OPINION
In this interlocutory appeal, Appellants Greg Abbott, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Texas; Kyle Ja-nek, in his official capacity as Executive Commissioner of the Texas Health and Human Services Commission (HHSC);
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
SSLCs (formerly State Schools) are state-supported residential facilities operated by DADS to provide a continuum of services to persons with mental retardation, including medical care, specialized therapy, and training in the acquisition of personal, social, and vocational skills.
Once a trial court issues a commitment order, the length of an adult’s involuntary commitment to an SSLC is indefinite and will not be automatically reviewed again by the issuing court. See id. §§ 593.052 (no
Although the PMRA itself does not provide review procedures to assess the appropriateness of a' resident’s continued commitment, DADS has developed .internal review procedures to assess whether a resident should remain in an SSLC or move to an alternate living arrangement. See 40 Tex. Admin. Code §§ 2.274 (2009) (Tex. Dep’t of Aging & Disability Servs., Consideration of Living Options for Individuals Residing in State MR Facilities), 2.275 (2001)(Tex. Dep’t of Aging & Disability Servs., Accessing Alternative Living Arrangements for an Individual Residing in a State MR Facility Who Has the Ability to Provide Legally Adequate Consent or Has a Legally Authorized Representative), 2.276 (2006) (Tex. Dep’t of Aging '&• Disability Servs., Accessing Alternative Living Arrangements for an Individual Residing in a State MR Facility Who Does Not Have the Ability to Give Legally Adequate Consent and Who Does Not Have a Legally Authorized Representative).
Under the internal review procedures, each resident is assigned an interdisciplinary team (IDT) which meets at least annually to assess whether the SSLC is the most appropriate living arrangement for the individual and to provide a recommendation as to whether the. individual should remain in the SSLC or move to an alternative living arrangement. Id. §§ 2.274(g)(4), 2.275-.276. Members of the IDT include, at a minimum, the resident, the resident’s legally authorized representative, if any, and the professional and direct care staff of the SSLC who provide services to the resident. Id. § 2.253(20) (Texas Dept, of Aging and Disability Servs., Definitions). A determination by an IDT that a resident could live in a less restrictive environment does not guarantee a resident the right to move from an SSLC, however, as the resident’s IDT must also provide a recommendation for community referral and the IDT and SSLC must then comply with numerous procedures to complete the formal referral process. Id. §§ 2.275-.278.
The Individual Plaintiffs are persons with intellectual disabilities, see Tex. Health & Safety Code § 591.003(15-a), who have been confined to SSLCs for many years.
Prior Department of Justice Investigation
In March 2005, pursuant to its authority under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, see 42 U.S.C. § 1997a, the United States Department of Justice began an investigation of conditions at the Texas SSLCs. As a result of the investigation, the United States filed a lawsuit against the State of Texas alleging conditions at the SSLCs violated federal law. The lawsuit culminated in a settlement agreement (Consent Decree) approved by the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas in 2009. The Consent Decree requires the State to make many changes at SSLCs, including detailed provisions for planning, carrying out, and following up on the movement of residents from SSLCs to community placements. The Consent Decree additionally called for professional monitors to inspect each SSLC twice a year to assess progress. The record does not contain the results of these inspections, but the parties appear to agree that the SSLCs have not reached full compliance with the terms of the settlement agreement.
Current Litigation Commenced
DRTx is a nonprofit protection and advocacy organization created under the federal Protection and Advocacy for Mentally Ill Individuals Act, see id. §§ 10801-10851, and the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, see id. §§ 15041-15045, which, as a condition of federal funding, must “pursue administrative, legal, and other appropriate remedies to ensure the protection of individuals with mental illness who are receiving care or treatment in the State.” Id. § 10805(a)(1)(B). Through its work, DRTx learned of the commitment circumstances of the Individual Plaintiffs. In January 2011, attorneys for DRTx filed suit on behalf of the Individual Plaintiffs through their next friend Geoffrey Courtney.
