abuse of discretion. Provost v. City of Newburgh, 262 F.3d 146, 163 (2d Cir.2001). We find that the district court properly excluded evidence of Central Credit Union‘s negligence, which Apazidis wished to introduce on cross-examination, as irrelevant to the trial. “Trial judges retain wide latitude ... to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.” United States v. Crowley, 318 F.3d 401, 417 (2d Cir.2003) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Furthermore, it properly allowed the Government to introduce evidence of Apazidis‘s transactions with the loan proceeds, necessary to make out the elements for a Section 1957(a) conviction.

Finally, Apazidis argues that the district court‘s $800,000 forfeiture verdict should be reduced by the approximately $133,000 that he made to the bank in repayment of his loan. As a mixed question of law and fact, we review de novo. Roberts v. Royal Atl. Corp., 542 F.3d 363, 367 (2d Cir.2008). However, the United States’ right to the proceeds of the fraudulent loan vested when the crime was committed, see 18 U.S.C. § 982(b)(1); 21 U.S.C. § 853(c), and thus the manner in which Apazidis spent these illegal proceeds—even partially repaying the loan before he was indicted—is irrelevant to the amount due to the United States as forfeiture.

We have considered all of Apazidis‘s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court hereby is AFFIRMED.

John R. Williams, Law Office of John R. Williams, New Haven, CT, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Nancy A. Brouillet, Assistant Attorney General, for George Jepsen, Attorney General of the State of Connecticut, Hartford, CT, for Defendants-Appellees.

Corrine McCarthy, Waterford, CT, pro se.

PRESENT: GUIDO CALABRESI, JOSÉ A. CABRANES, ROBERT D. SACK, Circuit Judges.

SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Habibah Abdul-Hakeem (“plaintiff“) began this action before the District Court, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by two of her supervisors, Cara Parkinson and Corrine McCarthy (jointly “defendants“), at the Connecticut Superior Court.¹ In a well-reasoned opinion of January 26, 2012, the District Court granted summary judgment to the defendants and dismissed plaintiff‘s complaint. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review an order granting summary judgment de novo and “resolv[e] all ambiguities and draw[] all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought.” Burg v. Gosselin, 591 F.3d 95, 97 (2d Cir.2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see also Winfield v. Trottier, 710 F.3d 49, 52 (2d Cir. 2013).

On the record before us, we conclude that the District Court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. “The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” Brown v. City of Syracuse, 673 F.3d 141, 151 (2d Cir.2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). In the context of a § 1983 suit where the “color of state law is established, [an] equal protection claim parallels [a] Title VII [employment discrimination] claim.” Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 159 (2d Cir.2004); see also Demoret v. Zegarelli, 451 F.3d 140, 149 (2d Cir.2006). “To establish a prima facie Title VII case, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that he belonged to a protected class; (2) that he was qualified for the position he held; (3) that he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) that the adverse employment action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discriminatory intent.” Sassaman v. Gamache, 566 F.3d 307, 312 (2d Cir.2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A showing of disparate treatment—that is, a showing that an employer treated plaintiff less favorably than a similarly situated employee outside his protected group—is a recognized method of raising an inference of discrimination for the purposes of making out a prima facie case.” Ruiz v. Cnty. of Rockland, 609 F.3d 486, 493 (2d Cir.2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The “standard for comparing conduct requires a reasonably close resemblance of the facts and circumstances of plaintiff‘s and comparator‘s cases,” such that “the comparator must be similarly situated to the plaintiff in all material respects.” Id. at 494 (internal quotation marks omitted). “An employee is similarly situated to co-employees if they were (1) subject to the same performance evaluation and discipline standards and (2) engaged in comparable conduct.” Id. at 493-94 (internal quotation marks omitted). The District Court determined that although plaintiff had “identified seven alleged comparators,” she provided “no factual support that a single alleged comparator performed similar job functions, was subjected to the same disciplinary standards, engaged in similar conduct, or was treated more favorably [than her].” Abdul-Hakeem v. Parkinson, No. 3:10cv747 (JBA), 2012 WL 234003, at *5 (D.Conn. Jan. 25, 2012). Upon an independent review of the record, we conclude that the District Court correctly held that plaintiff failed to establish circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination on the basis of her race in the absence of any evidence that she was treated differently than similarly situated individuals who were not members of her protected class. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the District Court, substantially for the reasons articulated in its opinion of January 26, 2012.

We have considered all of plaintiff‘s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the January 26, 2012 judgment of the District Court.

Notes

We note that McCarthy, although technically proceeding pro se, has decided to rely entirely on Parkinson‘s counseled brief, without filing a separate brief of her own.

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