Abbott v. BurkeAbbott v. Burke
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Antell, Joelson, McElroy
The complaint filed herein February 5, 1981 seeks judgment declaring that the finance provisions of the New Jersey statutory system of elementary and secondary school public education violate the Education Clause of the New Jersey Constitution and the Equal Protection Clauses of the New Jersey and United States Constitutions.
Plaintiffs are a number of children who assert that because they reside and attend schools in the school districts of Camden, East Orange, Irvington and Jersey City they do not enjoy the same educational opportunity as students in districts with greater tax revenues. They bring this action on their own behalf and on behalf of a class of all other children similarly situated. Defendants are New Jersey state officials responsible for administering the finance provisions of the public education laws and assuring that a thorough and efficient education is provided in all public school districts.
Although not recited in the order under review, the trial court noted that because the Supreme Court has determined the statute to be “in all respects constitutional on its face,” Robinson v. Cahill, 69 N.J. 449, 467 (1976) (“Robinson V“), plaintiffs’ challenge to the facial validity of the present school finance laws was barred. While plaintiffs may be correct in arguing that the determination by our highest court in Robinson V does not foreclose a litigant from raising the question of facial constitutionality anew, it is clear that neither the Chancery Division nor we, as an intermediate appellate court, can grant the requested relief.
In Robinson, et al. v. Cahill, et al., 62 N.J. 473, cert. den sub. nom Dickey v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 976, 945 S.Ct. 292, 38 L.Ed.2d 219 (1973) (“Robinson I“), it was held that the New Jersey statutes then governing the financing of public elementary and secondary schools failed to carry out the State‘s obligation to provide a thorough and efficient education,
It is important to this controversy to note that Robinson V was decided without any prior lower court determination and without the benefit of an evidential record.
We do foresee a pattern of perhaps quite considerable change coming about as the procedures of this new legislation are brought to bear upon the system as a whole. How much state aid will be needed in any particular district at any particular time to supplement the local levy is something we cannot forecast. We must assume, as we do, that the state aid provisions in the Act before us represent the Legislature‘s best effort to prophesy as to what this need will be. [Id. at 464-465].
We are satisfied that in deciding Robinson V the Supreme Court intended nothing beyond an adjudication that the legislation was facially valid. As it said, “[o]nly actual experience with the Act will demonstrate whether there is further need for adjustment or modification.” Id. at 467.
By holding that the complaint herein was appropriate for administrative action the trial judge envisioned the following progression of issues:
. . . the first question would be whether there are in fact any deficiencies in the education provided in the four districts. If the answer to that question is in the affirmative, then the next question would be presented. What is the magnitude, what is the scope of these deficiencies? The third would be the genesis of the deficiencies. The fourth would be what are the available means for remedying these deficiencies, and in fact it seems to be that since educational adequacy depends on a multitude of factors and not just financial input, and I believe that is the position of the Attorney General in this case, that the existence of a constitutional question could even be obviated by an appropriate
or a proper answer to that question. But even if this were not true, and it turns out that fiscal issue is the ultimate issue in the case, a factual record as to financing could be made in the administrative agency, and the viability of the issue of the availability of the funding scheme would be narrowed and clarified.
We discern from the foregoing remarks a fundamental misconception of the plaintiffs’ claim to relief. The trial court either mistakenly believed that the complaint was addressed to the correction of inadequacies in the programs, services and facilities for education in the four districts or mistakenly conceived that the inquiry must be limited to those grounds alone, considering financial constrictions only to the extent that they were correlated to specific educational inadequacies. On this basis it was concluded that plaintiffs would first have to seek the administrative remedy which the trial court deemed available under
Only the Superior Court, not the Commissioner, can consider plaintiffs’ claim or grant their requested remedy. While many considerations other than financial are relevant to a thorough and efficient education,
. . . it is nonetheless clear that there is a significant connection between the sums expended and the quality of the educational opportunity. And of course, the Legislature has acted upon that premise in providing State aid on formulas
designed to ameliorate in part the dollar disparities generated by a system of local taxation. Hence we accept the proposition that the quality of educational opportunity does depend in substantial measure upon the number of dollars invested, notwithstanding that the impact upon students may be unequal because of other factors, natural or environmental. [Robinson, et al. v. Cahill, et al., 62 N.J. 473, 481 (1973)]. [Emphasis supplied].