In their amended petition, the Plaintiffs allege that the continued confinement of the Individual Plaintiffs in SSLCs without periodic judicial review violates the Individual Plaintiffs’ right to procedural due course of law under the Texas Constitution, see Tex. Const, art. I, § 19, and that the State Defendants’ failure to provide the Individual Plaintiffs with a community referral — despite the determination of their respective IDTs that their needs could be met in a less restrictive environment — violates the Individual Plaintiffs’ right to substantive due course of law under the Texas Constitution, see id., and their rights under the PMRA — including the right to reside in the least restrictive setting appropriate to their needs.
Plaintiffs seek declarations that the indefinite involuntary commitment of the Individual Plaintiffs without judicial review of their commitment orders violates the Texas Constitution’s guarantee of procedural due course of law, and that the State Defendants’ failure to provide community referrals for the Individual Plaintiffs vio-, lates both the PMRA and substantive due process guarantees under the Texas Con
In their plea to the jurisdiction, the State Defendants asserted the Plaintiffs lack standing because: (1) their claims are not redressable by any permissible relief against the State Defendants; (2) Courtney lacks authority to act as next friend for the Individual Plaintiffs; and (3) DRTx has neither organizational nor associational standing. The State Defendants additionally argued that the Consent Decree takes precedence over any remedy the Plaintiffs could obtain from the trial court, and the trial court had no jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs’ claims for violations of the PMRA under the UDJA. The State Defendants additionally filed a verified motion to show authority also challenging Courtney’s authority to represent the Individual Plaintiffs.
In response to the State Defendants’ plea to the jurisdiction, the United States filed a statement of interest with the trial court stating that the U.S. has an interest in this litigation because it implicates the interpretation of the prior Consent Decree between the U.S. and Texas. In its statement, the U.S. states its position that the imposition of periodic judicial review of involuntary commitment orders would supplement — rather than conflict — with the terms of the Consent Decree:
To the extent that Plaintiffs seek the imposition of periodic judicial review in addition to the annual internal review process set out in the Consent Decree, Plaintiffs’ claims and prayers for relief do not conflict with the terms of the Consent Decree. On its face, Plaintiffs’ complaint does not seek to disrupt the Consent Decree’s annual internal review process, but rather, to supplement that process with an additional mechanism for discharge of individuals to the most integrated setting appropriate to their needs. In this regard, the Consent Decree expressly contemplates and reconciles the existence of parallel mechanisms for discharging individuals to the community, including court-ordered discharge.
In its statement, the U.S. took no position on the merits of the Plaintiffs’ claims.
Following the hearing on the plea to the jurisdiction, at which the State Defendants asserted that the relief sought would conflict with the Consent Decree, the U.S. filed a supplemental statement of interest reiterating its position that the periodic judicial review of commitment orders would not conflict with the Consent Decree. The supplemental statement, however, additionally addressed the injunctive relief sought by the Plaintiffs and stated that the U.S. would insist that any discharge of residents occur in compliance with the terms of the Consent Decree, requiring that all discharges occur safely and that the residents’ needs must be met in their community placement:
The Consent Decree between the United States and the State requires all discharges occur safely and that individuals’ needs are met in their new setting. To the extent that relief in this case results in the discharge of individuals from SSLCs, the United States will continue to insist that the Consent Decree be fully implemented.
The U.S. again took no position on the merits of the Plaintiffs’ suit.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, the State Defendants raise numerous issues challenging the Plaintiffs’ standing, contending: (1) Courtney does not have authority to represent the Individual Plaintiffs as next friend and DRTx lacks associational or organizational standing; and (2) the Individual Plaintiffs lack standing to pursue their procedural and substantive due course of law claims because a favorable decision would not redress their alleged injuries. In addition, the State Defendants challenge the Individual Plaintiffs’ claims for violations of the PMRA, contending that the trial court has no jurisdiction over these claims under the UDJA because: (1) the civil penalties prescribed by the PMRA are the Individual Plaintiffs’ exclusive remedy for violations of their rights under the statute; and (2) if declaratory relief is allowed, the APA provides the exclusive remedy for invalidating state agency policies and procedures.
Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s decision on a rule 12 motion for an abuse of discretion where, as here, there is- a best-interest consideration at play in the case. See Urbish v. 127th Judicial Dist. Court,
A plea to the jurisdiction is among the procedural mechanisms through which a party may challenge a trial court’s authority to decide the subject matter of a specific cause of action. See Texas Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda,
The State Defendants’ plea to the jurisdiction challenges the Plaintiffs’ pleadings and not the existence of jurisdictional facts. See id. Accordingly, we must determine if the Plaintiffs have alleged facts that affirmatively demonstrate the court’s jurisdiction to hear the cause. See id.; Miranda,
The State Defendants’ issues on appeal also raise questions of statutory construction. Statutory construction is a question of law that we review de novo. State v. Shumake,
Next Friend’s Authority to Represent Individual Plaintiffs
As a preliminary matter, we begin with the State Defendants’ third issue on appeal: whether Courtney has authority to prosecute this suit as next friend for the Individual Plaintiffs, who are all adults and have no familial relationship with Courtney. The suit was initially filed by DRTx on behalf of the Individual Plaintiffs through Courtney as their next friend pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 44, which allows persons non compos mentis who have no legal guardian to sue and be represented by a next friend. Tex.R. Civ. P. 44; see also Austin Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Lovato,
The State Defendants concede that the Individual Plaintiffs lack the capacity to proceed in this lawsuit without a guardian or next friend representing their interests. In their verified motion to show authority, the State Defendants argued only that under this Court’s prior opinion, Saldarriaga V. Saldarriaga, Courtney was not authorized to represent the Individual Plaintiffs because he had not been appointed next friend by a process equivalent to a guardianship proceeding under the Probate Code, and that he was not qualified to serve as next friend because of a conflict of interest. See
At the hearing on the motion to show authority, Courtney testified that he was a lawyer experienced with disability rights law, that he had completed courses with the State Bar of Texas authorizing him to serve as an attorney ad litem, and that he' had served in that capacity in many suits. With regard to the present suit, he testified that he had been approached by DRTx to evaluate the appropriateness of community placement for the Individual Plaintiffs. After meeting the Individual Plaintiffs and reviewing their records, Courtney testified that he determined they were appropriate candidates for community placement and proceeded with filing this suit on their behalf as next friend without complying with the procedural requirements for appointment of guardians under the Probate Code. See Tex. Estates Code § 1101.101.
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 44 provides that persons non compos mentis who have no legal guardian
In Saldamaga, we were presented with the same question and found that, where fact issues exist as to the competence or consent of an adult alleged to be non compos mentis, the appointment of a next friend — for due process purposes — should parallel procedures established in the probate court for appointment of guardians.
Here, unlike Saldarriaga, it is undisputed that the Individual Plaintiffs lack the capacity to properly care for their own interests in this litigation. The Individual Plaintiffs have severe intellectual disabilities and have been involuntarily committed to SSLCs for many years. Although an order of commitment is not an adjudication of mental incompetence, all that is necessary to be represented by a next friend is that the party merely be incapable, by reason of mental or bodily infirmity, of properly caring for his or her own interests in the litigation. Tex. Health & Safety Code § 593.054 (commitment order not adjudication of mental incompetence); Lindly,
Further, the trial court heard evidence on Courtney’s qualifications and found he was qualified to adequately represent the interests of the Individual Plaintiffs. Absent evidence to the contrary, “it is presumed that the action is brought with the permission and such consent” as the Individual Plaintiffs are “capable of giving and that it is in fact [their] suit.” See Kaplan v. Kaplan,
On this record, we cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion by overruling the motion to show authority and permitting Courtney to proceed as next friend. See Urbish,
Individual Plaintiffs’ Due Course of Law Claims
Having found the next friend is authorized to proceed in this suit on behalf of the Individual Plaintiffs, we next consider the State Defendants’ first issue and the crux of their appeal: whether the Individual Plaintiffs lack standing to pros
(1) the plaintiff must have personally suffered an “injury in fact — an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical”;
(2) “there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of — the injury has to be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant and not the result of the independent action of some third party not before the court”; and
(3) “it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury . will be redressed by a favorable decision.”
