62 Neb. 247 | Neb. | 1901
This was an action in ejectment instituted by the defendant in error, herein styled the plaintiff, against the plaintiffs in error, herein styled the defendants, to recover the possession of certain lots and blocks in Lane’s First Addition to Pleasant Hill, in Saline county,- Nebraska. Plaintiff claims title by virtue of a sheriff’s deed executed and delivered to him on a decree and order of sale in a proceeding in the district court of Saline county, Nebraska, to foreclose tax liens on these lands. To this foreclosure proceeding defendants were both made parties and answered, setting up substantially the same defense which they have interposed in this action. No appeal or error proceedings were instituted to review this- judgment. Plaintiff had judgment in the court below and defendants' bring error.
Almost all the allegations of error relied on for a reversal of the judgment of the lower court are predicated on the proposition that the description, in the sheriff’s deed of the plaintiff, is too vague and uncertain to convey any lands. This contention arises from the fact that no plat of the original town of Pleasant Hill was ever filed with the county clerk or register of deeds of Saline county, Nebraska, as provided by law. The plat of the addition in which the lots and blocks in controversy are situated was properly filed for record on August 4, 1.871; but to locate these lands it was necessary for the trial court to
It has been held that it is not necessary that a sheriff’s deed should of itself describe lands so that they may be located by the deed alone, but it is sufficient if the description contained in such deed furnishes the means by which the lands can be definitely located. This doctrine of the construction of a deed received the unqualified approval of this court in an able and exhaustive opinion written by Norval, J., in the case of Hubermann v. Evans, 46 Nebr., 784, 65 N. W. Rep., 1045. It has also been held that extrinsic evidence is admissible to locate lands conveyed by a sheriff’s deed containing an accurate but general description. Works v. State, 22 N. E. Rep. [Ind.], 127. Rucker v. Steelman, 73 Ind., 396; Smith v. Crosby, 86 Tex., 15, 23 S. W. Rep., 10; Brown v. Warren, 16 Nev., 228; Ward v. Saunders, 6 Ired. [N. Car.], 382. As these authorities seem to sustain the action of the trial court in admitting extrinsic evidence, the next question which follows is as to the competency of the evidence actually
Defendants contend that the decision in this case is governed by the decision in the case of Lane v. Abbott, 23 Nebr., 489. That case was a suit in ejectment instituted by Lane against this defendant to recover the possession of all or a part of the lots now in controversy. Lane claimed title by deeds from owners of the different lots in the addition which he had re'ceived subsequent to the deed which he had executed to Abbott for the entire quarter-section in which this addition was located. Abbott had judgment below, and this judgment was affirmed because Lane had failed to establish with certainty the location of Pleasant Hill. It was said in the opinion that “there is not sufficient proof of the exact location of the ‘walnut stake’ in the surveyor’s certificate, from which the location of the plat of the addition could be established.” But in the case at bar the location of this “stake” was definitely established by the testimony of the witness Castor, who made the survey. Again, it is plain from a review of that case that the Irregular Tract Book was not introduced in evidence, as in the case at bar. And again, in this case plaintiff, by his purchase at the sale in the foreclosure proceedings, to which defendants were parties, acquired all the title of the defendants to the lands involved in that suit. Carson v. Dundas, 39 Nebr., 503. Merriam v. Goodlett, 36 Nebr., 384; Buchanan v. Griggs, 18 Nebr., 121, 130. It therefore follows that the issues in this suit are in nowise determined by the judgment in Lane v. Abbott, supra.
There is one contention, however, of counsel for the defendants "with which we agree, and that is that there is not sufficient evidence to sustain the judgment with reference to lots 3 and 4 in block 9 of the addition. The decree and order of sale on which the sheriff’s deed was based were offered in evidence to supplement the deed. It is a well defined rule that the sale must be according to the decree. Nebraska Loan & Trust Co. v. Hamer, 40 Nebr., 281. Tootle v. White, 4 Nebr., 401. The decree and order of sale directed the appraisal and sale of all of block 9, except lots 3 and 4, while the deed purports to convey all of block 9, and by the-verdict of the jury and the judgment of the court below the plaintiff recovered all of block 9. Hence the judgment of the lower court, so far as lots 3 and 4 in said block are concerned, is wholly unsupported by the evidence. Jones, Mortgages [4th ed.], sec. 655 and cases cited. This was an error that probably crept into the proceedings without the attention of the trial court having been specifically called to it, and as section 594 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that “When a judgment or final order shall be reversed either in whole or in part, in the supreme court, the court reversing the same shall proceed to render such judgment as the court below should have rendered, or remand the cause to the court below for such judgment,” it is recommended that this cause be remanded to the court below with directions to render judg
For the reasons stated in the foregoing opinion the judgment of the district court is reversed and the cause remanded to the court beloAv Avith instructions to render judgment for plaintiff for all the lands described in his petition, except lots 3 and 4, in block 9, in Lane’s First Addition to Pleasant Hill, Saline county, Nebraska.
Reversed and remanded.