Thus, although defendants are free to demonstrate that equality of opportunity for a thorough and efficient education is nevertheless afforded because “of such other factors,” Robinson V, 69 N.J. at 462,
The complaint is a lengthy, complex document which, although sometimes obscure, appears to present a factual basis for the conclusion urged that in application the Act has actually magnified the very evils it was enacted to correct. Its central theme is that gross disparities in education resources continue and, indeed, have broadened during the years between 1975-76 and 1980-81. The asserted reason for this is that the law still depends heavily upon local tax revenues for school financing. While the complaint incidentally cites consequential effects in poorer districts such as high pupil-teacher ratios, dilapidated physical plants, lower basic skills test scores, less experienced teachers, etc., these are not posited as the subject of relief. What plaintiffs ask is the opportunity to provide the factually operative foundation notably lacking in Robinson V for a constitutional analysis of the finance provisions of the statute.
The nature of the complaint and its inappropriateness for administrative attention is best understood in terms of its challenge to the state aid equalization formula,
In determining the amount of equalization aid to be received by school districts the district‘s equalized assessed property valuation as determined by the State Division of Taxation is
Up to this point the formula seems designed to provide greater aid to those school districts whose per pupil valuations compare least favorably to the guaranteed valuation per pupil and less aid to districts with per pupil valuations closest to the guaranteed valuation. Plaintiffs’ attack, however, closes in on the next step in the calculation. The State support ratio is now translated into dollar support by applying it to the district‘s net current expense budget for the previous year.1 Thus, if the district‘s equalized valuation per pupil is 20% less than the guaranteed valuation per pupil, the state equalization support
Two factors, plaintiffs maintain, operate to assure a steadily widening financial gulf between wealthy and poor districts. The first is that the State‘s support ratio is applied only to the net current expense budget of the previous, not the current, year. This, they claim, discourages poorer districts from increasing their budgets since they must first finance the increases for a full year out of local revenues before they become eligible for added equalization support. The other factor is that equalization support is included in the net current expense budget, thus providing a mechanism to enlarge the base for calculating equalization aid to wealthier districts more rapidly than for poorer districts. For example, wealthier districts receiving high equalization support in 1982 because of a high
Plaintiffs include among their allegations claims that during the base period measured between 1975-76 and 1980-81 further disequalization of property valuation per pupil between the wealthier and poorer districts has taken place which they say is demonstrated by the following chart:
Equalized Property Valuation per Pupil Districts 1975-76 1979-80 Percent Change Camden $ 20,401 $ 23,759 +16% Ocean City 287,260 522,928 +82 East Orange 35,999 35,170 -2 Livingston 88,073 154,681 +76 Irvington 50,813 55,248 +9 Millburn 144,851 252,444 +74 Jersey City 33,661 39,514 +17 Paramus Boro 129,889 233,279 +80
They claim that the following chart of average equalized property valuation per pupil demonstrates that during the base
Average Equalized Property Valuation per Pupil District Wealth Groups* 1975-76 1979 % Growth $ Growth 1 $129,526 $220,541 70% $91,015 2 83,382 136,650 64 53,268 3 72,874 113,321 56 40,447 4 67,802 95,594 41 27,792 5 51,635 78,017 51 26,382 6 38,506 55,420 44 16,914 7 24,488 32,420 32 7,932 State Av. $ 67,021 $102,339 53% $35,318
The increase in disparity, according to plaintiffs, in the net current expense budgets per pupil is even more dramatic, as is shown, they claim, by the following figures:
Net Current Expense Budget Per Pupil % Increase in Disparity 1975-76 1979-80 1976-80 Camden $1266 $1447 Ocean City 1483 2225 _____ _____ Difference 217 778 258.5% East Orange $1420 $1696 Livingston 1550 2355 _____ _____ Difference 130 659 406.9% Irvington $1245 $1592 Millburn 2113 2653 _____ _____ Difference 868 1091 25.7% Jersey City $1396 $1735 Paramus Boro 1966 2899 _____ _____ Difference 570 1164 104.2%