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
In their pleadings, the Individual Plaintiffs assert both procedural and substantive due course of law claims under the Texas Constitution. For both claims, the State Defendants contend the Individual Plaintiffs have failed to meet the third requirement of standing: redressability. Redressability is an essential element of standing and requires the Individual Plaintiffs to prove that it is “likely, as opposed to merely speculative,” that their alleged injury “will be redressed by a favorable decision.” See Lujan,
Individual Plaintiffs’ Procedural Due Course of Law Claims
We begin by addressing the redressability of the Individual Plaintiffs’ procedural due course of law claims. Though textually different, Texas courts generally construe the due course of law provision in the same manner as its federal counterpart, the Due Process Clause. See Texas Workers’ Comp. Comm’n v. Patient Advocates of Tex.,
Liberally construing the Plaintiffs’ live pleadings, their central contention is that the State Defendants’ continued confinement of the Individual Plaintiffs is unconstitutional because the PMRA — the statute providing the State Defendants with the authority to confiné the Individual Plaintiffs indefinitely without periodic judicial review of their commitment orders — unconstitutionally deprives them of their liberty without due course of law protections afforded by the Texas Constitution. See Tex. Const. art. I, § 19; see also Tex. Health & Safety Code § 593.052 (providing no time limit on court’s order for involuntary confinement under PMRA). To redress the procedural due course of law violations alleged, the Plaintiffs seek declaratory relief and related claims for in-junctive relief.
To challenge a statute as unconstitutional, a plaintiff “must suffer some actual or threatened injury under the statute” and “must contend that the statute unconstitutionally restricts the plaintiffs own rights.” Barshop v. Medina Cnty. Underground Water Conservation Dist.,
With regard to the declaratory relief sought, the State Defendants contend' that the requested declaratory' relief would not redress the Individual Plaintiffs’ injury because the declarations would amount to “no more than an advisory opinion” that “would leave [the Individual Plaintiffs] institutionalized without periodic judicial review of their commitments.” The separation of powers article of the Texas Constitution prohibits courts from issuing advisory opinions. Tex. Const. art. II, § 1; See Brown v. Todd,
It is, however, “well recognized that declaratory relief is the proper remedy when challenging the constitutionality of a statute.” Rylander v. Caldwell,
Further, while we recognize the State Defendants’ contention that they themselves do not have the authority to provide SSLC residents with judicial review, it is the province of the judiciary to determine what process is due to sufficiently protect a Constitutional interest. See, e.g., In re Harhut,
In addition, we note that the Consent Decree does not negate the redressability of the Plaintiffs’ requested declaratory re
On its face, Plaintiffs’ complaint does not seek to disrupt the Consent Decree ... but rather, to supplement that process with an additional mechanism for discharge of individuals to the most integrated setting appropriate to their needs. In this regard, the Consent Decree expressly contemplates and reconciles the existence of parallel mechanisms for discharging individuals to the community, including court-ordered discharge.
As such, whatever , the merits of their claims might ultimately prove to be, we conclude the Individual Plaintiffs have plainly demonstrated the minimum threshold interest that confers standing under the Texas Constitution. Regardless of whether the trial court additionally grants the requested injunctive relief, we conclude the declaratory relief sought is sufficient to satisfy the redressability requirements of standings. Larson v. Valente,
Individual Plaintiffs’ Substantive Due Course of Law Claims
Besides their constitutional challenge to the PMRA, the Individual Plaintiffs
Like the federal due process clause, the due course of law provision of the Texas Constitution contains a substantive as well as a procedural component. Texas Workers’ Comp. Comm’n v. Garcia,
On appeal, the State Defendants argue — as they argued with the procedural due course of law claims — that the Individual Plaintiffs’ substantive due course of law claims are not redressable by the trial court. With regard to the substantive due course of law claim, however, the State Defendants argue the claim is not redress-able because it “duplicates a claim already brought and resolved against the same defendants by the U.S. Department of Justice,” and the Consent Decree resulting from that suit “foreclosed an independent remedy by a Travis County district court for essentially the same alleged deprivation.”
The State Defendants’ contentions, though, are in direct contradiction to the U.S. statement of interest stating that the Plaintiffs’ pleadings on their face do not seek to disrupt the Consent Decree. Moreover, the State Defendants acknowledge the Individual Plaintiffs’ claims are not barred by res judicata, nor have they cited any federal preemptive principles that would bar the Individual Plaintiffs from seeking relief for violations of rights guaranteed by the Texas Constitution. Accordingly, we cannot conclude the State Defendants have shown the Consent Decree deprives the trial court of jurisdiction over the Individual Plaintiffs’ substantive due course of law claims.
Having concluded the Individual Plaintiffs have standing to bring both their procedural and substantive due course of law claims, we overrulé the State Defendants’ first issue on appeal.
Declaratory Relief for Alleged PMRA Violations
In addition to their constitutional due process claims, the Individual Plaintiffs seek á declaration and related injunctive relief under the UDJA that the State Defendants’ failure to discharge them through community referrals — despite the determinations of their respective IDTs that their needs could be met in less restrictive environments — violates various rights guaranteed to persons with intellectual disabilities under the PMRA, including the requirement to provide services in the least restrictive environment. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code §§ 37.004 (person whose rights or status are affected by statute may have determined any question of construction arising under the statute and obtain a declaration of rights thereunder); ,011(further relief based on a declaratory judgment or decree may be granted whenever necessary or proper); see also Tex. Health & Safety Code § 592.013 (person with mental retardation has right to live in least restrictive setting appropriate to person’s individual needs); Carter v. State,
The PMRA expressly authorizes a person with mental retardation to sue in dis
In addition to these private remedies, the PMRA specifies that the attorney general may sue for additional civil penalties and injunctive relief to: (1) restrain and prevent a person from violating the Act or a rule adopted by the department under this subtitle; or (2) enforce compliance with the Act or a rule adopted under the Act. Id. § 591.028. The PMRA again specifies that these remedies “do not supersede or abrogate other remedies existing at-law.” Id.
Because the PMRA creates privileges and rights not existing at common law and prescribes a remedy to enforce those rights, the State Defendants contend that these are the exclusive remedies for a violation of the PMRA and that the Individual Plaintiffs are barred from seeking relief under the UDJA, a remedy not prescribed by the PMRA for individuals injured by a violation of the statute. See Texas Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Dierschke,
Whether a statute provides a specific right of enforcement is a question of statutory construction, hence subject to review as a matter of law. Witkowski v. Brian, Fooshee & Yonge Props.,
At issue, however, is whether the civil penalties .prescribed by the statute were intended to be the exclusive remedy for private enforcement of rights. The general rule is that when a cause of action and the remedy for its enforcement are derived not from the common law but from statute, as in this case, the statutory remedy is exclusive. See In re Ament,
The PMRA expressly provides that its remedies provisions do “not supercede or abrogate other remedies existing in law.” Tex. Health & Safety Code §§ 591.022(f), .023(g). Construing the plain language of the statute, we thus cannot conclude that the remedies provided under the PMRA are exclusive, as such an interpretation would be contrary to the express language of the statute. See id. §§ 591.022(f), .023(g); cf. Tex. Tax Code § 42.09 (statutory remedies provision titled “ Remedies Exclusive” and stating remedies “authorized by this title are exclusive”); see also Prairie View A & M Univ. v. Chatha,
Having concluded that a person injured by a violation of the PMRA may seek remedies in addition to those provided under the statute, we next consider whether the UDJA provided another remedy existing in law. The UDJA is a remedial enactment that generally permits a litigant in a justiciable controversy whose rights are affected by a statute, the right to obtain a declaration of their rights, status, or other legal relations thereunder. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code § 37.004(a); See Texas Parks & Wildlife Dep’t v. Sawyer Trust,
Here, we have already determined that the PMRA confers a private cause of action for those individuals afforded protections by the Act. Thus, a declaratory judgment is a proper remedy for determining the Individual Plaintiffs’ rights under the PMRA. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code § 37.004 (person whose rights or status are affected by a statute may have determined any question of construction arising under statute and obtain a declaration of rights thereunder); Frasier,
Further, while we acknowledge that the UDJA cannot be invoked when it would interfere with some other exclusive remedy or some other entity’s exclusive jurisdiction, see MBM Fin. Corp. v. Woodlands Operating Co.,
Accordingly, we conclude the Individual Plaintiffs have alleged a justiciable controversy as to their rights and status under the PMRA and are entitled, in accordance with the remedies provisions thereunder, to seek a declaration of their rights under the UDJA. We overrule the State Defendants’ fourth issue on appeal.