Current expenditure per pupil disparities, plaintiffs allege, increased during the years in question at rates ranging from
Current Expenditure Per Pupil % Increase in Disparity 1975-76 1979-80 1976-80 Camden $1535 $2009 Ocean City 1563 2748 _____ _____ Difference 28 739 2539.3% East Orange $1546 $1996 Livingston 1593 2600 _____ _____ Difference 47 604 1185.1% Irvington $1311 $1862 Millburn 2195 3001 _____ _____ Difference 884 1139 28.9% Jersey City $1492 $2239 Paramus Boro 2050 3219 _____ _____ Difference 558 980 75.6%
In terms of averages the following figures are presented in support of the complaint:
a. Average Net Current Expense Budget/Pupil District Wealth Groups 1975-76 1979-80 Group 1 (highest wealth) $1642 $2349 Group 2 1577 2250 Group 6 1294 1759 Group 7 (lowest wealth) 1272 1686 State Average 1427 1991 Range, Group 1 to Group 7 $ 370 $ 663
b. Average Current Expenditure/Pupil District Wealth Groups 1975-76 1979-80 Group 1 $1752 $2671 Group 2 1689 2531 Group 6 1414 2083 Group 7 1504 2166 State Average 1550 2325 Range, Group 1 to Group 7 $ 248 $ 505 c. Average Current Expenditure/Weighted Pupil District Wealth Groups 1975-76 1979-80 Group 1 $1681 $2529 Group 2 1628 2399 Group 6 1324 1920 Group 7 1372 1924 State Average 1472 2162 Range, Group 1 to Group 7 $ 309 $ 605
Numerous other assertions are contained within the complaint which, plaintiffs maintain, demonstrate the inequality of educational opportunity fostered by the Act. We will not attempt to deal with all of these since those already set forth adequately show the theory and factual basis of plaintiffs’ claim for relief. The argument tendered by plaintiffs is that the inequalities in educational resources available to children in the State of New Jersey have steadily widened because of the unequal distribution of taxable property wealth among the school districts, the Act‘s continued reliance upon local tax revenues to finance the school system and the proclivity of the equalization formula provided in
Responding to plaintiffs’ grievances, defendants note the power of the Commissioner of Education under
In considering the facial validity of the Act, the Supreme Court in Robinson V acknowledged that the Commissioner‘s power over local budgets answered one of the constitutional deficiencies of the earlier statute ruled invalid in Robinson I. Robinson V, 69 N.J. at 458-463. But in so doing, it specifically noted the possible inefficacy of a Commissioner‘s order where a school district lacked the fiscal means for compliance. As to this it held that the mere chance of fiscal inability did not impair the facial constitutionality of the Act, but did so only on the assumption that per pupil tax resources would be more nearly equalized by the equalization formula and the guaranteed valuation per pupil upon which it is in part based. In the words of the Court, although the Act made no provision for the contingency of fiscal inability, this was “not fatal to the facial constitutionality of the Act since State school aid may obviate
Defendants’ contention that plaintiffs may find their remedy in the Commissioner‘s power over local school budgets also misapprehends, as did the trial court‘s decision, the nature of the action which has been brought. It presupposes that the relief sought is the correction of deficiencies in the school districts’ educational facilities, programs and services which may be repaired by increased funding. As we have explained, however, the attack is upon the entire state system of financing public education on the ground that it has produced gross disparities in the financial resources for education. Thus cast, the issue may only be addressed in constitutional terms on the basis of factual and economic issues which lie outside the expertise of the Commissioner. The rule requiring the prior exhaustion of administrative remedies rests on the premise that such remedies are “certainly available, clearly effective and completely adequate to right the wrong complained of.” Baldwin Const. Co. v. Essex County Bd. of Taxation, 24 N.J. Super. 252, 274 (Law Div. 1952), aff‘d 27 N.J. Super. 240 (App.Div. 1953), aff‘d 16 N.J. 329 (1954). The issue to be decided is solely
The order of dismissal is reversed and the matter is remanded to the Chancery Division for plenary hearing.