Exclusive Jurisdiction under the APA
In their final issue on appeal, the State Defendants contend that, regardless of whether a party may seek relief under the UDJA for violations of rights guaranteed by the PMRA, the Individual Plaintiffs have failed to establish jurisdiction under the UDJA because the substance of their claims is an administrative rule challenge governed exclusively by the APA. It is true that when a party “files a proceeding that only challenges the validity of an administrative rule, the parties are bound by the APA and may not seek relief under the UDJA because such relief would be redundant.” See Texas State Bd. of Plumbing Exam’rs v. Associated Plumbing-Heating-Cooling Contractors of Tex., Inc.,
To better understand the State Defendants’ argument, a review of the statutory framework of the PMRA is helpful. As previously discussed, the PMRA itself does not provide review procedures to assess the appropriateness of a resident’s continued commitment, but DADS has developed internal review procedures to assess whether a resident should remain in an SSLC or move to an alternate living arrangement. See 40 Tex. Admin. Code §§ 2.274-.276. Under the internal review procedures, each resident is assigned an IDT that meets at least annually to assess whether the SSLC is the most appropriate living arrangement for the individual and
In their pleadings, the Plaintiffs allege that all three of the Individual Plaintiffs have been determined by their respective IDTs to be capable of living in an alternative living arrangement. However, according to the Plaintiffs’ pleadings, none of the Individual Plaintiffs have been provided with a formal recommendation for community referral. Plaintiffs allege that two of the Individual Plaintiffs — E.M.B. and G.D.E. — have been denied a referral because of the preferences of non-guardian family members. According to the pleadings, Plaintiff E.M.B. was initially provided with a community referral, but the referral was later revoked after the superintendent of her SSLC sent a letter to her IDT requesting they discontinue placement efforts because of the objections of a family member who was not an appointed guardian or otherwise legally authorized to represent E.M.B. Similarly, Plaintiff G.D.E. has also allegedly been denied a referral because of the preferences of a non-guardian family member. The pleadings do not specify why the third Individual Plaintiff— G.G.E. — has been denied a recommendation for community referral.
Based on their failure to obtain community referrals, the Individual Plaintiffs seek a declaration that the State Defendants’ policies and practices of failing to recommend a community referral for those individuals determined to be appropriate for community-based services is unconstitutional and violates the PMRA. Because the pleadings raise a challenge to the policies and practices of an agency, the State Defendants argue that the substance of their claims is an administrative rule challenge governed exclusively by the APA.
The APA allows a party to bring a declaratory-judgment action against an agency to challenge the validity or applicability of an agency rule if it is alleged that the rule or its threatened application interferes with or impairs a legal right or privilege of the plaintiff. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 2001.038. The APA defines a “rule” as a “state agency statement of general applicability” that “implements, interprets, or prescribes law or policy” or “describes the procedure or practice requirements of a state agency” but “does not include a statement regarding only the internal management or organization of a state agency and not affecting private rights or procedures.” Id. § 2001.003(6).
The Individual Plaintiffs in their pleadings, however, do not challenge any particular rule promulgated by. the agency. Moreover, the State has not identified any agency statement of general applicability that implements, interprets, or prescribes a policy of denying adult SSLC residents
Rather, the Individual Plaintiffs seek a declaration as to whether the State Defendants’ failure to provide them with community referrals violated their individual rights under the PMRA. Construing the rights guaranteed under the PMRA is central to determining and declaring whether the State Defendants have violated the Individual Plaintiffs’ rights and properly invokes the jurisdiction of the UDJA. See Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem.Code § 37.004 (person whose rights are affected by statute, may have determined any question of construction arising under statute and obtain declaration of rights thereunder); see also Texas Mun. Power Agency v. Public Util. Comm’n,
CONCLUSION
Having concluded that the Plaintiffs’ petition invoked the jurisdiction of the trial court, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the plea to the jurisdiction.
Notes
. The notice of appeal and prior filings in the trial court reference the former Governor, Commissioners of HHSC and DADS, and the former Directors of the Austin and Mexia . SSLCs. Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 7.2, the successors to these public officials have been automatically substituted as parties to this litigation. See Tex.R.App. P. 7.2(a).
. Weizenbaum, as the executive commissioner of DADS, reports to Janek, as the executive commissioner of HHSC, the umbrella agency over a number of health and human service agencies, including DADS. See Tex. Gov't Code § 531.001(4). Cazabon-Braly, Davis, and Wasson, as directors of SSLCs, are responsible for the administration of the SSLCs in compliance with applicable statutes and regulations. See Tex. Health & Safety Code § 551.0225.
. The PMRA does not alter or limit a resident's right to1 obtain a writ of habeas corpus. Id. § 594.003.
. G.G.E. has been confined for more than 40 years, E.M.B. for more than 60 years, and G.D.E. for more than 38 years.
.Act of May 12, 1977, 65th Leg., R.S., ch. 294, § 37, 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws 772, 783-789, repealed by Act of Apr. 29, 1991, 72nd Leg., R.S., ch. 76, § 1, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 515, 647-48 (current version at Tex. Health & Safety Code § 593.052.)
. The Individual Plaintiffs also seek to maintain the suit as a class, an issue not yet reached by the trial court.
. The only additional evidence presented at the hearing was a reference guide published by DADS.
. Effective January 1, 2014, the Texas Probate Code was repealed and recodified in the Texas Estates Code. See Act of May 26, 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., ch. 680, 2009 Tex. Gen. Laws
. According to the Plaintiffs’ pleadings, none of the Individual Plaintiffs had a guardian or legally authorized representative when this suit was filed. During oral argument, DRTx informed the court that a guardian has been appointed for G.G.E. during the course of this litigation. In suits and claims by and against a ward, the legal guardian must act for the ward. See Quada v. Quada,
. In its second issue, the State Defendants contend DRTx does not have organizational or associational standing to bring this suit. As DRTx asserts the same claims and seeks the same relief as the Individual Plaintiffs, we need not address and express no opinion as to DRTx's standing. See Watt v. Energy Action Educ. Found.,
. The State Defendants suggest that the requested declaratory relief would not redress the Individual Plaintiffs’ injuries because it is merely speculative that the Legislature would change the law upon a declaration of the statute’s unconstitutionality. We decline to presume that the Legislature would ignore a ruling from the court that a statutory scheme infringes upon constitutionally protected rights. See Acker v. Texas Water Comm'n,
. The Individual Plaintiffs alone assert substantive due course of law claims.
. There is no consensus among federal courts as to the scope of the Yotmgberg protections as applied to a committed individual's right to habilitative care and treatment outside of the institution. See Evans v. Fenty,
. The UDJA does not waive the State’s sovereign immunity when a plaintiff seeks a declaration of his or her rights under a statute. Texas Dep't of Transp. v. Sefzik,
. The State Defendants also argue the APA is the Plaintiffs' sole remedy for its procedural due course of law claims based on the lack of judicial review for involuntarily committed adults. We disagree. The State Defendants state in their brief that they have "no authority to provide, or compel courts to provide, post-commitment judicial review” and that "legislation is undisputably required.” As such, Plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of the statute governing involuntary commitments — the PMRA — and not the validity or applicability of an agency rule.